WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006300010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2006/1Q106 . CIA-RDP79-00927AO06300010002-2
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret
11 47
9 February 1968
No. 0006/68
C':5's-3/
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(Information as of noon EST, 8 February 1968)
Far East
VIETNAM
The week-long Communist offensive against key popula-
tion centers has tapered off although enemy troops
are still putting up stiff resistance in several
cities. Despite severe losses, the Communists have
sufficient strength to mount further actions through-
out the country. Meanwhile, the Saigon government
now appears to be performing with reasonable effi-
ciency despite some procrastination and internal
bickering.
COMMUNISTS IMPROVE ROADS IN LAOS PANHANDLE 6
The Communists are responding to heavy US air attacks
on truck traffic in the Laos panhandle with a con-
struction program that is adding flexibility to the
system and maintaining a margin of surplus capacity.
KOREAN CONFRONTATION CONTINUES UNRESOLVED 6
The talks between North Korean and US representatives
at Panmunjom appear to have made no progress toward
resolving the Pueblo incident.
PEKING MAKES LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARD STABILIZING PROVINCES 8
The Chinese central authorities, taking slow and un-
certain steps, are making little progress toward sta-
bilizing and institutionalizing leadership in the
provinces.
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MILITARY SETBACKS CREATE TENSION IN LAO ARMY LEADERSHIP
Following recent military setbacks, new signs of ten-
sion have been noted within the army leadership.
Europe
USSR EXPANDS PREMILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM
DOSAAF--the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the
Army, Air Force, and Navy--is expanding its role in
the premilitary training and political indoctrination
of Soviet youth.
CZECH AIRCRAFT SALES FLOURISHING
Prague's most successful item is the L-29 Maya mili-
tary jet trainer, which has been accepted as the
standard basic jet trainer in the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries and has also been purchased by at least four
Free World countries.
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PRAGUE'S FOREIGN POLICY MAY BECOME MORE LIBERAL
Several developments during the past few weeks, in-
cluding a major speech by new party First Secretary
Dubcek, suggest that Prague may be more interested
in improving relations with the West than official
statements would imply.
NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN DENMARK
Denmark's first non-Socialist prime minister in
nearly 15 years has called for belt-tightening on
the home front but'no change in foreign policy.
Middle East, - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
DEVELOPMENTS ' I'N THE' 'TWO YRMENS
The Peoples' Republic of Southern Yemen is adopting
more radical domestic and'foreign policies, while in
Yemen the military stalemate continues.
SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN'$VISIT TO INDIA
Talks were: mainly on bilateral' economic relations
but also covered current international,problems.
CABINET CHANGES IN CEYLON UNLIKELY TO SOLVE'PROBtEMS
Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake has made several
cabinet changes in an apparent attempt to strengthen
his government, but the adjustments are unlikely to
ease the government's pressing economic and political
problems.
Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SEEKS LABOR SUPPORT
The government recently restored the legal status of
two key Peronist unions, and Ongania himself has ap-
pealed to important labor leaders for active support
and collaboration in social welfare and public works
programs.
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ELECTIONEERING IN PANAMA HEATING UP
Charges and countercharges by government candidate
Samudio and National Union candidate Arias are becom-
ing more vicious, both sides are organizing strong-
arm bands, and the government may be planning moves
to strengthen Samudio's candidacy.
MEXICO'S RULING PARTY GEARS FOR HEAVY POLITICKING
In anticipation of gubernatorial elections this year
and the presidential succession in 1970, changes are
likely in the ruling party leadership which will prob-
ably reflect an emphasis on youth and affect the
choice of a presidential candidate for 1970.
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FAR EAST
The momentum of the Communist Tet offensive
in South Vietnam has diminished but there is
strong evidence that a new round is imminent. The
Communists apparently intend to maintain pressure
on urban centers, which in the past were relatively
immune from attack. Many North Vietnamese Army
units were not committed in last week's assaults
and the Communists thus retain the capability to
mount further country-wide attacks, perhaps in
coordination with a major thrust against allied
positions in the Demilitarized Zone area. This
long-expected thrust appears to have started with
the overrunning of the Lang Vei Special Forces
camp on 7 February and the simultaneous bombard-
ment of the Khe Sanh base.
Hanoi and the Liberation Front are portray-
ing last week's attacks as only the first round
of a prolonged and fierce struggle. There is no
evidence that the current offensive is a desperate
attempt to achieve an appearance of strength be-
fore negotiating a settlement on the most favor-
able terms.
Communist forces in Laos are preparing new
attacks on government bases. Recent military
setbacks have generated increased tensions in the
Laotian Army leadership and the loss of additional
bases would have a serious psychological impact on
an already nervous government in Vientiane.
The North Koreans appear intent on prolonging
tensions over the Pueblo affair by dragging out
negotiations at Panmunjom. South Korean dissatis-
faction with the US handling of the Pueblo crisis
has placed severe strains on US relations with
the Seoul government, which is particularly con-
cerned over the implications of private US -
North Korean talks without South Korean partici-
pation. The government has underscored its con-
cern by encouraging demonstrations urging mili-
tary retaliation agai t the North and protesting
the Panmunjom talks. 7
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C 1_ I N A`
V1f NAM
U A\N'GcT R 1
861.E K
ang Vei
N O R T H C H
E .T N A M
Phong Dien
GON
Da.Lat.
