PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00317A000100050001-2
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2002
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• Content Type: SPEECH

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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
A Lecture Delivered in the Intelligence Orientation Course
by
25X1A
Instructor Intelligence Production Faculty
Office of Training
Intelligence School
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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first entered upon intelligence work in 1943 with the
Office of Strategic Services. As a research analyst and geographer he
studied the climate of the invasion area of Europe and transportation
systems in the Par East. After several years of university teaching,
he joined CIA as an analyst in the Office of Research and Reports where
land transportation within the Soviet Bloc was his particular responsi-
bility. Since 1957, he has been a member of the Intelligence Production
Faculty of the Intelligence School, OTR, During his years of service
in war and peace, he has had the opportunity to observe practically
the whole growth of the concept of national intelligence.
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Introduction: Production of Intelligence
The production of intelligence involves something like alchemy in
its process. The analyst takes his carefully selected and winnowed in-
formation, subjects it to several purifying and fiery trials (analysis
and interpretation) and finally effects a transmutation into a new
product--finished intelligence. In national intelligence, the analogy
is even more exact: this type of finished intelligence is the result of
the blending of a wide variety of original materials, each chosen and
massed with others for its relevance to the final product. All finished
intelligence, than, stems from information previously gathered and
assembled.
Looked at from another angle, finished intelligence is the result
of the work of many minds and many men. An intelligence organization
is quasi-military. For every man on the firing line--for the man, that
is, who is producing finished intelligence--there must be a large number
working directly or indirectly in his support: those who collect the
intelligence information around the globe, those who assemble, grade,
and store it, and those who carry out the more mundane tasks of supply,
finance, and housekeeping.
This lecture, a general one introducing the whole process of pro-
duction, stresses this pyramid of production, explains the various
steps taken toward the final product and discusses a typical exercise
in assessment of potential.
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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
CLASSIFICATION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
THE INTELLIGENCE PYRAMID
Support Elements
Intelligence-Information Collectors
Repositories of Intelligence
Intelligence Research
Production of National-and Interdepartmental Intelligence
THE ORIGIN OF RESEARCH TOPICS
Requested Research
Self-Initiated Research
Examples of Research Topics
Capability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad
Communist China's Foreign Trade
Effect of a Blockade of China
Methodology for Computing Railroad Capability
Freight Traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad
Re-estimate of Trans-Siberian Capability
FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION OUTSIDE CIA
J-2 in Joint Chiefs of Staff
Army
Navy
Air Force
State Department
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Other Agencies
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCER, WITHIN CIA
Production by Repositories
Production by a Collector
Production by-a--Support Staff
Production by an Administrative Office
Production by Major Producers
Office of Current Intelligence
Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Research
and Reports
Office of National Estimates
STEPS IN PRODUCING FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
The Planning of Research
The Assembly of Data
The Analyst's Expertise
The Inbox
The Analyst's Files
Libraries and Registers
Collection Organizations
The Analysis of Data and Writin
Coordination
Editing
Dissemination
POST MORTEM
SUMIARY
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PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
(IOC lecture delivered by
25X1A
This lecture introduces the second phase in the intelligence pro-
duction cycle or process: the production of intelligencespecifically
of finished intelligence. Production of finished intelligence results
from research that utilizes intelligence information. It usually takes
the form of published reports, although it may also consist of briefings.
The third phase is dissemination of finished intelligence to potential
users which will be discussed later. The fourth phase is the use of
finished intelligence for policy or operations. The cycle is frequently
repeated when either producer or user reviews requirements for the
collection of additional intelligence information. These requests for
collection are often based on gaps found in the finished intelligence.
CLASSIFICATION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
Both finished intelligence and intelligence-information can be
classified in terms of subject matter: for example, geographic in-
telligence, economic intelligence, and military intelligence. Both
can also be classified in terms of the time period involved, as
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historical intelligence, current intelligence, or future intelligence.
Frequently a report will include two or more time periods. Basic in-
telligence, a species of encyclopedic information with widespread use in th<
intelligence community for reference purposes, is primarily historical.
The classification which will be used in this lecture, however, is
in terms of the use of intelligence, which also may involve the mode of
production. This classification applies only to finished intelligence.
