ROLLING THUNDER BRIEFING DATA JUN 1968-JUL1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 157
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 20, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

STAT Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-R DP78T02095R000600040001-8
15 years North Vi
E - c aid bas totaled more than $2.2 bill on
billion. The USSR provided 1.4 billion
3.aat foxr yen=# bas
70 minion. Only token
receive: a total of
frm the U and Camondst, China
minion in
were provided by the
year with total militva7 and economic aid
The due of aid received in 1968 domed
t
67 was the peak
edit $1 b#3i4t +.
trietcd in march 1966
naUy heated
xillim in I
The value of ecovMIC assistance,
: in= ,--*zed from $380 ad1H in 1967 to
ing t very sharp increases in imports
most particularly foodstuffs =4
the capabilities of the donors.
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19.: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
23*OWs ecWxed to a pock of
ran the in s?pplit of Ott
deft eqApmnt# tanks
p'jPRI3,y
at no more tb*n
V. estimate that there we about 2sODO Soviet
h VLe1
working an SAS 0v s Jet
titms and laslAtia support.
25Xt1
Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : - -
 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 00600040001-8
TOP SECRET
23 April 1969
DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Military Situation
I. The Communists' spring offensive which began on
the night of February 22-23 appears to have run
its course.
A. At its peak, it consisted primarily of fre-
quent mortar and rocket attacks, although
there were some bloody clashes between al-
lied and Communist ground forces as well.
B. For the most part, the enemy concentrated
his attacks on U.S. installations and posi-
tions, apparently in the belief that a dra-
matic rise in the number of U.S. casualties
would increase domestic pressures in the U.S.
for early concessions to the Communists in
Paris, and a quick end to the war.
II. By late March, a number of enemy main force units
in most areas of the country had begun to pull
away from forward combat areas back into in-coun-
try base camps.
VN-1
TOP SECRE
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA
TOP SECRET
A. A variety of sources, including captured docu-
ments and prisoners of war now indicate that
Communist units are being refitted and rein-
doctrinated for the next go-round. It is still
not clear when the next Communist offensive
will come. Some evidence points to mid- or
late Maya some to June.
Bo The enemy still has enough forces in forward
areas, however, to launch sporadic and fairly
large-scale shellings of urban areas and allied
installations, and even to stage some limited
ground attacks.
1. He is not in position, however, to attempt
anything on the scale of the February 23-
March 31 offensive.
III. The main concentration of enemy main force units is
still in III Corps near Saigon.
Ao Right now, the enemy has some four divisions
with a total of 13 subordinate regiments, plus
an additional 9 independent regiments and nu-.
merous smaller independent outfits in III Corps.
Altogether, this represents an enemy main force
strength of 45,000 to 60,000 men in the provinces
around Saigon. In addition, there are some 6,000
to 7,000 guerrillas in the same area.
VN-2
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CI - 0958000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
B. The North Vietnamese may also intend to create
a new major threat in northern I Corps.
1. The North Vietnamese 325th Division has
recently moved from well up in North Viet-
nam down into and just above the Demili-
tarized Zone.
2. In addition, the North Vietnamese 304th
Division is now moving through the Laos
infiltration corridor, apparently on its
way to northern South Vietnam. At least
one of its regiments now appears to be
located in Laos just west of Khe Sanh, the
scene of heavy fighting involving the 304th
last year.
3. At full strength, these two divisions
could consist of up to 20,000 North Viet-
namese regulars.
IV. The best indication of the long-term nature of
Communist military planning is the number of ad-
ditional troops being sent south from North Viet-
nam.
A. North Vietnam started some 20,000 troops south
through the infiltration pipeline in February,
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-R 00600040001-8
TOP SECRET
but in March the level dropped to around 13,000.
Since March 22, no groups have been detected
entering the pipeline in North Vietnam.
1. The replacements for the most recent Com-
munist losses were probably among the
45,000 North Vietnamese who started down
the pipeline in December.
B. The men now in the pipeline, most of them ear-
marked as replacements for III Corps, are the
equivalent of half the current North Vietnamese
manpower in South Vietnam.