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VIETNAM'
11 CO6S
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VIETNAM
The week-long Communist of-
fensive against key population cen-
ters throughout South Vietnam has
tapered off although enemy troops
are still putting up stiff resist-
ance in parts of Hue, Saigon, and
Da Lat. There is strong evidence,
however, that a new round of fight-
ing is in the offing.
Hanoi may hope that an inten-
sive military and political effort
now will bring windfalls in the
next few months. The Communists
may well view their current ef-
forts as part of an all-out attempt
to bring the war to a conclusion
on their terms in 1968. There re-
mains no indication, however, that
they have abandoned their ideas
of a prolonged struggle if present
efforts should fail.
In the Khe Sanh - Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ) area, the Communists
may now be initiating their long-
expected major thrust. On 5 Feb-
ruary, the base came under intense
fire and an unsuccessful ground as-
sault was launched against Marines
manning Hill 861 on the camp's de-
fensive perimeter. This sequence
was repeated on 7 February in con-
junction with the major assault that
overran the nearby Lang Vei Spe-
cial Forces camp. Against Lang Vei,
the Communists for the first time
in South Vietnam used PT-76 amphib-
ious tanks. They were brought in
through Laos.
A prisoner captured earlier
in the Khe Sanh area claimed that
the Communists intended to "lib-
erate" all of northern Quang Tri
Province and would be supported
by artillery, tanks, and aircraft.
It is still too early to predict
how determined an effort the Com-
munists will make to force the al-
lies from this area. They may be
equally prepared to sustain a
costly campaign to pin down allied
forces here while prolonging their
"winter-spring" offensive through-
out the South.
Despite the severe losses--
said to number almost 26,000-- that
the Communists have taken in their
offensive thus far, they continue
to have sufficient strength to
mount further intensive activity
throughout the country. Most of
their casualties were suffered by
Viet Cong local forces, and per-
haps half of the enemy main force--
including a substantial part of
the North Vietnamese units--has
not been significantly committed
in the current round of fighting.
Several towns, including Sai-
gon, have been subjected to re-
peated attacks or are still threat-
ened by enemy concentrations
nearby.
Specific Communist objectives
in the current campaign remain un-
clear. Many lower ranking prison-
ers taken in recent days appear to
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have been told that they were to
seize and hold urban strongpoints
for a few days and that there
would be follow-up attacks by
larger forces; few appear to have
been briefed on routes of with-
drawal. Officers, on the other
hand, are reported to have been
told merely to hold out as long
as possible; not all appear to
have believed that their missions
would be successful.
There is some evidence that
the Communist leadership may have
miscalculated the amount of popu-
lar enthusiasm they would receive,
but it is still questionable that
they seriously expected to hold
any major towns permanently or
to generate a "popular uprising."
Rather, their primary purpose
seems to have been to intimidate
urban areas and to lay the founda-
tion for the eventual collapse of
the Saigon regime. They have
clearly aroused new fears and
shaken confidence in the govern-
ment, but they have also drawn
new resentment upon themselves.
Their ultimate impact--on the
public and on the morale of their
own troops--is likely to depend
on their ability to maintain pres-
sures that will adversely affect
the government's response to and
effectiveness in the situation.
Political Situation
in Saigon
After some initial procras-
tination and despite some continued
Page 4
internal bickering, the Saigon
government has turned its atten-
tion forcefully to alleviating
the massive problems created
among the civilian population
by the Communist offensive.
A joint Vietnamese-US task
force has been established, with
branches in all the provinces,
to oversee the work of providing
food, clothing, and shelter for
the thousands of refugees left
homeless by the Viet Cong attacks.
The task force, under the direc-
tion of Vice President Ky, will
also look to such tasks as clear-
ing major transportation links
to ensure passage of vital sup-
plies. Several of the ministries
have been delegated specific re-
sponsibilities by the task force
and, despite some signs of slow-
ness and lack of coordination,
appear to be performing with rea-
sonable efficiency.
Appeals have been sent to
other countries requesting food,
medicine, clothing, and building
materials to assist in the job
of reconstruction. Various Bud-
dhist organizations have set up
reception centers for refugees,
and labor organizations are con-
tributing their facilities. Large
groups of students are reported
to be volunteering their services.
The government has also re-
ceived the united backing of sev-
eral religious and political
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groups as well as of the Lower
House. The Upper House, how-
ever, is proving to be particu-
larly obstreperous. Many sena-
tors have criticized the govern-
ment, particularly the military
leadership, for not taking suf-
ficient measures to prevent
the Communist attacks, and
their attitudes have resulted
in passage of a somewhat unen-
thusiastic declaration of sen-
ate support for the government.
During a recent session, sev-
eral senators vilified the
military as incompetent and ir-
responsible. Many senators are
reported to be intending to call
for an Upper House investigation
of a number of senior officers.
Prime Minister Loc was ap-
parently the chief offender in
the government's initial failure
to take any steps toward P-asina
the crisis.
he refused to take any
necessary measures, claiming
that civilians could do nothing
until the military had returned
the situation to something ap-
proaching normal. He is be-
coming the target of widespread
criticism, and his inability
to act in a crisis may well
prove to be his undoing.
