THE BAROMETER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R000100110028-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 1, 1962
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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27
(Writer comments on Mr. Edward R.F.
Sheehan's article "The United States, the
Soviet Union, and Strategic Considerations in
the Middle East" in the June issue.)
The statement that the Soviets have
introduced weapons into the UAR in-
ventory which are essentially defensive
is misleading. His comparison of Soviet
supplied aircraft with the U.S. supplied
Phantom is correct-that the Phantom
has greater offensive capabilities than
Soviet fighters, but there are other facts
which should be mentioned. Specifi-
cally, the Soviets have supplied KOMAR
and OSA guided missile patrol craft to
Egypt and one of these was credited
with the first operational sinking of a
naval unit by an anti-ship SSM on 17
October 1967. Offensive capabilities of
other items of military equipment sup-
plied such as submarines, SU-7 fighter
bombers. IL-28 and TU-16 bombers,
hundreds of medium tanks should have
been mentioned to present a more
balanced picture.
In all fairness to Mr. Sheehan, it is
recognized that, for the purpose of his
presentation, he was referring only to a
limited portion of the air picture-most
probably because of its currency-but in
doing so, he badly generalized to the
extent that he misrepresented the actual
situation. Mr. Sheehan did not reflect
the great number of offensive weapon
systems the Soviets have supplied the
UAR.
It is recognized that the Naval War
College Review is a caveated publication
so that the thoughts and opinions ex-
pressed are those of the lecturers and
authors and are not necessarily those of
the Navy Department nor of the Naval
War College. However, it is somewhat
surprising that the offensive characteris-
tics of Soviet naval ships, aircraft and
armor supplied to the UAR were not
mentioned in a presentation to the
student body. If this information was
later brought out in discussions or ques-
tion and answer periods, it should
properly have been incorporated into
Mr. Sheehan's edited version of his
presentation.
Your fine publication is widely read
and respected in professional military
circles but it lacks in my judgment, an
important section. A Letters to the
Editors feature should be incorporated
to permit readers' comments, correc-
tions, and rebuttals to be aired to the
same readership that was exposed to the
original article. This letter regarding Mr.
Sheehan's article is a case in point but
unfortunately not in print.
E.V. CRANGLE
Captain, USN
(Substantive comment on Naval War College
Review content is not only encouraged, but is
essential in the assessment of the journal's
content. Ed.)
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28 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW (9d.
Public diplomacy can make a significant contribution to international crisis
management and resolution when used wisely by governments in conjunction with
military power and private negotiations. This case study very ably illustrates the
usefulness, as well as some shortcomings, of public diplomacy as an instrument of
national policy with the improvement of world communications and the increased
importance placed upon public opinion.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AND
THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER
A research paper prepared
by
G. Scott Sugden
College of Naval Warfare
The recent presence of Soviet naval
craft at Cienfuegos, Cuba, has redirected
U.S. public attention back to that tur-
moiled island. The activities of these
units have raised questions as to their
ultimate purpose, such as the establish-
ment of naval facilities in support of
missile-laden submarines, and its pos-
sible effect on future U.S. national
security and defense posture. Already
the national press has speculated.on this
development in terms of the agreement
that resolved the last United States-
U.S.S.R. confrontation in Cuba, which
included halting the further intro-
duction of offensive weapons to the
island.
Nearly a decade has elapsed since the
world was engrossed by that epic occa-
sion, the historic Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962. Yet, one is still able to
awesome prospect that suddenly
emerged at its outset and the intense
relief that was apparent as the super-
powers drew apart.
The Soviet vessels at Cienfuegos may
be harbingers of a new crisis. Denials of
the offensive intent of the vessels or of
the naval base with which they are
alleged to be concerned sound familiarly
like those heard during the prelude to
the missile crisis of 1962. Similarly, the
national press again raises doubts about
the intent and resolve of the U.S.
position in the face of this renewed
Soviet activity.
But whether or not this episode
develops into another Cuban crisis, the
United States should seek to benefit
from the insights gained from the earlier
confrontation. While world conditions
have changed substantially during the
(,-d fie
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 29
continued importance of neighboring of and responsiveness to the opinions of
Cuba to U.S. security interests. An- their electorates. In turn, these elector-
other, albeit more subtle, attempt by ates have become the object of a grow-
the Soviet Union to extend its offensive ing variety of efforts through the com-
military capability into the Caribbean munications media to enlist their influ-
would carry the same challenge to the ence for the purpose of achieving
United States that it did in 1962. political leverage. In recognition of this
Meeting that challenge would again trend, more governments tend to weigh
require measured and effective use of all the strength of foreign public opinion
facets of U.S. statecraft which contrib- when assessing the current strength or
uted to resolution of the previous con- future direction of policies promulgated
frontation, including the application of by other governments. At the same time
public diplomacy. they seek to maximize the effectiveness
Despite the considerable amount of of their own foreign policy by influ-
literature which has been produced encing the opinions of overseas elector-
about the Cuban missile crisis, scant ates and governments by direct and
attention has been given to the conduct indirect means, largely through commu-
of public diplomacy during that event. nications media. It is upon these efforts
This lack of attention may be explained that the practice of public diplomacy
in part by the general unfamiliarity rests.
which most people have of this mode of During the Cuban missile crisis of
diplomatic procedure as distinct from 1962, public diplomacy played a sub-
the more traditional mode based upon stantial role, a role which emerged in
direct, formal government-to- two distinct phases. The first phase ran
government exchanges. It may also be from July 1962, when Soviet military
explained in part by the inherent diffi- assistance to Cuba suddenly burgeoned,
culty of measuring the effect that public until mid-October, on the occasion of
actions, materials, or pronouncements the U.S. discovery of the missile base
have upon goverments' foreign policy sites. The second, more critical but
decisions. Finally, the dearth of atten- brief, phase extended from discovery of
tion may be because there is no clear the sites until 28 October, when the
majority consensus even among the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw all
practitioners of this "new diplomacy" offensive weapons from Cuba. By the
as to what constitutes its limits, while latter date the most significant effects
its techniques remain in flux. of the impact of public diplomacy
Nonetheless, public diplomacy has activities had registered on the crisis.
come to bear with increasing effective- The initial, precrisis, phase was char-
ness on the affairs of international actor;zed by rising popular concern in
relations. This has been particularly the United States over the rapidly grow-
evident during the period since the First ing Soviet military presence in Cuba.
