CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

lease 2006/12116 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004100090003-7
9 August 1963
OCI No. 0292/63B
Copy No.
SPECIAL REPORT
CUBAN SUBVERSIQN IN LATIN AMERICA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
~~~~~ ICJ
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Y7`r~5~,'./~at~ig~ ing and declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
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WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
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This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTSa If marked with specific dissemination
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9 August 1963
The Castro regime continues to regard the pro-
motion of Communist-led revolution in Latin America
as one of its principal goals. Fidel Castro's 26
July address was the most militant public expres-
sions of this policy to come out of Cuba in many
months. He declared that conditions in many Latin
American countries now are mare propitious for the
initiation of revolutionary action than they were
in Cuba ten years ago when he began his revolu-
tionary struggle. He said that what has happened
in Cuba can happen "exactly the same" in many other
Latin American countries and exhorted revolution-
aries there to "open the breach" and begin fight-
ing.
Castro repeatedly declared that Cuba does not
"export" revolution. If by this he means that Cuba
does not send Cuban weapons and Cuban military units
to other countries, there is no evidence to refute
him. However, he and other Cuban leaders openly
declaim that they regard their country as the main
source of guidance and inspiration far what they
call the "inevitable" Latin American revolution.
The Cuban subversive effort is being carried on in
a number of ways, principally through the indoctrina-
tion and training in Cuba of hundreds of Latin Ameri-
cans who return home to pass on what they have learned,
and through the provision of practical guidance,
monetary aid, and open propaganda support to revo-
lutionary leaders and groups.
Between March and Castro's
26 July address, the surface
manifestations of the Cuban
subversive effort in Latin Amer-
ica appeared much more restrained
than during the several months
before, This period of rela-
tive restraint coincided with
the period of repair in Cuban-
Soviet relations that followed
the shock of last fall's mis-
sile crisis. It might also be
significant that the resumption
of the more militant Cuban line
did not take place until after
the breakdown in the Sino-Soviet
discussions in July.
One result of Castro's
trip to the USSR this spring
may have been, at least for the
time being, to bring Moscow
and Havana closer to partnership,
rather than rivalry, in the Com-
munist effort in Latin America.
Castro stated specifically in
his 26 July address that "we
know by experience and conviction
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Latin America
DOMINICAN
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CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
Caracas.. a art-of-Spain
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VENEZUELA __-_-__ _____.__
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that all people who do what the
Cuban people have done will have
the decided support of the So-
viet Union and of all the so-
cialist camp.
The whole subject of Com-
munist goals and tactics in
Latin America was almost cer-
tainly a subject of discussion
during Castro's visit. The
joint Cuban-Soviet communiqud
suggests agreement on the point
that conditions in certain Latin
American countries offer more
hope of Communist victory through
peaceful means than through vio-
lence.There had been indications
before the Moscow trip that the
USSR was concerned about Cuban
support for dissident Communist
or non-Communist revolutionary
groups in certain countries,
notably Brazil, over the op-
position of orthodox Communists
whose strategy was to attempt
to influence and eventually to
dominate the government rather
than to overthrow. it.
Several Latin American
Communist leaders may have par-
ticipated in the discussions
between Castro and Soviet leaders.
Three prominent South American
Communists were in the USSR at
the time of Castro's visit, and
at least two of them met with
him there.
The lavish treatment Castro
received during his Soviet trip
undoubtedly raised his prestige
among old-line Latin American
Communists by indicating to them
that Moscow had accepted Castro's
leadership of the first Commu-
nist regime in the western hem-
isphere. Uruguay's Communist
leader Rodney Arismendi, long
regarded as Moscow-oriented,
had the following to say during
a Communist gathering in Monte-
video in late June, shortly
after his return from the USSR
where he had met Castro: "We
are an echo of the continental
revolutionary movement which is
bursting forth, fighting against
imperialism, with its eyes on
the victorious struggle of the
Cuban revolution. We are a
single force, the force of anti-
imperialism in Latin America,
whose heart beats in the Cuba
of Fidel Castro."
Latin American Trainees in Cuba
An estimated 1,000 to 1,500
Latin Americans received train-
ing in Cuba last-year. The
trainees are subsequently re-
turned to their homelands, many
via circuitious routes through
Europe, to put into practice
what they have learned and to
recruit additional personnel.
In recent months, for instance,
Cuba-trained subversives have
set up guerrilla training camps
in Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Panama.