President Thieu and Vice
President Ky, however, havee
acted forcefully and are showing
a willingness to cooperate with
each other that has been notice-
ably lacking in the past. Thieu,
especially, is exhibiting an un-
characteristic confidence in him-
self and an ability to act deci-
sively. Some observers seem to
see in some of Ky's actions--
such as his initial take-over
during the few hours that Thieu
was out of town and his assump-
tion of the task force chairman-
ship--a move to gain power at
Thieu's expense. There is no
evidence, however, that this is
happening, and Thieu himself has
brushed aside the possibility. 25X1
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COMMUNISTS IMPROVE ROADS IN LAOS PANHANDLE
The Communists are respond-
ing to heavy US air attacks on
truck traffic in the Laos pan-
handle with a construction program
that is adding flexibility to the
system and maintaining a margin of
surplus capacity as insurance
against future needs.
In recent months, at least
five major bypasses and shortcuts
have been added to the already
elaborate road network in the
northern panhandle--between Mu Gia
Pass and Tchepone--through which
all trucks from North Vietnam must
pass. South of Tchepone, a new
road branching off Route 92 has
been more than half completed to
the Khe Sanh area near the western
end of the Demilitarized Zone, and
construction has been resumed on
another road north from Route 9
toward the zone. Farther south,
roads crossing the border are be-
ing extended to link up with South
Vietnamese roads
KOREAN CONFRONTATION CONTINUES UNRESOLVED
The talks between North Ko- legedly have expressed guilt and
rean and US representatives at Pan- "apologized" for the ship's in-
munjom appear to have made no prog- trusion into North Korean waters.
ress toward resolving the confron-
tation over the Pueblo incident.
Pyongyang is clearly intent
on prolonging tensions by dragging
out negotiations. North Korean
propaganda has concentrated on pub-
licizing "confessions" by the
Pueblo's crew. A lengthening
parade of officers and crewmen al-
The South Korean Government's
initial dissatisfaction over US
handling of the Pueblo incident
soon broadened, with official en-
couragement, into widespread pub-
lic resentment. The South Koreans
feared the Panmunjom talks were
ignoring the raid on Seoul and
were pushing South Korean national
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interests into the background. The
press complained that the Panmun-
jom talks undermined South Korean
sovereignty and elevated the sta-
tus of the North Korean regime.
Some politicians urged diplomatic
pressure to stop the "secret"
talks and demanded unilateral re-
taliatory action against the Com-
munist North. The National As-
sembly unanimously passed a reso-
lution protesting US - North Ko-
rean talks without South Korean
participation.
fully informed on the talks and
that the assassination attempt
against him had been discussed at
one meeting. The next day while
speaking to the National Assembly,
the foreign minister conceded that
discussion of the Pueblo crewmen's
release might be given priority
"from a humanitarian point of
view." This change in official
position has been reflected in the
shift of the Seoul press to a more
moderate stance.
Students have demonstrated at
the US Embassy in Seoul, in Pusan,
and near the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ). Prior official hints that
public agitation might lead to
demonstrations suggest the govern-
ment probably approved.
The South Korean leaders, how-
ever, realize the dangers to their
own position if popular emotions
get out of hand. They may also
now believe that the lack of prog-
ress at Panmunjom reduces the pos-
sibility the US might make com-
promises that would undercut Seoul.
Thus, after officially protesting
on 5 February, the government moved
to damp down public indignation.
A high-level spokesman assured
press representatives on 6 February
that President Pak has in fact been
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Soviet propaganda is playing
the Pueblo incident in low key and
Soviet officials have for the most
part been maintaining that the Pueblo
intruded into territorial waters.
Moscow continues to emphasize that
direct US - North Korean meetings
offer the best chance for resolving
the issue. The most authoritative
public statement on the crisis,
a Pravda "Observer" article on
4 February, concluded by advising
the US that if it really desired
a solution it should respect North
Korea's sovereignty and stop
"threatening" the Koreans.
Since China's official state-
ment of support on 28 January,
Peking propaganda has given only
sparse and low-level coverage to
the Pueblo incident.
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PEKING MAKES LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARD STABILIZING PROVINCES
The Chinese central author-
ities, taking slow and uncertain
steps, are making little progress
toward stabilizing and institu-
tionalizing leadership in the prov-
inces.
Peking announced on 6 Feb-
ruary that a Revolutionary Com-
mittee--the new form of provincial
government that has emerged from
the Cultural Revolution--was set
up in Hupeh Province on 5 Feb-
ruary. Earlier in the week, a
Revolutionary Committee was es-
tablished in Hopeh Province. Rev-
olutionary Committees have now
been established in 11 provinces
and in three autonomous cities
out of the 29 such entities in
China.
The establishment of these
revolutionary governments in the
provinces, however, is clearly
behind schedule. Last autumn,
Mao and other top officials de-
manded that "revolutionization"
of provinces be completed by the
end of the year or by 31 January
at the latest. Since October,
however, only seven provincial-
level Revolutionary Committees
have been set up, mostly in rela-
tively stable areas heavily dom-
inated by military officials.