World War, an era when social and This concern reinforced a residue of
political changes have coincided with a general discontent and frustration
rapid proliferation of technological toward Cuba which had remained after
developments in the field of communi- the abortive Bay of Pigs debacle of April
cations. 1961. It was further enhanced by
In a sense, public diplomacy has been impending 1962 congressional elections
spawned by a merger of modern com- scheduled for November of that year.
munications and democratized politics. President John F. Kennedy's policy
The growth of mass communications toward Cuba at this juncture had
has promoted governments whose deci- become less active and less aggressive
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30 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
During his presidential campaign he had nuclear missiles in that country. This
called for a strong, active stand against operation, which involved a massive
Communist influence in Cuba. Only 17 sealift utilizing over 100 shiploads of
days before he assumed office, relations men and material,4 was initiated late in
with Cuba ruptured, and as President he June and continued until mid-October
soon sanctioned the continuation of when the missile sites were finally iden-
U.S. support for an invasion of the tified from U.S. aerial reconnaissance
island by Cuban exiles. But after the photographs. Meanwhile, though con-
disastrous failure at Bahia de Cochinos scious of the sharp increase in the
and the violent international reaction to number of Soviet ships arriving at
the fiasco, President Kennedy publicly Cuban ports, the U.S. Government was
accepted full responsibility for the U.S. sluggish in reaction, while its policy
part in the attack, and U.S. policy lacked clarity, cohesion, and decisive-
toward Cuba became distinctly more ness.
passive and indirect. Quite naturally the Government's
The futility and ignominy of the Bay public diplomacy reflected identical
of Pigs episode made a deep impression qualities. During the months preceding
on the President. Further, it had serious the Cuban crisis, Government spokes-
politico-psychological implications for men concentrated upon the economic
future relations with Cuba and the ills and the loss of civil and political
Soviet Union. Although antagonism liberties in Cuba while generating sup-
toward Cuba gained momentum in the port for the Alliance for Progress as the
Americas, especially after Castro pro- most logical and effective deterrent
claimed that country socialist and later against the blight of Castro's brand of
announced himself a Marxist-Leninist, communism in the Americas. Refer-
the Kennedy administration concen- ences to the influx of Soviet supplies
Crated upon persuasive efforts to achieve and equipment into Cuba were treated
political and economic isolation of the with restraint and moderation. Even
island rather than seeking to promote after opposition leaders in Congress had
direct military action against Castro. seized upon the Soviet buildup to pro-
With respect to the Soviet Union, Presi- test the Government's policy of re-
dent Kennedy discussed the Cuban straint, spokesmen for the adminis-
attack with Premier Khrushchev during tration refrained from denouncing the
their Vienna meeting in June 1961. Soviet operation and were put in the
From accounts, he did so in an apolo- position virtually of defending the de-
getic manners giving rise to the feeling fensive character of the weapons and
that the United States was not prepared personnel being introduced. At the same
to resist forcefully U.S.S.R. involvement time, President Kennedy and various
in Cuba.' The apparent lack of will to members of his administration con-
resist was further reflected in the U.S. tinued to assure the public at home and
agreement to the "neutralization" of abroad that any genuine threat to the
Laos and later in the failure to respond United States would be dealt with in
strongly to the erection of the Berlin an appropriate manner. A closer look at
Wall in the summer of 1961. these Government statements, which
One year later Cuba was again serve as the grist for the conduct of
brought back toward the focus of atten- public diplomacy, reveals more. clearly
tion as the Soviet Union moved to test the ramifications of the administration's
U.S. policy and resolve. Allegedly in policy of restraint during the precrisis
order to prevent a U.S. invasion of period.
Cuba,3 the Soviet Union embarked The U.S. Government made few
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in Cuba until late August 1962. How-
ever, 5 months earlier the Department
of State had issued a press release on the
subject of Communist military aid to
Cuba.5 In response to numerous queries
being received on the subject, the state-
ment pointed out that Cuba had been
receiving large-scale military assistance
for 18 months from the Soviet bloc but
that there was no evidence of any
missiles being supplied or missile bases
being constructed on the island. When
the United States became aware, in
July, that the number of Soviet ships
arriving at Cuban ports had increased
drastically, surveillance of the ships and
the island was stepped up without
public fanfare while the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
Edwin M. Martin, continued to promote
the policy of isolating Cuba from the
rest of Latin America.6 At this time
there was a general consensus among the
U.S. foreign policymakers that the
Soviet Union might be tempted to
revive its waning postsputnik offensive,
but similarly these officials agreed that
the activity in Cuba did not then consti-
tute a threat to the United States and
did not presage introduction of offen-
sive missiles. Concurrently, the grow-
ing press campaign to alert the country
to the signs of increased Soviet activity
in Cuba was downgraded by such pri-
vate commentators as Saturday
Review's editor Norman Cousins who
stressed that private information media
did not speak for the U.S. Government.
