NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 18, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

'AMW 141W 1A1W 'AMP
are -fl131Il6_- CIA-RDP79T00975A0304~64Q
bbret 2
AME,P ADDRESS DATE LINITIALSI F~
ACTION
APPROVAL
COMMENT
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PREPARE REPLY
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
0
V
Tuesday 18 October 1977
w
CG NIDC 77/242C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review
completed
cioved
-OF
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
PLEASE 1 .~ I URN To (Security Clas i 'cation 25X1
For Releasa /M. CW4MP79T00975A~3q4 U1 U1 UT-1 U1 - 25
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010008-5
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010008-5
 Approved For Ro
25X1
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 18 October 1977.
I IThe NID Cable is for the purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
INDIA-USSR: Desai's Coming Visit
USSR: Intensified Propaganda
LEBANON-PLO: No Withdrawal Yet
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
NAMIBIA:
Talks with SWAPO
Page 6
WESTERN SAHARA: Mediation Efforts
Page 8
EGYPT:
Rumored Cabinet Changes
Page 9
CANADA:
BRIEFS
Elections
Page 11
Page 11
France
Czechoslovakia
Nicaragua
25X1
Approved For 4elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 30400010008-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010008-5
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010008-5
 Approved For
INDIA-USSR: Desai's Coming Visit
I /During his six-day visit to the USSR be-
ginning this Friday, Indian Prime Minister'Desai will probably
seek to convince Soviet leaders that his policy of "true non-
alignment" presents no dangers to Soviet interests. The Indians
believe--correctly in our view---that Moscow is concerned that
India is moving much closer to the US
//The Indians would like to diversify their
foreign sources o arms but are well aware that they have lit-
tle alternative to reliance on the USSR for many years to come.
Although Desai will try to ease his hosts' worries, he is un-
likely to give automatic support--as his predecessors sometimes
did in Moscow--to Soviet positions on international issues.//
//There has been no significant change in
the past six months in Soviet willingness to supply economic
aid and weapons to India. Moscow sees its economic and military
aid to New Delhi as the basis of its presence in India.//
//Last month, Premier Kosygin expressed con-
cern to the secretary general of Desai's Janata Party about the
future Soviet role in major development projects in India. The
Soviets want to emphasize projects that give them both visibil-
ity and economic influence. Even under former Prime Minister
Gandhi, there were differences between the two countries over
issues such as India's desire for more sophisticated technology
and over Soviet-Indian economic competition in some third world
countries.//
Approved For RoIease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T0097PA030400010008-5
 Approved ForiRelease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010008-5
//Desai's advisers believe that Moscow is
attempting to offset his policies by organizing a rival pro-
Soviet bloc within the Janata Party and by increasing Soviet
influence with Indian Communists--not only the pro-Moscow party,
but also the independent Marxist Communists who now rule West
Bengal state. Previous Indian prime ministers have enjoyed So-
viet support even when it conflicted with the interests of In-
dian Communists.//
I//India has been the cornerstone of Soviet
policy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean since the early 1960s.
The Soviets have seen India as the only power in the region
capable of balancing the Chinese. More recently, they have be-
gun to view India as a possible counterweight to Iran.//
//Since the Janata Party's victory in March,
the Soviets have been concerned over what they have character-
ized as a trend to the right in South Asia, represented by the
changes of government in India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan I 25X1
USSR: Intensified Propaganda
I An Izvestia article published on Sunday indicates
that Soviet propagandists are responding aggressively to West-
ern criticisms voiced at the current Belgrade CSCE conference
on the USSR's human rights record, especially on the free ex-
change of information. The recent house arrests of Jewish ac-
tivists in Moscow, meanwhile, seem to have ended. The increased
rate of Jewish emigration evident during the summer, and mainly
in September, is apparently continuing and may even have in-
creased.
The Izvestia article, elaborating on an earlier
Pravda attack on the proposed reorganization of the United
States Information Agency, charged that the US is moving into
open "psychological warfare" against the USSR. Focusing on
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, Izvestia calls both "shame-
ful symbols" of the "psychological warfare" that it says char-
acterizes the whole US approach to cultural exchanges.
Izvestia's attack clearly reflects Soviet sensitivity
toward the West's ability to transmit information directly to
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T0097AA030400010008-5
 Approved F
Soviet citizens and toward the established appeal for Soviet
intellectuals of academic and cultural exchanges with the West
and especially with the US.