The slow progress in this
field may have delayed plans to
hold the long-postponed ninth
party congress this year.
Page 8
rionai party congress would not
be held for at least another 18
months because it would take
that long to make "realistic"
preparations.
The provincial leaders named
to govern Hopeh and Hupeh repre-
sent a change in the pattern of
appointments thus far established.
For the first time, men previously
deposed by the Cultural Revolution
have been restored to important
offices. The Revolutionary Com-
mittee in Hopeh is headed by two
former party secretaries who were
harshly criticized by Red Guards
more than a year ago and were dis-
missed from their posts. In Hupeh,
the new officials are military lead-
ers who were assigned to govern
the area last July together with
a "rehabilitated" former provin-
cial party first secretary. The
restoration of party officials to
positions of some authority in both
provinces represents a setback for
the militant elements who engi-
neered their dismissal and may
well lead to new agitation in the
two provinces.
In fact, confusion and vi-
olence have been growing rapidly
in provinces where Revolutionary
Committees or "preparatory groups"
charged with setting up these com-
mittees have been formed. In Jan-
uary, provincial authorities in
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nine such provinces broadcast
strong attacks on "factional"
leaders who were instigating
clashes and allegedly trying to
bring down the new authorities.
The broadcasts indicate that
militant Red Guards, squeezed
out in the process of adminis-
trative rebuilding, have been
harshly criticizing the new
authorities. They have fre-
quently clashed with more mod-
erate elements supporting the
new leaders, and the scale of
violence appears to be growing.
Nevertheless, the militant
Red Guards in the provinces con-
tinue to operate with impunity
under a general protective um-
brella that gives them license
to arm and recruit followers
and to circulate propaganda
against the provincial author-
ities. Peking's unwillingness
to authorize an across-the-
board crackdown encourages the
militants and further exacer-
bates the factional splits in
the provinces. At the same
time, the continuing troubles
in the outlying areas almost
certainly tend to deepen divi-
sions among the Peking leader-
ship on the question of how to
deal with the problem.
This mutually reinforcing
factionalism now appears to be
reflected at all levels and in
virtually all areas of China, in-
cluding the army, which remains
the ultimate authority in nearly
all provinces. The tacit protec-
tion of the Red Guards in'the prov-
inces strongly suggests that they
still have powerful protectors in
Peking, despite the attempts to
re-establish and legitimize ad-
ministrative authority in the hin-
terland. Furthermore, it seems
unlikely that the authority of the
Revolutionary Committees can be
firmly established while the mili-
tant Red Guards remain free to
criticize and a emnt to undermine
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MILITARY SETBACKS CREATE TENSION IN LAO ARMY LEADERSHIP
There are new signs of ten-
sion within the army leadership,
following recent military set-
backs.
General Phasouk Somly, com-
mander of a key southern military
region and one of the few capa-
ble Lao military leaders, sub-
mitted his resignation to the
King on 27 January. Although
there was no prior warning that
Phasouk contemplated quitting,
he has long chafed over what he
regards as lack of adequate ma-
terial support from Vientiane
and excessive interference by
the higher echelon there.
Phasouk has said that his
relations with the general staff
have become more strained as his
political power in the south has
grown, and that Vientiane's hos-
tility reflects its continuing
fear of southern regionalism.
Phasouk probably intends
his resignation as a device to
draw attention to his grievances
and does not actually wish to
relinquish his command. He may
calculate that Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma will attempt to
persuade him to withdraw his
resignation.
Nonetheless, Phasouk's res-
tiveness is only the latest and
most explicit expression of the
backbiting that has gripped the
Lao armed forces in the wake of
recent military setbacks.F -
there appear o be
new grumblings among the younger
officers, who have long been
disenchanted with the general
staff, and who-had sent a peti-
tion to Prime Minister Souvanna
calling for a larger voice in
military affairs.
Souvanna himself has ap-
parently been the target of
criticism, although so far this
appears to be muted. He has
scheduled a number of briefings
for the national assembly in
an apparent attempt to allay
the fears of civilian politi-
cians and to counter long-stand-
ing complaints that he is in-
sufficiently responsive to
them. The current uneasiness
in Vientiane, however, raises
the possibility that another
military setback, such as the
loss of the southern provincial
capital of Saravane, would
have political repercussions
far beyond the town's strategic
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EUROPE
Political developments in several Eastern
European countries were the focus of attention
this week.
25X1
Dubcek,
e new party boss, is said to be especially con-
cerned about placing the right people in the posts
responsible for the economy, trade, internal secu-
rity, and foreign affairs.
In contrast to the changes in Czechoslovakia,
the East Germans seem to be working hard to stand
still. A draft of a new constitution, published
on 2 February, appears mainly intended to codify
changes that have already taken place; there are
no significant changes in the draft which affect
the status of Berlin. The question remains as to
why the East Germans went through this exercise.
Rumanian spokesmen in Geneva on 6 February
raised strong objections to the joint US-USSR draft
of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, charging
that it "profoundly discriminates" against the
nonnuclear powers. The Rumanian position contrasts
sharply with the approval Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
and Poland have given the treaty draft.