C. The overall movement pattern of reinforcements
and replacements from the North suggests that
the enemy intends to maintain the economy-of-
force tactics which he employed during the
latest offensive.
South Vietnamese Politics
V. The South Vietnamese Government appears to be
taking in stride the inevitable stresses and
strains imposed by the fact that it is now talk-
ing with the enemy in Paris.
A. President Thieu continues to strengthen his
control over the government and to make incre-
mental improvements in its administrative per-
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RD 00600040001-8
TOP SECRET
1. For example, he has given his supporter,
Interior Minister General Khiem, the new
post of Deputy Prime Minister. Khiem is
in charge of the Pacification Portfolio.
This puts under a single manager all min-
istries and programs aimed at extending
the government's control in the country-
side.
B. Thieu has played almost all of his political
cards well over the last year, with the re-
sult that his chief rival, Vice President Ky,
has begun to acknowledge Thieu's staying power.
Ky now is soft-pedaling his criticism of Thieu.
C. In recent weeks, Thieu has begun a new effort
to organize the country for political competi-
tion with the Communists after the cessation
of hostilities.
1. He is holding intensive discussions with
a wide variety of political leaders with
a view to launching a progovernment con-
federation of political groups that could
be representative of the whole population.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA RAPFATAP 8000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
2. So far progress has been slow as expected, in
view of the highly factionalized character
of South Vietnamese politics, but Thieu
seems to be proceeding about on schedule.
Pacification
VI. In the countryside, the government has been con-
solidating its control over hundreds of villages
previously contested by the enemy.
A. This has aroused serious concern among the
Communists, but so far they have not done
much about it.
B. Their recent offensive, for example, largely
bypassed the villages, concentrating instead
on harassing military targets and urban centers.
1. As a result, there is widespread confidence
in the villages as well as in Saigon that
more people than ever before are "protected"
from the enemy.
C. One sign of the government's increased rural
strength is the fact that it was able to go
ahead with previously scheduled local elections
despite the Communist offensive.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
D. One program which has begun to make headway,
with considerable promise for the future, is
the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.
1. This program, called Phoenix, stresses
concerted intelligence and planning to
root out the hidden Communist officials
in the hamlets, villages, and towns.
It is beginning to eliminate a substan-
tial number of low-level Viet Cong of-
ficials, although it has not yet bagged
many really important higher--level leaders
Captured documents, a new Viet Cong in-
terest in assassinating members of the
intelligence-gathering Grievance Census
teams,
attest to the seriousness with which they
regard the threat posed by the Phoenix
program.
Communist Aid to North Vietnam
VII. Over the past 15 years,'North Vietnam has received
a total of about $4.2 billion in military and eco-
nomic aid from other Communist countries--the bulk
of it from the Soviet Union and China.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 0600040001-8
TOP SECRET
A. Military aid, primarily in the past four years,
has amounted to almost $2 billion.
1. This consists of $1 billion 400 million
from the Soviet Union,$.470 million from
Communist China, and about $5 million from
the East Europeans.
B. Economic aid, concentrated in the earlier years,
totals slightly more: $2 billion 235 million.
1. Again, the major share--$l billion 40 million--
is from the Soviet Union. The Chinese have
provided $760 million, and the East Euro-
peans $440 million.
C. Russia's biggest input was in 1967, when mil-
itary aid accounted for $505 million and eco-
nomic aid $200 million.
D. The rate of military deliveries slackened,
somewhat in 1968 after the U.S. bombing pro-
gram was restricted.
1. These figures for military aid are calcu-
lated in terms of what we call "Soviet
foreign trade prices"--the list of prices
charged by the Soviet Union for military
hardware and ammunition in aid agreements
with non-Communist countries.
VN-8
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-REP
TOP SECRET
2. If we were to calculate the value of the
material in terms of what it would cost
in the United States, the total for Com-
munist military aid would go up from $2
billion to about $2.4 billion.
E. Soviet military aid has concentrated on air
defense equipment, while the Chinese have
provided mainly ground forces weapons and
naval craft.
