SPECIAL REPORT OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

elease 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04000080006-6
10 May 1963
0
OCI No. 0279/63E
Copy No. 78
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.
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10 May 1963
In their struggle with the Soviet Union for
leadership of the world Communist movement, the
Chinese Communists have shown a keen appreciation
of the opportunities that exist in underdeveloped
countries. In Latin America, where change of
government by violence is the rule, their radical
solutions to economic and political difficulties
find many a ready ear. Peiping can point to the
Cuban revolution as a prime example of the efficacy
of its revolutionary theories. At the governmental
level, however, China has made few gains: Trade is
minimal, and no diplomatic breakthrough has been
made since Havana recognized Peiping in 1960.
Last fall's Cuban crisis
provided China with an opportu-
nity to argue that no Communist
party could count on the Soviet
Union when the chips were down.
Peiping did not hesitate to
shout about another "Munich"
or to publicize the Russian
pull-back as dramatic confirma-
tion of Chinese charges that
the present Soviet leaders are
timid and lack revolutionary
fervor. The Chinese assiduously
contrasted Moscow's unreliability
with their own staunch support
of revolutionary struggle.
Such innuendos found a ready
audience in Cuba. Havana feels
an instinctive sympathy for Pei-
ping's more militant approach
to world problems. In addition,
both regimes are relatively
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recent in origin, both came to
power through a guerrilla
struggle, and both see the US
as their prime antagonist. De-
spite the similarity of outlook,
however, Chinese support for
Cuba is perforce primarily moral
and technical.
Although Peiping will un-
doubtedly seek to increase its
influence in Cuba, and delegations
of Chinese are continually
passing through, there are
probably fewer than 250 Chinese
Communists permanently stationed
on the island. An estimated
50 Chinese serve in the em-
bassy, and approximately 200
advisers and technicians--
primarily agricultural--are in
outlying posts. There are, how-
ever, more than 30,000 ethnic
Chinese--15,000 in Havana alone
--and they have undoubtedly
given rise to the refugee reports
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of a substantially larger
Chinese Communist presence.
There is also a very small num-
ber of military advisers.
Chinese military aid to
Cuba has been limited. Peiping
is known to have provided small
quantities of conventional in-
fantry weapons and antiaircraft
machine guns. There are also
reports that Cubans have re-
ceived flight training in China.
Communist Parties
The Chinese campaign to in-
fluence Latin American Communist
parties began in 1959. Twelve
Latin American delegations that
had attended the 21st Soviet
party congress were invited to
Peiping at Chinese expense.
They were welcomed by Mao Tse-
tung and Liu Shao-chi, and their
hosts sought to impress them
with the applicability of Chi-
nese revolutionary tactics to
their situation at home.
Although almost all the
Latin American parties remain
Moscow-oriented, there are
clear-cut splits in the ranks
almost everywhere--splits be-
tween the cautious and the
impetuous, between those in con-
trol and their younger critics.
These divisions, rooted in
local intra-party strife, have
been widened by the Sino-Soviet
dispute and the emergence of a
Communist Cuba.
Peiping's exhortations to
head-on struggle strike a sym-
pathetic chord in the impatient
splinter groups. They quote
Peiping to make their case in
party squabbles, and the vehe-
mence of the ammo-Soviet polemic
over strategy gives their own
local heresies an air of respect-
ability.
In Brazil, the party split
has become formal. A year ago
dissident Communists who were
expelled from the Brazilian
party set up their own rival
political organization. They
elected a central committee,
issued a party platform, and
established a party press. The
splinter group, small in com-
parison with the orthodox party's
membership, has party regulars
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worried. Led by Joao Amazonas,
the splinter group is pledged
to establish a popular govern-
ment by revolutionary means
and has been encouraged by Com-
munist China. Peiping accorded
red-carpet tours of the main-
land to Amazonas as well as
orthodox party leaders it hopes
to influence.
In Bolivia, it is reported
the party has recently forbidden
members from continuing on to
Peiping after visiting Moscow.
All previous travelers who
visited both countries reportedly
felt more admiration and affection
for the Chinese than for the
Soviets. Pro-Chinese sentiment
is apparently growing among
Bolivian party youth, and law
students at the University of
La Paz have recently formed a
group to defend Peiping's
ideological stand.