He made it clear that the Soviet Union
should not be misled into thinking
otherwise.8
Gradual escalation of Government
comment began in August, coincident
with indications of rising apprehension
in Congress and amid dogged attention
of the press. After Senator Homer Cape-
hart called for a U.S. invasion of Cuba
to halt the flow of Soviet troops and
supplies, President Kennedy in a press
conference on 29 August opposed such
... very serious consequences. ,9 One
week later he issued a statement deny-
ing the existence of any evidence of
offensive missiles, while announcing the
installation of surface-to-air missiles on
the island. But, at the same time, he
clearly inferred that surface-to-surface
missiles would be considered offensive
weapons, the emplacement of which
would not be tolerated. As emphasis, he
later requested and received congres-
sional authority to call up 150,000 U.S.
reservists in case of a critical inter-
national situation. The Soviet Union
quickly announced on 11 September
that in view of its powerful rockets
there was no need for missile sites in
Cuba or anywhere outside of its own
country.
Despite this apparent Soviet dis-
claimer, the Kennedy administration
found itself enmeshed in a cacophony
of criticism. In 6 weeks Senator
Kenneth Keating made 10 speeches in
the Senate warning of the Soviet mili-
tary buildup. Other opposition leaders
in Congress, including Senator Everett
Dirksen and Representative Charles
Halleck, also sounded the tocsin, declar-
ing a threat to the security of the
Nation and a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine. A Life magazine editorial
decried the administration's indecision.
Time magazine called for armed inter-
vention. And the U.S. News & World
Report saw a major U.S. defeat in the
Soviet incursion. Columnist David
Lawrence questioned why the U.S.
Government was failing to denounce or
protest publicly the Soviet activity,
while Marguerite Higgins asked in her
newspaper column if President Kennedy
was destined to administer over the
decline of the United States as a world
power. By September a Gallup poll
gauged public support for the President
at an all time low.
In the face of this vocal opposition,
the Kennedy administration steadfastly
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Responding to critics at home and During an interview on Howard K.
potential adversaries abroad, the admin- Smith's "News and Comment," the
istration's position was emphasized by a Secretary insisted that the "configu-
series of public statements on the Cuba ration" of the military forces in Cuba
issue by Government spokesmen. On 9 was defensive and that the United States
September Assistant Secretary of De- should find an answer to the buildup
fense for International Security Affairs without bloodshed. A similar assertion,
Paul H. Nitze stated on ABC's "Issues that the forces were no threat to the
and Answers" program that while the United States, was made on 3 October
United States had grounds for concern, by Under Secretary of State George Ball
the installation of offensive missiles in before a congressional committee in
Cuba would be contrary to past Soviet open hearing on trade with Cuba.I 1
policy and therefore extremely unlikely The administration's public defense
to take place. Four days later the of its policy continued until the last day
President, at a press conference, reiter- of innocence. On 14 October Presi-
ated the contention that the Soviet dential adviser McGeorge Bundy, during
military shipments, due to the defensive an interview on "Issues and Answers,"
nature of their contents, did not consti- confided that he did not believe that the
tute a serious threat to any part of the Soviet Union would try to establish a
hemisphere, but that if Cuba gained the "major offensive capability" in. Cuba.
capacity to conduct offensive action The final effort by the administration
against the United States, he would act was made by Assistant Secretary of
to protect the hemispheric security. State Martin who on 15 October for the
Chester Bowles, Presidential special first time placed the policy of the
representative and adviser on African, United States toward Cuba on record in
Asian and Latin American Affairs, in a a speech and explained why the Soviet
public address on 16 September asserted Union would not put offensive missiles
that a U.S. attack on Cuba would cause in Cuba.l z During his speech at the
irreparable harm to the cause of free- National Press Club in Washington, a
dom and provide the means for a series telephone call was made to inform him
of Soviet victories. On the very next day that missile base sites in Cuba had just
Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured been identified from reconnaissance
two Senate subcommittees that the photographs.
Soviet Union, by denying its need for These expressions of U.S. policy
missile bases outside the U.S.S.R., had toward the Soviet buildup in Cuba by
already recognized the "signals" which senior administration officials were the
the United States had transmitted in its basis for the public diplomatic activities
public statements regarding the danger conducted during the precrisis period.
of installing offensive missiles in Cuba. By providing these statements to the
Encouraged by the apparent effective- international communications media
ness of this public diplomacy, Secretary and by promoting the dissemination of
Rusk testified in favor of the proposed these statements and commentaries on
joint resolution which would signal the them through the facilities of its own
depth and unanimity of U.S. congres- information posts and diplomatic mis-
sional opposition to the creation in sions abroad, the Kennedy adminis-
Cuba of an externally supported mili- Lration sought to assure ally and neutral
tary force capable of threatening U.S. that the United States was following a
security. 10 rational, restrained, and measured
Later, on the last day of September, policy, despite Soviet provocation and
Secretary Rusk supported further the U.S. internal political pressure. More-
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 33
made to the Soviet Union during this that Latin American States could not be
phase, these public statements and the depended upon for support in the event
private exchanges which took place of a crisis.'
between United States and Soviet offi- The time for testing began 15
cials were intended to serve as impor- October and continued for 13 days.
tant indicators of U.S. security interests During that period, initiated by identifi-
to the Soviet leaders. The potential cation of the missile sites, U.S. public
adversary in the Kremlin was expected diplomacy played a far more effective
to note and to understand these and successful role than during the
"signals," such as the one to which precrisis phase. If the steps which led to
Secretary Rusk referred in his congres- the Cuban missile confrontation were
sional testimony about President facilitated by misjudgments based upon
Kennedy not tolerating the presence of public diplomatic relations, the resolu-
a force in Cuba capable of threatening tion of that crisis flowed in no small
the security of the United States. measure from the support achieved and
Clearly the Soviet Union misinter- the clear and precise intentions con-
preted or misjudged the signals. But veyed through public diplomacy.