The categories are not mutually exclusive but overlap somewhat. One
category is departmental intelligence which is intelligence produced and
used by a department to execute its mission. Secondly, there is inter-
departmental intelligence which is finished intelligence produced by two
or more intelligence agencies and which may be used in support of joint
responsibilities. Under this category is a special type called joint
intelligence which is produced within the Department of Defense by two
or all three of the Armed Services primarily for the use of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The third category in terms of use is national in-
telligence. This is integrated departmental intelligence and the main
criterion is that it is coordinated or agreed intelligence. It may
include dissents of one or more of the agencies participating. In
terms of use, national intelligence is generally for policy-making
and operational planning at the high levels of government.
PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
Finished intelligence in general deals with the capabilities,
vulnerabilities, intentions, and possible courses of action of foreign
countries. The stress in finished intelligence is primarily on
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potential enemies of this country, and it views subjects related to these
countries in terms of their possible effects on either the U. S. or its
friends. The ultimate use of finished intelligence is by the various
levels in our government which plan operations or determine policy. In
this respect, intelligence research differs from academic research in
that it is intended to be used-in planning of policy and operations.
THE INTELLIGENCE PYRAMID
The method whereby finished intelligence is produced and used may
be diagrammed in the form of a pyramid. (See diagram) The purpose of
this diagram is to indicate that each level or layer in the intelligence
community supports all other layers above it. At the top are the pri-
mary users of national intelligence, the President and the National
? Security Council.
Support Elements
At the base are the intelligence support elements within and out-
side CIA. These include personnel and finance officers, editors, IBM
machine operators, and reading panels.
Intelligence Information Collectors
At the next level in the pyramid are the intelligence information
collectors. Within CIA this level includes the DD/P for collection by
clandestine means; OCR Liaison and Collection Division, which collects
in Washington from U. S. Government officials, primarily in the non-
USIf3 agencies; and the
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At this level is the Photographic Intelligenc
Center, which exploits primarily air photography for intelligence infor-
In Defense and State Department, collection is done primarily by the
Armed Services and departmental attaches and by the foreign service
officers.
Repositories of Intelligence
The next level in the pyramid is the repositories of intelligence
information, as well as of finished intelligence. An important reposi-
tory which is frequently forgotten is the intelligence analysts own
files. These files may be the best single repositories of information
in the United States, and perhaps in the world, on the subjects in which
the analysts specialize. In CIA, there is, in addition, the OCR Library,
the several registers, and the ORR Map Library. State and Defense De-
partment also have intelligence repositoriesa
Intelligence Research
At the next level is the production of finished intelligence based
on research, utilizing the support that has been provided by each of the
levels below. Within CIA the major producers'of finished intelligence
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are the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Research and
Reports. The Office of Current Intelligence also produces some longer
term studies but its main product is quick assessments of current situa-
tions. Within Defense and State Departments there are also offices for
production of finished intelligence based on research.
Production of National arid ,Interdepartmental Intelligence
The culmination of this entire effort is the production of finished
national and interdepartmental intelligence. Within CIA the Office of
National Estimates is at this level. The new OCI daily might also be
included at this level because the items in it are published after inter-
agency agreement has been achieved. The various USIA committees also
produce interdepartmental intelligence. These include particularly the
Economic Intelligence Committee, the Scientific Intelligence Committee,
the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile and
Astronautics Intelligence Committee. If the product of these USIB
committees is agreed to by the USIB, it becomes national intelligence.
Another producer of interdepartmental intelligence is J-2 within the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. These producers of interdepartmental and national
intelligence do not normally do basic research work. Basic research is
done and contributions are written in OSI and ORR and in the various
research branches outside CIA. The contributions are then submitted to
these producers which merge them into national and interdepartmental
studies.
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THE ORIGIN OF RESEARCH TOPICS
Requested Research
The research studies on which the analyst works may be requested by
individuals or organizations outside the research office. Requests may
be two types: ad hoc or one time requests, and periodic requests, which
may recur annually or semi-annually, depending upon need. Major request-
ors include the National Security Council, which may see the need for
facts on which to base policy decisions. The Director of Central In-
telligence may receive a high-level request for certain types of infor-
mation or may think of studies which he needs. The Office of National
Estimates transmits requests from the National Security Council and also
asks for periodic revision of existing National Intelligence Estimates.