In Mexico, the Communist
Party is deeply split over the
Sino-Soviet question. In Feb-
ruary 1963, the Chinese Com-
munist trade delegation then
visiting Mexico reportedly
offered financial aid to a
splinter group in exchange for
support of Peiping's policies.
Since then, internal wrangling
has continued, and the differ-
ences do not appear near recon-
cilia+ion. In fact, the recent
pru tponement of the party congress
from July to October appears to
reflect a concern among party
leaders that a congress held
this summer might break down
over the Sino-Soviet issue.
In Venezuela, young party
activists--responsible for the
current violence--are at odds
with old-guard pro-Moscow leaders
and are sympathetic to the Chi-
nese. A number have traveled
to China for paramilitary train-
ing.
Only in Chile, where the
party is legal and enjoys some
real prospects of eventually
gaining power by parliamentary
means, is there little evidence
of attraction to Peiping's mili-
tant line.
Except for Cuba, where trade
reached about $200 million in
1962, Communist China has no
significant commercial relations
in Central or South America.
China recently bought about
$20 million worth of Argentine
wheat and corn as part of the
program to relieve severe food
shortages by grain purchases in
the free world, but trade is
usually very small. Peiping's
only permanent "trade" office
in the western hemisphere outside
Cuba is in Chile.
A government trade delega-
tion visited Brazil and Mexico
last winter but was received by
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~fto NOW
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minor officials and no discus-
sions of substance are known to
have occurred. Brazil's Goulart
is cool, and Mexico's Lopez Mateos
last fall publicly reiterated
his government's unwillingness
to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Peiping.
"People's Diplomacy"
Peiping has sought to en-
hance its propaganda efforts by
inviting influential Latin Ameri-
cans to visit China. Such in-
vitations are not confined to
staunch pro-Communists. Among
the more prominent politi-
cal figures who have visited
Peiping in recent years are
Mexico's ex-president Portes
Gil, Cuba's President Dorticos
and industry chief Guevara, and
Chile's Socialist presidential
candidate Allende.
Last fall Chicago-born Janet
Jagan, wife of British Guiana's
premier, was received by Mao
and accorded top-level attention
throughout her visit. If, as
seems likely, the Jagans are
still in power when British Gui-
ana is granted independence,
Peiping can probably expect
diplomatic recognition.
Brazil's Goulart, despite
polite expressions of friendship
during a 1961 tour, has moved
Brasilia little closer to rec-
ognizing Peiping. His govern-
ment continues to oppose China's
admission to international
organizations.
Only two Chinese delega-
tions, trade unionists and
journalists, made extensive tours
of Latin America last year.
The vast majority of visiting
Chinese still go only to Cuba--
undoubtedly a result of diffi-
culty in obtaining visas to
countries with which Peiping has
no diplomatic relations. Ex-
cluding Cuba, Chinese visits
both to and from Latin America
have declined slightly since
the peak years of 1959-60.
The drop roughly coincides with
Peiping's severe economic dif-
ficulties at home and probably
reflects a world-wide retrench-
ment effort. As'the domestic
crisis eases, Chinese "people's
diplomacy" is likely to expand.
Propaganda
In the past two years the
Chinese have beamed a vigorous
radio propaganda effort at
Latin America. Since 1962
Peiping has been broadcasting
28 hours of Spanish-language
programs and about ten hours in
Portuguese each week. Direct
wireless communications were
established with Havana two years
ago, and Morse and radiotele-
type transmissions to the
Americas now exceed 100 hours
a week. The Chinese have long
published Spanish-language
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editions of the glossy propa-
ganda magazines China Pictorial
and China Recons ructs, and this
spring the more meaty ideolog-
ical fare in the Peking Review
was made available to La in
American readers in Spanish.
The official New China
News Agency (NCNA)--working
primarily through local Com-
munist parties--has established
a network of correspondents in
Latin America. It has recruited
stringers in Argentina, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama,
Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Offices manned by Chinese corre-
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spondents have been set up in
Cuba, Brazil, and Chile.
The Havana office of NCNA
is the funnel through which most
of Peiping's propaganda pours
into Latin America. Soon after
its establishment in 1959, NCNA's
Havana office set up close liai-
son with Castro's revamped Prensa
Latina news agency--giving it
advice and financial support--
and the NCNA chief was appointed
to negotiate all preparations
for the arrival of China's
first western hemisphere ambas-
sador in 1960. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
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