while public diplomacy promotes During the first week after detection
policy, it is not a substitute for it. The of the missile sites, there was no visible
policy of restraint, by appearing to evidence of unusual activity in Washing-
deemphasize the missile threat, not only ton. Selected members of the National
made the President vulnerable to domes- Security Council and several other
tic political pressure, but it also pro- senior Government officials conducted
vided the Soviet leaders with grounds an extended series of meetings in
for believing that he lacked the will and secrecy to determine the best way to
boldness to oppose such a threat. meet the Soviet missile threat. By
Further, since the U.S. Government Friday, 19 October, there was general
policy failed to include public opposi- agreement among the participants, who
tion to the extension of communism were convened as the Executive Com-
into Cuba, the Soviet Union had reason mittec of the National Security Council
to believe that the United States was (ExCom), that the first step should
becoming acquiescent to the incursion. include the public declaration of a
The administration even appeared to quarantine against the further intro-
have sanctioned the defensive nature of duction of offensive weapons into Cuba
Soviet arms and personnel while deny- announced simultaneously with the
ing to opposition members in Congress demand that all similar weapons be
the existence of offensive missiles, removed from that island. Within 48
leaving Soviet policymakers free to spec- hours President Kennedy made a final
ulate as to whether the President was decision in concurrence with that view,
prepared to accept presence of the and arrangements were planned for its
missiles or to delay announcement until public release and implementation.
after the congressional elections. Fi- The President's address to the nation
nally, leaders in the Kremlin probably at 7 p.m., 22 October, was the first
were also wrongly emboldened by some public indication that the United States
information media comments in the and the world faced an unprecedented
United States and more generally crisis. The domestic and foreign reaction
abroad in allied countries that the was strong, immediate, and unequivocal.
United States had become obsessed by After achieving the support of its allies,
Cuba, that it had no grounds for threat- particularly the Organization of Ameri-
ening warlike action against the Soviet can States, the President's address was
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34 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
quarantine to become effective on 24 While these statements precommitted
October. While the quarantine remained the administration to eliminating the
unchallenged, the issue of Soviet inten- offensive threat, the President was
tions stayed in doubt until the denoue- determined that the operation be per-
ment on Sunday, 28 October. That formed without risking further miscon-
morning, Radio Moscow broadcast the ceptions of U.S. intentions. For this
text of Chairman Khrushchev's fifth purpose he made it clear that the U.S.
letter to President Kennedy since the Government was to speak with a single
advent of the crisis. Through this means voice. Planning for the dissemination of
Khrushchev agreed with the conditions public statements was charged directly
which had been set forth in President to ExCom, with the President's press
Kennedy's most recent letter calling for secretary Pierre Salinger responsible for
the removal of the offensive weapons coordination of the decisions.' s This
and a " . . . halt to further introduction determination by the President rankled
of such weapons systems into Cuba." many U.S. pressmen during the course
In retrospect, it is no more possible of the crisis, and it eventually led to
to determine which factor contributed charges of news management against the
most effectively to the Soviet decision administration. Nonetheless, with Presi-
to withdraw its offensive weapons than dent Kennedy reviewing all public state-
it is to determine which factor was the ments originating in the White House,
most responsible for their introduction. the decision to coordinate release of
However, the preponderant power of information materials was implemented
the U.S. strategic deterrent coupled faithfully and with telling effect
with the inability of the Soviet Union to throughout the crisis phase.
match U.S. military force in the Cuban Members of ExCom frequently con-
area were, undoubtedly, principal con- sidered foreign public opinion when
siderations. After being triggered by the assessing plans and their possible effects
President's speech on 22 October in a on the outcome of the crisis.16 While
preplanned response, the U.S. military the minutes of the ExCom meetings are
effort involved about 300,000 men, 185 not yet available for public record, it
naval vessels, a 2,100 mile quarantine may be inferred from guidelines laid
line, and the most massive airborne alert down for the implementation of deci-
in world history.14 But military force sions from this body that there were
would be effective as a deterrent only to three principal objectives to be achieved
the extent that potential adversaries in the field of public diplomacy during
were aware of its presence, its capabili- this period: first, to establish Soviet
ties, and the intent behind its utiliza- responsibility for the threat against the
tion. Consequently, one of the most United States, the Western Hemisphere,
important functions of U.S. public and world peace; second, to convince all
diplomacy during the crisis phase was to interested parties of the firm intention
convey in a direct, lucid, and unambigu- and capability of the United States to
ous manner to friend and foe the vital remove the threat;* and third, to con-
interests, intentions, and capabilities of vince all interested parties that the
the United States. measures to be used were limited to the
President Kennedy immediately threat, responsible in their inception
recognized this need. As soon as he and implementation, and peaceful of
learned that the missile sites had been intent. Adjuncts to these objectives
identified, he requested Special Assis- were to keep world opinion focused on
tant Theodore Sorensen to review all his the offensive weapons in Cuba, disasso-
public statements on the possible U.S. ciated from similar U.S. weapons or
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 35
countering critics of U.S. policy and
operations.
The President's speech of 22 October
provided the tone, direction, and basic
source for the projection of U.S. public
diplomacy during the crisis. Somber,
deliberate, and firm, the speech stressed
the unmistaken evidence and magnitude
of the threat, the duplicity of Soviet
policy in an area with a special relation-
ship to the United States, and the
resolve, but reasonableness, of the
United States to eliminate the threat by
whatever means were to be necessary,
with a peaceful solution clearly pre-
ferred. By stressing these points, the
President sought to emphasize the
strongest facets of the U.S. position: the
mutual threat to hemispheric security,
proven Soviet guilt, and the inevitable-
ness of the United States outbidding the
U.S.S.R. in a nearby area of tradition-
ally vital interest.
In his speech the President made the
U.S. position clear. This country con-
sidered that the Soviet Union, rather
than Cuba, was primarily responsible for
the crisis, the resolution for which the
United States was prepared to face the
cost of worldwide nuclear war, includ-
ing a full retaliatory response in the
event of a missile launched against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere. But
concurrently, the peaceful intent of the
limited quarantine-as an initial step
toward achievement of hemispheric
security-and the appeal to the regional
and international organizations as well
as to Khrushchev himself all indicated a
balanced and temperate approach in
favor of a peaceful solution. Each of
these points was amplified through
implementation of public diplomacy.
