MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HELMS FROM JOHN W. COFFEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R004000050049-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: July 6, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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DD/S 71-2615
6 July 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms
Attached are two copies of the
transcription made from the tape recording of your State
of the Agency talk on 15 June. We would appreciate
instructions as to any desired distribution either here or
overseas.
(signed) John W. Coffey
John W. Coffey
DD/S:JWC:maq (2 Jul 71)
Distribution:
Orig - Adse (by hand) w/atts
1-ER-6,4.d
""I,- DD/S Subject
1 - DD/S Chrono
SECRET
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DIRECTOR'S STATE OF THE AGENCY SPEECH
Good morning.
This is the second so-called State of the Agency talk. A year ago
when I gave the first one I had planned to have a question and answer session
after my prepared remarks but at the last moment I was called to the White
House and the session had to be cancelled. I am pleased to say that thus far
at least I haven't been summoned anywhere today. I look forward to answer -
ing a few questions immediately following these comments.
I'd like to begin by taking a look at the Agency in historical perspective.
During the past several years a number of Agency officers have been engaged
in reviewing the record and writing our history. Their work has underlined
the extent to which things have changed in CIA since the late 1940's and early
50's. In the perspective of historical inquiry the change has been a large
one. Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that in many areas a
quiet revolution has taken place.
Those of us who were around take pride in the way the Agency
performed during the Cold War and particularly during the build-up in the
Pacific at the time of the Korean War. We were saddled with large new
responsibilities when Korea occurred. We had to improvise programs,
hire new people in large numbers, and organize support for assorted jobs
that were suddenly required. We did well, I believe, but there is no doubt
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that it was at the cost of serious disruption to our young overseas'
organization.
When we compare our activities at that time with our work during
the last decade in Southeast Asia, we find that the Agency learned a great
deal from Korea. Again our responsibilities have expanded immensely.
Hundreds of employees have been called upon to accept separation from
their families and to serve under trying and exacting circumstances. The
support elements of the Agency have been tested severely and often. But
this has all occurred smoothly without serious disruption and without the
crises in personnel management and morale that we experienced in the 1950's.
Another improvement, less spectacular but still of great significance,
is the increased professionalism of the Clandestine Service. When I speak
of increased professionalism, I mean a reliable Service, one that can be
expected to handle just about any challenge that occurs in the field. The
kind of operation that ten years ago engaged the anxious attention of all con-
cerned up to the level of the Director is carried off today in an almost
routine fashion. We have come to expect that recommendations made by
a Station Chief or quick decisions made on the spot will stand up in the
light of careful and professional review at headquarters. Complicated
operations involving coordination and teamwork among several Stations
overseas are carried off with the speed and precision that would be the
envy of any ball team in the last stages of a pennant race. Let me assure
you it was not always so,
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I will not talk at length about the advances that have been made by
the Agency in technical intelligence collection; they are well known, at
least in a general way. It is worth saying, however, that many of us fail
to appreciate the human qualities that are critical in all important techno-
logical development. This is not a bloodless world in which a good idea
moves smoothly from the drafting board to the laboratory to production
and then to use. Trial and error, unexplained failures, improvisations,
sleepless nights, and dogged persistence are aspects of the human story
that cannot be told publicly. We are again reminded that people make the
Agency what it is.
Another significant change has occurred in the processing and analysis
of intelligence information. Our work originally was based on concepts that
grew out of the nation's experience in World War II. Some of these concepts
remain valid but others have fallen by the wayside and much has been added.
This is the result of technological change and of changes that have occurred
in the U. S. strategic position. It is also the result of experience and new
ideas.
It would be difficult to exaggerate how much the daily work of the
Agency has been affected by these changes. Fields of research that were
once regarded as central to intelligence have now been dropped or
significantly cut back. Several years ago, for example, we had analysts
working full-time on accumulating and ordering minute pieces of data on
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such things as the rail network in the Soviet Union. In this age of overhead
photography a component like this is no longer necessary. As these
changes have taken place, a whole new breed of intelligence officer has
come into being such as photo interpreters, specialized military analysts,
mathematicians, and highly specialized economists. They have had to fit
in and mesh their expertise with the social scientists, linguists, and area
specialists to make one team.
It is a good team. The papers and briefings it produces have
developed respect all over Washington. This is the way it has to be if we
are going to stay in business.
