NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 5, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Thursday 5 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/003C
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 Approved For Rel
National. Intelligence Daily Cable for
Thursday, 5 January 19
25X1
25X1 The NID a e is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
Page 1
VIETNAM-CAMBODIA: Diplomacy
INDIA: Gandhi Splits Opposition
UK-USSR: Steel Imports Banned
HUNGARY: Kadar The Middleman
EAST GERMANY: Reaction to Spiegel
CHILE: Pres. Pinochet's Victory
BRIEFS
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ARAB STATES: Possible Summit
Boumediene who departed Baghdad on Wednesday en.
route to uwait and perhaps other Arab states, was probably
trying to determine Iraq's terms for making common cause with
other hard-line Arabs against Sadat and the willingness of the
Iraqis to call off their drawn-out feud with Syria--a situation
Boumediene would like to mediate.
(S) Iraq's motives for becoming involved again in efforts
to counter Sadat's moves are not clear, but it may have.con-
cluded that the results of the Ismailia summit have deepened
Arab doubts about the wisdom of Sadat's negotiating process.
It is just as likely, however, that the Iraqis see a vacuum
they can exploit--if only to further Iraq's interests in its
feud with Syria.
The hard-line Arabs believe a Syrian-Iraqi rap-
prochement is a necessity if an effective counter to Sadat is
to be organized. There are some indications, according to the
mmodation ma
f
acco
US Embassy in Damascus, that some kind o
-nnn be reached.
Any
onciliation, however, is likely only to be a temporary papering-
over of the deep split between the rival Baathist governments
in Baghdad and Damascus.
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Unless Asad does a complete and unexpected about-
face--or the Iraqis come up with new formulations--he is un-
likely to reach agreement with Baghdad on cooperating against
Israel or for taking steps to derail Sadat's negotiations with
Tel Aviv.
I I Iraq has already proposed on many occasions the cre-
ation o an eastern front--which would involve the stationing
of a large part of the Iraqi Army in Syria. Asad would welcome
Iraqi aid in case of another war with Israel, but he is not
likely otherwise to risk having an Iraqi military presence in
Syria. He knows too well that it might open Syria to an attack
by Israel or to an Iraqi attempt to overthrow him.
ponent of
Iraq also has long considered itself the premier ex-
"rejectionisism"--the doctrine that calls for no
peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel. Hewing
to this line, the Iraqis also do not accept UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 242 and 338.
At the anti-Sadat conference held in Triopli early
last month, the Iraqis walked out and refused to sign the final
communique--which was signed by the other participants--on the
grounds that it did not call for tough sanctions against Sadat
and did not reject any form of negotiations with Israel.
Although Asad has reacted harshly against Sadat's
present tactics, we doubt that he is willing to adopt a full-
fledged rejectionist stance. At the Tripoli meeting, for exam-
ple, Asad reportedly persuaded the participants--except for
Iraq--not to burn their bridges to Cairo.
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VIETNAM-CAMBODIA: Diplomacy
present its side of the conflict with Cambodia. The Vietnamese
are promoting an image of aggrieved restraint and emphasizing
Cambodian provocation and their own desire for a peaceful set-
tZement.
On Tuesday, the Vietnamese Embassy in Laos circulated
in the diplomatic corps a "declaration" that summarizes Hanoi's
version of the postwar history of territorial disputes with the
Cambodians and Vietnam's attempts to reach a settlement. The
Vietnamese describe their frustrated efforts to arrange high-
level talks with the Cambodian leaders but urge again that the
two sides meet to settle their border problem in a spirit of
"fraternal friendship."
made demarches to the Swedish Government, which reportedly
agreed to issue a statement expressing its hope for a peaceful
settlement. The Indian Government reacted in similar fashion
following a briefing by the Vietnamese Ambassador in New Delhi.
Even before Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with
Vietnam last Saturday, Hanoi tried to establish its credentials
as the aggrieved party--probably hoping to develop a persuasive
rationale for its incursion into Cambodian territory--in brief-
ings of foreign diplomats in Hanoi and in 0 communica-
tions to foreign leaders such as Prime Minister Kriangsak of
Thailand.
Vietnam has begun a vigorous diplomatic campaign to
Vietnamese diplomats elsewhere have sought support
or at least a sympathetic ear for their position. They have
position.
In contrast to the generally neutral international
reaction to the conflict, Moscow has come out with strong pub-
lic support for Vietnam's position. Official Soviet media have
only hinted at Chinese involvement, but the Moscow-sponsored
Radio Peace and.Progress has explicitly charged that Peking pro-
voked the decline in relations between Vietnam and Cambodia.
