DAILY DIGEST MAY 25 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200260001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 25, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST
Dates MAY 25 1951
49203
97
39
COPY NO,
NOTES 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Offiq': of Current Intelligence. It does not
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2, Codments represent the preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intelligence.
1, Mariana' Xetter indications are defined as
followss
mAm - items indicating Soviet-Communist
intentions or capabilities
NB* important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
mCm . other imformation indicating trends
and potential developments
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
USSR'. Johnson ReSoldtion on Korean Settlement Publicized in Moscow. Noseewis
propaganda media have given unuanalemphatis.to-:Senator,Johnsont.s resolution
regarding a settlement of the Korean war, The text of the resolution calling
for a cease?fire and deelaration of an:areiStioe 1n Korea as of 25 June,
was printed in PRAVDA-anCIZVESTIA,-broadeaSt to the home audience and
transmitted for use by the -local Pa:let press on19 Ifty. Moscow also broad.-
cast the item 12 times to foreign auttIendesp'buViet in any Asian language.
PRAVDA's International ReView on 20 -May referred readers to the previous
dayis PRAVDA article, a praetioe-which is rate347,ifemer used by the Moscow
press. The manner of presenting -the reSolUtion, homewer0 was essentially
- factual, although the text was prefaced * allusion to reports of the new
' Communist offensive in Korea and aceoMpanied by the comment that "even some
representatives of US ruling circles see the hopelessness of the Wall Street
adventure in Korea.a (C Moscow 20040 23 Nay 51; C FRIS Trends and Highlights,
23 May 51). COMMENT: Moscow obviously desires to exploit the Johnson pro.
posal for propaganda putrposes with a view to influeneing such public opinion
as still desires UN withdrawal from Korea and to furthering the current
? WPC csepallim for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and a Fire?
Power peace pact. So far, there has been no firm indication that the USSR
? might now support or acquiesce in such a settlement as Jobmeon has proposed.
However, the unksual propaganda treatment of this resolution Wight indicate
that the Keemlin is preparing its audiences for a possible agreement on
Korea which would be labeled a US "defeat?. Current propaganda picturing
alleged discouragement among US rul4ng circles and US forces in Korea
over "failure of the Korean "adventure" 'could provide background for such
a settlement.
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EUROPE. BUIOARIA Residence and Travel Restricted in Frontier Zones.
the first public announcement
of the control of residence and movement of Bulgarian citizens in all
frontier regions appeared on 12 April in the government newspaper for the
Black Sea port of Burgas. The? restricted area is divided into a frontier
zone, reported to average about 30 kilometers in depth, and a frontier
strip of 2 kilometers. Inhabitants of the 2 kilometer strip must have
residence permits from the Directorate General of the People's Militia.
A curfew on all movement is in effect on this strip from sundown to sun-
rise. Inhabitants of the 30 kilometer zone must have a special Militia
stamp on their identity cards to permit freedom of travel, but such per-
mission is limited to their own administrative district. Passes for Bul-
garians to visit the border area are issued only by the Militia on a one
trip basis. Foreigners and members of the diplomatic corps may visit the
30 kilometer zone with a Militia pass, but are forbidden entrance under
any circumstances to the 2 kilometer strip. Bulgarians may enter Bul-
garian Black Sea ports withaut spec
which are specifically designated.
"C" CZECHOSLOVAKIA. US AMbassader Concerned-bv-Sudeten Irredentism. According
to US AdhateadOr-Briggs, the nneerouSadetingsof.transferred.Sudetanwp
in West Germany On Whitsunday, during Which revisionistaSpitAtions were
expreseed, have greatly assisted the Communist regime: in its efforts to
capitalize on the-fear of Wait German rearmament. Although most of the
speakers at the rallies dieciaimed any resort to arms, Briggs contends
that the rearmathent'of Western Germany coupled with Sudeten irredentism
means Only-one thing to-the Czechoslovaks: 4 renascent-REaRgnaOh Osteno?
The Ambassador sngdests,-in order to minimize the effectivenessof the one
issue around which the Communists might rally otherwise divergent Czech?.
slovak elements, that HICOGoissue an official statement disclaiming US
support for Sudeten aspirations. (C Praha 747, 24. May 51). CCHEM: Nearly
two million Sudeten*have been expelled from Czechoslovakia since the
end of World War II.