It should also be noted that the greatly expanded flow of information
from human and technical sources has placed heavy demands on the manage-
ment of analytical departments in the Agency. They have met these
demands well, I believe. In the process there has been greater contact
among Agency Directorates and as time goes on closer cooperation. A
few years ago one could speak of a certain tribalism, both among collectors
and producers. The points of contact between these tribes were often
points of conflict. There was a good deal of oneupsmanship. This is no
longer an important issue. The problems and misunderstandings among
the Directorates of the Agency are not all solved but they are minor com-
pared with those that beset us in its early years. I believe that CIA today
is purposeful and businesslike as never before.
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I would like now to touch on a few important developments of the
past year and then to discuss some of the problems the Agency faces over
the next few years.
During the past year we have greatly expanded the size and scope
of the annual National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet military matters.
The White House requested that we provide a much more extended and
detailed account of the evidence and arguments- on which judgments are
based. They asked that all differences of opinion be set forth at length
with supporting details. They wanted us to explore in depth all the various
options open to the Soviets as they decide on their future military programs.
The preparation of these comprehensive papers requires much larger effort
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and input not only by the Office of National Estimates but by specialists in
our Directorates of Intelligence and Science and Technology. The consumer
appears to be pleased thus far with the results. We have received a letter
from the President commending us for the first of the papers to be issued,
that on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack.
A word should be said on Southeast Asia where the Agency has been
so extensively involved for several years. During the past year and a half
the Saigon Station has turned from a broad and costly commitment in
support of certain overt programs to a concentration on the classical covert
and clandestine operations of the Agency. Such a change places a heavy
burden on Station management. The overt programs in which we had been
involved were not cancelled; they were transferred to the military services.
To do this, while maintaining the effectiveness of the programs, required
careful planning and good teamwork between our people and the military
services.
The orientation of the Station back to classical operations called for
strong leadership and clear-cut directives. It also required a readiness at
all levels to accept change both in work assignments and in the structure of
the Station.
The Station did this, and did it well. In addition it distinguished
itself in an area that is of vital importance to the policy of Vietnamization.
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The record of the Saigon Station had its counterpart here at head-
quarters. Operations officers and analysts have produced reports and
memoranda that have made important contributions to decision-making
in Washington. Our most severe testing ground are those areas that have
important political and policy implications. To have come through well
in handling the Vietnamese account is a satisfying achievement.
In sharing with you my reflections on the Agency's development over
the years, I do not want to give the impression that CIA has somehow made
the grade and that we can now cruise along comfortably. Every component
of the Agency is being tested and it will be each and every day. When we
blow one, it will do little good to trot out our list of past accomplishments.
There's no payoff for being wrong. Also we must recognize that in the
next few years our activity is going to be conditioned by budget restrictions.
As the budget remains tight, we will be expected to get more for every
dollar we spend. The ceiling that has been placed on our budget reflects
the Administration's desire to make money available to meet the internal
needs of the country while at the same time carrying out the essential
commitments that we.have overseas. I believe that the Agency has managed
to do its job despite severe budgetary constraints and substantial personnel
adjustments and reductions. But the matter will require constant attention
and further adjustments in our programs and by our people.
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The present Administration feels that intelligence can be improved
and. overall costs reduced by tightening up the organization of the intelli-
gence community as a whole. Many of you have no doubt noted that the
President has given certain recommendations for changes in structure and
procedure in the intelligence community. I do not feel I should comment
on recommendations while under consideration by the President, but
suffice it to say that I believe CIA can adjust to new requirements if these
are demanded. I have no reason to believe that the President wishes to
clip this Agency's wings in any way.
As we look to the future, we need to give careful thought and planning
to how CIA can best continue to meet the exacting requirements for timely,
reliable intelligence. How, for example, do we adjust to the ever-improving
collection techniques. We will soon be receiving an increasing amount of
our informationi We will have information
display our intelligence assessments and production in more than black and
white print. We will be able to do this using photography, television, and
other exotic means
At the same time the substance of international problems will change.
Over the years we have moved from our-virtually exclusive preoccupation
with Communist powers and the possibility they might attack us or any of
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our allies. We now concentrate on such matters as our role in imple-
menting a possible SALT agreement. the need to maintain a close check
on what the other side is up to, and whether or not an agreement is being
honored~is a crucial one for us.
We have moved, too, from the time when some of our top concerns
centered on the size and capability of foreign armies and the military-
industrial production to support them. We haven't lost our interest in
these topics, but we have developed a host of new ones of similar importance.
