NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: June 2, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
Friday 2 June 1978 CG NIDC 78/128C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 2 June 1978.
25X1
25X1 The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ZAIRE: Mixed Attitudes in Shaba
MOROCCO-ZAIRE: Mobutu's Visit
BRIEFS:
Zambia-Angola
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EGYPT-ISRAEL: Sadat's Policies
Egyptian President Sadat, by suggesting in a press
interview on Tuesday that October would be a time of decision
for his peace initiative, is trying to create a sense of urgency
in order to revive the faltering negotiating process. Even so,
Sadat's statement does not appear to be just a tactical ploy,
and he probably does intend to shift policies should no break-
through in negotiations occur. The domestic scene, meanwhile,
remains troubled. Negative reaction to Sadat's domestic politi-
cal crackdown continues, and he has again sought to justify it
to a skepticalEgyptian elite.
A policy shift: by Sadat could-begin as early as mid-
summer. n his interview, Sadat said any Arab summit should be
put off for two months, because his initiative will either gain
momentum or prove to be a failure within that time frame. Sadat
had not previously suggested that the success or failure of his
initiative might be determined that soon.
The implication of Sadat's comment is that--in the
absence of progress--he may be prepared to acknowledge his ef-
fort to secure peace through direct talks with Israel has failed
and new tactics are needed. Syrian President Assad has made such
an acknowledgment the basis for a reconciliation with Sadat.
Visible movements by Sadat toward a reconciliation with Assad
would add to the pressures on Israel and the US to produce move-
ment in the negotiations before October.
I I Egypt's media have contributed to Sadat's psychological
campaign y drawing attention to Sadat's interview with a New
York Times correspondent: last month. In that interview, Sadat
reversed earlier statements and suggested that a new war with
Israel is possible. Two Cairo dailies, in nearly identical edi-
torials that suggest official guidance, referred to the inter-
view as a "genuine warning" to Israel that the October 1973 war
was not necessarily the last.
I Sadat on Sunday lectured Alexandria University faculty
members w o had protested his recent referendum. He held a sim-
ilar meeting with journalists last week.
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Reaction among educated Egyptians to the referendum has
been almost universally negative. Critics argue that neither the
left nor the right presented a real threat to the government,
that much of their criticism was justified and should be expected
in a democratic system, and that Sadat's tactics have unnecessa-
rily hurt his and Egypt's image. The mass of Egyptians, who tend
automatically to support the President, probably do not share
these views.
Initially, the government has applied the new restric-
tions to -leftists in the media. Five prominent writers, including
Nasir's former confidant Mohammed Haykal, have been forbidden
to travel while the government prosecutor investigates charges
that their writings published abroad have "threatened security
of the internal front."
Procedures for dealing with the accused appear complex
and so blatantly political that the heavy criticism is likely to
continue. The prosecutor will apparently submit his case to a
special court of three "popular judges" and three laymen. They
will pass on their judgment to the People's Assembly for a yes
or no vote.
Sadat, under questioning by the faculty members, ad-
mitted that he wished to keep the proceedings out of the regular
criminal system and that the accused journalists had committed
no crime under existing law. The retroactive feature of the
referendum has been sharply criticized by Egypt's bar associa-
tion.
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ZAIRE: Mixed Attitudes in Shaba
Residents of Zaire's Shaba Region have greeted the
recap ure of KoZwezi by foreign troops with mixed feelings. The
European community and the small professional and technical
elite welcomed the foreign intervention as the only way Kolwezi
could have been retaken and the rest of Shaba stabilized. There
is, however, general recognition that Shaba's basic problems
are internal, both political and economic, and that the Mobutu
government--which is extremely unpopular in Shaba--is unlikely
to come to grips with them.
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 Those Zairians native to southern Shaba and villages near Kol-
wezi were apparently more sympathetic to the invaders than were
Zairians from northern Shaba.
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According to the US Consulate in Lubumbashi, most
Zairians in Shaba apparently showed solidarity with the Katangan
invaders at first but were indifferent to their socialist rhe-
toric and were quickly alienated by their uncontrolled brutality.
