NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010064-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: June 19, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Monday 19 June 1978 CG NIDC 78/142C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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LATE ITEM
OPEC: Oil Price Deadlock
OPEC oil ministers now meeting in Geneva have failed
so far to reach agreement on oil pricing. Saudi Arabia has
pushed for no change in prices, while other participants have
urged higher prices to offset the lost purchasing power of oil
revenues caused by the fall in the value of the dollar since
the previous price increase in January 1977.
Ministers of other countries have called for either
a direct price increase or for denominating oil in terms of a
group of currencies in order to protect against further de-
clines in the dollar. Saudi Oil Minister Yamani has argued
that the current world oil surplus precludes a price increase.
He foresees a strengthening dollar and consequent recovery in
the purchasing power of oil revenues. 25X1
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 19 June 1978
The NID Cable is for the purpose o informing
BENIN: Cuban and Soviet Interest
PORTUGAL-ANGOLA: Summit Planned
ISRAEL: Gush Emunim Settlements
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Tensi
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BRIEFS:
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BENIN: Cuban and Soviet Interest
Benin has received increased amounts of military
e.1uipment and additional advisers from the Soviet Union and
Cuba over the past year. The country's radical anti-Western
President Kerekou justifies th's support as necessary to pro-
t--ct his country.
//An attempt to overthrow Kerekou early last
year gave e SR and Cuba a pret increase the military
aid they had been providing Benin.Tt-t
Kerekou wants to acquire transport aircraft, and
some Beninese personnel are said to be training on MIG fighter
aircraft in the USSR.
I //Soviet and Cuban motivation for aiding Benin
is not entirely clear. Soviet naval units have made regular
visits to Cotonou, and access to Benin's port and air facili-
ties may be a factor. The Soviets and Cubans may also see Benin
as a stepping stone to expand their influence in West Africa.
In any event, their presence has been welcomed by Kerekou who,
in addition to his desire for military protection, probably
sees Soviet and Cuban interest as a response to his attempts to
impose a Marxist ideology on the country.//
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//Benin's army lacks the training to absorb
quickly all the materiel it has been receiving. In any event,
an attack from its African neighbors--despite Kerekou's ob-
session that a military threat exists--is unlikely.//
Kerekou's perceived need for Communist protection
and his devotion to the principles of Marxism are probably suf-
ficient to sustain Moscow's interest. Kerekou's radical behavior
may be tempered somewhat by his country's continuing heavy de-
pendence on Western economic aid. 25X1
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Angolan President Neto and Portuguese President Eanes
plan to meet this month in Guinea-Bissau to attempt to achieve
a, rapproch3ment between their two countries. Immediate objec-
tives appear limited to discussing technical and economic coop-
eration. Both leaders, however, have expressed interest in ex-
panding Angola's ties with the West, a policy that might lessen
.'ingoZan dependence on the USSR and Cuba. The Portuguese believe
progress toward these goals depends on Neto's ability to over-
eeume opposition at home,and on Portugal's success in eliciting
_zrly Western support.
Discussion and planning for a Portuguese-Angolan sum-
mit began last December, but several factors intervened. Each
side had misgivings about the other's motives in pursuing
closer relations. Scheduling a summit was complicated by Neto's
uncertain health and by the timing of President Eanes' recent
visits to Brazil, Venezuela, and the US. In addition, the Portu-
guese had doubts about holding a meeting before the situation
in southern Zaire had quieted.
I ISome of these obstacles were overcome last month when
e o Ant unes, a noted leftist and Eanes' personal emmissary,
traveled to Angola to explore the prospects for a summit with
Neto and other Angolan leaders. His visit was followed soon by
a flurry of high-level contacts--some mediated by leaders of
other former Portuguese colonies--that culminated last week in
the dispatch of Angola's first ambassador to Portugal.
Eanes' ability to disassociate his current initiative
?-rom go an internal political issues was also important in
producing a favorable climate. He was praised by the Angolan
Foreign Minister for abstaining from general Western condemna-
tion of Cuba's military role in Angola. The Portuguese have
also abandoned their earlier insistence on preconditions for
any formal agreement--reconciliation between Neto and Jonas
Savimbi's rebels and a reduction in Cuban and Soviet influence
in Angola.
Publicity surrounding the summit suggests that the
_:a cs will focus almost exclusively on technical and economic
cooperation, perhaps with some discussion of military aid to
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Angola. Eanes, however, sees formal agreements in these areas--
which could lead to lucrative trade and financial arrangments
as well as to the return of badly needed Portuguese technicians
to Angola--as minimal objectives. He would also like to discuss
the political and military situation in Angola and the prospects
for a Portuguese lead in opening Angola to the West.
The latter objective has intrigued Eanes for some
time an remains the major long-term goal of his Angolan pol-
icy. He recognizes, however, that such an opening will require
both the stabilization of the Angolan military situation and
Western economic aid that far exceeds Portugal's limited ca-
pacity.