We're concerned about the availability, present and future, of scarce and
essential resources -- energy, food, minerals. We're concerned about
population projections and the implications of all this for international
politics. We are watching and studying the economic aspects of newly
grown giants of prosperityl
Future concerns
and priorities will undergo a continuing evolution and we must be prepared
to handle new accounts with fresh expertise.
Before closing I would like to turn to the role of the individual in
CIA, especially the role of the young officer. As I noted earlier, our
country is focusing increasingly on internal problems such as social
justice, minorities, poverty, and ecology. Whole new departments of
Government have been created to wrestle with these issues and large sums
of money are required to deal with them. These problems and the new
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priorities are publicized widely and there is a widespread interest in them.
Much of this is accompanied by the feeling that national security matters,
particularly Defense programs, must get less emphasis or at least less
money so that more attention and resources can be applied to the new
problems.
Fortunately, this changed emphasis has not yet affected our ability
to attract top young people. We are not recruiting as many trainees as
we once did.but I can say that applications far exceed the number of
positions open. And they come to us from the best universities and with
more degrees than ever before. The number of professional employees
leaving the Agency to take up other careers is lower than it has been in
several years. This is encouraging. Indeed it is vital. The information
and advice that the Agency gives to policy-makers will continue to be
absolutely essential to the conduct of American foreign policy,` It may be
trite, but it is true that our national security in the age of rockets, thermo-
nuclear devices, and crisis spots, involves life or death issues. It
requires the best talents of the best men and women we can find.
I recognize, however, as do other senior officers in the Agency
that some of our finest young officers are concerned about the role of the
Agency and about their relationship to it. They ask themselves: how
important is the Agency's work? How does it fit in with other national
priorities? What about my own role? Is it meaningful? I am sure that a
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great deal of this type discussion occurs from desk to desk, over lunch,
among friends, among men and women who have been in training together,
between younger and older officers, and across Directorate lines.
Discussions on matters like these, even that which takes place
within the four walls of the Agency, is more difficult than in any other
Government organization. The kind of work we do requires compartmenta-
tion, the need-to-know principle, and a clear-cut command structure. We
simply cannot conduct our business like universities, businesses, or other
elements of Government. We cannot work in open forum where anyone is
free to come and discuss a subject of his choice.
On the other hand, we know that the Agency needs ways to insure
that good ideas move up and down the command structure, that they get
up to the place in the Agency where they can be acted upon. This has been
the subject of considerable discussion in the senior councils of the Agency.
Each of our Deputy Directors is focusing on it and a number of actions
are being taken although they vary from Directorate to Directorate. We
hope these will be helpful. Meanwhile we expect that young officers with
good ideas will take the initiative to raise them with supervisors or more
senior officers. The Agency has never stood much on ceremony. Bright
young professionals here with reasonable proposals can obtain an audience,
but let us not abuse the privilege.
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In a more formal sense, I believe one of the most promising
approaches to this problem is the Management Advisory Group. This group
known as MAG was established two years ago. It brings together officers
from all components and ranging in age from 30 to 45. We have asked
them to study problems of their choice. We have undertaken to make
available speakers and material as necessary, to receive their recommenda-
tions, and to report back to them on action taken. MAG has already done
studies on several problems. They include a study on the possibility of
an increased role for younger officers, the problem of the Agency's
public image, the problem of promotions of young officers, and a study
which reviewed our Career Trainee Program, MAG is a new group and
it is probably still feeling its way in our bureaucracy. But it is an experi-
ment that is taken seriously by our senior officers. As I said before,
carefully researched and well-presented proposals have always received
a hearing in this Agency and this will continue to be the case.
In concluding my remarks this morning, I want you to know that I
am very proud of the Agency which, of course, means the people in it -
you, We have all made our fair share of mistakes. This, I suppose, is
life. But on the whole we have built well., We have changed as time and
circumstances dictated. On the whole we have measured up to our respon-
sibilities in a way that I think we can look back on with satisfaction and
pride.
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But there isn't much profit these days in looking back. We must
look to the challenges of the future which may well be greater than those
of the past. I am confident that we are well staffed and adequately poised
to meet them.
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, one of the troubling paradoxes of our time is the
discrepancy between. the true self and its image. I know that your speech
to the newspaper editors in April and some very favorable coverage in the
New York Times recently have done a great deal to dispel some of this
discrepancy in the case of the Agency. But do you think there is more that
all of us as individuals and collectively can do to help Americans in public
and private life better understand the true and the overall functions of
intelligence?
