SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE LAND REFORM AND TRIBAL DISSIDENCE IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0280/63B
Copy No. 77
SPECIAL REPORT
'lease 2006/09/27: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000C~97C lay 1963
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
LAND REFORM AND TRIBAL DISSIDENCE IN IRAN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM ARCHIVAL RVCOD
SECRET
AG^NCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. A-10 GROUP I Excluded from automatic
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17 May 1963
LAND REFORM AND TRIBAL DISSIDENCE IN IRAN
The Shah of Iran has based the country's social
and economic future on the success of his reform
program. A salient feature of this "revolution from
above" is land reform, aimed at transforming rural
society from the traditional landlord-sharecropper
system to one of village cooperatives. The program
has made remarkable progress in its first year, and
resistance by the landowners has been largely in-
effective. However, the program now is encounter-
ing trouble from impoverished remnants of the old
nomadic-tribal society of southwestern Iran, who
see their pastoral life threatened by the establish-
ment of farming cooperatives on their range lands.
Since early March these tribesmen have been carrying
out a guerrilla-type resistance that has pinned
down a government force of more than two divisions.
If the dissidence spreads to areas inhabited by
larger, non-Iranian minorities, Tehran would face
an ominous security problem.
Dissolution of Tribal Society
About one third of Iran's
21,000,000 citizens belong to
ethnic minorities. In the past
most of these groups either prac-
ticed pastoral nomadism or moved
twice a year between traditional
summer and winter pasture areas.
Tehran's policy toward this
"tribal" segment of the popula-
tion has been to reduce its
troublemaking potential by dis-
arming it and to attempt to set-
tle it in well-defined areas.
Although the government's
efforts have only been partly
successful, tribal authority has
been breaking down gradually in
recent years as more and more
tribesmen adopt the settled life
of villagers. This process has
gone further in areas where
conditions are more favorable
for agriculture, such as in
northwestern Iran, but it is
also apparent elsewhere.
The land reform program
appears likely to hasten the
dissolution of the old tribal
society. It tends to split the
rank and file of the tribal
groups from their hereditary
chieftains, who consider them-
selves the owners of all tribal
lands. At the same time,, it sets
a new class of peasant landowners
against tribal remnants still
pursuing their traditional way
of life on land which was for-
merly open range but which now
is either turned over to or ear-
marked for peasant cooperatives.
Opposition to Land Reform
Thus far, resistance to
the Shah's reforms has come
from elements that have a vested
interest in preserving the old
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arrangements: large landowners
(some tribal), religious fanatics,
and certain members of the busi-
ness community. Their resistance
has taken the form of street dem-
onstrations by religious groups
in several cities and, beginning
about the first of March, at-
tacks by tribesmen on govern-
ment garrisons and troop units
in an area of southwestern Iran.
These attacks have been carried
out by elements of three minor
tribes of the Shiraz-Ahvaz region
--the Mamasani, the Sorkhi, and
the Boir Ahmadi.
The tribal insurrection
in southwestern Iran is not
directed against land reform
alone, but against Tehran's
tribal policies generally.
These have been especially op-
pressive and unimaginative in
this area. Much of the violence
is traceable to economic pri-
vation at the end of a severe
winter, to reaction to the threat
of forced disarmament, and to
the traditional tendency of these
tribes to brigandage. An ad-
ditional irritant is the govern-
ment's efforts to destroy the
lucrative illegal poppy crop,
on which the tribesmen rely for
much of their cash income.
settlement. Shortly thereafter
the Shah, over the opposition
of local civil and military
authorities, issued orders to
disarm the tribes in Fars
Province. This triggered the
insurrection.
Military Operations
Against the Tribes
Military operations against
dissident tribal. elements in
this region seemed to be making
progress during March and early
April, but have received several
setbacks since then. A task
force of about 13,000 infantry
troops, plus some armor and mo-
bile heavy machine guns, was set
up early in March to deal with
the insurrection. Command was
coordinated by Lt. Gen. Ariana,
who has had little field expe-
rience.