F. The Soviet Union and China both have military
personnel in North Vietnam.
1. The number of Chinese support troops--
antiaircraft and construction--has been
steadily declining since the bombing halt,
and stands now at no more than 23,000.
2. We estimate that there are as many as
2,000 Soviet military technicians in North
Vietnam, working on the surface-to-air
missile system, jet fighters, communica-
tions and logistic support.
3. The North Korean fighter pilots, who were
flying combat missions in North Vietnam
during much of the bombing, pulled out in
February.
VN-9
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA RIDP;z8T 'I 58000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
G. Throughout 1968, incidentally, the Chinese
Communists kept four anti-aircraft divisions
in northern North Vietnam on a rotating basis.
They have all been withdrawn; the last divi-
sion left in early March.
H. In addition, since the bombing stopped, the
North Vietnamese have re-positioned their
surface-to-air missile battalions so that
they provide a more intensive coverage of
the vital Hanoi-Haiphong region, but cover a
considerably smaller portion of North Vietnam.
1. The airfields at Kep and Yen Bai, for ex-
ample, for the moment at least are outside
the area protected by surface--to-air missiles.
Shipping
VIII. Almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's imports ar-
rive by sea, primarily through Haiphong. I want
to emphasize, however, that as far as we know, ex-
clusively military materiel is not and has not been
shipped by sea.
A. Shipborne imports of course, include such mili-
tary-related items as trucks, tractors, barges,
and petroleum products.
1. The weapons and ammunition, however, all come
in overland, by rail or road from China.
VN-10
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-R 8000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
B. Ocean shipping to North Vietnam in the first
quarter of 1969 remains about the same as dur-
ing 1968. An average of 43 foreign ships a
month arrived during the first quarter of 1969,
compared with 42 a month during 1968.
1. Free World arrivals declined from 12 a month
in 1968 to 9 a month in the first quarter
of 1969.
2. The great majority of the Free World arrivals
flew the British flag; most of these were
under charter to Communist China and owned
by Hong Kong firms dependent on or controlled
by China. Most of the remaining Free World
ships flew the Somalian, Cypriot, and Singa-
porean flags.
C. Seaborne imports in the first quarter of 1969
were slightly below the 1968 .level, averaging
about 160,000 tons per month. Foodstuffs have
risen sharply and P.O.L. imports have remained
at a high level. Imports of fertilizer have
dropped sharply.
1. Foodstuffs--mainly rice from China and
wheat flour from the USSR--made up almost
VN-11
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
50 percent of first quarter 1969 seaborne
imports, compared to 40 percent in 1968.
2. Imports from the Free World were up slightly
from 2 percent of the 1968 total to 3 percent
of the first quarter 1969 total, compared
with 18 percent in 1965. Almost 90 percent
of these imports consisted of timber from
Cambodia.
D. Seaborne exports went primarily to China and
Japan.
1. The volume of exports in the first quarter
of 1969, principally coal, remained at the
same level as in 1968--58,000 tons per month.
TOP SECREIL--] 25X1
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
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? TOP SECRET
23 April 1969
DCI BRIEFING FOR THE
DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Military Situation
I. The Communists' spring offensive which began on
the night of February 22-23 appears to have run
its course.
A. At its peak, it consisted primarily of fre-
quent mortar and rocket attacks, although
there were some bloody clashes between al-
lied and Communist ground forces as well.
B. For the most part, the enemy concentrated
his attacks on U.S. installations and posi-
tions, apparently in the belief that a dra-
matic rise in the number of U.S. casualties
would increase domestic pressures in the U.S.
for early concessions to the Communists in
Paris, and a quick end to the war.
II. By late March, a number of enemy main force units
in most areas of the country had begun to pull
away from forward combat areas back into in-coun-
try base camps.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 8000600040001-8 25X1
TOP SECRET I' j
A. A variety of sources, including captured docu-
ments and prisoners of war now indicate that
Communist units are being refitted and rein-,
doctrinated for the next go-round. It is still
not clear when the next Communist offensive
will come. Some evidence points to mid- or
late May, some to June.