MR. HELMS: Yes, I think so. What we have had to deal with, at least as
seen from my vantage point, was a very bad patch starting in 1967 with the
problems on the campuses resulting from our.identification with the National
Student Association. It became quite clear at that time that it didn't make
much difference what you said, nobody was interested in hearing it. The
association with NSA was regarded as a_ dastardly performance. In addi-
tion, there were other peculiar stories being passed around about the
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Agency's activities which really soured our so-called image on the college
campuses .
I sought a great deal of advice -- from newspapermen, from public
relations experts, from advertising people, from pollsters, from pro-
fessors, from anybody I could think of. And the more they helped me
examine the problem, the more manifest it became that the storm and the
wind were blowing too hard and you knew you just weren't going to get a
hearing. The only thing to hope for was that over a period of time the
storm would blow out to sea. There's the satisfying fact that undergraduate
courses in this country only last four years.
But I think that the time has now come where you are dead right.
I think there is more that can be done to put intelligence in a better
perspective in the mind of our compatriots, and we're going to be looking
at this and checking on ways to do this with increasing frequency. In
point of fact, the speech to which you refer was an effort to kick this thing
off and to see if we could get a hearing, and it was clear that we did. I
think by and large the speech was relatively well accepted. We are going
to try and get a quiet program together and to see whether over a period
of weeks and months we cannot do a better job of trying to convince
Americans that they need intelligence, which obviously they do. It is a
little bit like castor oil, you know.
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Jocularity aside, I couldn't be more conscious of your concerns.
It is not so bad for those of us who work in the Agency. It is rougher on
the kids, the cousins, aunts, uncles, and so forth who read these things
in the newspapers and wonder why in the world any lady or gentleman, man
or woman, or anybody else would work in that kind of an organization
doing that kind of thing. I recognize that makes life tough. All of you have
been superior in the way that you've lived through this last four years. It
hasn't been easy from that standpoint.
But I am hoping that we can start to do some things and some of
you may be called on to help out -- to make a small speech here, go back
to the college that you came from and address some honorary society,
something of this kind -- all of which helps in trying to adjust this difference
between the image we have in the country and what we, in fact, are like.
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, we see in the newspapers stories about our
photographic and COMINT intelligence. Is there a general leaking or even
collapse of security within the intelligence community?
MR. HELMS: One might think so. We sent to the White House and to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and
the Director of the Arms Control Agency a memorandum the other day
listing the stories that had appeared in the press since 1 January 1971 and
we pointed out in a low and balanced key the net and cumulative effect of
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this kind of thing. It was a pretty convincing story. I didn't mean to be
flip when you asked me the question. The way in which intelligence infor -
mation has been used in recent months to put water on the wheel of some
program or other, to defend the budget or just to make a point is a
matter of deepest concern to me. It is as though this stuff was free and it
was in the air and there was nothing to it and it could never be lost and it
was here to stay and all the rest of it.
I do not sense that anybody is on a campaign to do this. I do not
find either that these leaks and these problems exist in the intelligence
community as such. They are elsewhere. It is our customers who are
doing this to us. But I am deeply concerned about it because anything that
can be turned on can be turned off. And it may, down the road, have a
very severe effect on our ability to collect the quality of information that
we've been collecting recently. So I share your concern. I do what I
can about it. I will continue to do what I can about it, and I just can only
hope that the situation will get better.
I have no interest in taking sides on the series of articles in the
New York Times on the Pentagon documents. You can all make up your
own minds about this. But I must honestly say that one thing that is very
poor indeed is when a single human being decides that he knows more
about the national interest than. anybody else. And this is what arises in
connection with a lot of these leaks. There's some fellow who just thinks
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that this is the thing that's got to be put out and he's going to see to it.
He knows what the national interest is. It's this kind of behavior that I
think is most reprehensible. I mean, if there had been a decision to put
out these documents, that's one thing; but it was obvious that there was
no decision made to put them out -- they were put out. It might have been
a different kind of document. There might have been things in there
different than there were. There's a great deal of talk about morality
and who's moral and who isn't and so forth, but this morality business
cuts two or three different ways when one examines it. This question of
higher morality, namely what I personally believe to be right, is a very
dubious concept in my opinion.
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, how in your opinion is this Agency affected by
a problem that's common to most large businesses, namely, an unimagina-
tive or inert middle management group?