The importance of conveying these
points abroad was reflected in the elabo-
rate and finely timed arrangements
made to gain maximum impact with the
speech. In addition to the series of
briefings scheduled for foreign ambas-
sadors and the information media in
A W 06PI4ef a LP2% O5PF21 3
special Presidential envoys were dis-
patched to inform key leaders and
representatives abroad. At the same
time the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA) initiated a massive campaign to
disseminate the speech as the first step
in its drive to ensure that explanation of
the U.S. position was widely received
and clearly understood overseas.
The senior official available from
USIA, Deputy Director Donald
Wilson," had been brought into
ExCom during the weekend preceding
the President's quarantine speech. It was
soon clear to him that the President was
instictively interested in foreign public
opinion and in the vital need for every-
one, especially the people in the Soviet
Union and Cuba, to be aware of what
was happening.18 With this insight and
the benefit of the ExCom guidelines in
mind, he organized his Agency's efforts
to promote the objectives of U.S. public
diplomacy during the crisis.
USIA gave multimedia promotion to
the President's quarantine speech on 22
October. After alerting its overseas audi-
ence, the Agency's radio service, Voice
of America, carried the speech live from
the White House on its worldwide net-
work, with translations in Spanish and
Portuguese broadcast immediately after-
ward and in 35 additional languages
later. Maximum Cuban reception was
ensured by arranging for the unprece-
dented utilization of 10 private U.S.
radio stations to supplement VOA trans-
missions to the island. While more than
doubling its number of frequencies
carrying Spanish-language programs and
tripling its broadcast schedule to 24
hours per day, the Voice of America
also carried the President's address and
twice-daily news stories thereafter in
Russian to Cuba for the Soviet per-
sonnel stationed there. Videotapes,
kinescopes, and standard film prints of
the address in English and a wide variety
of foreign languages were sent to USIA
posts in more than 100 countries for use
dli4-F k4-b' oRo "'10699 W18-4
 ApproNAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW-RDP84-00499 R000100110028-4
commercial theaters, and television
stations. Telstar transmission of the
speech was arranged by USIA for
millions of viewers in Europe. Radio
teletype was used to send the text of
the address to 107 Agency posts as the
President spoke. These texts were trans-
lated and reproduced for thousands of
government officials, political leaders,
and newspapers editors around the
world. Finally, illustrated pamphlets
with the text of the President's address
in several languages were published at
the Agency's regional printing centers in
Manila, Mexico City, and Beirut, while
100 copies of a photo exhibit based on
the speech were sent via air to Latin
America, and prints in 40 languages of a
10-minute documentary on the Cuban
situation were airshipped throughout
the world.
This extensive dissemination of Presi-
dent Kennedy's quarantine speech typi-
fied the manner in which USIA opera-
tions19 promoted U.S. public diplo-
matic objectives during the crisis. Wide
coverage was also devoted to other
events which served to illustrate or to
strengthen the U.S. position, such as the
unanimous support of the Organization
of American States, the acrid Stevenson
-Zorin exchanges at the Security Coun-
cil sessions of the United Nations, and
the unique series of messages among
President Kennedy, Chairman Khrush-
chev, and Secretary General U Thant.
At the same time, USIA, as the
Government Agency charged with the
public promotion of U.S. foreign policy
objectives, faced a variety of audiences:
the governments and peoples of
friendly, nonaligned, and adversary
states. Many audiences merited special,
sometimes unique, attention. Three
examples illustrate the manner in which
this attention was implemented with
respect to the people in the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, and Cuba.
In order to keep pressure on the
leaders in the Kremlin, the United
of the Soviet Union knew about the
genesis and implications of the crisis in
Cuba. Since the controlled Soviet press
had not revealed the presence of nuclear
missile sites and other vital information
germane to the crisis, USIA undertook
to rectify the omissions. On 25 October,
following a series of radio announce-
ments alerting audiences to the up-
coming event, VOA conducted a satura-
tion broadcast to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Designed to penetrate
jamming by 2,000 Communist inter-
ference transmitters, VOA massed 52
transmitters, strategically sited around
the Soviet Union, with a total power of
nearly 4.5 million watts-equivalent to
more than 86 of the strongest U.S. radio
stations broadcasting simultaneously-
for an 8%z-hour-long radio barrage in 10
languages on 80 frequencies. Favored by
good propagation the saturation barrage
broke through the jamming efforts and,
as confirmed by electronic monitoring
and reports from American newsmen in
Moscow at the time, proved highly
successful.
A second example took place in
Great Britain. One objective of U.S.
public diplomacy was to establish the
credibility of the Soviet threat to world
peace. The United States recognized
that the promotion of this objective
would contribute to a favorable consen-
sus of public opinion and support
abroad which, in turn, would exert
additional pressure on the Soviet Union
to withdraw the source of the threat.