While Peking has long supported Phnom Penh's side in the dis-
pute with Hanoi, Chinese coverage of the most recent develop-
ments has stopped short of direct endorsement of the Cambodian
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INDIA: Gandhi Splits Opposition
I I The aggressive tactics former Prime Minister Gandhi
evidently intends to employ are likely to disrupt Indian poli-
tics. Her decision to split the Congress Party diminishes, if
not destroys, the party's potential for establishing itself as
India's first major opposition party since independence. The
split in opposition ranks also increases the di fficult`:y the
ruling Janata Party will have in staying together over the
long term.
I I Gandhi and about a third of her followers on the All-
India Congress Committee, the Congress Party's general working
body, called their own convention in Delhi this week attended
by 1,500 to 2,000 supporters. They declared their independence
of the present Congress leadership--after having failed in ear-
lier attempts to take over the party's organization--and issued
a program condemning the government's domestic and foreign pol-
icies. The rebels were promptly expelled from the party by Con-
gress President Brahmananda Reddy and Parliamentary Leader
Y. B. Chavan.
The week's actions parallel events in 1969 when
Morarji Desai and others broke away from the then governing
Congress Party and expelled Gandhi. At that time, however, by
exercising the powers of government and patronage Gandhi was
able to retain the loyalty of a large majority of Congress
Party members and to solidify her control over the party.
Neither wing of Congress has that power now.
The future outline of Indian politics is once again
fluid. We are not yet sure of the extent of Gandhi's support
in the Congress, or of where the bulk of her strength lies in
India. Both wings of the party are sure to begin wooing poten-
tial supporters. If Gandhi can muster sufficient popularity in
three southern states where elections are to be held in the
spring, she could emerge as a leader with at least regional
strength.
If the Reddy-Chavan Congress appears to be losing
popular support, many of its members might give in to the
temptation to join the Janata Party--especially in the north
where the governing party is strongest.
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I On the other hand, the old Congress Party might ap-
pear more attractive now that it is dissociated from the stigma
of Gandhi and emergency rule, and disgruntled Janata factions
in some states may be tempted to join with it in new political
coalitions.
UK-USSR: Steel Imports Banned
I //The British Government has banned the import of
virtually all Soviet steel in 1978. Under pressure from the
troubled British steel industry, Secretary of State for Trade
DeZZ invoked emergency provisions of the European Coal and
Steel Community against Soviet steel exports.//
I I //Brz is p
rolled products--reportedly increased from 16,000 tons in 1976
to about 100,000 tons last year. This volume, about the same
as total Soviet steel exports to the West in 1976, earned Mos-
cow an estimated $30 million to $40 million.//
't h im orts of Soviet steel--mostly flat
//London hoped that the Soviets would agree to
limit exports, as had most East European countries, but Moscow
would not agree to a level acceptable to the British. Given
the glut in Western steel markets, the USSR will have diffi-
culty finding another customer in the West and may have to
divert the steel to domestic uses.//
itish expect some retaliation, possibly
B
r
//The
in the form of reduced Soviet purchases of British steel. The
Soviets import large amounts of steel from the West--including
d a wide variety of
large-diameter pipe, specialty steels, an
ewhere
l
.
s
other products--and could easily buy e
HUNGARY: Kadar The Middleman
I //Recent reports indicate that Hungarian
party leader Kadar has been acting as a "mediator" between the
USSR and the independent-minded West European Communists. Last
fall the Hungarians received visits from the leaders of the
French and Italian parties; they reportedly have also invited
Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo to visit Budapest.
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Kadar is doing this to gain favor with Moscow and because he
knows that a split between the Eurocommunists and Moscow would
force him to sever ties with the Western parties.//
//The specific purposes of Kadar's "mediating"
have not been spelled out. One likely aim is a toning down of
the West Europeans' anti-Soviet rhetoric. Hungarian press arti-
cles on Eurocommunism have consistently called for an end to
public polemics and for private discussion of differences over
the strategy and tactics of revolution.//
//Moscow clearly cannot stomach the strident anti-
Sovietism of such people as Carrillo, which they see as under-
mining their authority with Communist parties throughout the
world and which they fear as a potentially disruptive influ-
ence in Eastern Europe and at home. Moscow has had a bit of
success in getting some Eurocommunists to dampen their public
anti-Soviet statements and may see advantages to following up
this partial success with a lobbying effort by the Hungarians.//
//The Hungarian activity may be part of a
ovie strategy designed to impede the development of a Western
Communist identity. The Soviets have long sought to deflect the
West European parties from organizing regional meetings by pro-
moting broader gatherings to deal with noncontroversial topics
in which the Soviets and their allies would have a voice.//
From the
Soviet perspective, such sessions could help intensify any dif-
ferences among the Eurocommunists and provide a forum in which
Moscow could exert influence.//
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//Apart from his own desire to see the "in-
,
nal movement" hold together, Kadar probably wants to
ti
o
terna
do a favor for Moscow that the USSR may reciprocate on bilat-
eral issues at some future date.//
//Some Hungarians may also believe that the
phenomenon o Eurocommunism is in Hungary's interest because
it helps to expand the limits of what the Soviets are willing
to tolerate and thereby allows Hungary more latitude in domes-
tic or foreign affairs.//
//Eastern Europe, however, occupies a spe-
cial place in Soviet thinking, and Moscow seems likely always 25X1
to demand more in the way of loyalty and orthodoxy from the
countries in the region than it could hope to get from other
Communist parties farther removed.
