NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010094-0
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94
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Publication Date:
December 9, 1977
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REPORT
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Friday 9 December 1977 CG NIDC 77/285C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 9 December 1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
PORTUGAL: Prime Minisi:er Sought
TURKEY: Municipal Elections
USSR - US - MIDDLE EAST: Comments
ARGENTINA-CHILE: Beagle Channel
BRIEFS
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United King om
USSR
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PORTUGAL: Prime Minister Sought
ist government Leaves President Eanes with the difficult task
of choosing someone to become prime minister. In making his
selection, Eanes will try to find a candidate who is supported,
or at Least not resisted, by the Socialists, Social Democrats,
and Center Democrats--the country's three Largest parties. Any
of the current party heads except the Communists' CunhaZ could
be picked, but Eanes may well decide on a relatively unknown
"independent" candidate. Until a new government is appointed,
Prime Minister Soares will govern in a caretaker capacity.
Eanes accepted Soares' resignation yesterday after
the Socialists lost a vote of confidence. The constitution does
he collapse yesterday of Portugal's minority Social-
not give the President a deadline for making his choice but in-
dicates that he should first consult with the Revolutionary
Council and the political parties, taking account of the par-
ties' parliamentary strengths.
The politically charged atmosphere in parliament will
make it difficult for Eanes to find an acceptable candidate
among party leaders. Soares' opponents accused him of being in-
decisive and resented his stalling tactics and unwillingness to
compromise. Intense personal antipathy has developed between
the Socialists and the ambitious Social Democratic leader,
Francisco Sa Carneiro.
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Only Center Democratic leader Diogo Freitas do Amaral
seems to command the respect of all three parties. His party is
small and conservative, however, and would have trouble govern-
ing if serious new partisan differences developed later on.
Consultations could go on for a couple of weeks or
so, but Eanes apparently is trying to speed the process along.
Among other things, he doubtless wants a new government in place
so that talks with the International Monetary Fund and other
foreign lenders can be resumed. 7_ I
TURKEY : Municipal Elections
//Turkey's municipal elections on Sunday may
provz e a critical test of the cohesion of Prime Minister
Demirel's Justice Part
Local issues and personalities are usually the deci-
sive factors in Turkey's municipal elections, but the vote is
nevertheless viewed by most politicians as indicative of pop-
ular attitudes on national policies. The Justice Party and its
coalition allies--Necmettin Erbakan's National Salvation Party
and the National Action Party of Alpaslan Turkes--will be look-
ing in particular for indications of the public reaction to the
recent devaluation of the lira and other austerity measures im-
plemented under pressure from the International Monetary Fund.
The vote may further be seen as a popular judgment on the gov-
ernment's ability to control political violence.
The parties will also be viewing the elections with
an eye to their impact on intra-coalition power relations.
Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan of the Salvation Party continues
to be a problem for Demirel, seeking to wrest every conceivable
concession from the Prime Minister in return for parliamentary
support of the government.
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Partly because of pressure from Erbakan, Demirel has
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been impeded in his efforts to negotiate usefully on the Cyprus
issue and on the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean. Erbakan's
intransigence on economic issues has complicated the IMF nego-
tiations as well. The fact that Erbakan lost considerable sup-
port in the June general election has probably added to his
determination to play the role of defender of the Turkish home-
land in hopes of enhancing his popularity.
//Demirel will be following the returns closely
for signs of salvationist vulnerability that he might be able
to play upon to tone down his obstreperous partner and mute
criticism from Justice Party deputies. Many of the latter are
frustrated by Erbakan's apparent ability to hamstring the gov-
ernment almost at will and by his success in filling bureaucra-
tic positions with his own party's stalwarts.//
/Oppos.ition leader Ecevit may have difficulty
exploiting Demirel's troubles. His failure to form a government
in June despite his plurality in the general election led to
harsh criticism among his Republican People's Party followers.
