NEW EMPHASIS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

NEW EMPHASIS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
t?Y1OPI/CDF Pages I and -
.iowrtgractr,a and decia~ss
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Tins MATERIAL CONTAINS INFOI-CNfATION AFFECT-
ING `?"JE NTATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
W ITL.I N THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
T1TLJ. 19, U C, SECTIONS 793 AND 791. THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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28 February 1964
NEW EMPHASIS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
De Gaulle has made it abundantly clear in the
past year that he is determined to assert the
global role he has always claimed for France. His
vigorous exercise of leadership in the EEC, his
call for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, and
France's recognition of Communist China are all evi-
dence of this. Equally clear is re Gaulle's intent
to take more initiatives in the year ahead. He prob-
ably plans to use his prospective trips to Latin
America to expand his views on the opportunities all
underdeveloped countries now have to follow independ-
ent policies. Efforts to re-establish French influ-
ence in the Middle and Far East are already evident,
and negotiations are under way for freer trade rela-
tions between France and various parts of the So-
viet bloc. A De Gaulle initiative in the disarma-
ment field is also a possibility.
At the bottom of De Gaulle
proclivity for functioning out
of concert with the US is his
conviction that the two major
postwar power blocs no longer
correspond to current political
reality. He believes that new
alignments are inevitable and
that all countries should be
encouraged to reassess their cur-
rent commitments in the light
of national interests. In De
Gaulle's view, France's asser-
tion of its national independ-
ence while at the same time
achieving economic prosperity
offers other countries--whether
or not they are aligned with
either of the major power blocs
--an attractive example to fol-
low.
De Gaulle, moreover, is
by no means 'above offering some
tangible inducements to pros-
pective converts to his way of
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thinking. France, whose record
on foreign aid is impressive,
seems to be in a mood to broaden
its program--which, up to now,
has been concentrated on its
former African territories.
Paris is giving serious con-
sideration, within its financial
limits, to the idea of granting
more aid to countries outside
the franc zone.
This intensified interest
in other areas of the world
does not imply any shift in De
Gaulle's view of France's claim
to leadership in Europe. In-
deed, if the other states of
Western Europe had responded
more favorably to his proposal
in 1962 for political integra-
tion,he might be asserting him-
self even more forcefully on
the world scene. His efforts
in Europe are less spectacular
at the moment because he is
not sure how far he can press
West German Chancellor Erhard,
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And because he fools overt
moves toward unity must now be
initiated by others. This does
not mean that he is quiescent,
however. On the contrary, he
has been pressing the Italians
behind the scenes to take the
lead in pursuit of the policies
he has recommended.
Many of the moves De
Gaulle has in mind run counter
to US objectives, although it
would be underestimating the
man to see in such initiatives
only an attempt to irritate
Washington. It is his single-
mindness in advancing French
influence, regardless of whose
toes are stepped on, that will
inevitably lead him to adopt
policies that will impinge on
US interests.
De Gaulle has made no
bones about his intention of
establishing an active working
relationship with Peiping. He
does not cherish the illusion
that China is a bottomless mar-
ket for French products, but
the prospects for trade and for
new opportunities to export
French technology probably had
a positive bearing on the de-
cision to recognize Peiping.
For both'France and the
US, Paris' political dealings
with the Chinese Communists
will be vastly more important
than other aspects of the rela-
tionship. High on the agenda,
perhaps the foremost item, is
the matter of working out a
settlement in Southeast Asia.
De Gaulle is at once concerned
that the war In Vietnam will
escalate and convinced that no
workable peaceful solution to
the problem is feasible unless
it is endorsed by Peiping.
Hence, his proposal for neu-
tralization of the area and the
withdrawal of all foreign
forces.
De Gaulle's approach does
not add up to his having any
serious thoughts of restoring
France's position in Southeast
Asia to what it once was. It
does, however, seem calculated
to make France the chief West-
tern spokesman in an Asia domi-
nated by China.
In the UN, France can be
expected to support Peiping's
claim to the Chinese seat in
the organization's delibera-
tive bodies as well as in its
various specialized agencies.
The French Foreign Ministry,
on the other hand, has told US
officials that it is doing
what it can to discourage
French-speaking African states
from following Paris' lead in
recognizing Communist China.
While the French would certainly
want to keep the Chinese Com-
munists from establishing them-
selves in West Africa, Paris
is in no position to dictate
a policy of caution to the Af-
rican authorities.
De Gaulle has long held
that the peace and stability
of all Southeast Asia turn on
a peaceful settlement of the
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struggle in Vietnam. The in-
ability of the South Vietnamese
military to control the Viet
Cong forces is permitting him
to sharpen his case.