In Western Europe, the coalition of Belgian
Prime Minister Paul Vanden Boeynants fell on
7 February because of a deep cleavage within the
government over the handling of the latest outbreak
in the ancient rivalry between the Flemish and
French communities. King Baudouin began consult-
ing with political leaders on the formation of a
new government. With communal tensions high, the
consultations are likely to be ifficult and lengthy.
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USSR EXPANDS PREMILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM
DOSAAF--The Voluntary Soci-
ety for Cooperation with the
Army, Air Force, and Navy--is ex-
panding its role in the premili-
tary training and political in-
doctrination of Soviet youth.
For many years, this para-
military organization has given
Soviet youths an opportunity to
participate on a quasi-voluntary
basis in military-oriented sports
activities and technical training
programs designed to prepare
them for military service. The
activities traditionally spon-
sored by DOSAAF have included
instruction in small-arms marks-
manship, communications and elec-
tronics, motor-vehicle driving
and maintenance, scuba-diving,
boating, and skiing. Where
equipment is available, it has
also offered courses in parachute
jumping and in helicopter, air-
plane, and glider piloting.
The new military service
law that went into effect on 1
January made premilitary train-
ing compulsory for all Soviet
males under the age of 18. This
training is intended to help off-
set the effects of the currefzt
reduction in the length of serv-
ice of conscripts from three
years to two.
Under provisions of the new
law, basic military training is
to be included in the curriculum
of secondary general education
schools, and DOSAAF is required
to assist the schools in imple-
menting the new program. In ad-
dition, DOSAAF and selected tech-
nical trade schools in the USSR
are to give some young men pre-
induction training in military
specialties such as electronics
and communications. Furthermore,
DOSAAF together with the Komsomol
youth organization and Soviet
trade unions are to set up and
operate camps where paramilitary
training will be given in the
summertime.
In addition to its premili-
tary training activities, DOSAAF
has been assigned responsibility
for an intensive "military-patri-
otic education" program to help
combat juvenile delinquency and
political indifference. To carry
out this mission, the society
last year announced steps to ex-
pand the network of facilities
that provide its traditional pro-
gram of military-oriented sports
and vocational training.
Public civil defense train-
ing ceased to be a DOSAAF respon-
sibility a year ago, presumably
to allow the society to concen-
trate on its other activities.
The current compulsory civil de-
fense training program, initiated
in January 1967, transferred re-
sponsibility for the civil defense
effort to local civil defense
staffs and to heads of enterprises,
farms, and institutions. DOSAAF
still p ro a anda support,
however
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CZECH AIRCRAFT SALES FLOURISHING
The Czechoslovaks are build-
ing a substantial export business
in domestically produced air-
craft. The L-29 Maya military
jet trainer is their most suc-
cessful item. It has been ac-
cepted as the standard basic jet
trainer in the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries and has also been purchased
by at least four free world coun-
tries.
L-29 MAYA basic military jet trainer
Since 1962, Czechoslovakia
has exported over 2,000 L-29s,
including some 150 to countries
outside the Warsaw Pact. In ad-
dition, the Czechoslovaks also
export the Z-37 light utility
aircraft and the Z-526 sports
aircraft. The sale of these
aircraft has enabled Prague to
maintain its large aviation re-
search and development program.
The versatile L-29 can be
easily converted to meet the
needs of its diverse buyers.
Nigeria and Uganda received de-
liveries of L-29s in 1967. The
Nigerians have used the L-29 as a
ground support aircraft in com-
bat missions against Biafra. The
Ugandans thus far appear to be
using theirs as basic trainers.
The ability to tailor the
aircraft to a number of military
roles and its attractive price--
about $150,000 each--assures
Prague of continuing sales. The
chief of air force operations
for Syria recently visited Prague
and may have purchased additional
L-29s to go with the 40 that
were bought in 1963 and 1965.
Indonesia also has rerived about
If; T-29 trainers.
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PRAGUE'S FOREIGN POLICY MAY BECOME MORE LIBERAL
Several developments during
the past few weeks suggest that
Czechoslovak policy toward the
West may be more forthcoming than
official statements would imply.
On 1 February, new party
First Secretary Dubcek delivered
a major speech, the first of his
that the regime has published.
Dubcek reaffirmed Czechoslovakia's
firm alliance with the USSR and
made pro forma references to soli-
darity with other Communist states
and nonruling parties. His tone,
however, and his carefully phrased
references to Czechoslovakia's
relations with the rest of the
world suggest, as have a number
of sources, that Prague will ex-
ercise the latitude in foreign
policy it has long had but never
used.
Dubcek lumped "imperialist
encroachments" in Vietnam, the
Middle East, and Korea into one
sentence, and refrained from di-
rectly attacking the US. His
handling of this subject sug-
gested he was speaking for the
Communist record and buttressed
the impression given by Czecho-
slovak officials in recent weeks
that in small ways--a civil air
agreement, literary and other
formerly taboo exchanges--Prague
may want to improve relations
with Washington.
Moreover, since Dubcek took
office, Czechoslovakia has taken
the heat out of its formerly pas-
sionate embrace of the Arabs'
cause and seems to have toned
down its propaganda about Israel,
dropping references to aggression
and shifting to support of a
"just peace."
Dubcek's speech probably will
dash the hopes of West Germany
for an early transformation of
its newly established trade mis-
sion in Prague into an embassy.