Among the more than 300
Latin Americans wha traveled to
Cuba in recent weeks under the
guise of visitors to the 26
July celebrations, many are ex-
pected to remain for some months.
These will probably join others
already there and receive ideo-
logical indoctrination and train-
ing in the practical arts of
subversion.
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Reports on last year's
training programs in Cuba pro-
vide considerable detail on
the types of training received.
The training programs, varying
in length from several weeks
to six months, included in-
struction on virtually all as-
pects of guerrilla warfare, as
well as heavy doses of ideolog-
ical indoctrination. A re ort
from a recentl returned
disillusioned after seen ing
several months in Cuba, sug-
gests that many Latin Americans
go to Cuba in the expectation
of receiving a useful education
but are then embroiled in ideo-
logical and paramilitary train-
ing.
Other Cuban Support
Reports from some of the
trainees reveal that groups
from certain Latin American
countries have received spe-
cific advice on what
to do on their return
they are 25X
a
the are to cultivate
.
laims to have been
as a erectly by Che Guevara
to prepare a detailed report
on Colombia covering the politi-
cal
situation, labor,
student
and
peasant affairs,
social and
economic conditions,
as well as
the extent and estimated ef-
fectiveness of the guerrilla
bands operating in his country.
The purpose of the report was
to assist the Cubans in devel-
oping "future plans for Colom-
bia." Similar reports have come
from sources of other nation-
alties.
A number of reports in-
dicate that Cuba continues to
provide financial assistance
to various subversive groups
in Latin America. There is
still no convincing evidence,
however, of Cuba's supplying
military equipment directly to
these groups. In most of the
countries concerned, military
equipment can be obtained
through illicit channels, or
is captured during attacks on
military and police posts.
Cuban Propaganda
Cuban radiobroadcasts,
although less inflammatory than
during the October to March
period, still perform a direct
service to Communist and pro-
communist actions and state-
ments. The Cuban radio, for
instance, is the primary means
by which the Venezuelan Commu-
nists' Armed Forces of National
Liberation (FALN) obtains pub-
licity in Venezuela. This pub-
licity carries a considerable
psychological impact, since a
relatively small group like
the FALN measures the degree
of its success to a large ex-
tent an its ability to create
the impression of much greater
strength than it actually pos-
sesses. Similarly, the publicity
received through Cuban media
has been one of the main assets
of the small guerrilla groups
which have operated sporadically
in Guatemala.
Travel Between Cuba
an Lain America
Cuba has been faced in re-
cent months with a growing problem
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in keeping open means of
travel between Havana and the
rest of Latin America. The
increasingly tight controls be-
ing imposed by the Mexican
Government on travelers who
pass through that country en
route to and from Cuba has
been an important case in point.
Cuba's response has been to
route an increasingly large
proportion of clandestine
trainees via the much longer
and more expensive commercial
links through Europe.
There have also been suc-
cessful Cuban efforts to return
a few visitors to Cuba by way
of Grand Cayman Island and
other western hemisphere air-
fields. Also, 24 South Amer-
icans who had visited Cuba for
May Day went home on a special
CUBANA flight, the only stated
purpose of which was to take
the new Cuban ambassador to his
post in Brazil. On its return
trip, this special flight car-
ried three of the Venezuelans
who had participated in the
seizure of the SS Anzoategui
early this year.-"
Overt Operations
Cuba is also seeking--not
too successfully so far--to fur-
ther its goals in Latin America
by various overt means, such as
participation in a number of in-
ternational conferences. The
"Congress of Solidarity with
Cuba" held at Niteroi, Brazil,
in March, was a failure as a
propaganda effort. The Student
Seminar on the Underdeveloped
World, held in Bahia, Brazil,
in July, also appears to have
been unsuccessful. Preparatory
meetings with Chilean, Bolivian,
and other Latin American yabor
leaders in an effort to spon-
sor the formation of a new
inter-American labor organiza-
tion to replace the CTAL as the
Communist trade union vehicle
in Latin America have not yet
produced any concrete results.
The Second Latin American Youth
Congress, which was to have
been held in Chile next month,
had to be postponed after the
organizers became increasingly
aware of the difficulties likely
to be encountered in that coun-
try.
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A country-by-country rundown of the Cuban sub-
versive effort in Latin America suggests strongly
that the total Cuban effort has not diminished dur-
ing the past six months. In some countries, notably
Brazil and Chile, where Havana may have come to
agree with Moscow that peaceful methods offer more
hope of a Communist victory than does violence,
Cuba is showing restraint. In others, such as Vene-
zuela, Peru, and Colombia, the Cuban effort appears
to be continuing as before.
