COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A006000060005-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A006000060005-7.pdf376.64 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A0 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 0 e5-- 0 Secret 1 -1 WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report Communist Aid to North Vietnam Secret N2 45 29 September 1967 No. 0309/67B Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927A006000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 SECRET COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM The grant aid agreement Hanoi has just signed with the Soviet Union climaxes the aid-seeking tour of Communist countries being made by North Vietnamese Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi. Agreements have also been signed this year with China, North Korea, Mon- golia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Cuba. The Soviet an- nouncement of the new aid agreement reasserts the prime role Moscow plays in supporting North Vietnam and underscores Hanoi's heavy dependence on Communist aid both to maintain essential production and serv- ices and to support the war in the South. This year's announcement for the first time enumerates specific types of military assistance in what is apparently an effort by Moscow to strengthen its claims of giving all-out assistance to the DRV. The Communist countries have supplied an es- timated $1.4 billion in economic aid since 1954. From that year through June 1967, they also are es- timated to have supplied military aid worth $1.2 billion, as computed in foreign trade costs; if fig- ured at US factor costs, the value would be $1.5 bil- lion. The Communist countries are continuing to sup- ply Hanoi with the necessary goods and equipment to prosecute the war despite North Vietnam's rapidly declining ability to repay. The Communist Aid Program The Communist aid program for North Vietnam has grown rap- idly since early 1965 when the US began bombing the North and increasing its troop commitment in the South. Sea shipments of goods from Communist countries have grown from almost 550,000 tons in all of 1965 to 735,000 tons in the first half of 1967. Most of the economic aid is shipped by sea, while military equipment comes in by rail. Page 1 Economic aid is aimed at keeping North Vietnam's vital services operating and on main- taining minimum subsistence lev- els while also sustaining and im- proving Hanoi's ability to infil- trate men and supplies into South Vietnam. The Communist countries have supplied substantial quanti- ties of equipment for transporta- tion, construction, power, and maintenance programs. Machinery and equipment are also being pro- vided to implement a program of dispersing industry into small SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sep 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 00927AO06000060005-7 Estimated Communist Economic Aid to North Vietnam MILLION US $ EAST EUROPE USSR COMMUNIST CHINA Total Value Unknown North Vietnam's Seaborne Imports and Exports to Communist Countries 1,010 in metric tons Misc. Goods IMPORTS EXPORTS 1965 IMPORTS EXPORTS 1966 1966 1965 Estimates Ist Half 66060 9-67 CIA Approved For Release 200611?/ -TR?P79-00927A006000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 10; F. units throughout the country. Food imports have increased sharply this year following the poor 1966 fall rice harvest. Military aid thus far has been designed largely to supply and maintain an air defense sys- tem that includes early warning radar, a small but modern air force, a surface-to-air missile system, and antiaircraft artil- lery. In addition, Communist aid has provided Hanoi with small arms, field artillery, and ammu- nition, much of which has been infiltrated into the South. food shipments that began in Jan- uary of this year. The character of aid to Viet- nam has changed considerably since the bombing began. Prior to 1965, economic aid emphasized Hanoi's economic development program. The Soviets were providing a number of major industrial installations, including the Thac Ba hydroelectric power plant and the Lam Thao su- perphosphate fertilizer plant. The Chinese had put into operation a pig iron facility at Thai Nguyen and were helping to expand it into a small steel complex. Economic Aid The new aid agreements cur- rently being signed probably call for an increase in economic aid over the estimated $340 million expected to be supplied this year. The USSR continues to be the prime supplier, providing equip- ment for road building, mining and manufacturing, as well as pe- troleum and food. The Chinese concentrate their aid on light industry and agriculture, while the East Europeans emphasize light industry, transportation, and medical. supplies. Little is known about the new agreements but, as in the past, they are probably suffi- ciently flexible to allow for frequent adjustments to meet Hanoi's quickly changing require- ments resulting from the war. Such a revision is believed to have been made in late 1966 when agricultural deficiencies in North Vietnam required the large Since the initial bombing in early 1965, however, the emphasis in aid has been switched to meet current consumption, maintenance, and reconstruction requirements. Economic development has for all practical purposes been shelved. At major aid projects started prior to 1965, activity has either stopped or continues at only a minimum level. The one possible exception may be the continuing