EAST GERMANY: Reaction to Spiegel
East Germany has reacted swiftly in denouncing the
i
Went German news magazine Der Spiegel's publication this week
osition manifesto" that purports to represent the
a:n "o
f
pp
.
o
work of a dissident group of "medium and high-level" East Ger-
man party officials.
East German media have labeled the document an "atro-
cious fabrication" designed to upset relations between West
The government has also refused to accredit
d East Germany
.
an
Spiegel's new correspondent in East Germany. Spiegel has been
unusually critical of East Germany since the arrest in August
of dissident critic Rudolf Bahro, whose criticism of the re-
gime Spiegel published.
The "manifesto" asserts that "democratic and human-
itarian Communists" in East Germany have organized an illegal
ue of Democratic Communists of Germany" to work for a
"L
eag
democratic Communist order, a unified and neutral Germany, and
the realization of basic human rights for each citizen. The
document is strongly anti-Soviet, nationalistics, and critical
of East Germany's political system and its leaders.
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The rambling and clumsily worded "manifesto" claims
to represent the culmination of a line of German Marxist theo-
reticians from Karl Liebkneecht through Ernst Bloch, Robert
Havemann, and Wolfgang Harich. The latter, however, has pub-
licly described the manifesto as "completely lacking in credi-
bility." Harich said that its language clearly does not repre-
sent that used by East German party officials. It also seems 25X1
highly unlikely that any reasonably serious dissident group in
East Germany would take on the Soviets in so straightforward,
abusive, and dismissive a manner as the manifesto.
I F
CHILE: Pres. Pinochet's Victory
I I Chilean President Pinochet appears to have won a
an some personal victory in yesterday's plebiscite. The vote
surpassed his own best hopes for the outcome. The latest avail-
able figures indicate that about 78 percent of the voting popu-
lace approved his rule.
We expect Pinochet simply to ignore critics of the
voting process, which was heavily loaded to ensure a favorable
result. He will make the most of the victory as evidence of the
regime's legitimacy and of his own political wisdom. In months
to come, Pinochet is likely to have reason to regret this exer-
cise in manipulating public opinion, which probably has raised
political expectations that the government will not want to
meet. But for now, Pinochet is in a privileged position.
Having consolidated his superior position in the
junta, Pinochet will have a free hand in many areas. Probably
at least the more outspoken of his critics on the junta, Air
Force General Leigh, will be obliged to retire. Another junta
member, Admiral Merino, might also step aside.
I Pinochet's win will galvanize support in the mili-
tary, were doubt about his judgment and leadership was begin-
ning to spread.
Options on the domestic scene are broader. Pinochet
is almost certain to be tougher toward opponents in political
and labor circles, but he could go either way toward the public
generally. He might loosen some of the more onerous security
restrictions such as the curfew, but he will see no need to
narrow his definition of subversion.
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 The effect of the plebiscite on Pinochet's approach
to foreign policy is harder to judge. Elated by the popular 25X1
denigration of international criticism, he might go so far as
to pull Chile out of the UN. He is more likely, however, to
wait to see what impact the vote has internationally.
BRIEFS
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Those responsible for the assassination yesterday of
the Palestine Liberation Organization representative in London,
Said Hammami, have not yet been identified. Hammami was a mem-
ber of the moderate faction of Fatah and apparently was chosen
for the post in London because of his ability to present the
moderate Palestinian position to Western audiences. In the past,
he apparently had participated in semiclandestine meetings held
between nonofficial Israeli doves and moderate Palestinians to
discuss conflicting Palestinian and Israeli views on settlement
issues. He may have been killed by Palestinian extremists be-
cause of this activity.
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