BELGIUM'S LIBERAL PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100110004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

0: CIA-RDP79-00927A00410011 4-3
August 1963
OCI No. 0294/63C
Copy No. 71
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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23 August 1963
Inherent instabilities in the Belgian political
situation enable the relatively small Liberal party
to exercise an influence out of proportion to its
size. Very conservative in its outlook and some-
what at odds with US policy on a number of past
issues, the party has wielded this domestic in-
fluence partly through its ties with the financial
world and partly by exploiting its balance-of-power
position between the two big parties--the Roman
Catholic Social Christian Party (PSC) and the So-
cialist Party (PSB). During the past two years it
has been extensively reorganizing in an effort to
broaden its electoral appeal, and it, probably hopes
that recent dissension in the Social Christian -
Socialist coalition government will provide an op-
portunity for Liberals to hold cabinet office again.
Political Situation
Several factors in the Bel-
gian scene combine to allow the
Liberal party an important role.
The system of proportional rep-
resentation almost invariably
prevents any party from achiev-
ing a majority; coalition gov-
ernments have been the rule
since 1919. The long-standing
and recently intensified dis-
pute between the French-speak-
ing Walloons and Dutch-speak-
ing Flemings (see inset box)
ensures that almost any coali-
tion government will rest on
hobbling compromises. The two
major parties are also divided
by historic differences on
clericalism and by current is-
sues in economic policy. In
this situation, any coalition
has difficulty in taking effec-
tive or decisive action and
tends to break down.
This instability has pro-
vided the Liberals with several
opportunities in the last dec-
ade to bargain successfully for
a place in the government. In
the PSB-Liberal coalition of
1954-58, for example, the Lib-
erals gained seven of the 16
cabinet posts, while holding
Historically, the Walloons of Belgium's southern provinces were mores
prosperous than the Flemings, and French was the only language, of Public
administration, the law courts, and higher education, thus inducing an
inferiority complex among the Flemings-which still persists. The northern
Flemish area has since e,cpanded in wealth and population, leaving the
French speakers nationally in the minority and on the defensive while the
Flemings still demand linguistic recognition beyond the equality_they won
in the 1930s.
Fleming elements tend to be strongest in the SocialChristian Party andq
the Walloons among the Socialists and Liberals, but the bitter linguistic
dispute cuts across all three main parties, the Roman Catholic Church,-the
trade unions, and other institutions. Recent efforts by the government to
compromise the difficulty by drawing a linguistic frontier across the country,
leaving Brussels the only officially bilingual area, have proved of no avail.
In an attempt to reach an overall settlement, the government in March_
1962 established a "working group" to prepare proposals fora Flemish-
Walloon "pact" that in turn would be the basis for amending the Belgian
constitution in such a way as to protect the position of the Walloon minority.
Initiation of the constitutional amendments would require a majority vote-o#
both houses of Parliament,- followed by national elections to choose a-
-new--
parliament to vote on the actual revisions of the constitution. So F'ar, how-
ever, the "working group has not announced when its report will lie~presented
to Parliament.
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only one eighth of the seats
in Parliament. Again in 1958,
the Liberals obtained seven of
the 19 cabinet posts, although
their parliamentary representa-
tion had been reduced to one
tenth of the total.
The current PSC-PSB coali-
tion is under serious strain on
the linguistic issue and has
failed to enact any extensive
portion of its reform program
except in watered-down form.
The Liberals now scent a fresh
opportunity for office during
the next session of Parliament
and are attempting by various
means to enlarge their popular
base and to refurbish their
image and appeal.
Background of Liberal Party
The Belgian Liberal Party
was organized in 1846 as an
anticlerical party representing
the interests of upper middle
class industrial, commercial.,
and professional groups. Until
1.894 control of the government
alternated between the Liberals
and the Roman Catholic party,
but having little or no appeal
to the mass of the population,
the Liberals found themselves
replaced by the Socialist in
electoral strength after the
introduction of modified uni-
versal manhood suffrage in 1893.