B. The enemy still has enough forces in forward
areas, however, to launch sporadic and fairly
large-scale shellings of urban areas and allied
installations, and even to stage some limited
ground attacks.
1. He is not in position, however, to attempt
anything on the scale of the February 23-
March 31 offensive.
III. The main concentration of enemy main force units is
still in III Corps near Saigon.
A. Right now, the enemy has some four divisions
with a total of 13 subordinate regiments, plus
an additional 9 independent regiments and nu-.
merous smaller independent outfits in III Corps.
Altogether, this represents an enemy main force
strength of 45,000 to 60,000 men in the provinces
around Saigon. In addition, there are some 6,000
to 7,000 guerrillas in the same area.
VN-2
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-?R nP7RTfl2fl R000600040001-8
? TOP SECRET
B. The North Vietnamese may also intend to create
a new major threat in northern I Corps.
1. The North Vietnamese 325th Division has
recently moved from well up in North Viet-
nam down into and just above the Demili-
tarized zone.
2. In addition, the North Vietnamese 304th
Division is now moving through the Laos
infiltration corridor, apparently on its
way to northern South Vietnam. At least
one of its regiments now appears to be
located in Laos just west of Khe Sanh, the
scene of heavy fighting involving the 304th
last year.
3. At full strength, these two divisions
could consist of up to 20,000 North Viet-
namese regulars.
IV. The best indication of the long-term nature of
Communist military planning is the number of ad-
ditional troops being sent south from North Viet-
nam.
A. North Vietnam started some 20,000 troops south
through the infiltration pipeline in February,
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
but in March the level dropped to around 13,000.
Since March 22, no groups have been detected
entering the pipeline in North Vietnam.
1. The replacements for the most recent Com-
munist losses were probably among the
45,000 North Vietnamese who started down
the pipeline in December.
B. The men now in the pipeline, most of them ear-
marked as replacements for III Corps, are the
equivalent of half the current North Vietnamese
manpower in South Vietnam.
C. The overall movement pattern of reinforcements
and replacements from the North suggests that
the enemy intends to maintain the economy-of-
force tactics which he employed during the
latest offensive.
South Vietnamese Politics
V. The South Vietnamese Government appears to be
taking in stride the inevitable stresses and
strains imposed by the fact that it is now talk-
ing with the enemy in Paris.
A. President Thieu continues to strengthen his
control over the government and to make incre-
mental improvements in its administrative per-
formance. VN-4
TOP SECRET
0
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-R 9 , 000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
1. For example, he has given his supporter,
Interior Minister General Khiem, the new
post of Deputy Prime Minister. Khiem is
in charge of the Pacification Portfolio.
This puts under a single manager all min-
istries and programs aimed at extending
the government's control in the country-
side.
B. Thieu has played almost all of his political
cards well over the last year, with the re-
sult that his chief rival, Vice President Ky,
has begun to acknowledge Thieu's staying power.
Ky now is soft-pedaling his criticism of Thieu.
C. In recent weeks, Thieu has begun a new effort
to organize the country for political competi-
tion with the Communists after the cessation
of hostilities.
1. He is holding intensive discussions with
a wide variety of political leaders with
a view to launching a progovernment con-
federation of political groups that could
be representative of the whole population.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600040001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 1DR;Z8TQ2Q@ AR 000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
2. So far progress has been slow as expected, in
view of the highly factionalized character
of South Vietnamese politics, but Thieu
seems to be proceeding about on schedule.
Pacification
VI. In the countryside, the government has been con-
solidating its control over hundreds of villages
previously contested by the enemy.
A. This has aroused serious concern among the
Communists, but so far they have not done
much about it.
B. Their recent offensive, for example, largely
bypassed the villages, concentrating instead
on harassing military targets and urban centers.
1. As a result, there is widespread confidence
in the villages as well as in Saigon that
more people than ever before are "protected"
from the enemy.
C. One sign of the government's increased rural
strength is the fact that it was able to go
ahead with previously scheduled local elections
despite the Communist offensive.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
D. One program which has begun to make headway,
with considerable promise for the future, is
the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.