Additionally, Izvestia last Saturday rehashed the now-
familiar charges of espionage leveled against a number of former
US correspondents in Moscow, and again called Robert Toth of the
Los Angeles Times a "spy." It did not repeat earlier allegations
of CIA connections with some US journalists, but charged once
again that Moscow-based US correspondents incite dissidents and
Jewish activists.
While public agitation by Soviet Jews continues to be
curbed, the house arrest of several Moscow Jews reportedly ended
on 10 October. The timing of this harassment suggests the pur-
pose was to prevent a sit-in or other demonstration during the
recent sessions of the Supreme Soviet, whose pro forma approval
of the new Soviet constitution received worldwide publicity.
The rate of Soviet Jewish emigration for the first
half of October, meanwhile, seems to have remained at least at
the significantly higher levels observed in September and may
be rising. The Belgrade conference clearly has been the foremost
factor influencing Soviet emigration policy in recent months.
If the current trend continues, Jewish emigration could approach
2,000 per month, in contrast to the 1,100 to 1,200 monthly
average that prevailed for several years and until June of
this year.
LEBANON-PLO: No Withdrawal Yet
The Lebanese Government and the Palestinians have yet
to implement phase III of the shaturah accord, which calls for
a Palestinian withdrawal in southern Lebanon and the deployment
of Lebanese Army units to strategic points along the Lebanese-
Israeli border.
I The government is blaming the delay on "technical
difficulties," but the real cause is the absence of any reso-
lution of conflicting Palestinian and Israeli concerns. The
Palestinians wish to avoid the appearance of withdrawing under
Israeli pressure and want assurances that the Lebanese Army
Approved F
 Approved Foti
will be able to block the Christian militias from expanding
their enclaves. Israel wants to prevent the disbandment of the
Christian militias, both to assure its continued political con-
trol in the immediate border area and to preserve its "good
fence" program.
Artillery exchanges between Palestinians and Lebanese
Christian forces in southern Lebanon, which escalated toward
the end of last week, abated on Sunday. The Palestinians have
complained of Israeli participation in several of last week's
violations; the Israelis have publicly acknowledged their in-
volvement.
Approved Fq
 Approved Fo4
NAMIBIA: Talks with SWAPO
The delegation from the South-West Africa People's
Organization that is meeting with the Western contact group in
New York has rejected South Africa's plan to withdraw only part
of its troops from Namibia before an independent government is
established. SWAPO's counterproposals stipulate that all the
troops must be withdrawn before a preindependence election is
conducted. Although the SWAPO delegates are'adamant on this
primary issue, they appear anxious to avert a collapse of the
Western effort to devise an internationally acceptable inde-
pendence program. The talks may exert a moderating influence
on the UN General Assembly's discussion of the Namibia problem
that is to begin today.
The detailed transitional program that the SWAPO
delegates presented to the Western contact group last Saturday
confirms SWAPO's previous offer to implement a cease-fire as
soon as South African troops begin a phased withdrawal. SWAPO
is adamant, however, that a cease-fire agreement include sev-
eral points from its transitional program:
-- A UN peacekeeping force must be phased in as the South
African troops leave.
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79Tog975A030400010008-5
 The SWAPO delegates believe that any remaining South
African troops might continue repressive tactics, and they in-
sist that SWAPO's exiled leadership must have ample time to re-
turn home and carry out an unfettered election campaign. The
South Africans, for their part, fear that an unchecked UN force
would allow SWAPO cadres to use coercive tactics and seem deter-
mined to keep enough troops in place to counteract any resump-
tion of SWAPO guerrilla incursions from Angola. In addition,
South Africa's latest transitional proposals stipulate that an
election must be held within six weeks of the partial troop
withdrawal.
Western diplomatic initiative.
On Saturday, the SWAPO delegates accepted a Western
proposal that the South African administrator-general, who as-
sumed office in Namibia last month, work in tandem with a spe-
cial UN representative throughout the transitional period. The
delegates showed flexibility on other significant points; they
intimated, for example, that SWAPO would not insist on a one-
for-one replacement of South African troops with UN troops.