The campaign also suffers
from division of responsibility.
There have been charges and
countercharges among the various
services. In the wake of a
tribal ambush of a two-company
force on 20 April, the Shah)
dispatched an aide to Shiraz
to investigate the operation
and make recommendations.
The "threat"' of land re-
form is basic, however, because
it is associated in the minds of
the seminomadic tribesmen of
the Shiraz region with forced
resettlement. In January the
former minister of agriculture
and chief proponent of land
reform, Hassan Arsanjani, made
several public statements on
the necessity for tribal re-
Further reasons for the
poor showing of the troops are
the basic deficiencies in
training, equipment, and combat-
level leadership. During the
early stages of the operation,
units were immobilized by snow
and cold because they had been
brought into the mountainous
area in March without winter
uniforms. There is apparently
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Rasht
?Ah aaz
NA h dan DILFIELDS
Gach
KUWAIT REFINERP Saran hiraz
BAKHTIAR
Kerman
IRAn
TRIBAL AREAS
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no system set up for the evacua-
tion of casualties; many of the
troops wounded in the 20 April
ambush were not picked up for
more than 24 hours.
The government now plans
to bring in'progovernment
tribesmen from southeastern
Iran to hunt down the dissi-
dents.
poor tactical leadership
of the local government forces
is illustrated by an account by
a survivor of the 20 April de-
bacle. An infantry battalion,
minus one comapny, was moving
in administrative formation
through tribal territory west
of Shiraz. The force was guided
by local tribesmen. As the
column entered a narrow defile
the leading guide suddenly drew
his pistol and shot the battalion
commander dead. This was the
signal for tribal forces con-
cealed along the slopes to open
fire from a range of about 50
yards. The two companies,
totaling about 150 officers and
men, suffered over 100 casualties.
Apart from their attempt at
encirclement of the hostile bands,
the government forces have re-
sorted to various other measures,
all so far without decisive
success. Indiscriminate bombing
and strafing of suspected villages
appear to have had little effect
on the tribes' paramilitary capa-
bilities. Military units have
also occupied blocking positions
at passes used by the larger
tribes in their annual migration
to.summer pasture. Here again
the tactic has backfired, be-
cause this year's migration
seems to consist solely of
women and old men accompanying
the flocks while the younger
tribesmen.remain behind in the
mountains.
The insurrection and the
associated rise in brigandage
and highway robberies have dis-
rupted normal life over wide
areas of Fars and Khuzestan
provinces. Few unescorted
vehicles venture outside the
towns, and oil exploration
activity in the promising area
between Ahvaz and Shiraz is at
a standstill.
Many local observers feel
that the problem-requires a social-
political, rather than a military
solution. They recommend thatthe
government declare the entire
region a disaster area, and set
the army to distributing food to
the starving people and animals.
In spite of the repeated
setbacks suffered by the govern-
ment forces in their campaign
of tribal pacification, there
is no question that Tehran has
the force to crush tribal dissi-
dence in this region. However,
the process will probably be a
long and bloody one, with great
suffering not only on the part
of the combatants, but on the
part of the larger uncommitted
population, as well.
Other Minority Groups
A more serious situation
would develop if some of the
larger ethnic minorities in Iran
were to engage in the same type
of antigovernment activity.
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There have been some indications
of dissatisfaction among the
Kurds, the Lur, and the Arabs
of Khuzestan, and low-level
reports that they have received
arms from outside Iran, but no
overt moves have been made by
any of them.
The two tribal groups pres-
ently causing Tehran the most
concern are the Bakhtiari and
the Qashqai. These large con-
federations are concentrated near
the area where military opera-
tions are going on,but, although
Qashqai elements appear to have
been involved in the banditry
that has plagued the Shiraz
region since the beginning of
the tribal insurrection, neither
they nor the Bakhtiari appear
to have taken any part in anti-
government attacks.
