DE GAULLE, EUROPE, AND THE MLF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

SPECIAL
27 November 1964
DE GAULLE, EUROPE, AND THE MLF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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DE GAULLE, EUROPE, AND THE MLF
De Gaulle's grand design for Europe involves
the creation of a loose confederation of states
capable of providing its own nuclear defense and
determining its own destiny. Essential to such a
confederation would be the closest of Franco-Ger-
man collaboration in all fields. In De Gaulle's
view such an arrangement does not exclude an alli-
ance with the US and the UK; the UK could be a mem-
ber of the European confederation if it were will-
ing to give up its special relationship with the
US. But it does involve an end to direct US politi-
cal and military controls in European defense mat-
ters and the end of NATO in its present form.
Only when Europe can stand on its own will
it be possible, in De Gaulle's view, to take the
necessary diplomatic, political, and economic meas-
ures to draw Eastern Europe and Russia eventually
back into the comity of the European family and
civilization.
The current controversy over Western economic
and military cooperation, which has brought to a
head the question of continued French participation
in the European Economic Community and the Atlantic
Alliance, must be viewed in the context of De Gaulle's
grand design. From the outset, he has viewed the
MLF basically as an American effort to prevent the
European countries--particularly Germany--from de-
veloping a European deterrent independent of US con-
trol. Should indirect threats to take stringent
action against the EEC and NATO fail to block the
MLF, he is probably prepared to end effective par-
ticipation in both organizations, confident that
the protection of the US "nuclear umbrella" will
continue.
De Gaulle's Strategy
Until very recently De
Gaulle seemed content to dismiss
the MLF as an impractical dream.
When he returned from South
America in October, however, the
proposal seemed to be approach-
ing agreement. Since then,
French opposition has become in-
creasingly open and positive.
Nevertheless, France is
anxious not to emphasize unneces-
sarily its divergence from its
European partners on this question.
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MLF plans have provided a delay
that gives De Gaulle a chance
to mobilize European opinion
against the MLF; and his threat
to withdraw from the EEC stands
as a grim reminder to his part-
ners that he is prepared to take
drastic steps if necessary.
Paris has mounted a frontal
attack on the MLF. Both Foreign
Minister Couve de MurviLle and.
Prime Minister Pompidou in major
speeches have made it clear that
France considers it inimical to
the interests of Europe. De
Gaulle charges tha.t the MLF is
designed to prevent the emergence
of a self-contained Europe by
destroying the power base inher-
ent in an autonomous military
policy. The French believe there
is no prospect of an eventual
US withdrawal from the MLF or a
surrendering of US veto rights
in the event a. European politi-
cal authority is established.
European subservience would thus
be perpetuated.
Should the MLF actually
come into being, it is not cer-
tain what course of action De
Gaulle would take. He might
"withdraw" from the EEC, arguing
that if Europe does not seek the
maximum "Europeanization" of its
defenses, all European institu-
tions and projects lose their
meaning. If Germany had mean-
while found a. way around the
grain-price issue, the decision
to withdraw would probably be
very difficult, but not insur-
mountable. De Gaulle might also
take actions against NATO calcu-
lated to hasten its disintegra-
tion
While De Gaulle has always
advocated a European grouping
as a power base to promote his
policies, he is not wedded to
the existing EEC institutions.
Since his Long-range goal is not
a. Europe of the Six but one ex-
tending "from the Atlantic to
the Urals," he probably feels he
can afford `o see the current
framework vanish, to be replaced
in time by a structure less
"rigidly integrationist" in form.
There has been no attempt
to specify the exact form which
a French "withdrawal" from the
EEC would take. The EEC treaty
makes no provision for withdra.wa.l,
and the French cannot legally
block Community progress by pre-
venting movement to the third
and final stage of the 12-year
transitional period provided by
the EEC treaty. Nevertheless,
as a minimum, France could re-
fuse to participate actively in
the decision-making processes of
the Community.
The French will give due
weight to the economic gains
they have won since the Common
Market was formed in 1958. Their
agricultural exports to the EEC
countries have expanded, and
French farm interests are look-
ing to further expansion after
the common agricultural policy
is worked out. The stake of
French industry in the Common
Market is reflected in trade fig-
ures which show a 171-percent
increase in France's trade with
its EEC partners since the
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