He attacked the "rebirth of neo-
nazism" in the Federal Republic,
and rebuked Bonn both for "revanch-
ist demands on its neighbors" and
its alleged aim of liquidating
East Germany. Although Dubcek
reaffirmed that Czechoslovakia
"stands unshakably" on the side
of the East Germans, he said
nothing to foreclose closer eco-
nomic relations with Bonn. In-
deed, Czechoslovakia has recently
entered into a consortium with
West German and French firms to
build large steel mills in Vene-
zuela.
Prague has been renegotiating
its civil air agreement with
Canada, and wants to extend its
routes to Latin America. The
Czechoslovaks have also asked
Canada for a reciprocal exchange
of information on the training
of diplomats, suggesting it may
upgrade the caliber of its for-
eign officials.
Even though Prague is main-
taining a correct Communist
image, Czechoslovakia's neighbors
are for the most part treating
the new regime with reserve.
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Only Yugoslavia and Hungary among
the Eastern European states have
reported on the economic and po-
litical changes pending or under
way. The USSR's cautious atti-
tude toward Czechoslovak develop-
ments has not changed appreciably
since Dubcek visited Moscow in
late January. Such treatment a
month after the Czech change of
command suggests more-than-nor-
mal caution and fear that re-
formist trends in Prague will re-
inforce pressures for changes
F7r7~ in V.A=4-4~-rn P.11-r
NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER IN DENMARK
Denmark's first non-Social-
ist government in almost 15 years
came into power this week. Its
program, as spelled out to par-
liament by Prime Minister Hilmar
Baunsgaard, hews closely to the
foreign policy line of the former
Social Democratic government,
but calls for a reduction in do-
mestic spending.
The new government is a
center-right coalition of Bauns-
gaard's Radical Liberals, the
agrarian Moderate Liberals, and
the Conservatives. The Radical
Liberals are conservative on do-
mestic issues and tend toward
pacifism. They hold the balance
of power in parliament between
the two major non-Socialist
parties and the Social Democrats,
who remain the largest single
party in parliament.
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Baunsgaard has indicated the
government will propose a budget
cut of about 2.3 percent, or
$81 million. The coalition par-
ties have agreed to reduce de-
fense spending by some 6 percent
and are contemplating reducing
military conscripts' length of
service from 14 to eight months.
An immediate issue facing
the government concerns Greenland
and US treaty rights there. Since
the B-52 crash near Thule, con-
siderable public sentiment has
developed in favor of explicitly
prohibiting landings or over-
flights of the island by nuclear-
armed aircraft. In response to
this pressure, the government
has said that it will seek as-
surances that the US accepts
Denmark's policy of not allowing
nuclear weapons on its territory
and banning overflights of air-
craft armed with such weapons.
Baunsgaard has sought to
put to rest speculation about
his government's attitude toward
NATO by declaring that membership
in it remains the basis of Den-
mark's foreign policy. Before
the election, the Radical Liberals
had advocated giving the electo-
rate an opportunity to express
its wishes--either in an election
or by a referendum--on the ques-
tion of Denmark's membership in
NATO after 1969.
The success in reaching
agreement among the three parties
on domestic and foreign policies
is due in no small part to
Baunsgaard's skill as a poli-
tician. He may, however, be
hard pressed to keep his own
party in line on some of the
more contentious issues facing
the government. The Radical
Liberals in parliament are
deeply divided an nt to
party discipline.
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
Exploratory efforts to find more promising
paths toward settlement of several of the area's
major problems appear to be getting nowhere.
Jordan has become pessimistic about the
prospects of the UN-sponsored Jarring mission.
The Jordanians are particularly distressed that
the slow pace of the mediation attempt is allow-
ing Israel to become more firmly entrenched in
the occupied areas. Cairo and Beirut have ex-
pressed similar dissatisfaction. If Jarring is
unable to make progress, the Arabs ultimately
may seek a fresh UN resolution.
The Nigerian federal military offensive has
maintained its momentum, and on 2 February the
large powerplant southwest of Enugu was seized
intact. Lagos' recently acquired IL-28 jet bomb-
ers have already raided Port Harcourt at least
once in an effort to knock out the airfield there.
Renewed efforts to get peace talks under way are
being made by the Commonwealth Secretariat, but
these fruitful at this
time. F7~ I
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TWO YEMENS
The Peoples' Republic of
Southern Yemen is adopting more
radical domestic and foreign pol-
icies, while in Yemen the military
stalemate continues.
it will almost certainly accept
any aid that the USSR might offer.
Southern Yemen's Defense
Minister Baidh arrived in Moscow
on 2 February in search of for-
eign aid. Before his departure,
Aden radio quoted him as saying
that Southern Yemen's British-
trained army had been equipped
by imperialism and that it was not
possible to have an army whose
arms and ammunition were in "en-
emy" hands. The Ministry of In-
formation later denied the state-
ment, but admitted that Baidh
would be particularly interested
in military assistance.