The party is split into ideological camps, with a leftist minor-
ity sniping at the moderate progressives around Ecevit. This
internecine quarreling resulted in bitter primary battles in
some key cities that could have a negative impact on the party's
performance Sunday.//
1//Ecevit appears convinced that his party will
widen its lea over the Justice Party by 3 to 5 percent. He
believes this will be enough to cause Justice Party dissidents
to defect and bring down Demirel's administration.
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Justice Party leaders, while not overly optimistic,
do not envisage a defeat of the magnitude anticipated by Ecevit.
Demirel discounts reports of possible defectors and seems con-
fident that his party can hold its own at the polls.
In our view, Ecevit's optimism is probably unwar-
ranted. Although he does seem likely to gain in the elections,
he would probably need a striking victory to induce Justice
Party deputies to abandon Demirel. Barring such a success for
Ecevit's party, the elections may serve only to confuse further
an already muddled political situation.[ I
Comments in Soviet media yesterday on developments
in the Middle East indicate considerable unease over Secre-
tary of State Vance's visit to the area.
A TASS statement in English complained of "definite
circles in the US administration "set on pressuring" Arab
states to support both the meeting in Cairo and direct con-
tacts between Egypt and Israel. The statement attacked Secre-
tary Vance's remarks at his press conference Tuesday; it said
that his placing greater emphasis on the session in Cairo than
on a reconvening of the Geneva Middle East conference was a
"direct contradiction" of the Soviet-US joint statement of
1 October. The Soviets continue to be concerned that they may
not play a significant role in the Middle East negotiating
process.
Both a Radio Moscow commentary in Arabic and the
TASS statement noted the Egyptians' order closing consulates
and cultural centers of the USSR and its close allies. The
Radio Moscow language was the more vehement; it asserted that
the action was "another link in the chain of political steps"
by Cairo to undermine Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Radio Moscow did not mention Egyptian President
Sadat, and TASS referred to him only matter-of-factly. The con-
trast between this treatment and the virulence of earlier Soviet
media pieces may indicate that the Soviets want to prevent a
further deterioration of relations.
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ARGENTINA-CHILE: Beagle Channel
/Argentina's demarche to Chile demanding
assurances that the Atlantic Territorial waters off the south-
ern tip of South America belong to Argentina is the latest
move in a diplomatic strategy aimed at protecting Argentine
interests before the International Court's arbitration decision
becomes final on 2 Februar
re atzons )e ween
the two nations are outwardly cor is an z ely to remain so.//
I /At issue is not the disposition of the three
small, Chilean-occupied islands--which have little value--but
how the decision formally awarding them to Chile will affect
Argentina's maritime rights outside the Beagle Channel, a
question not addressed by the International Court.//
/Argentine officials fear that Chile will try
to use the decision to justify an extension of its maritime
jurisdiction into the Atlantic. This potential threat was sub-
stantiated when the Chilean Foreign Ministry published maps
projecting Chilean territorial claims 200 miles outward from
the Beagle Channel islands. If the Chileans acted on such
claims a major confrontation could ensue; the region is be-
lieved to be rich in cobalt, copper, petroleum, and marine
resources. Such action would also have an impact on Chilean
and Argentine overlapping claims to Antarctic territories.//
I /Efforts by both nations to resolve recent alleged
territorial violations in the area have been unsuccessful. The
Chileans are concerned that Argentina will try to occupy some
islets south of the channel to reinforce its claim to control
of the Atlantic side of Cape Horn.//
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//Within the Argentine junta, the most vociferous
critic o the arbitral award is Navy Commander in Chief Admiral
Massera, a political opportunist who has recently sought to ad-
vance his own fortunes by appealing to ultranationalist senti-
ment on a variety of issues. Vowing to defend Argentina from
"geographical mutilation," the bellicose Massera has placed
naval forces on alert in the South Atlantic.//
I /Other members of the junta have been publicly
silent on the issue. The chief of the Army General Staff, Gen-
eral Viola, was moderate in a press conference last week. He
said that it is in the interest of the Argentine Government to
maintain the strengthened cordial. relations with Chile.//
/While an invasion of islands in the Beagle Chan-
ne area y the Argentine Navy cannot be ruled out, we have no
evidence that such an adventure would have the support of Pres-
ident Videla. The Chileans, however, have begun to watch Argen-
tine troop movements in the southern border area more closely
although they have made no move to reinforce the islands.//
//There is no indication that the Argentine leaders
have agreed on how to resolve the dispute if Chile does not re-
spond positively to the recent demarche. Chile, however, may
not push too hard on the issue, out of fear that Argentina would
support Peru in any border showdown with Chile. Argentina has in
fact already made some gestures in this direction, presumably as
a subtle warning to the Chileans.//
//Each country can be expected to maintain firm
diplomatic and military pressure on the other, and small-scale
border incidents are possible, but neither is likely to allow
the channel issue to lead to major fighting.