De Gaulle probably has
not formulated a point-by-point
proposal for restoring peace in
Vietnam. It is evident, how-
ever, that he is thinking about
a settlement along the lines of
the 1954 Geneva accords. In
broad outline, De Gaulle sees
four principal requirements
for such a settlement: 1) a
negotiated cease-fire, 2) the
withdrawal of all foreign forces,
3) establishment of a neutral,
coalition government in South
Vietnam, and 4) some arrange-
ment leading to the reunifica-
tion of the country. De Gaulle
is under no illusion that the
Communists would concede that
a unified Vietnam could be truly
neutral. He probably believes,
however, that the North Viet-
namese fear Chinese domination
and thinks that continued French
and Soviet interest in the area
ultimately would produce a na-
tionalist-Communist state which
would limit Chinese expansion-
ism and leave some opening for
Western influence.
Paris is keeping its lines
open to Hanoi while continuing
to maintain clandestine contact
with Vietnamese exiles and pro-
French elements within South
Vietnam itself. One aspect of
the exercise presumably is to
turn up a credible candidate,
either civilian or military, to
head a neutralist regime in Sai-
gon. So far, however, there is
no evidence tnat the French are
on the verge of surfacing any-
one or that they have even nar-
rowed the field of prospects.
Elsewhere in Indochina,
De Gaulle can be counted on not
only to support the neutralists
in Laos and Sihanouk in Cam-
bodia, but to encourage them to
reach some sort of accommodation
with the Communists. In Laos,
the French have worked against
an alliance between the neutral-
ist premier, Souvanna Phouma,
and the rightist leader, Gen-
eral Phoumi, that would isolate
the Pathet Lao. Souvanna and
King Savang, when they visit
Paris in April, are likely to
be pressed to loosen their ties
with Phoumi in favor of closer
ones with the Pathet Lao. The
French may even attempt to
allay Laotian fears that such
a move would precipitate a cut
in US aid by promising to fill
some of the gap as they have
done in Cambodia.
De Gaulle has worked as-
siduously to cultivate Prince
Sihanouk and is sympathetic to
Cambodia's demand for an inter-
national conference to guarantee
its neutrality. He may, in
fact, see in such a conference
an opening to negotiate the neu-
tralization of all Southeast
Asia.
Paris has hinted that
Thailand must ultimately be in-
cluded in the area to be neu-
tralized, and is not above pro-
moting neutralist sentiment in
that country. It can be antici-
pated that the French will
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25X1
continuo to ?uup ort thi Ctmho-
dtans III t1wil' t'cude with the
Thais., c1t1d ttl step UP the tf-
fort to denigrate SEATO. A
ranking Foreign Ministry of-
ficial, in fact, has already
hinted that his government feels
the time is fast approaching
when SEATO ought to be dis-
banded.
Middle and Far East
De Gaulle's advocacy of
independence from the US and
the USSR in the French manner
is likely to be sounded in all
those countries that make up25X1
the arc stretching from Suez
to Japan.
source 0
claimed in mid-February
out for special attention. At
any rate, Premier Pompidou and
Foreign Minister Couve de Mur-
ville are scheduled to travel
to Tokyo in April,where they
will no doubt treat the Japa-
nese to an eloquent exposition
of De Gaulle's views.
Other, less developed
countries may become benefici-
aries of French aid. This aid,
however, will have some strings
attached for, as De Gaulle
bluntly stated in his recent
press conference, "we would
not be inclined to give much
to him who gives nothing."
What the French apparently have
in mind is the granting of
loans tied to purchases of
French goods, similar to the
$60-million deal worked out
with Iran last year.
that French propaganda activity
had intensified in Lebanon and
that he had never seen French
popularity and influence in
the Levant as high as they are
today. He said Paris was
hammering at several themes:
there is no conflict between
France and the Arab states;
unlike the US, France is not
tied to Israel; France does
not maintain occupation troops
in the area as does the UK,
nor does it support subversive
elements as does the USSR;
France is willing to increase
its aid to the Arab states;
France exercises enormous in-
fluence in the Western Mediter-
ranean that could be useful to
the Arab states.
It is Japan, the key coun-
try in this sprawling area, that
appears to have been singled
In any event, the French
aid effort in this area will
be limited, and dispensed on
a highly selective basis. This
is because Paris' policy pre-
cludes any major reduction in
the amount of aid earmarked for
Africa, and France's current
stabilization program limits
the availability of new funds.