1. This program, called Phoenix, stresses
concerted intelligence and planning to
root out the hidden Communist officials
in the hamlets, villages, and towns.
2. It is beginning to eliminate a substan-
tial number of low-level Viet Cong of-
ficials, although it has not yet bagged
many really important higher-level leaders.
3. Captured documents, a new Viet Cong in-
terest in assassinating members of the
intelligence-gathering Grievance Census
teams, and other Communist actions all
attest to the seriousness with which they
regard the threat posed by the Phoenix
program.
Communist Aid to North Vietnam
VII. Over the past 15 years,'North Vietnam has received
a total of about $4.2 billion in military and eco-
nomic aid from other Communist countries--the bulk
of it from the Soviet Union and China.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
 w
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TOP SECRET
A. Military aid, primarily in the past four years,
has amounted to almost $2 billion.
1. This consists of $1 billion 400 million
from the Soviet Union,$?470 million from
Communist China, and about $5 million from
the East Europeans.
B. Economic aid, concentrated in the earlier years,
totals slightly more: $2 billion 235 million.
1. Again, the major share--$l billion 40 million--
is from the Soviet Union. The Chinese have
provided $760 million, and the East Euro-
peans $440 million.
C. Russia's biggest input was in 1967, when mil-
itary aid accounted for $505 million and eco-
nomic aid $200 million.
D. The rate of military deliveries slackened
somewhat in 1968 after the U.S. bombing pro-
gram was restricted.
1. These figures for military aid are calcu-
lated in terms of what we call "Soviet
foreign trade prices"--the list of prices
charged by the Soviet Union for military
hardware and ammunition in aid agreements
with non-Communist countries.
Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
2. If we were to calculate the value of the
material in terms of what it would cost
in the United States, the total for Com-
munist military aid would go up from $2
billion to about $2.4 billion.
E. Soviet military aid has concentrated on air
defense equipment, while the Chinese have
provided mainly ground forces weapons and
naval craft.
F. The Soviet Union and China both have military
personnel in North Vietnam.
1. The number of Chinese support troops--
antiaircraft and construction--has been
steadily declining since the bombing halt,
and stands now at no more than 23,000.
2. We estimate that there are as many as
2,000 Soviet military technicians in North
Vietnam, working on the surface-to-air
missile system, jet fighters, communica-
tions and logistic support.
3. The North Korean fighter pilots, who were
flying combat missions in North Vietnam
during much of the bombing, pulled out in
February.
TOP SECRET
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA- 58000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
G. Throughout 1968, incidentally, the Chinese
Communists kept four anti-aircraft: divisions
in northern North Vietnam on a rotating basis.
They have all been withdrawn; the last divi-
sion left in early March.
H. In addition, since the bombing stopped, the
North Vietnamese have re-positioned their
surface-to-air missile battalions so that
they provide a more intensive coverage of
the vital Hanoi-Haiphong region, but cover a
considerably smaller portion of North Vietnam.
1. The airfields at Kep and Yen l3ai, for ex-
ample, for the moment at least are outside
the area protected by surface--to-air missiles.
Shipping
VIII. Almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's imports ar-
rive by sea, primarily through Haiphong. I want
to emphasize, however, that as far as we know, ex-
clusively military materiel is not and has not been
shipped by sea.
A. Shipborne imports of course, include such mili-
tary-related items as trucks, tractors, barges,
and petroleum products.
1. The weapons and ammunition, however, all come
in overland, by rail or road from China.
VN-10
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600040001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
B. Ocean shipping to North Vietnam in the first
quarter of 1969 remains about the same as dur-
ing 1968. An average of 43 foreign ships a
month arrived during the first quarter of 1969,
compared with 42 a month during 1968.
1. Free World arrivals declined from 12 a month
in 1968 to 9 a month in the first quarter
of 1969.
2. The great majority of the Free World arrivals
flew the British flag; most of these were
under charter to Communist China and owned
by Hong Kong firms dependent on or controlled
by China. Most of the remaining Free World
ships flew the Somalian, Cypriot, and Singa-
porean flags.