Antigovernment feelings have been strong for many
years in southern Shaba but a radical Marxist ideology has
never taken hold. Many of the better informed Shabans refuse
to believe that the Congolese Liberation Front is a genuine
socialist force and view it as a group that has made an al-
liance of convenience with Angola and Cuba in exchange for
arms and training. The poorer Zairians are unconcerned about
Cuban involvement or socialism; they own little and have little
at stake. In general, Shabans believe the invading force was
almost entirely composed of dissident Zairians, perhaps largely
of Shaban origin.
I IThe invading force was apparently joined by large
nu ers local unemployed--some of whom seized the oppor-
tunity to loot--as well as by infiltrators who had hidden in
she cities. According to sources of the US Consulate in Lubum-
bashi, perhaps only 50 percent of the occupying force arrived
from outside of Kolwezi. Those who emerged from within Kolwezi
apparently caused most of the violence of the last days.
y
si es, p
wealth for other parts of the country--notably Kinshasa; deci-
sionmaking handled increasingly by the Kinshasa elite; haras-
sment and extortion of Shabans by military and civilian offi-
cials appointed by Kinshasa; neglect of roads, schools, and
health facilities; and discrimination against Shabans in
general and Lunda tribesmen in particular. President Mobutu
is popularly viewed in Shaba as a venal man concerned only
with the well-being of his family and a close group of sup-
porters.
The Shabans have legitimate grievances against the
central government: chronic shortages of food and basic neces-
ment and inflation; exploitation of the region's
't' unem lo
The antagonism between the Zairian military and the
local population in Shaba is longstanding. Even in peaceful
times, the poorly paid soldiers extort what they can from
travelers and mistreat civilians in the poorer urban areas.
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Shabans with economic interests are concerned first
with stability and are therefore favorable to a continued
Western presence. Many, however, resent the foreign troops
because they enable the Mobutu government to cling to power.
Among the Europeans in Shaba there is recognition
of Mobutu's shortcomings, but most are concerned about personal
security for themselves and their families. The Europeans be-
lieve that another attack like the one on Kolwezi is very
likely in the near future and that only a continuing Western
presence can provide adequate security and counter what they
perceive as a Soviet threat to Shaba's wealth.
The Europeans are aware that the masses envy their
comparative wealth and that many Zairians view them as will-
ing collaborators in Kinshasa's exploitation of Shaba. They
believe that they and their families would be the primary
victims of changes brought about b the Katangan rebels.
The cool reception Moroccan King Hassan gave visiting
Zairian President Mobutu is a further indication of his cautious
approach to sending significant Moroccan forces to Zaire. The
Moroccans also appear to have doubts about Mobutu's political
prospects in the absence of significant domestic political re-
forms.
The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Mobutu's talks
with, King Hassan on Monday were difficult. Hassan probably at-
tached conditions--such as internal political reforms and pan-
African participation in any peacekeeping force--to his willing-
ness to send troops to Zaire.
Morocco's perception of the strategic importance of
Zaire remains unchanged, but its willingness to support Mobutu
personally has diminished. During the Zairian President's visit
to Rabat, the government-controlled press avoided any praise of
Mobutu., a marked contrast to a similar visit in mid-1977.
I I Only a small Moroccan military mission has so-far been
sent to Zaire. In addition to a few in Kinshasa, some 30 Moroc-
cans arrived in Lubumbashi on 30 May, presumably to obtain a
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firsthand appraisal of the military situation in Shaba. Hassan
will not make any final decision on military assistance for
Zaire until he receives their appraisal of the situation.
Hassan is sensitive to African criticism of, and the
lack o strong Western support for, Morocco's military role in
Zaire's Shaba Region last year. This time, he clearly wants
Western political support and at least token participation by
other African countries to offset anticipated criticism from
those African states that oppose external efforts to shore up
the Mobutu regime. F7 I
Zambia-Angola
Zambian President Kaunda will meet with Angolan Presi-
dent Neto this weekend, primarily to discuss Namibia. The two
Presidents will firm up arrangements for a meeting of frontline
leaders, possibly as soon.as 10 June, which would focus on Nami-
bia.
Neto may be less willing than Kaunda and Tanzanian
President Nyerere to urge the South-West Africa People's Organi-
zation to return to the negotiating table, a key aim of the West-
ern contact group. Angola is still smarting from the South
African raid on SWAPO bases in southern Angola. South African
forces occasionally have also crossed into Zambia to attack
SWAPO forces based there, and Kaunda would like to see SWAPO
agree to a Namibian settlement.
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