SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE FOREIGN POLICY PRESSURES ON FINLAND'S INTERNAL POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000120005-2
7 June 1963
OCI No. 0283/63D
Copy No. ,1 6
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
FOREIGN POLICY PRESSURES ON FINLAND'S INTERNAL POLITICS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Finland's strongly anti-Communist Social Demo-
cratic Party is trying to end the political isolation
to which it has been relegated for four years by
President Kekkonen and his dominant Agrarian Party.
While there are numerous differences between the two
parties, their overriding point of friction is the
Agrarian allegation that the Social Democrats do
not support the official policy of neutrality and
friendship with Moscow. On these grounds the Agrar-
ians have refused to accept the Social Democrats,
Finland's other principal non-Communist party, in
a government coalition. As a result the country's
recent governments have been little more than presi-
dentially appointed cabinets without any representa-
tion for democratic labor elements which, with the
farmers, comprise the dominant economic interest
groups in Finland. This has weakened parliamentary
democracy and undermined Finland's ability to resist
Soviet pressures. A change in the Social Democratic
leadership expected to be approved at the party con-
gress opening on 15 June may ease, but is not likely
to resolve, this deadlock.
Social Democratic Leadership
A major development at the
Social Democratic congress is
expected to be the retirement of
the veteran party chairman,
Vaino Tanner. The 82-year-old
Tanner has long been persona
non grata with Moscow and is
also the symbol of the polit-
ical tug of war between the
Social Democrats and the Agrar-
ians.
provocative of the Soviet Union,
they reject any idea of accept-
ing Agrarian judgments on the
qualifications of their leaders.
It appears, however, that the
Social Democrats will approach
Agrarian insistence that
the Social Democrats purge their
leadership of allegedly anti-
Soviet individuals has merely
served to exacerbate the already
strained relations between the
two parties. While many Social
Democrats concede that Tanner's
appointment at the 1957 congress
was unwise and unnecessarily
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this congress in a more concil-
iatory mood on the leadership
question if for no other reason
than to try for a political. come-
back.
Tanner's successor is
likely to be Rafael Paasio, a
prominent Social Democrat who
is regarded as a moderate on
the all-important question of
Soviet-Finnish relations.
Another point in Paasio's favor
is his lack of firm identifi-
cation with either of the party's
mutually antagonistic left- and
right-wing factions. His selec-
tion, nonetheless, would indi-
cate a consensus in favor of
reconciliation with the dissi-
dent left-wing Social. Democrats
--the so-called Skogists--and
support for an effort to attempt
to improve relations with the
Agrarians as a preliminary step
toward eventually regaining
representation in the cabinet.
Agrarian Strategy
The Agrarians, however,
apparently are convinced they
have the Social Democrats on
the defensive, and recent pro-
nouncements by party leaders
indicate that they have raised
the price for readmittance into
the government.
In what has come to be
known as the "March Manifesto,"
the official Agrarian Party
paper declared that there was
no prospect of renewing a coali-
tion between the two parties
even if Paasio succeeds Tanner,
since actual power would remain
in the hands of such leaders as
Vice Chairman Olavi Lindblom,
Secretary Kaarlo Pitsinki, and
Vaino Leskinen, an influential
member of the party's executive
committee. Like Tanner, all
three have been bitterly attacked
by Moscow, and the Agrarians are
indicating that reconciliation
between the two parties hinges
on their withdrawal from posi-
tions of leadership.
The Social Democrats for
their part are certain to reject
such onerous terms. To accept
them would reduce the party to
a pliant tool of the Agrarians
and merely serve to drive most
of labor into the arms of the
Communists.
The Agrarian - Social Demo-
cratic dispute has its origins
in the December 1958 cabinet
crisis in which Soviet politi-
cal and economic pressure was
instrumental in toppling Social
Democratic Prime Minister Fager-
holm's coalition government.
The crisis was resolved only
when President Kekkonen appointed
an Agrarian minority government
for which he obtained Khrushchev's
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personal approval during his
visit to Leningrad in January
1959. Although Finnish leaders
in the postwar years have al-
ways taken Moscow's likely re-
action into account when draw-
ing up cabinets, Kekkonen's di-
rect solicitation of Khru-
shchev's approval on this oc-
casion appears to have estab-
lished a precedent which gives
the Soviet Union a kind of veto
power over the composition of
Finnish governments.
With the resolution of the ?'???'