Argentina
Since early 1963, there
have been a number of indica-
tions of a Cuban effort to win
the cooperation of former
Argentine dictator Peron and
his followers. There is no
evidence that Peron himself
has made any commitment to the
Cubans, although he reportedly
has just appointed a Cuban
agent as his representative
in charge of the revolutionary
wing of-the Peronist movement.
Such extreme left-wing Peronists
as John William Cooke and Amer-
ico Barrios are also reportedly
cooperating fully with Cuban
agents in their efforts to in-
fluence the Peronist movement.
In the meantime, Cuban
propaganda media gave strong
support to the Peronist effort
to sabotage the 7 July national
elections in Argentina. Also,
three of Castro's top aides
who accompanied him to Moscow
contacted associates of Peron
in Spain while Castro was still
in the USSR.
Despite the deep splits
within the Peronist movement,
revealed by the recent elec-
tions, extremist Peronist lead-
ers still threaten revolution-
ary activity. Cuban-Peronist
revolutionary activities may
also find new help from the
Argentine Communist Party (PCA).
This may result from Moscow's
recent criticism of PCA leader
Codovilla--made partly at Cas-
tro's behest--for his lukewarm
leadership.
The working headquarters
for the Cuban subversive effort
against Argentina is located
in Montevideo, Uruguay, where
the Cuban Embassy gives support
to a small group of Argentine
terrorists and Peronist revo-
lutionaries. The Cuban Embassy
in Montevideo has been instru-
mental in recruiting and pro-
viding travel arrangements far
Argentines sent to Cuba for
training. At least 2E3 Argen-
tines traveled to Cuba for the
26 July celebration, and some
may remain for training.
The preparation of mili-
tary training areas in Bolivia
and Paraguay for Argentine sub-
versives has also been reported.
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Bolivia
Evidence that Cuba regards
Bolivia as a staging area from
which to send trained subversives
into neighboring countries was
reinforced since late May by
the arrest of a number of Peru-
vian subversives, some of whom
had received training in Cuba.
These Cuba-trained subversives
apparently enter Bolivia from
Brazil for an onward journey
to Peru through the dense, un-
patrolled jungle regions. Also,
two Peruvians having Cuban
funds and propaganda in their
possession were found in Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia, staying at the
home of a pro-Communist news-
paper editor. The Cuban Em-
bassy in La Paz has reportedly
offered to pay monthly rent for
a meeting place for a newly
formed Bolivian youth group.
There are also tentative
indications that the Cuban Em-
bassy in Bolivia may be pre-
paring to support and guide
certain extremist political
factions with a view to influ-
encing the presidential elec-
tions in Bolivia scheduled for
next year. So far this year,
at least 37 Bolivians are known
to have traveled to Cuba, 18
of them for the 26 July cele-
brations.
Brazil
The appointment of Raul
Roa Kouri, son of Cuba's for-
eign minister, to be ambassador
in Rio de Janeiro is clear evi-
dence of the importance Cuba
attaches to Brazil in its over-
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all hemispheric planning. Roa
proved an able and popular diplo-
mat at his previous assignment
in Prague and is reliably re-
ported to have been Fidel Cas-
tro's personal choice for the
Rio post.
The first six months of
this year have been character-
ized by a struggle among several
Brazilian Communist and pro-Com-
munist groups to win Cuban sup-
port. Chief among them are the
orthodox Communist party headed
by Luiz Carlos Prestes, that
portion of the Feasant Leagues
of northeast Brazil still led
by Francisco Juliao, and the
relatively small dissident
Communist party which is ideo-
logically allied with Communist
China. During 1962 Castro had
shown his sympathy for Juliao
and the dissident Communists,
both of which favor the violent
revolutionary approach to power,
and had provided each with sup-
port. The support for Juliao's
Peasant Leagues ended abruptly
last December, however, after
the eruption of dissension within
the movement and the discovery
of several training centers by
the Brazilian authorities,
In late February, Juliao
and Prestes both traveled to
Havana for talks with the Cuban
leaders, and Prestes stopped
off for talks in Moscow both
on his way and his return from
Cuba. On their return from
Cuba, both Juliao and Prestes
claimed to have won Gastro's
support--Prestes for a "peace-
ful" approach and Juliao for
continued violence. Cuban support
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for Juliao has apparently
been resumed although possibly
on a reduced scale.
