INPUTS FOR SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT PAPER ON PRM-11, PART 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000200010019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 29, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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ICS-77-6237
29 March 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
Director, Office of Performance, Evaluation
and Tmprovement, Intelligence Community Staff
Director, Office of Policy and Planning,
Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Inputs for Sections of the Draft Paper on
PRM-11, Part 2
Forwarded for inclusion in the first composite draft,-are
papers covering the subjects reflected in the attachments
hereto.
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Attachments:
(1) The Intelligence Community Guidance and Planning System
(2) Setting Priorities and Requirements
(3) The National-Tactical Relationship
(4) Compartmentation and Dissemination
(5) Planning and Requirements
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Distribution:
Original - Addressee, w/atts
1 - OPBD, w/atts
1 - OPP Subject, w/atts
1 - OPP Chrono, w/atts
1 - IC Registry, w/atts
DCI/IC/OPP/PPD (29 March 1977)
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29 March 1977
MASTER DRAFT/CROPPER
III.C.2.d. The Intelli ence Community Guidance and Planning System
1. Section 3(d), Executive Order 11905 charges the DCI with
"providing leadership guidance and technical assistance to other
government departments and agencies performing foreign intelligence
activities...." and NSCID No. 1 states that the DCI shall oversee
.such activities and is authorized to plan, direct, conduct and
coordinate them. Inherent in the PRC (CFI} resource management
role of the DCI is the responsibility to prepare a planning basis
for development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
2. Historically DCI substantive and resource management
guidance documents provided to the Community for current operations
and for planning and programming were not issued at times so as to
maximize their utility, were not developed for all areas of primary
concern, nor have they been related to each other in a total systems
context.
3. .Efforts to refine and improve Community guidance and
.planning have culminated in the recent development of a more cohesive
and comprehensive National Foreign Intelligence Community Guidance
and Planning System. Included is a proposal to establish a DCI
Committee to participate in the development, operation and
maintenance of the system. (The coordinated proposal will be
referred to NFIB shortly.) The three major elements of the system
focus on the current, mid-range, and loi;g-range periods:
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a. Components of the current element include a substantive
overview, a priorities and requirements framework, lists
...,
of requirements, Key Intelligence Questions and Goals
and Objectives.
b. Components of the mid-range element include Perspectives
for Planning .and Programming, an intelligence strategy and
a projection of changes in priorities .over the next five
years.
c. The long-range element will be a study which projects-the
world environment and identifies related intelligence
implications out to a 20 year horizon.
4. The refined Gommunity Planning System should be a more
effective mechanism for the DCI in exercising his responsibility
for the coordination and direction of intelligence Community
activities.
a. Expanded guidance for the current time frame is
designed to provide a broader substantive basis
which considers the intelligence needs of all
consumers. Linked with this appreciation is a
revised intelligence requirements categories and
priorities mechanism (DCID No. 1/2) which portrays
current priorities for all geographical areas and
major topics. The priorities will be continuously
updated as world events unfold and emphasis changes..
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The same framework will be used to project changes in
?~? priorities into the mid- and long-range periods.
b. Special attention will be given to including in the
Goals and Objectives document not only the broad
goals and specific objectives of the DCI but also
those of the Intelligence Community as a whole. (An
examination is ongoing as to how Goals and Objectives
will relate to zero-based budgeting.)
c. For the mid-range element of the System, the focus
is on support for the annual preparation of PRC(I) guidance
for the development of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program and Budget. Rounding out the current element
of the Guidance and Planning System should now provide
an improved basis for initiating mid-range planning.
The-new "perspectives" component of the mid-range
element of the System will highlight the anticipated
changes in world conditions-that are likely to have
implications for intelligence. With some understand-
ing of this impact, attention will be given to how.
these changes in intelligence support needed during
the mid-range will require that we alter our strategy
for dealing with that period. By identifying specific
anticipated changes in intelligence priorities occuring
during the mid-range, initial guidance will be available
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on what resource adjustments should be conside-red
??~ during the program period when the budget is
reviewed.
d. For the first time, the Intelligence Community is
endeavoring to capture a long-range view and relate
it to the rest of a guidance and planning system.
Initial efforts are limited to an exploratory study
which has examined what non-intelligence people have
concluded in looking at the future.. From an analysis
of this review, an attempt will be made to identify
implications for the intelligence planning process.
Although it will likely take more than one iteration
of this effort to reach optimum effectiveness, it
does show some promise of providing, in a systematic
way, very useful guidance for resource programming
during-the mid-range period.
5. The refined and improved Community Guidance and Planning
System is currently in the development phase. As it generates
updated guidance for current operations and for planning and
programming, better guidelines will be available for the evaluation
of overall performance and the identification of key areas in which
to focus Community improvement efforts.
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IV.A,B The National-Tactical Relationship .