1958 crisis, the campaign to
isolate and discredit the Social
Democrats' party and leadership
began in earnest. The Agrarians,
Skogists, and Communists in vary-
ing degrees have echoed Moscow's
line that the Social Democrats
are hostile to the Soviet Union,
do not support Finland's basic
foreign policies, and hence are
unfit for cabinet responsibility.
The Soviet Union's desire
to discredit, if not to destroy,
the Social Democratic Party is
clear, and is reflected in the
basic strategy of the Finnish
Communist Party (FCP). This
strategy is aimed at weakening
Social Democratic influence in
labor as a prerequisite to gain-
ing for the FCP the role of
principal spokesman for labor,
and thus representation in the
government.
There is also a historical
basis to Moscow's animosity
toward the Social Democrats. In
1918 large numbers of radical
Socialists and Communists fled
to the USSR after failing in
SOCIAL IIBERAlS'
DEMOCRATIC 3 LIBERAL'
OPPOSITION UNION
(SROGISTS) 1
2 200 SEATS
their attempt to seize power in
Finland. (Among them was Otto
Kuusinen, the lone survivor of
these emigrds and currently a
member of the presidium of the
Soviet party) The FCP and Mos-
cow have never.forgiven the
Social Democrats for frustrating
this and more recent efforts of
the Communists to gain power,
and also for turning their backs
on doctrinaire Marxism and identi-
fying themselves with the moder-
ate, reformist programs of the
Scandinavian Social Democratic
parties.
Kekkonen's Image
The motives behind Kekkonen's
unrelenting attitude toward the
Social Democrats are more ob-
scure. His critics charge that
he is using foreign policy is-
sues such as the Social Demo-
crats' alleged hostility to the
Soviet Union merely to strengthen
his own position as well as that
of the Agrarian Party. They
assert that by raising doubts
about the Social Democrats'
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stand on basic foreign policy
questions and encouraging the
divisive activities of the
Skogists, the Agrarians have
sought to keep the Social Demo-
crats in a permanent political
limbo.
In addition, the critics
claim the Agrarians have at-
tempted to establish an image
of Kekkonen as the indispensable
leader who alone is able to
maintain relations with the
Soviet Union on a firm and
practical footing. To under-
line this, they point to the
crisis in Soviet-Finnish rela-
tions in late 1961 when Moscow
invoked the 1948 Treaty of
Friendship and Mutual Assist-
ance and called for military
consultations with Finland on
grounds that West German mili-
tary activity in the Baltic area
presented a threat to the se-
curity of both countries.
While Kekkonen subsequently was
able to "persuade" Khrushchev
to defer the consultations, it
now is generally accepted that
the episode was primarily a
maneuver on Moscow's part to
assure the re-election of Kek-
konen in the presidential elec-
tions which followed shortly
after.
Kekkonen's supporters, on
the other hand, vigorously deny
that he is using foreign policy
issues for domestic political
purposes. Noting that the
Finnish constitution specifi-
cally delegates to the presi-
dent responsibility for direct-
ing foreign relations, they
argue that,Kekkonen is acutely
conscious of this responsibility
and the overriding importance
of maintaining a balance in
Finland's relations with both
East and West.
Kekkonen does, in fact,
regard his principal task to be
one of assuring that Finland's
official policy of neutrality
enjoys the "confidence" and
"trust" of the major powers--
above all the Soviet Union.
His supporters maintain that
since the Social Democratic
Party's present leaders do not
wholeheartedly support Finland's
official policy of friendship
and cooperation with the Soviet
Union, any government in which
that party is represented would
not enjoy Moscow's confidence.
Therefore, they say, it would
be dangerous to attempt to form
such a government since it would
only invite another Soviet foray
into Finland's internal affairs.
On the offensive, the
Agrarians have exploited a
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recent interview Tanner gave
to a Dutch newspaper in which
he expressed the conviction
the Soviet Union would not rest
until it had absorbed Finland.
In the Agrarian view, this was
conclusive evidence of the So-
cialist leadership's unyield-
ing hostility to the Soviet
Union. To be sure, many of
Kekkonen's supporters privately
entertain doubts concerning
Moscow's protestations of
friendship and good will toward
Finland, but it is one they
keep to themselves.
It is Kekkonen's belief
that the problem of regulating
Finland's relations with the
Soviet Union is of overriding
importance and all other facets
of foreign policy and domestic
considerations must be subor-
dinated to the maintenance
of good relations with Moscow.