While the favorable consensus was
achieved rapidly in most countries, this
was not the case with respect to the
United States major ally, Great Britain,
where much of the immediate press
reaction to the quarantine address was
negative. The Guardian doubted the
effectiveness and wisdom of the quaran-
tine, while the Daily Telegraph saw it as
"greatly mistimed." The Daily Mail felt
that the President was being led by
popular emotion rather than states-
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 37
promote the traditional British stance as have originated from the Bay of Pigs
mediator. Perhaps most revealing was experience. He wanted to be certain
the call by the Daily Herald for "irrefut- that the Cubans knew what the Soviet
able proof" of the charge against the Union was doing on their island and
Soviet Union. that the United States sought elimina-
Luckily the proof was at hand in the tion of the missile threat without the
form of photographs of the missile bases use of force. These points were high-
which had been flown to London for lighted in the round-the-clock Spanish
briefing of the British Prime Minister, programs of the Voice of America,
Harold Macmillan. Presciently, upon which carried news broadcasts every 30
being shown the photographs the night minutes. But the President also ordered
the President delivered his quarantine USIA to organize a massive leaflet drop
speech, the Prime Minister had asserted for the island.22 Within 72 hours, 5
that they should be published in the million copies of a one-page leaflet were
newspapers immediately since the threat prepared and printed in cooperation
would not be believed until the photo- with the Psychological Warfare Head-
graphs were shown.2 0 As a result of the quarters at Fort Bragg, N.C. On one side
reaction of the press and the Prime of the leaflet was a photograph identify-
Minister, USIA officers in London ing a nuclear missile base site in Cuba,
sought and received permission on 23 while the other side described in
October to release prints of the photo- Spanish the responsibility and inten-
graphs. The prints were used that tions of the Soviet Union in con-
evening on special programs carried by strueting the missile bases on Cuban
both nationwide television channels, soil. Though the leaflets were loaded
reaching an. estimated audience of 21 into canisters and mounted on planes at
million persons. At the same time, a Florida airbase, they were never
prints were provided to the national dropped.
press, and they dominated the news on As the leaflets were prepared for
the following morning, appearing in delivery, a U-2 plane had been shot
newspapers with national circulations of down by a missile over Cuba. At the
24 million copies. Citing the photo- same time a letter was received from
graphs, the London daily Express ran a Premier Khrushchev indicating possible
one-word headline "Evidence." And the stiffening of Soviet resistance. As a
daily Sketch called it "Proof." The consequence, President Kennedy was
photographs were credited with playing probably reluctant to aggravate the
a principal role in converting British tense situation with a leaflet drop which
public opinion toward acceptance of the might have been interpreted as a prelude
U.S. position. to invasion. Since the Soviet Union
Moreover, because of the release of agreed during the following morning to
the photographs in Great Britain, the remove the offensive weapons from
embargo on their use was lifted every- Cuba, the rationale for dropping the
where. As a result, they made a substan- leaflets was eliminated.
tial contribution toward influencing Through these and a myriad of other
world public opinion21 in favor of activities, USIA played the prime role in
principal objectives of U.S. public diplo- presenting U.S. policy to foreign audi-
macy: the establishment of the Soviet enccs during the crisis. In large part
guilt and threat. because of this effort, it was later
As a final example, President claimed that the U.S. position in the
Kennedy expressed special concern for crisis and the threat upon which it was
the Cuban people. This concern sur- based-the Soviet missiles in Cuba-were
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 3roe~~A~rW ~R~LLOEG)ERA-RDP84-004998000100110028-4
C( 1.? DE 1'F'(>YfiCT[Lf
iznrruia A-.,,-
)f_I>C) 1* C"U111f RTA
f. f: Pf UYf:C'1"f A
RKMOLQU ES-TANQUE
D. COMf3USTMIX
PAPA ? N YEtfIIA7S
?UES-TANQUE
DE COMf3USTI13LF.
PARA PROYECTILES
Esta fotografia fue' tomada un dia de ]a semana pasada desde
un avion que volo' sobre Cuba. Ella muestra una base de
proyectiles nucleares de caracter ofensivo cerca de San Cristo-
bal. Esta es una de varias bases que apresurada y secreta-
mente fueron construfdas por los rusos y pare los rusos.
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 39
LA VERDAD
Los rusos secretamente han construido bases de proyectiles
nucleares de caracter ofensivo en Cuba. Estas bases ponen en
peligro. vidas cubanas y la paz del mundo, porque Cuba es
ahora una base de avanzada para la agresion sovietica.
Los rusos, con el consentimiento de Castro, Ilevaron a cabo
su trabajo en secreto. Los cubanos no tienen acceso a esas
bases. Pero las bases estan alli
Para proteger a) pueblo cubano, y a todos los pueblos del
hemisferio occidental, el Presidente Kennedy con ]a aprobacion
de todos los paises latinoamericanos ha impuesto una cuar-
entena para evitar que este equipo belico de caracter ofensivo
sea desembarcado en Cuba. Los alimentos no son detenidos,
]as medicinas no son detenidas, solo es detenido el material
de guerra agresivo de los rusos.
Cuando. ese material de guerra sea retirado de Cuba la cuar-
entena terminara
Gt
Ocho de diez bases de
proyectiles nucleares de
caracter ofensivo. eaten
localizadas en ]as cerca-
nas de Guanajay, Reme-
dios, San Cristobal y
Sagua la Grande.
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40 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
throughout the world than any other
single international issue in history.2 3
But USIA was not the only channel
for promoting the objectives of U.S.
public diplomacy in this period. These
objectives were also advanced by unoffi-
cial means, such as through the domes-
tic and international information media,
which carried or commented upon
reports made by U.S. Government
spokesmen at the White House, the
Department of State, the Department of
Defense, and the United Nations. This
news coverage and commentary not
only informed the world public about
events and their implications, it also
engaged in transmitting to all recipients
signals of the will, force, and intent of
the United States throughout the crisis,
thereby providing an additional means
of presenting and clarifying the U.S.
position abroad. Because of the extreme
seriousness of the situation and the
rapidity with which these reports were
disseminated by the international infor-
mation media, this facet of public diplo-
macy had a greater impact than usual on
the crisis.
This facet and its impact became
particularly apparent during the final
phase of the crisis. By Friday, 26
October, 4 days after the quarantine
speech, the United States knew that
construction work on the missile bases
was being accelerated, rather than termi-
nated. In view of this information it was
estimated that some of the missile bases
could be operational within several
days, at which time the United States
would have lost its tactical advantage
and be faced with a new, more dan-
gerous situation: the probability of mis-
sile launches from Cuba against targets
in the United States before the bases
could be eliminated by force, in case a
strike became necessary. Operational
readiness of the bases would raise
sharply the ante of the confrontation.
