SOVIET MILITARY AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300040003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0311/63A
Copy No. 71
SPECIAL REPORT
SOVIET MILITARY AID
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH ~PHrc,aRu1aRTS
at~T IX=DIATSIX AMR USE
Jos .. _ ,
20 December 1963
C RO1!P i F , ~ sided f,cirt, automatic
ioAr Iccmu and cec.lassitieation
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Military aid continues to be an important
instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow's
activities in the field appear to be at an all-
time high. More than $3.2 billion worth of Soviet
bloc military hardware and technical assistance
has been committed to non-Communist countries
(excluding Cuba) since 1955. Two thirds of this
has been extended by the USSR since early 1960.
The size of new military aid commitments has
been reduced in the past two years from the 1960-
61 peak, but the number of recipient countries
has increased and long-term programs are steadily
being carried out. Advanced weapons systems have
become a standard aid item, large Soviet military-
advisory missions are operating in several coun-
tries, military production facilities are being
supplied abroad, and on some occasions the USSR
has provided personnel to man equipment tempo-
rarily.
Soviet military aid origi-
nally focused on the same short-
term ends as economic aid: es-
tablishing a presence, develop-
ing ties, fostering neutralism,
and stimulating economic rela-
tions through repayment obliga-
tions. It was used as a means
of entry into several countries,
even before economic aid. Prior
to mid-1960, however, the USSR
seemed reluctant to acknowledge
its association with arms deals.
It avoided undue publicity about
the program and sometimes used
the European satellites. as
middlemen.
Moscow probably soon saw
the advantages of military
assistance: rapid delivery,
plentiful supplies to draw on,
immediate impact, and the en-
largement of Soviet contacts
with elite military circles.
As the trade and aid offensive
matured and Moscow became em-
broiled in the complexities and
slow fruition of economic develop-
ment, the military aid program
doubtless seemed even more
attractive. In 1960 and 1961,
when the rate of Soviet economic
aid extensions was curtailed,
new military aid extensions
reached record levels.
In the second half of 1960,
soon after the collapse of the'
summit conference and the erup-
tion of the Sino-Soviet conflict,
the USSR embarked on an unprece-
dented wave of military aid ac-
tivity. This seemed aimed largely
at demonstrating militant Soviet
support for the "national libera-
tion movement" to the rest of
the Communist world.
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GHANA
EGYPT
NOTE: These figures reflect list prices quoted by the bloc for equipment and
technical services. They do not reflect the large price discounts frequently
granted by the USSR and they do not indicate the debt obligations of recipe
ients. In most instances the estimates are based on fragmentary information
and for some countries they are quite rough. The figures for Iraq, Indonesia,
and India, for example, are based largely on reliable documents, while those
for Egypt, Syria, and Afghanistan generally lack similar supporting evidence.
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the
port
In August-September
1960
Soviet weapons--had not then
USSR moved rapidly to
pro-Communist forces
sup-
in
been transferred
countries.
to
other bloc
the Congo. In September it be-
gan to supply arms to Cuba after
months of apparent hesitation.
In the same month Soviet mili-
tary shipments to Guinea were
initiated and the first major
Soviet-Indonesian arms deal was
signed. In October the first
important arms agreement with
the UAR in more than two years
was concluded. In November the
first Soviet military agreement
with India--for transport air-
craft--was concluded, a gift of
jet fighters was offered to
Morocco, and a long-range mili-
tary program was proposed for
Ghana.
In early December 1960,
soon after the Moscow conference
of Communist parties in which
the Soviets were scored by the
Chinese for inadequately sup-
porting revolutionary struggles,
the USSR began its airlift to
aid the neutralist/Communist
forces in Laos. Shortly there-
after the first shipments of
Soviet weapons were made via
Morocco to the Algerian forces.
In January 1961 the first
agreement for tactical missilery
was concluded with Indonesia;
similar agreements were reached
with the UAR and Iraq later in
the year. For the first'time
the USSR agreed to supply TU-16
(Badger) jet medium bombers,
MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighters,
and Komar guided-missile boats,
as well as modern armored vehi-
cles and naval ships. Many of
these items--still first-line
An innovation in Soviet
military aid was introduced under
an arms deal with Indonesia in
May 1962. Soviet crews were
used to man six submarines which
SOVIET BLOC IC( YASSISTANCE
and"Ft8uies
asrcp
ice 1955, more than $~ 2 billion worth of Soviet bloc
ry aid has been committed to ISS non Communist coon
. Over $.2 5 billion of this has been delivered- a rake af,'
V utilization far greater than for economic aid programs`
4 out$# 2 bstlionoftotal aid in the form of grants acrd
c discounts -does not require_repaymenf iPu st ?af t .