The Castro regime has ex-
pended considerable effort and
funds on activities designed
to impress Brazilians with the
achievements of Cuba under
Castro. Cuban support goes
regularly into various Cuban-
Brazilian friendship and cul-
tural societies established in
most major Brazilian cities and
such nationwide organizations
as the Society of Friends of
Cuba and the National Committee
Against Intervention in Cuba.
At least 27 Brazilians went to
Cuba for the 26 July celebra-
tions.
British Guiana
The government of Premier
Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana
is openly pro-Castro. During
the recent general strike,
Jagan's regime requested and re-
ceived shipments of fuel and
food from Cuba and the Soviet
Union. These have served to
increase both the government's
control over the economy and
its reliance on bloc supplies.
Although trade now is re-
turning to normal patterns,
the ships, both Cuban and Soviet,
carrying various items to British
Guiana and Guianese rice to
Cuba provide a means for the
clandestine travel of subver-
sives. Guianese students and
party organizers have used
them to go to Cuba, most re-
cently on 20 July.
While there have been
numerous reports that arms are
being brought into British
Guiana both for local use and
for transshipment to Venezuela,
these reports have not been
confirmed. However, empty can-
isters, of a type normally used
for the transportation of rifles,
were reportedly found hidden
under bags of cement which had
been shipped from Cuba to Guiana
during the strike. Also, on
14 May the police found a US-
made machine gun with almost
1,000 rounds of ammunition con-
cealed under the house of an
organizer for Jagan's political
party. At least 35 Guianese
students have been in Cuba this
year, and four of the five men
arrested in Guiana in connection
with a bombing attempt during
the strike are members of the
youth branch of Jagan's politi-
cal party who had been in Cuba.
A Cuban tanker disembarked
1$ Cuban air technicians in
British Guiana on 16 July. Four
of them, including three pilots,
are still there and may be em-
ployed in Guiana's civil airline.
In addition, Guiana Import-Ex-
port Corporation, the govern-
ment's trading agency, recently
loaned the regime a sum of
$1 million which had been ob-
tained from Cuba, allegedly as
advance payment for Cuban goods.
Chi l e
Chile is the only Latin
American country where there
is any possibility of a Commu-
nist-dominated political group
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winning in legal elections in the
foreseeable future. There the Cu-
ban effort is concentrating on
support for the presidential cam-
paign of Socialist leader Sal-
vador Allende, the candidate
of the Comm-unist-dominated
Popular Action Front (FRAP).
In June it was reliably
reported that the Cuban news
agency in Chile has supplied
funds for office rent and other
expenses for a group of far-
leftist economists who are
working for Allende's election.
Allende himself has visited
Castro several times, and his
campaign manager was in Cuba
as recently as last March. The
latter 's trip to Cuba was paid
for by the Cuban commercial
office in Chile.
Popular disillusionment
in Chile with the Castro gov-
ernment, however, has led the
FRAP to avoid references to
Cuba in its present campaign,
since it believes this would
cost votes. At least 21 Chileans
traveled to Cuba for the 26
July celebrations, including
Luis Corvalan, secretary gen-
eral of the Chilean Communist
Party.
in April of this year. The
report that a Colombian sub-
versive is drawing up an ex-
tensive report on conditions
in the country suggests that
Cuban efforts there may becomQ
more extensive. Thus far this
year, at least 130 Colombians
have traveled to Cuba, 27 of
them for the 26 July celebra-
tions.
Costa Rica
The Popular Vanguard Party,
Costa Rica's Communist party,
continues to maintain a pro-
Castro position and to send
some of its members to Cuba for
subversive training in Cuba.
In February, 21 Costa Ricans
returned from Cuba where they
had received four to six months
training as instructors in
guerrilla warfare. Since their
return, preparations have been
made to set up training camps
in Costa Rica with Cuban finan-
cial support. These prepara-
tions appear to be directed
more toward support of the sub-
versive effort in neighboring
countries than against the gov-
ernment of Costa Rica. At least
12 more Costa Ricans went to
Cuba for the 26 July celebra-
tions.
Colombia
In Colombia the United
Front for Revolutionary Action
(FUAR), a pro-Castro revolution-
ary organization, and the pro-
communist Worker-Student-Peasant
Movement (MOEC), a terrorist
organization, have been reported
to be recipients of Cuban finan-
cial assistance--most recently
Dominican Republic
Since February, a number
of Dominican Communist and pro-
Castro leaders have returned
to the country from exile.