In the public mind the
party has always been closely
associated with French-speak-
ing banking and business cir-
cles, although most large banks
and industries have a mixture
of PSC and Liberal ties. The
Federation of Belgian Industries
(FIB), for example, is led by
a French-speaking Social Chris-
tiaiu; but its conservative pol-
icies often more closely re-
flect Liberal attitudes. The
Societd Generale de Belgique
(with its important connections
with the Union Miniere du Haut
Katanga) has PSC tendencies,
whereas the Solvay chemical
interests, Nagelmackers Bank,
and the Brufina investment firm
are predominantly Liberal. In
state financial institutions,
tripartite political appoint-
ments to boards of directors
dilute the influence of any one
political party.
The Liberal party has never
had much appeal to conservative
rural elements, who still vote
PSC, nor has it made significant
inroads into the Socialist
stronghold among industrial
workers.
Program of the Liberals
The Liberal party has de-
veloped no modern doctrine of
its own and continues to advo-
cate the standard laissez--faire
socio-economic policies of the
19th century. It opposes all
efforts to increase taxes or
to reform Belgium's antiquated
fiscal. system, which for gener-
ations has produced neither suf-
ficient government income nor
adequate incentive for invest-
meat. The Liberals withdrew
from the previous government in
January 1961, when it appeared
that the tax provisions of the
Omnibus Bill--intended to reor-
ganize the financial system--
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were to be implemented ahead of
the austerity provisions. More
recently the party has adamantly
opposed the present government's
fiscal reform, joining with
right-wind, Social Christians
in the Senate Finance Committee
to delay its passage and to in-
sist on amendments which reduced
both the yield and, progressivity
of its tax provisions.
Although having little ap-
peal for labor, the Liberal
party has fostered a small labor
organization, the General Or-
ganization of Belgian Liberal
Labor Unions (CGSLB), numbering
about 50,000 members, and has
got some of its delegates seated
on Joint commissions and semi-of-
ficial consultative bodies along
with the delegates of two big la-
bor confederations. But conflicts
of interest have often estranged
the party and its satellite.
The Liberal labor union's par-
ticipation in the campaign for
the five-day workweek was bit-
terly opposed by most Liberals
on the grounds that it would
jeopardize the existence of
many small enterprises. During
the 1961 election campaign the
position of the party was so
hostile to labor that the CGSLB
boycotted the General Assembly
of the party in May 1961.
Although their influence
remains small, Liberal unions
have registered a slight rise
in voting strength among workers
in larger plants, probably
as a result of Socialist dis-
sension and Liberal efforts
to create a more attractive
party image. In the May 1963
works council elections the Lib-
eral unions increased their
share of the vote from the 1958
figure of 3.8 percent to 6.2
percent.
Foreign and Defense Policies
Foreign policy is not a
major political issue in Belgium.
All three main parties favor
collective security and Western
solidarity in NATO and are
strongly behind Belgian partici-
pation in the European Economic
Community. The official PLP
position is anti - De Gaulle,
pro - Atlantic Alliance, and
"not afraid of the US Trade Ex-
pansion Act."
Emotionally, however, the
party is split on the issue of
Gaullism. Some old-line Liber-
als, such as former party presi-
dent Roger Motz, have been
strong in their support of For-
eign Minister Spank's anti.- De
Gaulle position, while but a
number of French-speaking Lib-
eral right-wingers are drawn
to De Gaulle by ties of lan-
guage intensified by their fear
of being submerged by Flemish
population and culture. These
pro - De Gaulle sentiments are
shared by certain right-wing
PSC elements and by those left-
wing Socialists who have always
been suspicious of capitalistic
America. Some Liberal elements
attack the Trade Expansion Act
as having "protectionist"
features.
Defense expenditures have
been prime targets in the Liberal
campaign to keep government
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spending at a minimum. The
party has sharply criticized
Belgium's commitment to the
expensive F-104G program and
has joined other opinion--left
wing as well as conservative--
in opposing Belgian participa-
tion in the multilateral nuclear
force (MLF). As a further
means of undermining the present
coalition, the Liberals are
not above exploiting the popu-
lar distrust of the efficiency
and state of operational read-
iness of the Belgian Army.