The various USIB committees originate needed studies in their special
fields. The Office of Basic Intelligence has a schedule for the pro-
duction of new or revised chapters for the National Intelligence Survey.
The DD/P makes requests for various types of support on operations.
$elf-Initiated Research
Topics which are initiated within the research office are generally
based on a need to fill gaps in intelligence. The analyst may originate
projects on the basis of his specialized knowledge of gaps that exist
in his field. Often these gaps are based on post-mortems of recently
produced National Intelligence Estimates. Self-initiated studies
frequently anticipate the type of information needed for a forthcoming
National Intelligence Estimate by studying the effects of some recent
development, such as a recent scientific advance in the U.S.S.R.
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Examples of Research Topics
As examples of the origin of demand for research, following is a
brief discussion of a related series of finished intelligence studies,
most of which had a direct or indirect effect on U. S. Policy.
Capability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad: An interdepartmental
study of the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and connecting
lines into China was published by the Economic Intelligence Committee
of the USIB (then IAC) as EIC-R9. The Economic Intelligence Committee
has a number of specialized subcommittees, one of which is the Trans-
portation Subcommittee. This subcommittee is composed of representatives
of the various government agencies which do research on foreign transpor-
tation. It, therefore, includes not only intelligence community repre-
sentatives but also representatives from Department of Commerce and
Maritime Commission. In 1952, the CIA member pointed out the need for
a joint study of the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and
connecting lines into China. At that time there was no agreed estimate;
in fact, each agency had its own estimate and none of them agreed with
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IThe Trans-
Siberian railroad is the single most important railroad in the world,
for on this slender thread is suspended practically all of Soviet Far
East policy. By contrast with the carrying capacity of the Trans-
Siberian railroad, the airlines connecting European U.S.S.R. with the Far
East and the Northern Sea Route, which operates only in summer, have a
very small carrying capacity. The Transportation Subcommittee set up a
working group made up of members from CIA, Army, Air Force, and State
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Exams of Research Topics
As examples of the origin of demand for research, following is a
brief discussion of a related series of finished intelligence studies,
most of which had a direct or indirect effect on U. S. policy.
Capability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad: An interdepartmental
study of the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and connecting
lines into China was published by the Economic Intelligence Committee
of the USIB (then IAC) as EIC-R9. The Economic Intelligence Committee
has a number of specialized subcommittees, one of which is the Trans-
portation Subcommittee. This subcommittee is composed of representatives
of the various government agencies which do research on foreign transpor-
tation. It, therefore, includes not only intelligence community repre-
sentatives but also representatives from Department of Commerce and
Maritime Commission. In 1952, the CIA member pointed out the need for
a joint study of the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and
connecting lines into China. At that time there was no agreed estimate;
in fact, each agency had its own estimate and none of them agreed with
Siberian railroad is the single most important railroad in the world,
for on this slender thread is suspended practically all of Soviet Far
East policy. By contrast with the carrying capacity of the Trans-
Siberian railroad, the airlines connecting European U.S.S.R. with the Far
East and the Northern Sea Route, which operates only in swmner, have a
very small carrying capacity. The Transportation Subcommittee set up a
working group made up of members from CIA, Army, Air Force, and State
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Department. The CIA member agreed to do the research work and to write
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the draft report which would then be considered by the working group. At 25X1 B
the time this work was completed the Chief of the U.$ S.R.. section of the o
agreement on this capability study. This,
then, was a study initiated by a specialized subcommittee in the USIB
structure on the basis of the suggestion of an individual member.
Communist Chinas Foreign Trade: At about the same time
Truman and Prime Minister Churchill discussed the trade in strategic
materials from the Free World to Communist China, and the possibility of
blockading China as a result of the Korean War. They found, however, that
their figures on China?s trade differed greatly. To achieve some agree-
ment on the level and nature of this trade, the Director of Central In-
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study of this
problem. The USIB (then IAC) submitted a request to the Economic In-
telligence Committee, which transmitted it to the Transportation Sub-
committee. This subcommittee set up another working group to produce
study containing agreed figures on the trade of China.