Some are known to have received
training in Cuba. One recent
returnee is supposed to have
brought $30,000 in Cuban funds
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for use by the Dominican Popu-
lar Movement (MPD), a pro-Cas-
tro, Communist-dominated party.
At least 20 Dominicans
traveled to Cuba for the 26
July celebrations. Others,
who had lived in Cuba for some
time, may return soon. On 29
July, a Havana radiobraadcast
was heard urging all Dominicans
in Cuba desiring to return to
their country to attend a meet-
ing that was to be held later
that day under the sponsorship
of the "Committee for the Re-
turn to Santo Domingo of Domin-
ican Residents."
Beginning in May, the
Ecuadorean Government made
several arrests of Communists
returning to Ecuador from Europe,
the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba..
These persons were found to be
carrying sizable amounts of US
currency, propaganda material,
and various incriminating papers.
The arrest of one of them, Jose
Maria Roura, a member of the
central committee of the Ecua-
dorean Communist Party, touched
off a bitter internal struggle
within the party resulting in
a split and his expulsion. These
divisions and the loss of funds
intended to finance guerrilla
activity forced the extreme
left to postpone its plans to
launch guerrilla action.
Prior to the recent mili-
tary coup, Ecuador was one of
the Latin American countries
where Cuban-supported subver-
sion appeared to be reaching
a point of possible overt guer-
rilla action. Ecuadoreans who
had received guerrilla warfare
training in Cuba last year had
returned home and were reported
on the point of beginning ac-
tion.
In late March, Aquiles
Valencia, a member of the
central committee of the Ecua-
dorean Communist Party, returned
to Ecuador from Chile reportedly
bringing with him between
$30,000 and, $50,000. These
funds allegedly were supplied
by the Cuban Embassy in Santiago
for use in supporting the guer-
rilla effort. An additional
$15,000 is reliably reported to
have been promised the Ecuadorean
Communists by Cuba.
The military junta has,
since the 11 July coup, taken
a very strong stand against
Castro-Communists and has ar-
rested several key leaders;
others have gone into hiding.
There has been little
evidence of direct Cuban-sup-
ported subversion in E1 Sal-
vador during the past six
months. Seventeen Salvadorans
are known to have gone to Cuba
since January of this year.
Four Salvadorans who went to
Cuba in late April for the
May Day celebrations were ar-
rested on their return to E1
Salvador via the Grand Cayman
air route and are still being
held. Four more went for the
26 July celebrations.
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Guatemala
There is strong evidence
-Chat Guatemalan Communists
have been receiving material
support and guidance from Cuba.
Meanwhile, pro-Communist for-
mer Guatemalan President Arbenz
remains in exile in Cuba. The
strong antisubversive measures
by the Peralta government have
apparently been an important
setback to the subversive ef-
forts.
Castro, in his 26 July
address, singled out the "he-
roic Guatemalan fighters" along
with the Venezuelan guerrillas
as the only groups of Latin
American revolutionaries to
whom he sent messages of "soli-
darity and fraternity." Cas-
tro declared that the "revo-
lution" in Guatemala, as in
Venezuela, has reached the
point where: it has become ir-
reversible.
There has been no indica-
tion during the past six months
of direct Cuban-sponsored sub-
versive efforts in Haiti. Ha-
vana continues :its Greol.e-l an -
guage broadcasts to Hari, how-
ever, and a broadcast in May
urged Haitian Communists to
"follow the example of their
Venezuelan comrades and take
an active role in the struggle
against the government." They
were urged to oppose any form
of foreign intervention in
Haiti.
Pro-Castro activities in
Honduras appear directed largely
toward support of Communist ef-
forts in neighboring Nicaragua
and Guatemala. The govern-
ment's attitude, the country`s
rugged terrain, the absence of
an effective internal security
force, and the presence of
long-established routes for
smuggling arms into neighboring
countries make konduras well
suited for such a role.
Mexico
The Castro regime has made
every effort to avoid antag-
onizing the Mexican Government
in view of the importance to
Cuba of maintaining its embassy
there and its civil air connec-
tions through Mexico. On 29
July, two of the Mexican Com-
munist Party`s three top leaders
traveled to Cuba by CUBANA
flight from Mexico.