.., .
1. The national-tactical interface has developed as a matter of
concern to the Intelligence Community as a result of ambiguous language
in E0 11905. In Section 3, the EO notes that the DCI shall have no
responsibility for tactical intelligence but the CFI should provide
guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence.
An NCSID assigns responsibility for tactical intelligence to the SecDef.
The NSCID's, however, assigned the DCI responsibilities as set forth
below:
(1) The DCI-shall supervise the production and dissemination
of national intelligence and shall develop national intelligence
requirements and priorities;
(2) The DCI. shall ensure that planning for the utilization
of the collection and reporting capabilities for intelligence pur-
poses of each of the several departments and agencies avoids unde-
sirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and provides adequate
coverage for national security purposes.
2. Clearly then the DCI must have some responsibility for tactica l
intelligence even if only limited to a review process. The Senate recog-
nizes this fact by deleting the "no responsibility" clause and adding
that the CFI shall "review tactical intelligence programs and initiatives
in the .context of National Foreign Intelligence Programs to assure coor-
dination where warranted and to address the overall balance of resources
devoted to all intelligence activities."
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3. From the perspective of the Intelligence Community,
the national-tactical interface is a byproduct of organization and
not a determinant in the merits of any particular organization. The
national part of the interface exists independent of who controls the
nationa] assets because national intelligence is defined as repre-
sent ing-many broad legitimate interests at the highest policy and
decision making level. Tactical is on the opposite end of the scale
and represents a narrow, limited need of a lower echelon commander.
All organizational options will develop a national.-tactical interface
and generate problems caused by the conflict of interests.
4. From the DCI's perspective there are some interests to protect
in whatever organizational scheme is adopted. Examples were developed
in the national tactical intelligence relationship paper recently
forwarded to the PJFIB for information: The following policy guidance
on the interface has been-suggested as helpful:
(1) In general, the JCI is not the appropriate official to provide
resource recommendations pertaining to intelligence units and activities
that exist for the principal purpose of supporting combat commanders in
wartime, or to evaluate their efficiency and effectiveness for wartime
missions. He can, however, take advantage of force support units for
Intelligence in peacetime consistent with their missions and the mis-
sions of supported forces.
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(2) The DCI will .ensure that national assets are designed and
operated to optimize capabilities to provide support, where needed,
to tactical intelligence users consistent with the primary national
mission purpose.
(3) In the context of national-tactical interface, the DCI
shall concern himself with tactical intelligence to the extent that:
a) tactical intelligence assets can provide significant national
intelligence, b) tactical intelligence requirements interfere or
conflict with national requirements in the tasking of national as-
sets, and c) tactical intelligence requirements impact on resource
allocation in the NFIP.
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IV.A.10 Compartmentation and Dissemination
. .
1. Compartmentation is justified by the need to enforce
limits on access to protect intelligence sources vulnerable to
counter-action. Where it applies to the product of intelligence.
collection programs, or to generalized or inherent source data
needed to evaluate the product, it inevitably operates at cross
purposes to full dissemination. In such cases, it divides the
intelligence data base; inhibits cross-communication between
program managers; invites duplication of effort; and is costly
to administer. Necessary compromises between collectors'
restrictions and users' requirements for access can result in
anomalies--too many .accesses for tight control., but not enough
to satisfy all claimed needs. In the case of the major
compartments, continuing unauthorized disclosures raise questions
about the effectiveness of the systems. The relatively small
amount of damage reasonably attributable to those disclosures
raises questions about the true need for the compartments.
2. No system exists for periodic DCI validation of the
need for and effectiveness of compartments, or for balancing
the need for additional security against the analytical and
management problems resulting from restrictive dissemination
systems. The DCI is tasked with responsibilities in both areas.
The National Security Act gives him a responsibility to
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IV,A.1Q Compartmentation and Dissemination
1. Compartmentation is justified by the need to enforce
limits on access to protect intelligence sources vulnerable to
counter-action. Where it applies to the product of intelligence
collection programs, or to generalized or inherent source data
needed to evaluate the product, it inevitably operates at cross
purposes to full dissemination. In such cases,- it divides the
Intelligence data base; inhibits cross-communication between
program managers; invites duplication of effort; .and is costly
to administer. Necessary compromises between collectors'
restrictions and users' requirements for access can result in
anomalies--too many accesses for tight control., but not enough
to satisfy ail claimed needs. In the case of the major
compartments, continuing unauthorized disclosures raise questions
about the effectiveness of the systems. The relatively small
amount of damage reasonably attributable to those disclosures
raises questions about-the true need for the compartments.
2. No system exists for periodic DCI validation of the
need for and effectiveness of compartments, or for balancing
the need for additional security against the analytical and
management~prablems resulting from restrictive dissemination
systems. The DCI is tasked with responsibilities in both areas.