r t r? fining $2 billion has been financed by medium and long
term credits. ~
# ercer t of total Corn
U SR I pr tvided m aret anto
rtitait ma itary aid, and much, cf the_ rest has been me naged
ascow
Bi est=gears for new commitments were F9b0 aid ] 6r
wen aid extended totaled some 50 million and $770 mrl-
pectively . Extensions have tapered ofd` somewhat sinc
hen, but,the size + f man ynew agreements in not yet known
`,: deals w h Indonesia and Egypt accoun for nearf
a-t ?trr s o the entire program
estimated $ la mill an _at,. O#n spent an militar
ca assistanae.._
earl lvr,t :foreign nationais have re lved some
of m itary training sn the Soviet bloc
r est mate l 11,000 Soviet bloc military technicians`
`~d advisers hove worked abroad for perfi+ ds-of six months
Or: ,ore: ...
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had been provided on very short
notice and deployed during the
height of the West Irian crisis.
The Soviet crews stayed for sev-
eral months while Indonesian
personnel were trained. Simi-
larly, in early October 1962
Soviet personnel began to help
man Egyptian bombers and trans-
ports in support of UAR mili-
tary operations in Yemen.
The development of Cuba as
a strategic Soviet base in the
summer and autumn of 1962 was
carried out under the guise of
a military aid program. Much of
the intense Soviet activity in
the military aid field last
year--including that in Indo-
nesia and Yemen--served to mask
the nature of the Cuban build-
up, even though the Soviets may
not have intended this.
Recent Developments
Since the US-Soviet con-
frontation over Cuba in 1962--
a high-water mark in Soviet
military activities abroad--
Moscow has continued to stress
military aid. Throughout 1963
the USSR has supported UAR opera-
tions in Yemen and early in the
year began supplying the repub-
lican government with some equip-
ment directly. In the UAR it-
self, Soviet activity is con-
centrated on development of a
missile-equipped air defense
system, which now includes con-
struction of at least eight sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) sites
and some 60 MIG-21s. The system
is not yet in operation.
The program in Iraq was
subjected to a severe test in
1963 when Soviet-Iraqi relations
were nearly broken off and mili-
tary aid was halted for two`
months. Shipments have resumed
since then, but parts of the
over-all program--including the
SAM project--are suspended and
the number of Soviet military
advisers in the country has been
sharply reduced.
In Syria, political insta-
bility has hampered Soviet mili-
tary aid activities. Periodic
deliveries are continuing, how-
ever. Four Komar guided-missile
boats arrived recently.
Apparently under a 1963
military aid pact with Algeria,
more than 400 Algerian person-
nel--mainly naval and air trainees
--are receiving instruction in
the USSR; aircraft and naval
equipment eventually will be
supplied. Only one shipment of
military equipment, consisting
of tanks and other land arma-
ments, was made directly to
Algeria from the USSR during the
hostilities with Morocco. Mos-
cow, however, probably encouraged
UAR military aid to Algeria and
at least acquiesced in Cuba's
efforts.
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 Ag do M'krlYl 160WOP1 E .M9P7W9 I r? 6 V I ET
MILITARY AID PROGRAM
Indonesian MIG-21 jet fighter
equipped for air-to-air missiles. M1G-
21's have also been supplied to Egypt,
Iraq, Syria, India, Finland, Yugoslavia,
and Cuba.
Indian AN-12 heavy
military transport.
AN-12's have also
gone to Iraq ,Egypt,
Ghana, and Cuba.
Egyptian Komar-class guided missile
patrol boat. Komars have also been sup-
plied to Cuba, Indonesia, and Syria.
Egyptian TU-16 jet medium bomber.
TU-16's have also gone to Iraq and to
Indonesia; some in Indonesia are equipped
for air-to-surtace missiles.
Indonesian Sverdlov-class light cruiser.
Indonesia has received more Soviet naval
aid than any other country and is the only
one to get a cruiser.
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An arms deal with the So-
mali Republic last October is
the first major Soviet military
aid agreement in Africa south
of the Sahara. More than 200
Somali officers and men are in
the USSR for military training.
Deliveries of jet fighters,
small patrol ships, and land
armaments are expected, and may
already have begun.
Elsewhere in Africa, Soviet
military aid to Guinea--the only
African country equipped entirely
with bloc military gear--has
come to a virtual standstill and
no further deliveries are known
to be scheduled. A small train-
ing program continues, however.
In Ghana, where Soviet arms aid
has been limited to a small
amount of equipment for Nkrumah's
personal guard, there are signs
that a more extensive program
of Soviet military assistance
may be in the wind.