Although neither side seems disposed to compromise
on these issues, the SWAPO delegates now appear as anxious as
the South Africans at least to avoid blame for scuttling the
The SWAPO delegates also promised the contact group
that the details of the South African withdrawal plan--sub-
mitted to them by the contact group--would not be mentioned in
the course of the UN General Assembly debate on Namibia. It
seems unlikely, however, that the SWAPO spokesmen in the Gen- 25X1
eral Assembly will forgo the opportunity to assert demands for
a complete troop withdrawal before the start of a pre-election
campaign.
Approved For Re
Approved For Re
-- The withdrawal must be completed within three months
of a cease-fire.
-- There must be six-month interval between the withdrawal
and a preindependence election.
 Approved F4
I Recent efforts by Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Tunisia
to mediate Algeria's dispute with Morocco and Mauritania over
Western Sahara have foundered over the continuing unwillingness
of either side to compromise its basic position.
Algeria has not budged from its insistence on consul-
tations with the poeple of Western Sahara through an interna-
tionally supervised referendum, and it continues to support
Polisario Front guerrillas seeking independence for the former
Spanish territory. Morocco and Mauritania are unwilling to
allow such consultations and want to limit any negotiations
to reducing tensions in the region.
The most persistent mediator has been Saudi Arabia,
which over the past year has made several attempts to resolve
the dispute. Its primary concern is to keep the dispute from
escalating into open hostilities between Morocco and Algeria
that could become another distraction from the broader Arab
interest in the Arab-Israeli situation.
A Senegalese initiative last month was motivated
by a growing concern over Polisario guerrilla attacks against
neighboring Mauritania, the weakest party to the dispute. Al-
though Senegalese President Senghor's public proposal for a
referendum never got off the ground, he may have been reassured
by King Hassan that Morocco would continue to provide Mauritania
with military support against guerrilla attacks.
Tunisian Foreign Minister Chatti held separate talks
with Algerian President Boumediene, Mauritanian President Ould
Daddah, and King Hassan this week in an apparent effort to act
as an intermediary. Chatti had earlier expressed hope that the
dispute might be resolved by negotiations at the Arab foreign
ministers' conference scheduled to be held in Tunis on 12 Nov-
ember. He would like Tunisia to share credit if talks do take
place.
Approved F4
r Release 2007/03/069 CIA-RDP79T06
25X1
 Approved For RO
EGYPT: Rumored Cabinet Changes
Recent articles in the semiofficial Egyptian news-
paper Al-Abram lend credence to rumors that President Sadat
plans to form a new government soon. Changes in the cabinet
probably would be largely cosmetic, designed to reduce popular
frustration by fostering the impression that Sadat is assem-
bling a team better able to deal with pressing economic prob-
lems and Middle East negotiations.
According to AZ-Ahram, Prime Minister Salim has al-
ready begun consultations with candidates for ministerial posi-
tions and has accepted the resignation of at least one cabinet
member. A companion commentary--written by an editor who appar-
ently has personal ties with Sadat--listed improvement in the
economy, further political liberalization, and improvement of
relations with the USSR and Libya as high priorities for the
new government.
If the AZ-Ahram articles were inspired by Sadat, it
would appear that the two most prominent figures in the current
government--Salim and Foreign Minister Fahmi--will retain their
posts. Fahmi has strongly advocated a more balanced policy to-
ward the USSR, and in so doing has annoyed but perhaps influ-
enced Sadat.
Before the current Middle East peace initiative
gained momentum, there was considerable speculation that Sadat
would remove Fahmi because of the latter's "pro-Soviet" posi-
tion, his close association with step-by-step diplomacy, and
his poor relations with key Saudi and Syrian diplomats.
Although Sadat's relationship with the Foreign Minis-
ter has been cool for months, Sadat may now see some merit in
allowing Fahmi to temper Egyptian policy toward Moscow. This
would help mute domestic criticism of Sadat's antagonistic
treatment of the Soviets and would accommodate what the Egyp-
tians interpret as a US decision to give the Soviets a greater
role in the peace negotiations.
Sadat's retention of Salim would be puzzling. Salim
is not a popular prime minister and has been widely criticized
for mishandling the events that touched off nationwide rioting
Approved For
 Approved Fo
last January. He has not demonstrated much talent for running
the government or for leading Sadat's centrist party in the
Egyptian parliament. Salim's failure to contain a recent up-
surge in extremist political activity by both the Egyptian
right and left has undermined Sadats confidence in Salim's
once highly touted performance in the security and intelligence
fields. It is possible, however, that Salim will be given an-
other chance because of his close personal ties with Sadat.