MR. HELMS: I think this Agency is affected by it, at least to a certain
extent, just.the way all sizable organizations are. It's a strange thing
about human beings, but they tend to have behavior patterns and organiza-
tions consisting of human beings also develop behavior patterns. I think
probably what you refer to is what a few years back I used to refer to as
the "Dead Wood Syndrome." Every time I went before a class or a seminar
or anything in the Agency, I always got one question about what was going
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to be done about the dead wood in the Agency, And I find that it's a
remarkably hard thing to deal with because I've never had anybody walk
in my office and say, "Mr. Helms, I'm dead wood. "
The question is how one identifies this wood and how dead it is.
I would say that everybody is aware of this problem from the most
junior officer in the Agency to the most senior one. There is a tendency
at the middle levels for people to figure that maybe they've got about as
far as they're going to go and therefore they better settle themselves in
for the long haul. It is only natural. But on the other hand, I think you
will agree that over the past few years we have done what could humanly
be done to keep motion in the Agency, to keep things moving. As we have
cut down on the total number of our people, that means individuals have
moved out. There have been a lot of retirements, a great many in the
last couple of months. We have done what we could to try and break down
that peak that seemed to build up in the middle levels and see if we couldn't
stretch it out, keep some promotion movement, and all of these things. But,
you know, there's nothing perfect, and it certainly isn't perfect around here
in that respect, But I think you will concede tliat we have all tried.
May I say, in conclusion on this point, that this is a matter for all
of us. I must say that one attribute that almost every officer in this
Agency has is being able to pass that buck on the tough ones to somebody
else. If you would actually look into your heart and consult your conscience,
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I will bet you that each of you out there on some occasion or other has
failed to face up to one of these personnel situations and has just let it
go by. Oh, what the hell, good old Joe -- let's leave him alone. And
it's that as much as anything which perpetuates this kind of a situation.
So please recognize it's a problem for all of us. Letting George do it is
not the answer.
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, would you say a word about our relationship
with Congress? What I really have in mind is that Congress is more and
more getting into policy-making or attempting to get into the policy-
making business. Should we not make some attempt to make sure they
have the information and intelligence that you have? I realize the security
problems, and so forth. Is there some way that we could have special
briefings or special Congressional papers or something more for Congress
than we had in the last decade. ?
MR. HELMS: I don't think that most of you realize the extent to which
Congress is. kept informed. I appear before a lot of committees in the
course of a year, and I'm usually there for two or three hours at the least.
I get through an awful lot of stuff,
a briefing which
covers a whale of a lot of information in a surprisingly short period of
time. The issue in the Congress these days, particularly in the Senate,
is not lack of information. They've got it all; it's a question of what they
can do with it.
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Take the issue of Laos, for example. They've known every detail
of what was going on in Laos from me personally for five years. Because
.of the groundrules under which the Agency operates with certain com-
mittees of the Congress, they're not supposed to leak this or to use this
in the public domain. Well, when an individual Senator gets to the point
that he thinks it's important that he get something into the public domain
because then he will be connected with the act of getting it into the public
domain, he needs another forum. So the first thing is to say that the
Congress has been diddled and fiddled, and the second thing is to get a
new kind of a hearing, and the third thing then is to get it into the news -
papers.
I really believe that if you examined all of the things that have been
covered just in 1971, for example, before various Congressional committees,
I think you'd believe as I do that we've gone about as far as we should.
And that going any further than this would simply mean that we were giving
a lot of people interesting reading, like the funny papers or whatever you
want, but it wouldn't necessarily affect their ability to do their job. So I
have a clear conscience on this, interestingly enough, and I'd just like you
to know that. I just don't have any hang-ups at all that I have been
squirreling away information that legitimately should be made available to
our policy-makers in Congress.
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What the future holds in the Congress, I don't know. I think that
anybody will agree that it's a very different body in this session than it
has been for some time. You raised the question about getting into policy-
making and so forth. There's no doubt that they're hell-bent to do this.
How much they're going to be able to achieve and how long this will go
on, I have no way of knowing. But while they're in the process, it's not
a very easy group to deal with.
On the other hand, I don't want to leave you with the impression
that the Agency or I personally have been badly treated because that isn't
true. We've been treated with regard and we've been listened to and I'm
not heckled or harried or beat up on or denigrated or anything else. So
I have no complaints about the relationship with the Congress and I
wouldn't want to leave you with any impression that this was a Gethsemane
that I went through every other day because it's not,
QUESTION: This memo that you wrote, Mr. Helms, about the security
leaks over the past year or so, well, has anybody been hung?