Implementation of the naval
llgluarantine
2 days
ent MAs'' , r1rs Q ?4J 9W
ARW
had failed to deter construction at the
sites. It was clear that the United States
would have to convince the Soviet
Union of the need to halt work on the
bases very shortly or be prepared to do
it by unilateral means through the use
of force.
At this juncture, on 26 October,
Department of State spokesman Lincoln
White noted at the noontime press
briefing that construction work was
continuing on the missile bases. He then
called attention to President Kennedy's
earlier statement in his quarantine
speech to the effect that further U.S.
action would be justified if the military
preparations continued. Later that day
the White House released a statement
indicating that construction of the bases
was being speeded up under the attempt
of camouflage. Shortly thereafter Con-
gressman Clement Zabllocki told
reporters that it might soon be neces-
sary to conduct "pinpoint bombing"
against the missile sites. Finally, the
press was authorized to report on the
buildup of a marine strike force in
Florida.24 This series of public
announcements was sufficient to ignite
a barrage of headlines indicating the
growing justification for, and the strong
imminence of, invasion or airstrikes
against Cuba. Within 48 hours Radio
Moscow broadcast the text of Khrush-
chev's letter agreeing to dismantle the
missile sites and to remove the offensive
weapons from Cuba.
Publicizing knowledge of the accel-
erating construction work on the missile
bases established the basis for "further
action" cited by the President. By
coupling notice of this acceleration with
the buildup of a U.S. invasion force
implied what the next act on the part of
the United States could be. Moreover,
correlating the preparations for invasion
with the construction work on the
missile bases served to indicate to
Premier Khrushchev how the Soviet
Union could stop escalation of U.S.
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 41
Khrushchev later admitted that the
Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the
offensive weapons when it became clear
that an invasion from the United States
was actually imminent.2 5 And Pierre
Salinger, the President's press secretary,
concluded that the statements released
on the continuing work at the missile
base sites were as important in main-
taining pressure at this time as the
positioning of U.S. troops for the pos-
sible invasion of Cuba. 2 6
There was no boasting and no claim
of victory by the United States when
the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its
offensive weapons from the island.
President Kennedy declined to appear
on television at this occasion and made
it clear to his staff that moderation
remained the rule-giving rise to the
suggestion that the United States wished
to avoid dismantling Khrushchev along
with the missile bases. Even during the
following weeks that it took to achieve
removal of the missiles and the
bombers, without the agreed on-site
inspection, the United States refrained
from any appearance of gloating over
the outcome of the crisis. Realization of
how close the United States had come
to open hostilities with its nuclear-
armed adversary must have been suffi-
ciently sobering for the policymakers
who had endured the traumatic experi-
ence. During this aftermath period they
also may well have been assessing the
factors which created the crisis, as well
as those that facilitated its resolution.
The same determinations could be
sought with respect to the role played
by public diplomacy during this epi-
sode.
With hindsight, there is general agree-
ment that misjudgments and misconcep-
tions contributed substantially to the
growth of the crisis. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union erred in
assessing the strength of the other's will,
interests, and intentions. The "signals"
that the Kenned administration felt
proMcgiFt@ i, elWsgh?0We i 3
apparently did not transmit the
messages that were intended. These
efforts were conceivably masked by the
administration's seeming reluctance to
challenge openly the blatant Soviet
buildup of military supplies and person-
nel in Cuba. Certainly the U.S. policy of
restraint, as reflected in its public diplo-
macy, provided ample grounds for the
Soviet Union to be misled into sus-
pecting that the United States might not
oppose, either publicly or forcefully,
the presence of offensive weapons in
Cuba, at least until after the congres-
sional elections-by which time the mis-
sile bases would have been operational
and incalculably more difficult to elimi-
nate.
But after the discovery of the missile
sites by the United States, the extent of
Soviet misjudgment was revealed by
deft and coordinated application of
military power, private persuasion, and
public diplomacy. Under firm, unilateral
leadership, the United States rallied its
own forces, its allies, and world opinion
to the defense of a vital interest. By
clearly defining achievable objectives
and by pursuing them with the mini-
Mr. G. Scott Sug-
den did his under-
graduate work at
Brown University in
international relations
and holds a master's
degree and Ph.D. in
international relations
from the Fletcher
School of Law and
Diplomacy. As an officer of the United States
Information Service (USIS) he has served in
USIS offices of both India and Pakistan, has
been the Director of Student Affairs in
London and the Director in Northern Nigeria
and most recently was assigned to the Office
of the Director for Africa. Mr. Sugden is a
recent graduate of the College of Naval
Warfare, and is currently serving as Plans
Officer for the Joint United States Public
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42 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
mum amount of force through means
which allowed the Soviet Union an
honorable means for public accomo-
dation, the United States reached a
resolution of the crisis. This process was
facilitated by the ability to convince the
Soviet Union and other interested coun-
tries that the United States had both the
resolve and the military power to elimi-
nate the threat of the offensive weapons
in Cuba by whatever means were neces-
sary. It was in this capacity that public
diplomacy made its most meaningful
contribution.
In short, during the Cuban missile
crisis U.S. public diplomacy served as a
principal means of conveying the will,
intent, and capability of the United
States. Its use expressed recognition of
the influence that modern communica-
tions media and world public opinion
can have upon government decision-
makers. Moreover, it demonstrated with
force the dependence of its effectiveness
upon sound policy and the strength of
credible evidence.
If the United States is to face
another confrontation with the Soviet
Union in Cuba, it would do well to
profit from the experience of its previ-
ous encounter. The Soviet Union must
not be misled into harboring misconcep-
tions about the interests of the United
States and its capacity and resolve to
protect those interests. It should be
made clear at the outset what the
United States considers inimical to its
security and to its interests.