F__ I
Approved for Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T009y5A030400010008-5
 Approved For Releo
/An upset election victory by the Progressive
Conservatives in Manitoba Province earlier this week has en-
hanced the Tories' prospects in Canada's national election
that is widely predicted for next spring.//
I /The provincial Tories, led by Sterling Lyon,
won 33 of the 57 seats in the provincial assembly, a gain of
10, while the incumbent New Democratic Party under Edward
Schreyer held onto only 23 of its 31 seats. The Liberals, who
had looked on the election as a test of their resurgence in
the western provinces where the Tories and the New Democrats
are dominant, were able to retain only one of the three seats
they held going into the contest.//
//For conservative leader Joe Clark, the victory
provides an especially welcome boost before the Tories' annual
party conference next month. The Conservatives now head five
of Canada's ten provinces, and all five premiers have solidly
endorsed Clark's leadership.//
//The latest Gallup poll shows that the Liberals
now trail the Conservatives in western Canada for the first
time in four months and may be losing ground in Quebec and On-
tario, the Liberals' traditional base of power. Although the
Liberals maintain a sizable edge over the Tories in voter popu-
larity nationwide, the poll indicates that a record 38 percent
of the electorate is now undecided--further evidence that the
wide popularity Prime Minister Trudeau's Liberal Party enjoyed
this summer was fragile and may to lost well before any elec-
tion next spring. 25X1
be the case following the breakdown of negotiations on the Com-
mon Program on 22 September. According to the poll, which was
More complete data on a recent public opinion poll
Indicates that the Communist-Socialist-Left Radical alliance
is not losing as much support among the voters as appeared to
Approved For Rel
 Approve
taken between 30 September and 4 October, 50 percent of the
voters now intend to vote for the Left Alliance, 47 percent
for the governing coalition, and 3 percent for the ecologists.
It was the first time that voters had been given an opportunity
to declare in favor of the ecologists.
Another poll indicates that seven out of 10 voters
who favor the ecologists would cast their vote for a leftist
candidate in the second round. Assuming that these percentages
hold and that the Left parties reach an electoral accord, they
could probably still count on getting 52 percent of the total
vote in the two rounds--enough to overcome gerrymandering and
give the Left a victory at the polls next March.
Czechoslovak authorities yesterday began a closed
ria 51--lour prominent dissidents. The stiffest charges have
been lodged against former theater director Ota Ornest and
journalist Jiri Lederer, who were accused of maintaining "con-
spiratorial links" with Czechoslovak emigres and smuggling
anti-state articles abroad. They could get up to 10 years in
jail. The other two defendants, theater director Frantisek
Pavlicek and playwright Vaclav Havel, face maximum prison sen-
tences of five and three years, respectively.
All except Ornest are signatories of the Charter 77
human rig is manifesto released last January. The authorities
apparently have pushed the Ornest case to the forefront, partly
because they may have the best evidence against him and partly
to prove their contention that the trials are not aimed specif-
ically at Charter 77.
lOrnest reportedly was the only one of the four to
plead guilty yesterday. All but the closest relatives of the
accused have been barred from the courtroom, but some 50 people
gathered nearby yesterday. Around 20 of the Charter 77 signa-
tures were reportedly held briefly by the police, who warned
them to stay away from the courthouse.
Approv
 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T0097AA030400010008-5
Nicaragua
Leftist Sandinist National Liberation Front guerrillas
in Nicaragua fought National Guard troops in Managua and other
urban centers yesterday. Guerrillas attacked National Guard
headquarters and a patrol in the capital and killed four sold-
iers nine miles southeast of Managua while ambushing a convoy.
Last week, Sandinist guerrillas attacked National Guard troops
at two widely separated locations, killing 10 soldiers.
I
The recent upsurge in guerrilla activity seems to in-
_j
dicate some increased outside support for the Sandinists, who
had been generally quiescent. They probably have been spurred
by the lifting of martial law and President Somoza's heart at-
tack in July. Somoza reportedly is directing counterinsurgency
operations. Guard troops outnumber the guerrillas by at least
20 to one.
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AP30400010008-5
 PF AW AW AW AMW AMW AW AW AMW AAW Air
0
0
0
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010008-5
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
'0
0
Top Secret 0
(Security Clad gy,S~For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010008-5
'Aw IAW 'Aw 'Aw 'Aw Idw 'Aw Adw 4