For the last two years
Soviet military aid to Afghan-
istan has been focused on train-
ing, maintenance, and reorgani-
zation. Little additional equip-
ment has been delivered, but
local interest in more modern
weapons is likely to be fostered
by Soviet technicians and ad-
visers working with Afghan per-
sonnel.
The nature of Soviet mili-
tary assistance to India almost
certainly has been influenced
by Moscow's sensitivity to Pei-
ping's strident denunciations
of Soviet support for the Nehru
government. The USSR has been
careful to provide only equip-
ment designed to serve primarily
defensive purposes in order to
avoid the appearance of strength-
ening India's offensive capabil-
ities against China. The Soviets,
however, have shown no signs of
backing out of their commitments
and now are executing the ex-
panded program agreed to in
1963. Moscow has provided India
with a large number of military
transports and helicopters, and
a few MIG fighters. It has
agreed to supply SAMs and is
proceeding with plans for set-
ting up production facilities
for MIG aircraft and missiles.
The USSR has turned down some
Indian requests, however, partly
for technical reasons, and has
refused consistently to liberal-
ize its rather stiff financial
terms for military aid to India.
This would enable the Soviets
to claim that these are commer-
cial sales and do not involve
financial assistance.
There have been few new de-
velopments in Soviet military
aid to Indonesia this year. Con-
struction of new SAM sites con-
tinues, and extensive training
programs, frequently for officers
in the higher ranks, are under
way in many fields. Few addi-
tional arms shipments are being
made pending the assimilation of
equipment already on hand.
In Cuba, the remaining
Soviet military personnel ap-
parently are being shaped into
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a permanent military aid and
advisory mission. Intensive
training programs for Cuban per-
sonnel have led to turnover of
much of the equipment brought
in as part of the Soviet mili-
tary build-up.
The amount and make-up of
Soviet military aid to Yugosla-
via is still uncertain, but a
substantial program is being
carried out. Deliveries in
1962-63 included tanks, assault
guns, MIG fighters, and radars.
A SAM system apparently will be
established, but the number of
sites has not been disclosed.
Impact of the Program
Moscow has registered some
significant gains through mili-
tary aid, and the vigor put in-
to the program in recent years
indicates clearly that the
Soviets consider their efforts
worthwhile. Furthermore, the
achievements have proved last-
ing and may well have greater
implications in the long run.
Through its aid programs
Moscow has developed close work-
ing ties with several key under-
developed countries--ties vir-
tually nonexistent before 1955.
While military aid is only part
of the total Soviet approach,
countries heavily dependent on
Soviet military support fre-
quently develop the most durable
and far-reaching relations with
Moscow. The durability of mili-
tary aid ties was proven during
the height of Soviet-Iraqi re-
criminations in mid-1963 when
shipments were suspended for a
time but the program itself was
not jettisoned.
Military aid results in a
dependence unmatched by most eco-
nomic relationships. A country
relying largely on the USSR for
military equipment, spare parts,
and technical aid must at least
consider Moscow's views before
embarking on a venture hostile
to Soviet interests. Reluctance
of local military leaders to
jeopardize their source of sup-
ply almost certainly has tempered
some political decisions. Simi-
larly, military aid stimulates
trade and frequently leads rapidly
to financial indebtedness, giving
the Soviets another instrument to
manipulate in support of their
local policy objectives.
Provision of military tech-
nicians and advisers has resulted
in a Soviet presence in many new
areas. This technical aid, along
with training programs for thou-
sands of foreign nationals, may
have increasing important conse-
quences as Soviet-trained person-
nel advance in military and po-
litical hierarchies.
Introduction of advanced
weapons systems in technically
backward countries has spurred
training programs, but even the
supply of conventional equipment
places a strain on the technical
resources of many countries
where numbers of qualified per-
sonnel are severely limited.
Military training is an attrac-
tive prospect for many Afro-
Asians who lack other means of
acquiring the educational attri-
butes needed in a modern society.
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MILITARY HARDWARE IS
,TUBED ON MANY CEREMONIAL
OCCASIONS IN AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES
T-54 tanks, Kabul, August 1962.
Twin 57mm.self-propelled anti-aircraft
guns, Cairo, July 1963.
SA-2 (GUIDELINE) surface-to-air missile,
Cairo, July 1963.
PT-76 amphibious tank, Djakarta, MIG-19 jet fighters in flyby over Cairo,
October 1962.
July 1963.
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The Soviets doubtless cultivate
this desire and attempt to se-
lect the cream of military can-
didates for higher level in-
struction.
Although reports of dis-
satisfaction with Soviet train-
ing are frequent, these may
originate with malcontents who
do not represent a majority
of trainees. Moreover, large-
scale training programs continue
to be planned and carried ouV
despite occasional rumblings
of discontent and failures of
some training ventures.
