NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010002-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 15, 2006
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 3, 1978
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010002-0.pdf | 291.34 KB |
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03050001 002-0
AW 'Aw 'Aw IMF AW AW low IMF AW AJ
Tuesday 3 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/001C
CIA-RDP79T00975AO305O9p Q Stcret 2, c
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PaFinnal Tntellicrenr'e nails Cable for Tues January 1978, 25X1
rune NID Ca e is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
USSR: Additional Grain Purchases
CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Situation Report
TURKEY: Coalition Government
CHILE: Plebiscite Consequences
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USSR: Additional Grain Purchases
//We believe that the Soviets have
contracted for 23.5 mi ion tons of grain in 1977, an estimated
22.5 million of which will be delivered in the October 1977 -
September 1978 marketing year. The bulk of the deliveries will
be evenly divided between wheat and corn; there are also small
amounts of barley, rye, and oats.//
//We estimate that the Soviets are
already committed to buy 10 million tons of corn and 5 million
tons of wheat. Because supplies of non-US grain are short, the
Soviets will probably have to make a formal request to the US
to raise the 15-million-ton purchase limit established by the
long-term US-USSR grain agreement if they are to make substan-
tial 25X1
additional purchases.
ket for additional rain or delivery in the current marketing
year,
CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Situation Report
Vietnam's public reaction to Cambodia's severing of
Zp omatic relations on Saturday has been more of sorrow than
anger. Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops are mopping up Cambodian
units in Svay Rieng Province.
I I Recalling their common struggle for. independence,
Hanoi expressed regret that Cambodia soured the relationship
with armed incursions into Vietnam. Detailing past efforts to
bring the Cambodians to the negotiating table, Hanoi urged an
early meeting to discuss the current situation. Phnom Penh
radio late yesterday broadcast official statements that Cam-
bodia would not consider talks unless Vietnam withdraws its
forces and creates "an atmosphere of friendship and mutual
confidence."
China, although Cambodia's mentor, has taken an im-
partial stance by broadcasting without comment both Cambodian
and Vietnamese statements. Moscow, on the other hand, sharply
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//The Soviets may soon be in the mar-
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criticized Cambodia's action and supported Vietnam's call for
a meeting to settle the dispute. The Soviet response also
clearly implied that Peking fully supported Cambodia's action.
Initial Soviet reaction ignored. Cambodian intimations that So-
viet advisers are with Vietnamese forces.
The Vietnamese continue their militar
o
er
ti
y
p
a
ons
in the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng but are encountering
Since the Vietnamese invaded Svay Rieng in early
December, they have destroyed several Cambodian combat units,
captured a large number of Cambodian troo s and now occupy
key positions throughout the province.
TURKEY: Coalition Government
//President Koruturk on Sunday named opposition
leader BuZent Ecevit to form a new coalition government. Prime
Minister DemireZ, who resigned Saturday when his coalition
failed to win a vote of confidence, will remain as caretaker
until Ecevit wins acceptance for his cabinet and program, pos-
sibZy within two weeks.//
1//Ecevit's efforts to bring down Demirel and
his three-party coalition succeeded Saturday when he mustered
228 votes against the government in a no-confidence motion.
Weakened by the defection of 11 Justice Party deputies last
October, Demirel's government polled only 218 ballots, eight
short of a majority.//
//An informal coalition headed by Ecevit and
his Republican People's Party might be able to count upon 227
votes, one more than a majority. Aside from two small splinter
parties possessing three votes and his own party's 213, Ecevit
has received support from 11 of parliament's 14 independents.//
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//While questions remain about Ecevit's ability
to hold his prospective allies together, his success in unseat-
ing Demirel will probably strengthen the commitment to forming
a stable government. Furthermore, Ecevit's allies might fear
that a failure to put together a government could precipitate
a political crisis in which the military might intervene--de-
spite the recent statement by the Chief of the General Staff
that the military intends to stay out of politics.//
//Ecevit's highly personal approach to politics
makes it i icult to predict his actions on foreign and domes-
tic issues. He believes austerity measures are essential if
Turkey's serious economic problems are to be solved and will
probably accept the International Monetary Fund's conditions
for granting a loan in order to reassure other international
lenders.//
//In order to solve Turkey's continuing prob-
lems with Cyprus and the Aegean, Ecevit might opt for a dra-
matic move, such as an immediate meeting with Greece's Prime
Minister Karamanlis. On Cyprus, Ecevit would probably be in a
better position to make concessions than his predecessor.//
//Domestic security may prove a more difficult
problem for Ecevit to solve. Turks have become accustomed to a
high level of political violence, much of which is the work, of
individuals or small groups acting spontaneously and with lit-
tle allegiance either to larger organizations or to ideologies.
Ecevit, usually cast as a social democrat, might placate left-
ist elements but incite rightists to more violence.//
the Cyprus situation could well
//Nevertheless
,
en to compromise than are Turkish claims in the
s o
l
p
es
prove
Aegean. The military might quietly press Ecevit to make.prog-
ress on Cyprus in order to improve chances for US ratification
of the $1 billion Defense Cooperation Agreement, but they too
are divided as to how much Turkey should concede.
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CHILE: Plebiscite Consequences
The Chilean public will respond by plebiscite on
Wednesday to President Pinochet's appeal for support in the
face of "foreign aggression" on the human rights issue. De-
spite dissent within the junta, and against the judgment of
his civilian supporters, Pinochet is determined to gamble on
this "national consultation."
The consequences of exposing the regime to popular
judgment will almost surely exceed what Pinochet had in mind
when he submitted his political brainchild. He evidently fore-
saw an easy personal victory in playing on nationalistic sen-
timent against foreign criticism. He may also have counted on
the pervasive fear that has developed among the public that
the military will somehow know how each individual votes.
Pinochet did not anticipate either the immediate or
longer range risks in this venture. Unless the vote is over-
whelmingly favorable and the election unquestionably clean,
the prestige of the regime will suffer and Pinochet's personal
chance to enhance the power of the presidency will falter.
Air Force General Leigh still refuses to support the
plebiscite. With the junta's division now in the public domain,
some shakeup in the governing body will almost certainly be
required after the vote is in. No clear mechanism exists to
prevent this shakeup from becoming another embarrassing con-
frontation within the leadership.
A longer range risk arises from Pinochet's implicit
acknowledgment that the regime depends on popular support. The
plebiscite on Wednesday is likely to create demands for other
expressions of popular will. According to the US Embassy, many
Chileans believe the plebiscite will have a major impact on
the country's future. The junta will not be able to i nore
these expectations without further political cost. 25X1
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