Nicaragua
The Cuban-supported
Nicaraguan revolutionary group,
the National Liberation Front
(FLN), is directed by a group
of Nicaraguan Communists resi-
dent in Cuba. Help from Cuba
has been in the form of train-
ing, financial assistance, and
guidance. A veteran member of
the Nicaraguan Communist Party
said in May that the party now
receives funds and instructions
from Cuba rather than from Mos-
cow, via Mexico, as in the past.
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The FLN is active in
neighboring Honduras and Costa
Rica as well as in Nicaragua,
and Cuba-trained men are reli-
ably reported to be conducting
guerrilla training programs.
FLN activities in general ap-
peared to be on the upswing
during the past three months
and were highlighted by the
robbery of about $7,000 from
the Bank of America branch
in Managua on 31 May.
At least 18 Panamanians
traveled to Cuba for the 26
July celebrations. Among them
were two leaders of the Commu-
nists' Peoples Party of Panama.
Paraguay
Paraguayan exiles continue
to travel to Cuba and some of
these receive training in sub-
version. At least three came
for the 26 July celebrations.
The pro-Castro revolution-
ary group, Vanguard of National
Action (VAN), has received both
material support and guidance
from Cuba. During the past
six months some of the more
than 100 Panamanians who had
earlier received training in
Cuba have established rudimentary
training facilities in Panama.
In addition, VAN members have
apparently had some success in
their efforts to accumulate
arms and equipment.
Same of the Panamanians
trained in Cuba were instructed
to take every advantage of
the opportunities afforded by
next year's election cam-
paigning. They were told to
undertake campaign trips through-
out Panama, to prepare reports
on banks and bank employees, and
to obtain information on pay-
rolls and paymasters of Pana-
manian Government a encies
Fidel Castro had or-
ere at sabotage, terrorism,
and attacks on Cuban exiles in
Panama begin without delay.
Cuban influence is pro-
nounced in some of the Para-
guayan exile groups active in
Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina.
In April, Havana Radio announced
that Paraguayan residents of
Cuba had formed an association
"to publicize the struggle of
the Paraguayan people against
the Stroessner dictatorship and
to inform the oppressed Para-
guayan people about the achieve-
ments of the Cuban revolution."
Cuba's major effort to
foment revolution in Peru
apparently is being done through
the Movement of the Revolution-
ary Left (MIR) and the Revolu-
tionary Labor Party (POR), This
is evident in the clandestine re-
turn of MIR and POR trainees
from Cuba. While some of these
trainees were apprehended by
the Peruvian and Bolivian
authorities as they entered
the country, it is probable
that others succeeded in re-
turning. The MIR, at latest
report, intends to begin
guerrilla activity this month.
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Uruguay
Uruguay's importance to
the Cuban subversive effort in
Latin America lies in its value
as a place where Cubans and
Cuban agents are relatively
free to carry on subversive
contacts with dissidents from
neighboring countries, partic-
ularly Argentines and Para-
guayans. The Cuban Embassy in
Montevideo has been the focal
point of this activity. During
the past six months, Uruguay has
also been useful to Cuba as a
distribution point for Cuban
propaganda. Several thousand
copies of Cuba, printed in
Uruguay by a local publisher
and paid for by the Cuban Em-
bassy, are reportedly distrib-
uted fairly regularly. At
least 15 Uruguayans traveled
to Cuba for the 26 July cele-
brations.
Venezuela
The Betancourt administra-
tion continues to be Castro's
primary target in Latin America.
The Armed Forces of. National
Liberation (FALN), a pro-Commu-
nist paramilitary group, con-
tinues to receive Cuban propa-
Banda support. The FALN re-
portedly also has radio con-
nections with Cuba; the fact
that the Cuban radio transmits
news of FALN exploits very
quickly after they occur would
tend to substantiate this re-
port.
The FALN does not appear
to be receiving any substantial
material or financial assistance
from Cuba at this time. It now
is meeting these z~.eeds through
its own activities. Sabotage
and guerrilla activities by
the FALN were stepped up during
June and continue at a high
level. At least 65 Venezuelans
have traveled to Cuba already
this year, 12 of them for the
26 July celebrations.
Anti-Castro feeling among
the general public in Venezuela
is presently high and the ter-
rorist activities of Castro
supporters have probably con-
siderably damaged Castro's image.
Also, the government of Venezuela
has taken increasingly energetic
measures in an effort to counter
Communist insurgency. Special
emphasis is being placed on the
improvement of the Venezuelan
law enforcement and security
agencies. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
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