The two trips De Gaulle
plans to make to Latin America
in 1964--Mexico from 16 to 19
March and South America in the
fall--may have exceptional
significance. Much as he sees
the Sino-Soviet conflict as a
fertile field of exploitation,
he may view the friction be-
tween the US and some countries
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of Latin America as opening an
area for French maneuvers. The
itinerary he seems to have in
mind--including Brazil and Ar-
gentina--suggests at least that
he has chosen countries which
would be receptive to encourage-
ment of greater independence
from the US.
His purpose in making an
appeal for independent action
would not be to exacerbate fur-
ther the relations between
France and the US. However,
he may feel that his backing
for such a posture in Latin
America would help to focus
US attention more strongly on
the Western Hemisphere and tend
to divert it from other areas.
In the Gaullist view of inter-
national power relationships
this would mean more freedom
of action for France elsewhere.
It is doubtful that De
Gaulle will sanction any aid
program in Latin America that
would leave France substantially
out of pocket. He may, however,
seek to bring the rest of the
EEC in on a joint European aid
program or, if the EEC mecha-
nism proves too cumbersome, at-
tempt a coordinated program with
West Germany and possibly Italy.
In any case, De Gaulle will
almost certainly refuse to con-
nect any French or European aid
program with the US effort, al-
though he may agree to some
vague form of "coordination."
Areas of Soviet Influence
De Gaulle probably does
not feel the time ripe to nego-
tiate directly with Moscow--
the USSR is not yet sufficiently
hard pressed by conflicts within
the bloc nor is Western Europe
sufficiently strong. It is
well to remember, however, that
he believes this ultimately
must come and that he owes
Khrushchev a visit that he will
want to repay, at least before
leaving office if not this year.
Some increase in trade with the
USSR will result from Finance
Minister Giscard d'Estaing's
recent visit to Moscow and from
the scheduled negotiation of
new French-Soviet commercial
protocols this spring. France
is also wavering on the issue
of granting long-term credits
to the USSR; in this, it will
be influenced by what other
West European countries do.
It would be consistent
with De Gaulle's philosophy
if Paris were to undertake
some moves to encourage the
East European satellites, par-
ticularly Poland, to assert a
greater degree of independence
from Moscow. While France's
leverage is limited, there
exists some possibilities of
influencing the satellites
through a trade expansion pro-
gram. Paris may feel, however,
that more positive results can
be obtained by promoting the
revival of old cultural ties
and developing new ones.
Trade with Havana, on the
upswing in 1963, is likely to
keep rising, as Paris shows
increasing willingness to move
away from its straight cash
sale policy. Thus, more deals
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similar to the one in which
the government guaranteed 80
percent of a $10-million loan
to cover a Cuban purchase of
trucks and tractors are defi-
nitely in the offing.
Western Europe
France's refusal to par-
ticipate in the US-UK plan for
a NATO peace-keeping force on
Cyprus is only the latest mani-
festation of De Gaulle's dis-
satisfaction with the Atlantic
Alliance in its present form.
He continues to disparage NATO
while maintaining his loyalty
to the alliance. No changes
are in prospect for a change
in the French attitude toward
the rest of the alliance on
such matters as drafting a com-
mon strategy governing the use
of nuclear weapons. For the
present, however, cooperation
between French national com-
mands and NATO is reasonably
satisfactory, and there are no
indications that De Gaulle is
planning any more drastic anti-
NATO moves in the immediate fu-
ture.
In the European Community,
De Gaulle will push for early
implementation of the EEC agri-
cultural agreements and.may
well make agreement on this a
prerequisite for EEC participa-
tion in the Kennedy Round.
Disarmament is one field
in which De Gaulle would very
much like to make a dramatic
gesture if he could find the
right opening. In a press
conference last July he indi-
cated an intention to call a
meeting of the four nuclear
powers before the end of the
year, and subsequently ordered
the Foreign Ministry to consider
a French disarmament plan. His
unexplained silence in the in-
terim should not be taken to
mean that he has dropped the
notion. He sees no prospects
for success in the current dis-
armament conference in Geneva,
which Paris will probably con-
tinue to avoid. He may call
for a new one in which the Chi-
nese Communists would be in-
vited to participate..
It must be assumed that
De Gaulle has analyzed the
outlook for disarmament in
terms of Peiping's policy ob-
jectives. He has almost cer-
tainly weighed the pros and
cons of giving the Chinese
enough information to qualify
them for membership in the nu-
clear club. It would not be
surprising if France and China
were to negotiate a nuclear re-
search agreement similar to that
which France has with the USSR.
While there has been some specu-
lation that French-Chinese nu-
clear cooperation was in prospect
in the weapon field, there is
no firm evidence to substan-
tiate the speculation. There
are potential advantages as
well as disadvantages to such
a step from De Gaulle's point
of view, however, and the pos-
sibility cannot be ruled out.
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