Such overtures to Moscow
will reduce the likelihood of a
continuation of Britain's $29-mil-
lion subsidy, due to lapse next
May. At the same time, the South-
ern Yemeni Government has ex-
pressed little interest in low-key
US offers of nonfinancial assist-
ance. The government continues
to insist that it is "neutral" in
its international alignment, but
The military stalemate con-
tinues. Sana is still surrrounded
and being shelled by the royalists,
and all of the roads leading into
the city are cut. The royalists
admit that their activities are
hampered by republican air attacks
and that their supplies of heavy
ammunition are growing short,
while planes still landing in Sana
keen
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ARABIAN PENINSULA
0;
0
1
YEMEN
t SOUTHERN
*Sana
I Hudaydah-' / YEMEN
t bx~J
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ARABIAN SEA
100irr~rr200
MILES
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SOVIET PREMIER KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO INDIA
Soviet-Indian exchanges dur-
ing Premier Kosygin's visit from
25 to 31 January covered both bi-
lateral economic relations and
current international problems.
India's industry, which
has been in a recession for the
last two years, was a major topic
of discussion. The Indian Gov-
ernment's investment programs
have not proceeded as planned.
Moreover, the Soviet-aided pub-
lic sector has performed poorly
and become the subject of much
domestic criticism. Many plants,
including those getting Soviet
supplies, are operating at as
much as 30-percent below capacity
because of slack demand.
To help spur production, the
Russians offered to purchase all
the surplus rails and railroad
cars the Indians could produce
in the next five years. A guar-
anteed export market for these
products would stimulate demand
in other industries but the net
effect on the Indian economy
would probably be slight.
The Russians also offered
to take all the jute and leather
products India wanted to export,
but the Indians made no commit-
ments. These products are market-
able in the West and are major
foreign exchange earners.
The Soviets undoubtedly
hoped to get Indian endorsement
of the US-Soviet draft treaty on
nuclear nonproliferation, but
the final communique contained
only a general statement approv-
ing the principle of nonprolifer-
ation. On Vietnam, the communi-
que called only for a halt to
the bombing of the North.
The communique probably also
covered over some differences be-
tween the Soviet and Indian po-
sitions on the International Con-
trol Commission in Cambodia. The
Soviets do not want to see its
functions enhanced, but the Indi-
ans may be willing to go along
with a small increa -
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CABINET CHANGES IN CEYLON UNLIKELY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
Prime Minister Dudley Sena-
nayake has made several cabinet
changes in an apparent attempt
to strengthen both the govern-
ment and his United National
Party (UNP). The adjustments,
however, are unlikely to ease
the government's pressing eco-
nomic and political problems.
The changes bring two new
men into the cabinet, ease out
one minister, and involve a minor
reshuffling of some responsibili-
ties. One of the new ministers
was once a member of former prime
minister Bandaranaike's leftist
Sri Lanka Freedom Party and
served as speaker of the lower
house of parliament during her
administration. His appointment
may, in part, be intended to
broaden the UNP's appeal among
political centrists.
Another shift moved M.D.H.
Jayawardena--the UNP's general
secretary--from the Health Minis-
try to the less taxing new
job of minister of housing and
scientific research. Although
this move was intended to allow
him more time for party work,
the minister was miffed by what
he regarded as a downgrading,
and this may aggravate frictions
within the party.
The cabinet changes may
slightly improve the government's
popular image, but the regime is
still plagued by serious economic
problems that have strong politi-
cal overtones--consumer scarci-,
ties, a rising cost of living,
and high unemployment. A 20-
percent devaluation of the Ceylon
rupee in late November has failed
to alleviate these pressing prob-
lems. Meanwhile, rising prices
resulting from the devaluation
have provided the leftist opposi-
tion with an exploitable issue,
which has found expression in in-
creased labor unrest. Although
the opposition recently failed
in an attempt to organize a gen-
eral strike, leftist unions suc-
ceeded in tying up a substantial
part of the economy for about a
month.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Intensive, but thus far unsuccessful, diplo-
matic maneuvering is under way in an effort to
break the two-month-old deadlock over the election
of a new secretary general of the organization of
American States (OAS). The OAS Council is sched-
uled to hold its fifth ballot on 12 February, but
at this point it appears that it, too, will be
inconclusive.
Except for Venezuela and Ecuador, which con-
tinue to back their own candidates, many countries
seem willing to seek a compromise. The Central
American foreign ministers met on 8 February to
consider how they could salvage something out of
the confused situation. Panama has suggested that
it will withdraw its candidate if the other two
also quit in favor of a mutually acceptable nomi-
nee.
In Latin American Communist affairs, initial
reactions among pro-Soviet parties to the Cuban
party's purge of a few old-line Communists have
Anibal Escalante, leader of the purged group,
has been sentenced to 15 years in prison and 34
others to lesser terms. All formally confessed
their guilt and supported Castro's methods of
bringing true "national liberation" to Latin Amer-
ica. The two central committee members involved
with Escalante were ousted from the committee and
one was stripped of his party label; neither,
however, was jailed.
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ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SEEKS LABOR SUPPORT
President Ongania is trying
to improve his relationship with
labor leaders in order to win
support for his government's eco-
nomic policies. Recently, the
government restored the legal
status of two key Peronist un-
ions, and Ongania himself ap-
pealed to important labor lead-
ers for active support and col-
laboration in social welfare and
public works programs.