More than ever before,
large numbers of foreign na-
tionals are receiving high-
level military instruction in
the USSR. Indonesia is the
most striking example of such
training, and large programs are
also in progress for trainees
from the UAR, Afghanistan, and
Cuba. More recently, Algeria
and the Somali Republic have
embarked on military training
programs in the USSR as a pre-
requisite to deliveries of
equipment.
No clear-cut gains, such as
growth of pro-Soviet attitudes
among military circles, are evi-
dent from this training, even
though the USSR has carefully
fostered the anti-Western views
of many foreign military men.
Moscow probably calculates that
working relationships with key
military leaders and prolonged
exposure to Soviet views and
methods may build a reservoir
of influence which could be
critical in some future power
struggle. In the meantime,
short-run objectives will be
achieved if Soviet-trained per-
sonnel exert any influence on
their governments to continue
neutralist, if not pro-Soviet,
foreign policies.
Fears of these trends are
expressed rather frequently by
both military and civilian leaders
in underdeveloped countries, but
rarely do these fears result in
curtailment of military programs.
King Zahir of Afghanistan, for
instance, is said to be concerned
with the long-run consequences
of Soviet influence in the Afghan
military, but he continues to
approve additional training pro-
grams, both at home and in the
USSR. As long as the Soviets
remain willing to fulfill desires
for military equipment, partic-
ularly of the more modern
varieties, they will be able to
capitalize on the need for train-
ing and to insist on the entry
of Soviet technicians and advisers.
The most immediate impact
of Soviet military aid has been
its further injection of the
USSR into regional disputes
throughout the world. As a sup-
plier of military equipment to
one or more of the participants
in local conflicts, Moscow often
becomes a factor where otherwise
it would have little influence.
While the Soviets probably wel-
come these opportunities in gen-
eral, it seems likely that in
some instances they would prefer
to be less involved.
The USSR frequently moves
cautiously in providing military
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aid, but compared with most West-
ern countries, Moscow has fewer
conflicting interests in under-
developed areas and usually is
able to choose sides more rapidly
in local disputes. Even where
they have conflicting interests,
the Soviets usually are more un-
inhibited in their approach to
military aid and are less con-
cerned with the consequences
of introducing weapons in trouble
spots. This allows rapid Soviet
support for nationalist goals
and expansionist aspirations of
leaders like Sukarno and Nasir,
winning laurels for Soviet
policies at the expense of the
West.. Damage to Soviet relations
with other countries affected by
these methods may well be out-
weighed by the prospects for
eroding Western influence in the
area as a whole.
Moscow continues to respond
favorably to new military aid
requests and to seek out new
areas of activity. In recent
weeks there has been a surge
in Soviet military shipments
abroad, reflecting new aid agree-
ments as well as maintenance
and modernization under well-es-
tablished programs. There is
no sign that the USSR's increased
selectiveness in making economic
aid offers carries over into the
military field. The Soviets are
well aware of the limitations
of foreign aid diplomacy, but
they appear convinced that it
retains its usefulness, partic-
ularly military aid.
As long as an improvement
in East-West relations remains
a primary Soviet objective, the
USSR is likely to limit its
direct involvement in regional
crises. In Indonesia, for in-
stance, the Soviets may be ex-
erting a moderating influence
on the military aspects of
Djakarta's anti-Malaysian pol-
icies. In the recent Algerian-
Morrocan border fracas, the
Soviet Union could have become
more deeply involved, but seemed
content to work largely in con-
junction with the UAR and Cuba,
and to carry on its longer
range program of military aid
to Algeria.
To help protect its image
from criticism which may arise
from lagging Soviet economic
programs, Moscow will be alert
for new military aid opportu-
nities. Military aid could
help gloss over any Soviet un-
willingness to undertake siz-
able new economic commitments
abroad. In Brazil, for instance,
the USSR displays a marked re-
luctance to engage in an ex-
pansive economic aid program,
but might make an attractive
offer of aircraft to the Brazil-
ian Air Force as an inexpensive
substitute.
The USSR probably will con-
tinue supplying selected coun-
tries with advanced weapons
systems and sufficient manpower
to train local military person-
nel. Agreements with India and
Indonesia for setting up MIG
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fighter assembly plants suggest
that provision of military pro-
duction facilities may become
a more important part of the
program. Such agreements are
unlikely to reduce a recipient's
reliance on Soviet military aid
in the near future and may even
increase it through the need
for imported components.
The USSR probably will con-
tinue to emphasize the techni-
cal aspects of its military aid
program. In addition to opera-
tional and maintenance instruc-
tion, greater training in the-
oretical military concepts seems
Likely as the Soviets seek to
cultivate long-range influence
with foreign military establish-
ments.
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