While a government-appointed
committee has considered propos-
als for improving the military
establishment, the Liberals,
with an eye to the next elec-
tion, have come up with a more
far-reaching plan for gradually
transforming Belgium's NATO-
committed troops from a con-
script to a professional basis.
The real vote-getting feature
of this plan is a reduction of
the term of conscription for
service within the country from
twelve to six months, a popular
position which embarrasses both
the government parties.
Many Liberals and some
right-wing PSC members have a
lingering bitterness against US
and UN policies in the Congo.
Opinion within the Liberal party
on the question of Katangan
secession was deeply divided.
Right-wing French-language news-
papers--La Libre Belgique (Con-
servative CathooTic , a eniere
Heure (Liberal), and Le oir
in ependent but Liberal in-
fluenced)--were not only the
most ardent spokesmen for Moise
Tshombd but the most vitupera-
tive critics of US and UN Congo
policy.
Party Reorganization
The loss of Liberal seats
in the March 1961 election
spurred a party reorganization
which has been carried out at
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four Congresses since October
1961. A new party president,
48-year-old Omer Vanaudenhove,
assumed control in May 1961
along with several other younger
leaders such as Rend Dreze,
Jacques Van Offelen, and Willy
De Clercq.
Vanaudenhove and his
"progressivists" wanted to
establish the party as the "new
center" in the Belgian political
spectrvm,:first by luring the
middle' classes into membership
and eventually by staging an
"opening to the?, left" to broaden
the party's, almost negligible
appeal to labor. Vanaudenhove's
principal problem was to avoid
taking hard positions on issues
that might antagonize prospec-
tive members while not alienat-
ing his own followers by doing
violence to cherished party
principles. Nevertheless, the
party had to change its spots
at least to the extent of no
longer appearing violently
anticlerical or exclusively
big-business. As a first step
in this direction, it changed
its~.name in October 1961 to
Party of Liberty and Progress
(PLP) as indicative of its
receptivity to new ideas.
The Liberal party has
always championed secular educa-
tion free from domination of
the Roman Catholic Church, but
the three-party Schools Pact
of 1958 removed this issue from
the political arena and paved
the way to rapprochement with
right-wing Catholics, usually
affluent middle-class people
whose economic views often ac-
cord with Liberal doctrine.
Other moves to demonstrate that
a practicing Catholic can in
good conscience vote Liberal
include party propaganda in
favor of religious tolerance
and isolating old-guard anti-
clericals, such as ex-party
president Motz, from most pub-
lic activities of the party.
Liberals are also trying
to remedy the poor discipline
that has long troubled the
party. Steps have been taken
to increase the power of its
central Political Bureau over
individual members, and voting
discipline in Parliament has
consequently increased. The
Political Bureau's new-found
powers to scrutinize and alter
local and regional electoral
lists give it a powerful tool
to discipline recalcitrant
parliamentarians and to replace
electoral liabilities in the
party federations.
The PLP expansion drive has
met with enough success to cause
uneasiness within the two coali-
tion parties. Between the Octo-
ber 1961 reorganization congress
and the October 1962 congress,
the Liberal membership, accord-
ing to party announcements, rose
from 46,000 to 100,000, the gain
coming mostly from small parties
of the far right and defectors
from the right wing of the PSC.
During. December 1961 alone the
PSC received over 3,000 resigna-
tions, among them several fairly
prominent personalities, and.
concern within the party over
such defections has recently
caused a PSC cabinet minister
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SOCIALIST PARTY
75
PARTY OF LIBERTY AND
18
COMMUNIST PARTY 1 175 SEATS* 12 VOLKSUNIE
BELGIAN PARLIAMENT
Following Elections 26 March 1961
PROGRESS (LIBERALS)
20 12%
2 3% OTHERS**
5 3% VOLKSUNIE
*l06 elected by direct vote, 46 chosen by provincial councils, 23 co-opted by the political parties.