C. Seaborne imports in the first quarter of 1969
were slightly below the 1968 level, averaging
about 160,000 tons per month. Foodstuffs have
risen sharply and P.O.L. imports have remained
at a high level. Imports of fertilizer have
dropped sharply.
1. Foodstuffs--mainly rice from China and
wheat flour from the USSR--made up almost
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600040001-8
 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600040001-8
TOP SECRET
50 percent of first quarter 1969 seaborne
imports, compared to 40 percent in 1968.
2. Imports from the Free World were up slightly
from 2 percent of the 1968 total to 3 percent
of the first quarter 1969 total, compared
with 18 percent in 1965. Almost 90 percent
of these imports consisted of timber from
Cambodia.
D. Seaborne exports went primarily to China and
Japan.
1. The volume of exports in the first quarter
of 1969, principally coal, remained at the
same level as in 1968--58,000 tons per month.
TOP SECRET
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600040001-8
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DCI 3/13 BRIEFING FOR
DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
(MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM)
The Military Situation
I. The new Communist offensive which began on the
night of 22-23 February is still continuing. So
far it has consisted primarily of frequent mortar
and rocket attacks against U.S. and and South Viet-
namese military facilities and outposts, although
there have been some bloody clashes between allied
and Communist ground forces as well as spellings
of Saigon and other urban centers.
A. For the most part, the enemy appears to be
trying to conserve his main force units and--
by committing them to action a few at a time--
to draw out the current round of fighting.
1. The shellings have been spread out pretty
much throughout the country. Allied posi-
tions and some urban centers in all four
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corps areas have been shelled.
2. Saigon has been hit four times since Feb-
ruary 22 and the northern city of Hue once.
Da Nang has also been shelled on several
occasions during the current offensive.
(MAP, III CORPS AREA)
II. The major concentration of Communist main force
units is in the III Corps area around Saigon.
This is where some of the stiffest ground fight-
ing has occurred in recent days and where we expect
to see a great deal more in the days to come.
A. Right now, the enemy has some four divisions
with a total of 13 subordinate regiments, plus
an additional 9 independent regiments and nu-
merous smaller independent outfits. Altogether
this represents an enemy main force strength
of 45,000 to 60,000 men in the provinces
around Saigon..
1. In addition, there are at least some 6,000
to 7,000 guerrillas in the same area.
B. The enemy main force units are currently de-
ployed in such a fashion as to pose an imminent
threat to Tay Ninh city, to the huge allied
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military complex between Bien Hoa and Long
Binh, and to the many smaller allied posi-
tions throughout the vicinity. Elements of
at least two of these divisions could be de-
ployed into the immediate Saigon area within
a matter of days,
1, The Communists on February 23 tried a
ground attack on the Long Binh base but
Lost 194 killed.
2. Another abortive attempt by a Communist
regiment to attack the Bien Hoa airfield
on February 26 was beaten off, with the
attacking units losing some 214 men killed.
C. Captured enemy personnel report that their ul-
timate aim is to attack major allied posts,
despite the heavy casualties the Communists
are likely to incur in any such frontal assault.
Some prisoners from the Communist 9th Division
have claimed that their ultimate target is
Saigon itself.
1. Given the present disposition of enemy
main force units, however, it seems more
likely that over the next few weeks at
least, any major attack is more likely
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to be against targets outside Saigon,
rather than against the city itself.
2~ We do, nonetheless, credit the enemy with
the ability to stage terrorist actions
within Saigon, and even to get units as
large as several hundred into the outlying
parts of town, if he is willing to take the
heavy personnel losses which are certain
to result.
3. We cannot. rule out such a suicide attempt,
if the enemy should decide that the pub-
licity he would gain would be worth the
loss in men.
(.REPEAT MAP, SOUTH VIETNAM)
III. Another concentration of enemy main force strength
is in the northern portions of the Mekong delta
where he could move against. My Tho town or harass
still further the U.S. 9th Infantry Division head-
quarters at Dong Tam.
A