ISRAEL: Gush Emunim Settlements
I //Israel's Gush Emunim group has achieved its
controversial goal of winning official approval of 18 estab-
lished Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank in less than
a year despite its meager financial resources and minority po-
liticaZ representation. The group's few thousand members have
capitalized on Israeli public sentiment and demonstrated on
several occasions the ability to mobilize as many as 40,000
Israeli supporters. It is clearly an effective pressure group
that the Israeli Government must contend with as it debates
the future of the West Bank.//
I -4 //The group believes that the West Bank--con-
sisting o the Biblical regions of Judea and Samaria--is an
integral part of Israel. It recently submitted to the government
a master plan for the settlement of 1 million Jews on the West
Bank within 25 years. Some members have been actively promoting
such settlement for more than 10 years, but the group itself
was not founded until 1974; it has close ties to the hawkish
youth wing of the National Religious Party.//
//The first Gush Emunim settlements were "temporar-
y es a ished in 1975 without government authorization. The
group's objective was first to "create facts" and then gain
government approval. Of the present 47 Israeli settlements in
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joccupied West Bank, the group has established 17, compris-
ing more than 2,200 inhabitants. These include two paramilitary
..ettlements that are expected to convert to Gush Emunim set-
i loments An 18th '-ettlerlent, established in 1968 by orthodox
leas, is now dominated by the Gush Emunim group.//
//The government of former Prime Minister Rabin
~it.3r ega ized the Gush Emunim settlements, even though a
>ecember 1975 government statement favored settlements in places
ghat would serve both political and tactical goals. In July 1977,
the new government of Prime Minister Begin legalized the three
settlements already established, although it delayed approving
a Gush Emunim proposal for 12 new ones. The Begin government
has since approved all 18 Gush Emunim settlements.//
government with some apprehension despite Begin's philosophical
sympathy for the group. They feel that the Begin peace plan,
//The members of the Gush Emunim regard the Begin
which they describe as "negotiated withdrawal under American
pressure," can only weaken the Israeli hold on the West Bank.//
//Gush members maintain that their "pure vision"
of renewed dedication to Zionism is needed to ensure that
Israel will endure. The group's immediate objective is to con-
solidate the present 18 settlements and establish two more.
The Gush Emunim undoubtedly will continue to exert pressure on
the Begin government to annex the West Bank as part of Israel.//
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Tension is rising in the Dominican Republic because
the official certification of Antonio Gunman's victory in the
presidential election Zast month is being delayed by legal
ohaLlenres and administrative haggling. President Balaguer is
Likely to meet increasing pressure to speed up the process and
thus to allay growing suspicion that a few top military
cers may somehow intervene to prevent Guzman from taking
office in August.
//Leaders of the military establishment met with
Guzman ear y t is month and publicly pledged
to b
ack his admini-
stration after he agreed to hold his leftist
supp
orters in check
and not to interfere with the armed forces.
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Since the election Balaguer's diehard supporters in
the ru ing party--backed by Nivar--have succeeded in ousting
both the chairman and the secretary of the Central Electoral
Commission and have swamped the commission with legal challenges
that have blocked an official declaration of a winner. In an
apparent effort at intimidation, Nivar's police temporarily
detained the head of the commission's computer center and,
according to the press, have remained at the center to monitor
the final tabulations.
I//For his part, Balaguer has publicly congratulated
Guzman and has received him twice in the national palace. He
has also authorized his apparent successor to visit various
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government departments and has assigned security protection to
Guzman and his running mate. Balaguer has also strongly opposed
a Nivar-backed effort to ram through pro-milit
without the approval of the new administration
J Balaguer is aware of the growing unease caused by the
vote dispute but refuses to intervene. He told the US Ambassador
on Friday that he fully expects to step down in August and
that legal challenges aimed primarily at congressional and
municipal returns would'run their course in accordance with
the constitution. He also expressed complete confidence in his
control of a military organization seriously hampered by fac-
tional rivalries.
Balaguer, however, has not called off Nivar or re-
strained the extremists in the ruling party. This ambiguity has
greatly increased tensions among a population that generally
accepts the unofficial Guzman victory but is becoming increas-
ingly suspicious of behind-the-scenes maneuvering. The majority
of the military and most political forces favor a peaceful
transition and are now almost certain to step up pressure on
Balaguer to resolve the confusion. They especially want him to
rein in Nivar, whose provocative actions could lead to a
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Libya
//The Libyan Central Bank is apparently prepar-
ing to reca all outstanding dinar notes and issue a new cur-
rency. Only formally declared assets up to a certain maximum
limit will likely be eligible for exchange. Individuals who
have been hoarding dinars probably will not declare all their
holdings for fear of being branded antisocial.//
//These actions by the Central Bank would be
consistent with President Qadhafi's call for limitations on
wealth. In recent months, many wealthy individuals have converted
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:heir dinara to other assets or sold them on the flourishing
,..lack market, thus avoiding the impact of the new regulations.
//The attack on an Omani Army convoy by the
Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman on 7 June--
Lwo soldiers were killed and six wounded--was the second rebel
operation in Dhofar Province in a week. Five British civilian
technicians were killed in the other incident. The attacks
were probably meant to mark the 13th anniversary of the or-
ganization last Friday.//
4 A handful of hardcore rebels are still at large in
e o ar mountains, but resupply from neighboring South Ye-
men is difficult. The coming three-month monsoon period could,
however, tie down government forces and make resupply of the
rebels easier.//
South Yemeni leader Salim Rubayi Ali strongly re
T era e his government's support of the rebels last week.
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The nonaligned countries -led by Algeria and Yugo-
s.avia--rare preparing to act jointly on the issue of regulating
international communications at next year's World Administrative
Radio Conference. The conference will attempt to deal compre-
hensivei/, for the first time in 20 years, with the allocation
of radio frequencies. The nonaligned states, which will con-
stitute the majority at the conference, might be able to form
a consens,is on such issues as equal sharing of the spectrum.
In this event, there is little prospect that the conference
could accommodate the legitimate needs of all countries.
I I The nonaligned countries apparently intend to con-
centrate on "the elimination of the information monopoly of
the developed countries." They maintain that the radio fre-
quency spectrum is a limited natural resource belonging to all
countries and are critical of what they see as the "first-
come, first-served" principle that has allowed the developed
countries to dominate broadcasting frequency allocations. The
use by foreign broadcasters of the territory of nonaligned
states to transmit programs directed against liberation move-
ments is also likely to be a significant issue at the confer-
ence.
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