**-One seat was won by the Rassemblement National, a Catholic middle-class splinter party in Brussels,
and the other by a dissident Liberal in Mons. Both seats were absorbed by the Liberals at their
reorganization congress in October 1961,
Figures in brown represent % of total vote,
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to remark that the shift may
enable the Socialists to replace
the PSC as the largest single
party in Belgium after the next
elections.
Noting these gains in PLP
party membership and assuming a
parallel gain in electoral sup-
port since the March 1961 par-
liamentary elections, PLP
strategists calculated that by
the fall of 1962 their party's
share of the total national
vote had risen by eight percent-
age points to a total of over
20 percent--a position it had
not attained since 1919. In
November 1962, even neutral
estimates gave the Liberals,
who now hold 22 of 212 seats
in the Chamber of Deputies, a
gain of 10 to 20 seats in the
event of an immediate election.
The PLP gains in member-
ship, however, have been largely
confined to the dissidents from
the far right. This has- had
the by-product of apparently
making the PLP a competing at-
traction for some elements which
might normally incline toward
the extraparliamentary extremism
of the Poujadists in France;
but the votes to be gotten from
extreme rightists are necessar-
ily limited. Consequently, the
PLP leadership has made new
efforts to appeal to a wider
middle-class vote composed of
farmers, professional and white-
collar workers, small property
owners, and small-business pro-
prietors--all groups resentful
of the present government's pro-
labor orientation.
At the May 1963 congress,
Vanaudenhove presented the Lib-
eral party as the defender of
middle-class interests by es-
tablishing a Centre Nationale
des Independents et eves Cadres
indepen ents and saTariecl-
executives) to act as a roof
organization for the myriad pro-
fessional groups that now exist
independently of any political
party and which have been with-
out adequate representation
either in the government or with-
in the two larger political
parties.
Prospects
Aided by the tactical ad-
vantages of an opposition party,
the PLP now stands a good chance
of improving its position in the
next parliamentary elections,
although it is uncertain how
important and permanent the
effects of the party reorgani-
zation will be. The PLP vote
has always fluctuated more than
that of the two big parties.
Dissatisfaction with recent
linguistic legislation may work
in the PLP's favor. In an at-
tempt to placate new conserva-
tive Flemish Catholic members
while maintaining the traditional
allegiance of French-speaking
Liberals, the party straddled
the Flemish-Walloon question at
the February 1962 party congress,
and evaded responsibility by
refusing to participate in the
working group set up by the gov-
ernment to deal with the problem
until allowed to do so without
a commitment in advance to
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support the solution proposed
by the group.
Nevertheless, the PLP has
not been able to avoid entirely
the Flemish-Walloon issue and
other sources of intraparty
dissensions. Old-guard conserv-
atives (mostly French-speaking)
have become increasingly antag-
onized by tactics of the younger
progressive wing (mostly Flem-
ing). Some of the extreme
right-wing recruits have struck
respectable business elements
in the party as personally un,
savory. Conservative Liberals,
on the other hand, have opposed
Vanaudenhove's goal of an "open-
ing to the left" and have re-
mained convinced that the party
can grow only by assuming a
clearer position on the right.
The tightening up of party
discipline with its threat to
the position of old-guard Lib-
erals in the federations has
left hard feelings. Moreover,
nearly all the major personal-
ities from the PSC and the
right-wing splinter parties
have been promised places on
PLP electoral lists. If this
cannot be accomplished with-
out sacrificing the party
stalwarts, many of the new
members will probably redefect.
It remains problematical how
far the party reorganization
has widened the Liberals' elec-
toral appeal. The new middle-
class members it has attracted
thus far may aid in dispelling
the image of the PLP as the
party of the French-speaking
wealthy but not that of a party
of the extreme right.
The linguistic issue makes
the political situation in Bel-
gium uncertain as well as un-
quiet. It is possible that a
"national government" will be
organized to give the pro-
jected Flemish-Walloon "pact"
the assent of all three major
political parties, but such
a government is not required.
The Liberals' best chance of
participating in a govern-
ment depends mainly on the
Social Christians' and Social-
ists' finding themselves hope-
lessly at loggerheads over
the formation of a coalition
program, as they did in 1954
and 1958. F7777 I
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