The resultant study is ETC-Rl, Communist China's Imports and Exports,
Trade and Transport Involved. This study has been produced annually for
six years. This, then, was a study which had been requested by the
President.
Effect of a Blockade of China: The third related study is one on
the possible effects of a blockade of Communist China. In early 1952,
the National Security Council requested a special estimate on the
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probable effects of various courses of action against Communist China.
In early 1953, it requested another special estimate on the probable
effects on the Soviet Bloc of action directed at the commerce of Commu-
nist China; in other words, a blockade. This second special estimate drew
on the drafts of the two studies mentioned above. It used agreed figures
on the amount of traffic carried to China from EIC-Rl and compared these
tonnages with the capability of the Trans-Siberian railroad and connect-
ing lines into China, taken from EIC-R9. It concluded that the estimated
capability of inland transport facilities serving Communist China was
probably adequate to carry essential tonnage then seaborne, plus
essential traffic then carried by land. This study, which was requested
specifically by the National Security Council, undoubtedly played a
major role in the U. S. decision not to blockade the coast of China
which had been under consideration for some time.
Methodology for Computing Railroad Capability: Another related
study was a methodology for computing the capability of railroad lines.
When work was completed on the study of Trans-Siberian capability, one
of the conclusions reached was that an agreed methodology should be de-
veloped. A working group was set up and developed a methodology which
was approved for testing. This study was done as a result of the state-
ment of gaps in a report.
Freight Traffic on the Trans-Siberiann Railroad: At about the same
time the Transportation Branch in ORR realized that one of the means
whereby one could check an estimate on the capability of a railroad line
would be to find out how much traffic was moving. Obviously, if the
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capability of a railroad line was estimated to be 20,000 tons each way per
day and the railroad was actually handling much more than 20,000 tons,
then there is something wrong with the methodology used for calculating
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capability. An ORR analyst worked for a period of several years on the
volume and character of traffic on the Trans-Siberian railroad. The re-
sult was a truly monumental study
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It was published as CIA/RR82
in November 1956. This study was self-initiated within the research branch
Re-estimate of Trans-Siberian Capability: In 1956, the Army requested
that a re-estimate be made of the capability of the Trans-Siberian rail-
road because an agreed methodology was available and much new information
had been received on the railroad
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An inter-agency working group was established
in the Pentagon. When it completed its work, the CIA member found himself
in disagreement with the conclusions because on the Omsk to Novosibirsk
section, which has the heaviest traffic, the capability was estimated to
be about one-half of the actual traffic as shown in the CIA traffic study.
The Army finally published the paper on capability of the Trans-Siberian
railroad using figures which the Defense Department members agreed to.
Within recent months, however, the Defense Department has come to agree
with the actual traffic movement figures published in the CIA report so
that the Army report is no longer valid. At present another working group
is restudying the methodology to find out what is wrong with it.
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FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION OUTSIDE CIA
In intelligence research offices outside of CIA there is a large
commitment of manpower to the writing of basic intelligence, primarily
of chapters for the National Intelligence Survey. In addition, of course,
there is departmental intelligence produced in support of the operations
of the agency involved. In some subject fields these agencies are in-
creasingly calling on ORR and OSI to produce studies to supply depart-
mental needs. Departmental intelligence production includes classified
periodicals such as the Army's Intelligence Review. There is also a
small effort in interdepartmental and joint intelligence production. It
includes work done for J-2 in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for the
various USIB sub-committees. Finally, these agencies also write some
contributions to national intelligence, particularly for National In-
telligence Estimates.
Following is a brief discussion of the major producers of finished
intelligence outside CIA.
J-2 in Joint Chiefs of Staff
J-2 is the intelligence producing group under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Its product is primarily estimative intelligence dealing with
capabilities of potential enemies. These studies are based primarily
on contributions received from the intelligence organizations of the
Armed Services.