The Qashqai, who number
about 250,000, have long been
a thorn in Tehran's side, and
have carried out several large-
scale attempts at rebellion in
the past. They are a fighting
people, linguistically related
to the Turks. Their ruling
family now is broken up, however,
and general tribal unity appears
poor. One of the khans of the
Qashqai family is apparently
attempting to direct subversive
activities from exile in West
Germany, perhaps with Soviet
or UAR financial backing. The
Qashqai are presently concentrat-
ing in their summer pasture area
in the mountains north of Shiraz,
and the government has positioned
an infantry battalion between
their range and that of their
neighbors to the north, the
Bakhtiari, in an effort to keep
them separated.
About 125,000 Bakhtiari
occupy an area south of Isfahan.
Many of them have adopted a
sedentary life, but there re-
mains seminomadic elements
organized into clans under he-
reditary chieftains. Like the
Qashqai, the Bakhtiari have a
single, over-all ruling family.
The leader of this family owns
extensive lands in southwestern
Iran apparently not yet affected
by the land reform program. It
is possible that he has been
supporting the Boir Ahmadi in-
surgents with money and arms.
Another seminomadic,
pastoral people, the Lurs, live
in the mountainous region along
the Iraqi border between Ahvaz
and Kermanshah, This group,
which numbers about 210,000, is
reportedly disaffected, but so
far they have taken no overt
action. It is possible, however,
that the Lurs are active in
smuggling arms from Iraq and
transferring them to other trib-
al groups in the interior of
Iran. The Lurs are loosely
organized, each small tribal
group being governed by a
council of elders.
About 300,000 Arabs live in
Iran along the northern coast
of the Persian Gulf and in the
Ahvaz region near the Iraqi
border. Although many of these
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are now refinery and oilfield
workers in the Abadan - Gach
Saran region, most are still
organized into seminomadic trib-
al groups under local sheiks.
Separatist sentiment is known
to exist among this minority
group.
The Kurdish Problem
The 1,000,000 Kurds who live
in Iran make up the most poten-
tially dangerous minority, not
only because of their number
but also because of their fight-
ing qualities and their relative
political sophistication. The
Kurds occupy two widely sepa-
rated areas in Iran, with the
larger group--about 700,000--
living in an area that stretches
along the Iraqi and Turkish
borders. The remainder live
almost a thousand miles to
the east in the Meshed region
and constitute no threat to
government authority.
The Kurds of northwestern
Iran have a history of separatist
activity ana were able, with
Soviet assistance, to establish
a short-lived breakaway Kurdish
state just after World War II.
At the present time the Iranian
Kurds appear peaceful. They
have been strongly affected by
land reform, which has been
carried further in northwestern
Iran than elsewhere, and many of
the tribesmen have been brought
into the newly organized peasant
cooperatives. These now may
feel that their best interests
lie with the central government
rather than with their former
landlord, the tribal leader.
The Kurds also appear to be
impressed by the heavy concentra-
tion of military force deployed
throughout their area.
Nevertheless, considerable
separatist sentiment probably
remains alive in the Kurdish
minority. Contact has undoubt-
edly been maintained between the
Iranian Kurds and the followers
of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the
leader of the Kurdish revolt in
Iraq.
Tehran has endeavored to
maintain an ambivalent position
in this dispute, surreptitiously
supporting the Barzani group on
one hand while assuring Baghdad
of its friendship on the other.
The Iraqi Government has re-
quested the cooperation of both
Turkey and Iran in sealing their
borders if hostilities resume.
Turkey agreed promptly, but Iran
has dragged its feet on the re-
quest while keeping open its com-
munications to the Barzani Kurds,
Moscow's recent show of
sympathy for the Barzani cause
may also cause apprehension in
Tehran. If the Soviets should
decide to furnish material sup-
port to the Iraqi Kurds, the
logical route for a supply line
--clandestine or otherwise--
would lie across the Kurdish
populated northwestern corner
of Iran. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
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