He maintains that Finland's
experiences in wars with the
USSR in 1939-40 and again in
1941-44 proved the folly of
looking to the outside world
for effective assistance in
moments of national crisis.
Finland, therefore, has been
forced to come to terms with
the harsh reality of its postwar
position as a virtually unarmed
neutral controlling territory
of great strategic importance
to a powerful and suspicious
Soviet Union. Finland's only
hope for survival in these cir-
cumstances is to pursue what
is essentially a policy of pas-
sive neutrality, accommodating
itself to the steady pressures
exerted by Moscow which affect
many areas of its national
life, but maintaining inviolate
its free institutions and way
of life.
All of the non-Communist
parties, including the Social
Democrats, support this policy
of accommodation--the so-called
"Paasikivi line," named after
Kekkonen's predecessor. How-
ever, many non-Communists take
issue with Kekkonen's interpre-
tation and implementation of it,
which they feel have served to
further circumscribe Finland's
freedom of action in the con-
duct of its foreign relations
and invited a growing measure
of interference by Moscow in
its internal affairs. They
contend that he has given a
lopsided interpretation to Fin-
land's neutrality by placing
greater emphasis on avoiding
any actions which he anticipates
might be viewed with disfavor
by the Soviet Union than on
pursuing a genuine middle-of-
the-road course between the two
power blocs.
They cite, for example, his
intervention which enabled the
Communist-sponsored World Youth
Festival to be held in Helsinki
last summer, despite its boycott
by most Finnish youth organiza-
tions. More recently, his pro-
posal for declaring the four
northern countries a nuclear-free
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zone is hardly likely to be
regarded as a welcome initia-
tive at this time by the Scan-
dinavian countries.
Of particular concern to
many Finns is Kekkonen's refusal
to recognize that in recent
years Moscow has on several oc-
casions actively interfered in
Finnish affairs.. They are con-
vinced that Kekkonen's refusal
to recognize this meddling for
what it is only encourages Mos-
cow to press its advantage and
paves the way for more flagrant
intervention in the future.
Soviet Opportunities
The continuing bitter
struggle between the Agrarians
and the Social Democrats has
offered the USSR opportunities
to extend its influence in Fin-
land. Several months prior to
the fall of the Fagerholm govern-
ment, the long-developing split
within the Social Democratic
Party was finalized when the
Skogists withdrew. Politically,
the Skogists have only a small
following and control only two
of the seats in the 200-member
parliament. It is a matter of
speculation as the degree to
which the Agrarian leadership
has encouraged, if not actively
abetted this division of the
Social Democratic Party. At
any rate, it is one of the more
telling criticisms of President
Kekkonen that during his tenure
he has been a divisive rather
than a unifying influence in
Finnish political life.
Despite their small size,
the very existence of the
Skogists has weakened the So-
cial Democrats politically.
The Soviet Union and the FCP
apparently are prepared to
underwrite much of the Skogists'
activities because of the key
position they hold in the
deeply divided trade union
movement. Along with the split
in the Social Democratic Party,
a parallel division in the
trade union movement occurred
in early 1960 when the Skogists
and the Communists cooperated
to oust the regular Social
Democrats from positions of
leadership in the Central Con-
federation of Finnish Trade
Unions (SAK). The Skogists,
who since April 1962 have held
two cabinet positions as "labor"
representatives, continue to
fill the top posts in the SAK.
This arrangement provides
the Communists with a good cover
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for their operations; they have
been hesitant about wielding
their power too openly for
fear of driving the remaining
"neutral" unions in the SAK to
the rival trade union organiza-
tion founded in late 1960 by
the regular Social Democrats.
The new organization, the Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (SAJ),
got off to a slow start, but
now appears to be attracting an
increasing number of the "neu-
tral" unions which heretofore
have elected. to remain in the
older trade union federation.
Future Prospects
The direction in which
Finnish political life will
move in the days ahead--either
toward reconciliation or fur-
ther embitterment of relations
between the Agrarians and the
Social Democrats--will be de-
termined largely by President
Kekkonen. Recent pronouncements
by Kekkonen and the Agrarian
leadership, however, appear
to leave little prospect of
an early initiative from that
side toward reconciliation.
The only hope for an early
break in the impasse would
seem to lie with an increas-
ingly impatient public opin-
ion which, if sufficiently
aroused, may compel both
sides to yield out of con-
sideration for Finland's na-
tional interests.
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