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Army
Within the Army the major producer of finished intelligence is the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, formerly G-2. ACSI may re-
ceive contributions from the various intelligence units of the Technical
Services, such as the Army Signal Intelligence Agency, the Transportation
Intelligence Agency, and the Engineers Strategic Intelligence Division.
The overseas commands of the Army also put out some finished intelligence
studies.
Navy
Within the Navy the major producer is the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence and its major product is port studies.
Air Force
The Air Force's major producer of finished intelligence is the Air
Force Chief of Intelligence, or A-2. It has overseas commands which also
put out finished intelligence studies.
State Department
Within State Department the major producer is the Office of Intelli-
gence Research and Analysis. Its products are primarily on political
subjects, but sometimes deal with non-Bloc economic matters.
Other Agencies
There are other producers of finished intelligence studies outside
the intelligence community. The Departments of Commerce, Interior, and
Agriculture all have units producing chapters for the National. Intelligence
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Survey.
PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE WITHIN CIA
Within CIA, there are a number of producers of finished intelligence
or of studies between the level of intelligence information and finished
intelligence, such as research aids.
Production by Repositories
There is some production by divisions which are primarily reposi-
tories. Industrial Register, for example, produces studies of indivi-
dual plants or products on request.
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Production by a Collector
There is also some production by a division which is primarily a
S TAT S PE C collector.
STATSPEC trends
specific topics.
aroduces studies on
Production by a Support Staff
There is also production by a staff which is primarily a support
staff for operations. The Counterintelligence Staff of DD/P produces
some studies of other intelligence services. They also produce Section
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In the DD/P there are a number of other staffs and branches which do
research in a support capacity.
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Production by an Administrative Office
The Office of Basic Intelligence has administrative and editorial
functions in the production of the National Intelligence Survey. It
gets contributions of chapters primarily from intelligence agencies.
Little if any basic research and writing on the basis of intelligence
information is done in OBI.
Production by Maior Producers
The production of finished intelligence in CIA by offices whose
primary activity is the writing of finished intelligence reports takes
place in four offices: Current Intelligence, Research and Reports,
Scientific Intelligence, and National Estimates.
Office of Current Intelligence: OCI produces the Current Intelli-
gence Daily and Weekl . These periodicals are based primarily on quick
analyses.of situations. There is rarely time for thorough research,
although OCI does produce some spot studies for other purposes that
are based on longer term research.
Office of Scientific Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports
The Office of Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Research and
Reports are the primary producers of finished intelligence in CIA
based on long term research. Their area of responsibility is primarily
the Soviet Bloc. Within OSI the subject responsibility is scientific
and technical achievements and capabilities, and in ORR the responsi-
bility is economic status and capabilities of a country and the
geographic description of a country or parts of a country.
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These two offices produce several types of finished intelligence
studies. First of all, they produce basic intelligence. They each have
responsibility for the production of certain chapters in the National In-
telligence Survey. Secondly, they produce a number of types of current
intelligence. Both offices write items for the OCI Dail and Week -
CSI also produces its own Scientific Intelligence Di est, which appears
twice a month. Within ORR the equivalent publication is the Current
Su rt Memorandum. However, this is not a periodic item, and covers
only one subject. One of these memoranda is produced when an analyst
finds an item which seems to have current support value. Thirdly, these
offices produce departmental intelligence. Some studies are done in
support of DD/P on specific request. In addition, they produce atudles
in fulfillment of their own mission. Fourthly, these offices produce
contributions to interdepartmental intelligence. This consists primarily
of studies done for the various USIB committees and sub-committees.
Finally, these offices produce contributions to national intelligence.
They write the scientific and economic contributions to National Intelli-
gence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates dealing
particularly with the Bloc.
Office of National Estimates: The fourth CIA office whose primary
activity is the writing of finished intelligence reports is the Office
of National Estimates, which produces the draft for National Intelligence
Estimates. The drafts are then considered by various groups and are
finally approved by the USIB.
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STEPS IN PRODUCING FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
The major stress in the remainder of this paper will be on the
methods of producing finished intelligence as it is done primarily in
ORR and OSI.
The Planning of. Research: The first step in this production is the
planning of research, and the first phase in planning is the origination
of the research topic itself. On requested research projects the indi-
vidual who requests the project normally does this part of planning, but
with self-initiated research the analyst or one of his supervisors de-
termines the subject or topic to be studied.