expansion and modernization of the anthra- cite mines in the Hon Gai - Cam Pha area. Soviet technicians also are working at a number of mines and at the Vanh Danh coal processing plant. Hanoi's 1967 economic plan emphasized increased coal production--the one hard- currency export readily market- able in the free world. Imports in 1967 emphasize the priority attention given to North Vietnam's transportation network. The USSR continues not SECRET 29 Sep 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 SECRET only to supply a large portion of the vehicles needed to move sup- plies south, but also the road construction equipment needed to keep existing roads serviceable and to build new ones in the southern North Vietnam and Laotian panhandles. In addition, the So- viets have been supplying rail- road equipment, barges, bridge trusses, and petroleum for North Vietnam's transportation industry. The Soviets also are providing equipment to dredge Haiphong harbor and apparently plan to assist in expanding berthing space at Haiphong. China and Eastern Europe have provided ve- hicles and construction equipment. Food imports became increas- ingly important in 1967 after a poor rice harvest in the fall of 1966 created shortages. North Vietnam imported 222,000 tons of grain and foodstuffs from Commu- nist countries in the first half of this year--almost four times as much as in all of 1966. The Soviets have shipped almost 70,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour out of Vladivostok in the first six months of the year, while China shipped 90,000 tons of food. mostly rice. Hanoi in the past year has signed project aid agreements with the USSR and Eastern European 25X1 Estimated Communist Military Aid to North Vietnam MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS CHINA USSR *VALUES IN FOREIGN TRADE COSTS. IF COMPUTED AT US FACTOR COST THE VALUES WOULD BE $200, $350, $550 RESPECTIVELY. SECRET Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sep 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 SECRET countries. These agreements prob- ably include repair and mainten- ance facilities as well as proj- ects designed to help Hanoi's regional self-sufficiency program aimed at dispersing essential in- dustry to the countryside in order to minimize bomb damage. A few may be for major projects that the North Vietnamese intend to begin after the war. In addition to the agreements' providing for aid goods, Hanoi has recently signed a series of cul- tural and scientific-technical agreements, primarily with the USSR and East European countries. The agreements provide for the training of as many as 20,000 Vietnamese in universities, pro- fessional/technical schools, and in industrial enterprises through 1969. Most of the students are probably scheduled for long-term training looking forward to a posthostility recovery of the North Vietnamese economy. A few, however, may be receiving inten- sive training in basic technical skills that can be used during the war. Military Aid Since 1965, when the US bombing of the North began, the USSR has surpassed Communist China as the principal supplier of mil- itary aid to North Vietnam. In an apparent response to the US bombing of the North, the Soviet military aid program has focused on the rapid development of an air defense system. Since the beginning of 1965, the Soviets have supplied about 30 surface- Page 5 to-air missile (SAM) firing bat- talionsy a radar network, and 147 aircraft, including eight IL-28 jet light bombers, 42 MIG-21s, and 74 MIG-15/17s. In addition, the USSR has supplied North Vietnam with a large quantity of antiaircraft artillery as well as ground forces equipment. There are an estimated 2,000 Soviet military technicians in North Vietnam providing assist- ance and training in the use of SAM and radar equipment as well as furnishing some administrative support. Fewer Soviet aircraft have been delivered this year possibly because the North Vietnamese Air Force has been relatively inef- fective in defending against US Lrd- nance aeiiverles, however, are up. North Vietnam expended about 1,750 SAMs in the first six months of this year. compared with about 1,100 in 1966. Expenditures of conventional antiaircraft ar- tillery ammunition have also in- creased. In addition, Communist forces in South Vietnam have been using Soviet-made 140-mm. rockets and 120-mm. mortars since early 1967. Communist China's major con- tribution has been the deployment of a number of troops in North Vietnam. Some are believed to be antiaircraft units, and the remainder are engineering troops aiding in the repair of roads, rail lines and airfields north SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sep 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 of Hanoi. Military equipment de- liveries from China continue to emphasize small arms, ammunition, and light antiaircraft artillery. Peking's deliveries of major equip- ment this year include at least 12 MIG-15/17s, the first since 1965. Only minor quantities of military aid are being supplied by the other Communist countries, and very little of this is es- timated to be weapons. Some East- ern European countries are sup- plying sport rifles in small quan- tities, and North Korea is sup- plying automatic attack rifles. In addition, about 50 North Ko- rean pilots are currently in North Vietnam, F SECRET Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT 29 Sep 67 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2006/12/26: CIA-RDP79-00927AO06000060005-7