MR, HELMS: I know that the memo arrived downtown because I was told
that it had, but other than that there has been a deathly quiet. As far as
anybody being hung is concerned, I haven't heard about that happening
around here for years.
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But let us get back for just a moment to the question of the leaks.
As far as I know, our record in the Agency has been first class. I would
genuinely and warmly bespeak your continued assistance in this matter
because it's important that we not be tagged with security violations of this
kind or with giving stories out to the newspapers or getting involved in
some way which is underhanded or against the law. One of the things
I've discovered about the Agency over the years is that there is no group
of human beings who can take any more credit than our group for their
understanding of what morality and truth and various things in our life
turn out to be. The people in CIA understand morality as very few American
citizens will ever understand it. They know the difference between truth
and fiction. They know where the cut-off lines are and where the fuzzy
fringes are. We need to take a back seat to no one. One of the reasons
I get a little bit pained by all the moralizing in the newspapers is I think
how do some of those fellows have the right to do any moralizing, But I
believe that we do. I would. not like to see us get sloppy or to get involved
in any of these capers around Washington because I can assure you that
because the Agency is the kind it is and because of the impression that it
has left with the American people for better or for worse, we would have
a hell of a time living through it because there's no reason to. We're not
going to get a cent more in our budget by any of these devices. We're not
going to achieve one single thing by doing it. Therefore, if anybody feels
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under any constraints to talk too much to a newspaperman or to a television
broadcaster or an author or somebody, I wish that he'd just come up and
knock on the door of my office and submit his case and see if I couldn't
talk him out of it. I'd like to try. But in the meantime, let's hang
together here because this is one organization that we either hang together
or we're going to hang very separately indeed. I'm not trying to coin
phrases; I'm just trying to cite facts.
QUESTION: Mr. Helms, we have a capability, I think sometimes it's a
curse and sometimes a blessing, for quick reaction. I wonder if you expect
that this will get us into trouble many more times in the future in activity
where we don't rightfully belong, for example as in Southeast Asia.
MR. HELMS: I don't know how one predicts these things. I don't think
in 1960 one would have had any view of our involvement in Southeast Asia
at all. So in 1971 I don't know what the future holds. I think it is less
likely in this decade than it was in the last decade because the events of the
last decade have put some very clear strictures on American policy-
makers and the extent to which they're going to be able to involve the
country in anything overseas.
What is of more concern, I think, than the fact that we might get
involved in something is that the country may back up so far and get so
inward looking in its preoccupations that things happen in the world which
V
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we could have at least guided or assisted and we stood aside and watched
the car go over the cliff. This is not to say that I happen to be one of
those people who thinks we should be the world's policeman or be digging
our fingers into everybody's business or going through the garbage cans
in people's backyards and so forth, But I do think that any rational person
will agree that America by and large in many places in the world has been
a source of good. At least we've certainly tried to help the poor, the
hungry, with health, with foreign aid, with all kinds of things in the years
since World War II, and have asked very, very little in return, if anything
at all. I don't think the American record is one that has to be looked on
with shame. Part of the temper of the times is the rather ridiculous way
in which the American record overseas has been viewed by a lot of citizens
of this country. I can't figure out how they get that way. I don't think they
can possibly have read the history that's even now available about these
things and have arrived at these conclusions.
Be that as it may, I think that there is going to be a lot of inward
turning. It's going to make it more difficult for us to get our job done
because there's going to be less interest in the job. That is not a pessi-
mistic statement. That is simply a question of degree a little bit, not of
kind. I don't want to leave you with the impression that despite my remarks
earlier this morning that we were going to be out of business or something.
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There isn't any question of that. But there is a question of emphasis,
and as I did point out this emphasis is inward looking rather than outward
looking.
In a strange way this is in the American tradition. We have always
been a nation since 1776 that has been preoccupied pretty much with its
own problems. It has been only for a very few years in our history that
we've been heavily involved overseas. So it isn't hard to see how we're
sort of veering back now. What will pull us out of this, if anything will.,
I don't know. But-in this life things do go in trends and sweeps and the
pendulum goes back and forth and the dresses go up and the dresses go
down and so forth. We're going to go through a period here when it looks
to me as though there is going to be less emphasis on the overseas commit-
ment and that in turn, I think, helps to answer your question. There's
probably less for us to get involved in. But let me say that we're not out
of Southeast Asia by a long shot. American troops are going to be out, but
that doesn't mean that we're going to be out. Ithink we've got a long row
to hoe there.
Thank you.
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