The second step normally is the writing of the terms of reference.
This is a major planning tool which consists of a title, a statement of
problem, and either an outline or a list of questions which define the
scope of the project. A terms of reference may include a number of
other items such as deadlines, man-hours, and the name of the responsible
analyst. On research requested by the Office of National Estimates for
a National Intelligence Estimate, and by the USIB sub-committees, the
terms of reference normally accompany the request. Requests from others,
however, may be received by word of mouth. In this case the analyst or
his supervisor may write the terms of reference. On self-initiated re-
search, whoever originates the project generally writes the terms of
reference.
The third planning tool is the project work schedule. The well-
organized analyst will normally schedule the work that he is going to
do. This schedule helps him finish his work within the deadline which
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hbeen set and also acts as a check list so that he will do all the
things necessary to turn out a finished intelligence study.
The Assembly of Data: Having completed the greater part of the
project planning the analyst begins the active assembly of data for the
project. The analyst has a number of major repositories of information
to draw on, some of which he actively builds up as well.
The Analyst2s ertise: The analyst has his own fund of specialized
knowledge to draw upon as well as to build up. Many analysts come into
CIA lacking knowledge in one or more major aspects of their work. An
economist who is put to work writing economic analyses of the Soviet steel
industry at first may not know where the Donets Basin is, much less where
some of the more obscure steel producing centers are located. So the
analyst must train himself, and also take advantage of courses in the
Office of Training. The Agency is among the best in providing training
for its analysts to build up and to maintain their expertness in their
own field.
The-Inbox: The analyst also has the inbox, which is the Agency9s
means of spoon feeding pertinent information to the analyst. Whether
or not the inbox contains information which the analyst can use depends
on the reading requirements which he has submitted to OCR Document
Division. Document Division is the funnel through which practically
all documents come into the Agency and are then routed to the individual
analyst. These reading requirements are an important means of reducing
the amount of extraneous material in the analyst?s inbox and of increas-
ing the value of the material which he gets.
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The Analyst's Files: Selected material received through the inbox is
incorporated in his files, and after a period of time the analyst may have
files on his particular specialty and area that are second to none. When
the analyst begins work on a project, he first reviews his files to de-
termine whether he has enough information on each of the subjects to be
covered in the project. He also consults with other specialists ("oppo-
site numbers") inside and outside the Agency who work on the same or
similar subjects, and utilizes their files.
Libraries and Registers: The analyst also checks with the various
libraries and registers both within and outside the Agency to determine
whether they have information which he does not have in his files. How-
ever, if he has a short deadline, he may find that his files have more
information than he can exploit fully in the time available. If he has
kept good files, he checks the various libraries and registers primarily
to determine whether they contain anything which is not in his files.
He usually finds a few items, some of which may be of considerable value,
which did not get into his inbox, although they should have.
On the other hand,. if he has been collecting on his subject for
some period of time, he will also find that his file has far more infor-
mation than he will find in readily available form in any of the reposi-
tories. The reason is that a number of the major sources of intelligence
information are difficult to recover from repositories. For example,
after one year cables are not available in Cable Center. The individual
25X1 items in
are not indexed in a central place. The analyst
must therefore go through
regularly to tear out individual.
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pages and file them. Similarly, the FDD Summaries contain many small
items gleaned from Soviet newspapers and magazines which are not indexed
in the Intellofax system. So these must also generally be read and filed
on a current basis. The statement is frequently made that an average of
about 90 percent of the information in finished intelligence reports is
from open sources. Open sources consist primarily of these radio broad-
casts and translations from newspapers and magazines, most of which cannot
normally be recovered from either the library or the registers. Nonethe-
less, CIA Library is by far the best intelligence repository in the
Washington area, if not the world, and is getting better all along. The
best evidence for this statement is the fact that it is being used in-
creasingly by the Armed Services and State Department, because there is
more material, in more readily available form, than in their own libraries.