The National Security Act gives him a responsibility to
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,protect sources and methods*. Executive Order 11905 tasks him to
ensure timeliness, relevancy and quality of intelligence product--
..: .
factors closely affected by dissemination practices.
3. A mare rational system of security and a better balance
between compartmentation and dissemination might be attained by:
(a) .Reforming the classification system and supporting
personnel security programs so as to restore their credibility to
protect secrets, and thereby relieve artificial pressures for
compartmentation.
(b) Reorienting producers to provide. only generalized
descriptions of sensitive sources in their disseminated product--
enough information for the user to weigh the validity of the
product, but not enough to compromise the source.
(c) Giving the ,.DCI full authority to set and change policy
bearing on all Community compartments--he does not have this for
TK, which is tied to diplomatic considerations.
(d) Subjecting compartments to the sunset law concept--i.e.,
making them self-cancelling. after a stated period unless renewed by
the-DCI, based on an IC Staff risk-gain assessment participated in by
both collectors and consumers. This principle also to apply to
proposed new compartments.
*See Item V. A on the role of the DCI as protector of sources and
methods.
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IV.B.1 Planning and Requirements: Do Needs or Capabilities Drive
? '? Requi rements?
1. Intellectually, it has come to be axiomatic throughout the
Intelligence Community that needs must drive programs. And in actual
fact, needs are used as justification in acquiring new or modified cap-
abilities. However, once large investments have been made to develop
new capabilities, there is a natural tendency to improve and perpetuate
those capabilities from an operational efficiency viewpoint which may or
may not continue to be .supported by the continuing requirement for output
from those capabilities.
2. ~A related problem arises when the advances in technology uncover
a new way to increase intelligence capabilities, quite apart from the
paint that these improved capabilities should be exercised only if it
can be demonstrated that they can res-pond to validated priority needs.
3. Of course, the decision to take advantage of these technological
advances is based on a review and confirmation that there are needs for
these new capabilities to satisfy. However, the problem in the Intelli-
gence Community is not with the concept but in developing improved tools
for making the correlation between needs and capabilities. In some
specific areas, this can be done well; but across the board, it is a com-
plex and difficult task. The primary reason for this is that many con-
sumers have an interest in the same intelligence needs and many intelligence
capabilities have the capacity to respond to a wide spectrum of needs.,
Coupled with these basic factors, the timeliness and duration of interest
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with respect to needs are constantly changing in unpredictable ways.
4.= This is the constant dilemma which has-been the driving factor
.behind the emphasis given recently on the development of an improved
guidance and planning system and the evolution of a better and more com-
prehensive requirements and priorities system. Both the planning system
and the setting of priorities are discussed in other sections of this
paper.
5. Priorities and requirements are.-basic considerations in the
guidance and. planning system. in-the current time frame; it is important
to link consumer needs and an appreciation of the world environment to a
priorities mechanism and a full spectrum of substantive intelligence
requirements.. Then by associating specific production and collection
requirements to these substantive requirements, it is possible to. relate
the resources working on these requirements to the initial. needs state-
ments.
6. This improved current baseline can be very useful. in projecting
priorities and requirements into the mid range by first focusing on the
specific changes in needs anticipated during that time period, In this
way, the continuum is recognized and the changes in needs between the
present and the mid range can then be compared with current capabilities
contrasted with proposed adjustments in capabilities for the mid range.
7. The emphasis given recently to improve guidance and planning in
the manner described should contribute to better correlation between
needs and capabilities. Sustained high-level support will be needed to
complete these developmental efforts.
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8. Another problem area that deserves increased attention is the
relat~trnship between the R&D planners and the capabilities=-needs --
equation. The Intelligence Community is just beginning to reap the bene-
fit accruing from the establishment of the .Intelligence R&D Council.
As yet, no consolidated evaluation effort has been undertaken to plot
the composite course of all the intelligence-related R&D projects to
determine whether they are collectively leading to capabilities which
match our continuing needs, overlap unnecessarily, or leave shortfalls
that deserve attention.
9. Another plaguing problem is deciding on how much capability
should be available to support initiative efforts in the production
analysis and collection opportunity areas. These will probably remain
judgmental matters but they are areas that should not be overlooked as
contributions which can be of critical importance. When reviewing re-
source capabilities, care needs to be exercised to preclude jeopardizing
potentials in these areas.
10. Perhaps the most fundamental problem in striking the proper
relationship between needs and capabilities lies in the leadership area.
Without centralized direction and coordination of the development and
determination of programs and rather rigid adherence to a common dis-
cipline, it will not be possible to assure that excessive and misdirected
capabilities have been minimized and that all possible has been done to
develop capabilities designed to respond to critically important chronic
gaps in our ability to respond to priority needs. .
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