The two restored unions are
the metalworkers, headed by mod-
erate Peronist Augusto Vandor,
and the textile workers, led by
hard-line Peronist Andres Framini.
Both unions lost their legal
status last year when they par-
ticipated in the "Action Plan,"
an abortive attempt to unify
labor opposition to government
economic reform through a series
of strikes and demonstrations.
Despite the loss of his
union's status, Vandor continued
his dialogue with the adminis-
tration in an attempt to achieve
a closer relationship between
the General Confederation of Labor
(CGT) and the government. In
his negotiations with the regime,
Vandor apparently also spoke for
Framini who in the past has been
outspokenly antigovernment. if
Framini has now decided to throw
in with Vandor, it could mean
that the moderates will be able
to sell their line of cooperation
with the government throughout
much of organized labor.
More recently, the govern-
ment decreed that labor unions
must comply with the law regulat-
ing union conduct within 60 days
or lose their legal status. On-
gania had stated previously that
the labor unions did not repre-
sent the legitimate interests of
the workers, because recent union
elections had not been carried out
strictly in accordance with the
law. In response to the decree,
Augusto Vandor stated that the
national congress of the CGT,
which was to have met next month,
will be postponed until July to
give the unions time to revise
statutes and elective processes.
Despite the government's im-
pressive gains in reforming the
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Argentine economy, Ongania has
been plagued with increased oppo-
sition from top military officials
as well as labor leaders. This
dissatisfaction stems from the
continuing rise in the cost of
living and from the government's
restrictions on wage increases.
There is no indication at pres-
ent, however, that either organ-
ized labor or any influential
group of active military officers
is a threat to the government.
Labor and other groups in opposi-
tion remain in a state of disor-
ganization and apathy
Page 29
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ELECTIONEERING IN PANAMA HEATING UP
Panama's presidential cam-
paign could degenerate into vio-
lence as charges and counter-
charges exchanged by government
candidate Samudio and National
Union (NU) candidate Arias become
more vicious. Participants in
several political rallies have
already come close to violence,
and both sides are organizing
strong-arm bands for use during
the campaign and at the polls on
12 May.
The government may be plan-
ning further moves to strengthen
Samudio's candidacy. A dispute
over alleged irregularities in
issuing voter identification
cards has raised the possibility
that President Robles may make
changes in the three-member elec-
toral tribunal that would reverse
the present pro-Arias two-to-one
majority. Two of the tribunal
judges have sons running for leg-
islative posts on the Arias
ticket and have demonstrated a
partiality toward the NU that
has opened them to charges of
illegal behavior. A change in
this key body could lead to
changes in provincial and district
election boards, now heavily
weighted in favor of Arias.
Recent wholesale firings
and cabinet changes have assured
the Samudio forces of control
over the government machinery.
In addition, National Guard Com-
mandant Vallarino is under pres-
sure to work for the Samudio
ticket. He has thus far remained
neutral, but both sides are court-
ing his support. Vallarino is
in a difficult position, but re-
fusal to side with the government
candidate could result in his
removal by President Robles. In
addition, many guard officers see
little future for themselves un-
der an Arias administration.
Arias' chances of getting a
fair election will depend in
large part on Vallarino. If
Samudio succeeds in dominating
the election machinery and gain-
ing Vallarino's support, Arias'
backers probably will initiate
disturbances protesting govern-
ment rigging of the el P!`i-i n-
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MEXICO'S RULING PARTY GEARS FOR HEAVY POLITICKING
A general overhaul of Mex-
ico's ruling party appears to be
shaping up in anticipation of
gubernatorial elections late this
year and the choice of a succes-
sor to President Diaz Ordaz in
1970.
Changes in the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) leader-
ship have been expected following
the extraordinary electoral set-
backs last year in the capitals
of the outlying states of Sonora
and Yucatan, two focal points of
resent t against the PRI ma-
With governorships
opening this year in 12 states,
including several that have been
the scenes of political violence
in recent years, many in the PRI
want better party leadership.
Frequently mentioned as Or-
tega's successor is 46-year-old
Alfonso Martinez Dominguez, a
dynamic, powerful politician.
As leader of the "popular sector"
of the PRI, he built that group
into the strongest in the party.
The choice of Martinez or some
other bright young star on the
political scene would go far to
implement President Diaz Ordaz'
Page 32
suggestion that the party give
real importance to youth. Young
Mexicans have been increasingly
alienated by the political dogma-
tism of the old party bosses who
have used their power to resist
change and liberalization of the
PRI.
Not the least effect of new
PRI leadership will be on poten-
tial candidates for the PRI's 1970
presidential nomination, which
leads to virtually automatic elec-
tion. Jockeying among the hope-
fuls has already begun, with three
of Diaz Ordaz' cabinet-level ap-
pointees apparently the front-run-
ners. The ultimate decision rests
with the President, and will be
made on the basis of maintaining
the unity of the party that has
brought Mexico its sustained po-
litical stability and steady eco-
nomic progress.
Of the groups shaping up for
a future showdown, the one ex-
pected to gain from a turnover
in key PRI personalities appears
to be backing Minister of Govern-
ment Luis Echeverria. Echeverria's
"restraint," in contrast to the
premature and open campaign by
other presidential hopefuls, has
apparently been noted favorably
by the resident.
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