The analyst also uses the Map Library in ORR and the photo files
in Graphics Register, air photos in Photographic Intelligence Center,
Washington
also has an abundance of specialized libraries, in addition to the
Library of Congress. Many of the national associations that have head-
quarters in Washington have some sort of library. The subjects covered
by these libraries range from homeopathic medicine to paints and varnishes.
On our Trans-Siberian study we made extensive use of the Association of
American Railroads library, from which we obtained information on opera-
ting practices in areas with very cold winters, such as Canada and
Alaska. This analogical research was necessary because information was
not available on winter operations on the Trans-Siberian railroad.
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Collection Organizations: Having made these checks, the analyst may
find he has little or no information on some portions of his project, He
is now in a position to write requirements for collection of intelligence
information to fill these gaps. It would be tremendously wasteful if he
were to submit requirements for collection of information which was in
his files, the files of his opposite numbers, or in the libraries and
registers. Through the collection requirements which he writes, the
analyst can call not only on CIA collectors, but also on the collectors
for other U. S. and friendly intelligence services.
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The Analysis of Data and Writing of the Report
Having collected information for a project, the analyst must process
his material and write a finished intelligence report. This stage is
similar to writing a research paper in college; however, there are some
significant differences. For one thing, in intelligence research the
analyst generally knows he is writing something that is going to be used,
whereas many pure researchers in the academic world are disinterested in
anything that has immediate usefulness.
Coordination
When the analyst has finished writing his report, the final process-
ing must be performed. One important step at this stage is coordination.
Coordination simply means having your paper checked by analysts who are
expert in the subjects dealt with in the paper. This may have consider-
able value because these experts often find mistakes that no one else
could catch. Occasionally, they have information that the analyst didWt
happen to have. And, finally, their interpretation of the facts may
differ from the analysts and, in some cases, may be better.
Within the Agency, coordination is required, because finished intelli-
gence reports represent the best views of the Agency. Both OSI and ORR
reports include a statement that the report represents the best judgment
of the Office; thus, after it has been coordinated, the report is no
longer the best judgment of the analyst alone. External coordination
is not required for Agency reports, but it is often done on an informal
basis if the analyst has a competent opposite number in another Agency.
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Editing
The editing, which takes place before a report is published, is a
further means of making it an Agency product. Editors check manuscripts
to make them conform to the office2s format and style and to be sure it
is written in language appropriate for those who will read and use it.
The checking of maps, graphics, and proofs or multilith masters must be
done before the report can be reproduced.
Dissemination
The analyst may be asked to aid in establishing the dissemination
list for his report. Most published reports are given a standard
dissemination within the intelligence community.
POST_MORTEI
The final step:iri:,the production of,a report. may be the post-mortem.
For example>,.: ORR reiquires..that: each report .have .an annex on gaps .in
intelligence which were discovered " as::. a; result of: the research on.that
reports::The..analyst is then-duty-bound to-take action on filling the
gaps,?which::he:discoveredd, Following.the.publication:of National In-
telligence Estimatesa postn.ortem.is.prepared and published separately.
This post-mortem discusses the major gaps in intelligence and the things
that ought to be done the next time the NIE is produced. This post-
mortem is in a sense also a collection guide, because in various parts
of the Agency it is looked upon as one of the most current indicators
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of vital gaps in intelligence. As indicated earlier, the post-mortem
on our study of the Trans-Siberian railroad showed the need for a con-
siderable amount of information. It also pointed out the need for a
methodology to improve calculations of railroad capability and predicted
the need for an early revision of the estimate when more information be-
came available and when the methodology had been approved. These
recommendations were carried out.
SUMMARY
In summary, this lecture has introduced the production of finished
intelligence. It reviewed the various ways of classifying finished in-
telligence and summarized the philosophy or purpose of finished intelli-
gence. The intelligence pyramid was introduced to show the interdependence
of all levels in the intelligence community in the production and use of
finished intelligence. The origin of demand for these studies was dis-
cussed, using as specific illustrations a group of studies related to the
Trans-Siberian railroad and the China blockade question. The types of
finished intelligence produced both outside and within CIA were described,
and steps in the production of finished intelligence were discussed.
These steps are the planning of the research, the assembly of data,
analysis and the writing of the report, and the final processing of the
report.
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