The confrontation of 1962 demon-
strated that public diplomacy can make
a significant contribution to inter-
national crisis management and resolu-
tion. The United States must be well
prepared to use it wisely and effectively.
FOOTNOTES
1. Robert D. Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: a Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet
Policy," Orbis, Winter 1963, p. 533. See also James Reston, "Not Only the President Was Killed,
but the Promise," The New York Times Magazine, 15 November 1964, p. 24; and Theodore C.
Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 545-550.
2. Arnold L. Horelick, The Cuban Missile Crisis: an Analysis of Soviet Calculations and
Behavior (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 1963), p. 38.
3. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 492-496.
4. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 161, 165.
5. U.S. Dept. of State, Press Release no. 195, 27 March 1962.
6. "Interview with Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs," U.S. News & World Report, 6 August 1962, p. 18.
7. See Oral History Interview (text) for John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Mass., with
Robert Hurwitch, Special Assistant for Cuban Affairs, Department of State, p. 1.36; Walt W.
Rostow, View from the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 9-10; Sorensen, p.
671.
8. Norman Cousins, "Newspapers and Hair Triggers," Saturday Review, 4 August 1962, p.
12.
9. See "The President's News Conference of August 29," Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., ]1963), p.
652-653; and Harold Chase and Allen Lerman, eds., Kennedy and the Press (New York: Crowell,
1965), p. 314-315.
10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committees for Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Situation
in Cuba, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962), p. 31.
11. George W. Ball, "Trading Relations between the Free World and Cuba," The Department
of State Bulletin, 22 October 1962, p. 591-595.
12. See Oral History Interview (text) for John F. Kennedy Library with Edwin Marlin, p. 56;
and James Daniel and John G. Hubbell, Strike in the West (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1963), p. 34.
13. See Walter Lippmann, "Cuba: Watchful Waiting," New York Herald Tribune, 18
September 1962, p. 26; Walter Lippmann, "On War with Cuba," New York Herald Tribune, 9
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MISSILES OF OCTOBER 43
off Cubanism," The Economist, 6 October 1962, p. 1647; David Richardson, "Count Me Out,"
U.S. News & World Report, 17 September 1962, p. 39; and Sorensen, p. 672.
14. For details of the military operations see the Reports of the Secretaries in the
Department of Defense, U.S. Dept. of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1963
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1964), p. 4-8, 111-114, 190-191, 243-247.
15. See Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 287; and
Sorensen, p. 319, 674.
16. Thomas C. Sorensen, The Word War (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 205; and
Crane, p. 538.
17. USIA Director Edward R. Murrow was in the hospital with pneumonia throughout this
period.
18. Interview with Donald Wilson, Vice President, Time Inc., New York: 17 November 1970;
and Oral History Interview (text) for John F. Kennedy Library with Donald Wilson, 2 September
1963, p. 16-21.
19. For a summary of these operations, objectives, and reactions see U.S. Information
Agency, 19th Review of Operations July 1-December 31, 1962 (Washington: 1963), p. 5-12; and
Thomas C. Sorensen, p. 202-210.
20. Oral History Interview (text) for John F. Kennedy Library with Dean Acheson, p. 27.
21. See Oral History Interview with Donald Wilson, p. 21; and Alastair Buchan, Crisis
Management the New Diplomacy (Paris: Atlantic Institute, 1966), p. 34.
22. Ibid., p. 22-23. See also Theodore Sorensen, p. 711; and Thomas Sorensen, p. 204-205.
23. Donald Wilson, "Persuasion Overseas: an Element of Power," Vassar Alumnae Magazine,,
February 1964, p. 11; see also Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time: the Life of Edward R. Murrow
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 484.
24. See Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: Lippincott, 1966), p. 173-174; Oran R.
Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 212-213; Henry
M. Pachter, Collision Course (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 44-50; and Hilsman, 213-214.
25. Nikita Khrushchev Speech before the Supreme Soviet December 12, 1962, The New
York Times, 13 December 1962, p. 2:3-8; and his Khrushchev Remembers, p. 497-498.
26. Salinger, p. 301; see also Young, p. 213.
The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the
modern commander.
T.E. Lawrence, 1888-1935
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44 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
PHYSICIANS' ASSISTANTS:
CAN THEY AUGMENT THE NAVY MEDICAL SERVICE?
The adequacy of health care by naval medical facilities is being seriously
threatened by a chronic shortage of doctors-a situation that is projected to further
deteriorate in the civilian as well as the Navy community. Available resources will not
permit the training of sufficient doctors to alleviate this problem, and what is clearly
needed is some alternative method for improving health services in the Navy. One
practical alternative is the physician's assistant. It offers both a feasible and suitable
means of making existing Navy physicians stretch further and, thereby, provide more
adequate health care to the greater naval community.
A research paper prepared
by
Captain Mario A. Vasquez, MC, U.S. Navy
College of Naval Warfare
THE CONTEMPORARY
HEALTH SCENE
Introduction. One hundred years ago
on 7 March 1871, the U.S. Navy Medi-
cal Corps came into being. For almost
an entire century its basic mission has
remained unchanged: To provide the
best medical care available to the men
and women of the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps. That this has been done
with skill and distinction is attested to
by the admiration and gratitude of
generations of Navy men. Unfortu-
nately, congressional acts in 1947 and
1950 have added such an additional
patient load on Navy physicians that
they can no longer provide the quality
of medical care which has characterized
The major problem facing Navy
medicine today-indeed, medical prac-
tice throughout the country-is the in-
creasing number of patients without a
compensatory increase in the number of
physicians. The training of paramedical
personnel has been suggested as one way
to reduce the medical manpower short-
age.
For many years the Navy has trained
an "army" of allied health personnel to
assist with medical care. It would seem
prudent, therefore, to examine the con-
cept of the physician's assistant in the
light of present-day Navy medical needs
and resources.
Civilian Medical Scene. One of the
realities of present-day medicine has
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