MAURITANIA: Rail Line Reopens
Mauritania resumed iron ore shipments on Tuesday
along the vital rail Line between the mining center of Zouerat
and the port of Nouadhibou. The Line had been closed as a re-
sult of attacks by Algerian-backed PoZisario Front guerrillas
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in late October. The Mauritanians depend on iron ore exports
for some 85 percent of their foreign exchange earnings. Al-
though they had a two-month stockpile of ore at Nouadhibou as a
buffer against guerrilla harassment of the line, this reserve
would have been exhausted this week.
The recent arrival of additional Moroccan troops in
Mauritania has enabled the Mauritanians to deploy more,of their
forces along the railroad. It is doubtful, however, that they
will be able to prevent new Polisario attacks. Mauritanian mili-
tary officers have admitted to US officials that their intelli-
gence-gathering abilities are weak and that many nomads in the
area are cooperating with the guerrillas.
(Mauritanian mining officials fear that additional
Polisario attacks against the trains, and especially the seiz-
ure of more French workers as hostages, could result in the de-
parture of much-needed French technical and managerial exper-
tise.
//An unattributed Algiers radio broadcast, meanwhile,
has alleged that a French Jaguar fighter aircraft fired on
Polisario guerrillas in Mauritania. The guerrillas reportedly
damaged the aircraft, forcing it to land at an unspecified 25X1
Mauritanian base. French aircraft based in Dakar, Senegal, are
flying missions over Mauritania, but other information indicates X1
they are unarmed reconnaissance flights.//
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United Kingdom
//Prime Minister Callaghan's wage policy received
a major boost yesterday when moderate leaders of the coal min-
ers' union accepted the government's rule calling for 12 months
between pay increases. They also voted to permit local unions
to pursue productivity incentive schemes that had been turned
down earlier by the national union.//
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I //The victory is only partial, however; union mili-
tants are likely to challenge the decision, and the demand for
a 90-percent pay increase during the next contract period re-
mains unresolved. The militants have vowed to fight on both
questions. The future of the government's wage policy could
hinge on the outcome of negotiations with the miners, because
other unions will take their cue from the final settlement.//
//The government's hand has been strengthened in
recent weeks by a lack of popular sympathy for excessive wage
demands. The miners, and the striking fireman as well, have re-
ceived little support from fellow unions or from the powerful
national Trades Union Con ress which has been reluctant to 25X1
fight government policy.
I The latest issue of Izvestiats weekly feature magazine
has elaborated on earlier "exposes' of the alleged activity of
US diplomats among Soviet dissidents. The magazine named two
former embassy officers as having been the most active in this
regard.
Petr Grigorenko, a leading dissident and former gen-
era, was portrayed as having played the most important role in
maintaining contact between other dissidents and the West. Oth-
ers named were dissident Lyudmila Alekseyeva, who has since emi-
grated, and Vladimir Slepak.
The magazine article was clearly designed to keep
alive the accusations of espionage activity that have been
levied against US diplomats periodically since the spring of
this year. The article's chief targets, however, seem to be So-
viet dissidents. The focus on Grigorenko, who recently arrived
in the US for a six-month visit, may be part of an effort to
discredit in advance any public statements he might make and
could even be the first sign that Moscow will bar his return.
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