"Zw! IpOOSLAVIA. Co-s-.--enorea. The United NatiOns has
...approved the aasignment of s Yugoslav correspondent to Korea. The news.-
man will be Yugoslavia's first war correspondent in that theater,
will represent POLITIKA, second most important Yugoslav daily newspaper,
RYT? 25 Nay 51). COMMENT; Press coverage of the Korean war by a Yugo-
slav Correspondent should have a greater impact on the Yugoslav thinking
than previous coverage which has been ;actual and objective but obtained
, from foreign sources. Ambassador Allen believes that the Yugoslav Govern,.
ment may desire to change its position on Korea in the UN from neutrality
to active support, The assignment of a .Yugoslav correspondent to Korea
may provide theinternal basis fbi such a change in policy. The Yugoslav
Government on 18 May voted for the UN General Assembly resolution supportiag
a strategic embargo on areas.vulder the control of Communist China and,North
Korea. This was the first major UN resolution regarding the Korean wa!
which Yugoslaukt ham supported.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
IC6 IRAN, Oil Committee Maintains That it will Not Confiscate the Oil'Com
=Ayer eh, Chairman of the Par iamentary I anmit sea a press
conference on 24 May declared that the Iranians intended to exploit their
own resources and to achieve this aim Iran must obviously make use of the
farmer Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and staff. As for the installations,
transfer in no way means the requisitioning or illegal confiscation of
anthers property. All properties of all foreign individuals or companies
in Iran are imdune from any violation. In accord with constitutional law
and provisions of article 3 of the law of April 29, all the Campanyls
claina_a111 be considered and met. (U AP News Ticker, 25 May 51)0 -
CU14MENT8 The Government has maintained that it does not intend to con-
fiscate the oil Compagyos properties, but will act in accordance with the
nationalization lawa. THe'Article to which Saleh referred binds the Oil
Committee to examine the just claims of the Company with those of the
GoVernment and, after their approval by Parliament, to act on them. The
law also provides that the Oil Committee will act as a holding company
until the chartet of a ?National Oil Calapanyw is prepared, to investigate
the Companyos accounts and to dx,aar up regulations for sending Iranian
students abroad so that they may replace gradually foreign experts. The
Iranians are determined to go ahead with implementing the laws, for the
Government on 24 la Y informed the Oil Company that it must hbminate re-
presestatives to norkwith the Oil Committee before 30 May, ot the Govern-
ment wiu1 have no choice but to act in accord with the Nationalisation
laws.*
aa
ISRAEL. General Ril ?Vies on Border Diss te Solution. General
ey? Chairman of the Truce ? upewapion'arganization TSO has in-
formed US Charge Clark in Damascus th0 theiltrat steps necessary toward
solving the Syrian-Israeli dispute welt the Lake Rule drainage project
area (a) the stoppage of the drainage work by Israel on Arab-awned land
in the demilitarized zone and (b) the setting of a date by Syria for the
return of the Iraqi fighter squadron, to Baghdad, (See OCI Daily Digest,
19 May Si), Riley believes that the terms of the Armistice would per-
mit Israel to continue drainage of the Jewish-owned land in the demtli-
tarized zone even though he has requested a halt of this work for a
short period. Riley would also arrange a transfer of the Arab-owned
/And blocking the drainage project with Jewish-owned land elsewhere in
the zone. Riley stated that he would inform the Syrian Army Chief of
Staff, Shishakli, that world o ion would be aroused against Syria in
the same way that it was recently aroused against Israeli if Syria con-
tinued to block the drainage scheme indefinitely. Concerning Riley7s
reference to the Arabs recently expelled from the zone, Clark expresses
his fear that any further expulsion of the Arabs by the Israelis might
be used by Syrian extrealst elaments to base their charge that the Four
Powers are masking Israel us imposition of 02de facto', authority in the
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area, (S Damascus 655$ 23 May 51), CCRIMENTs General Riley's return to
the Palestine area has speeded up UN attenir,s in the field toward solving
the border difficulties, Riley's task is particularly difficult)howevers
since any decisions favoring Syria may enbarrass the moclorate Socialist
?Government of Ben?Gurion in the coming Israeli elections and any action
favoring Israel may antagonize Syria and the Arab States against the US
and UK as well as against the UN generally,
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"B" AUSTRALIA. Government Mploritv In Senate Confirmed. Final returns
from the 28 April Parliamentary elections give the Liberal-Country
coalition Government a majority of four votes (32-28) over the
Labor Opposition in the Senate. (R Canberra 332, 24 May 51).
COMMENT: Government legislation will no longer be hampered by the
deadlock which formerly existed in the Australian Parliament
whereby the Government controlled the House of Representatives and
the Opposition held the Senate.
"B" INDONESIA. Surabava Harbor Committee Issues Security Ultimatum.
The Surabaya Harbor Committee issued an ultimatum on 21 May to
local government authorities to the effect that the harbor security
situation must improve within 10 days or the Committee will call
to the attention of shipping lines the complete lack of security
at the port of Surabaya. The US Maritime Commission has already
issued a warning to US lines, and one Australian line has ceased
calling at Indonesian ports, British underwriters have raised '
insurance rates for Indonesian ports to a level five times higher
than that for other ports in Asia. (C Surabaya 112, 23 May 51).
COMMENT: There is no evidence to date of municipal action on the
ultimatum. The security situation at Surabaya harbor has steadily
decreased during the past six months with extensive looting of
ships, wharves, and warehouses.
25X1X "B" INDOCHINA. Pro-French olice Chief Co ducts aid at o ali-t
Party.
that Nguyen an am, e nam overnmen e o o ce, as a legedly
searched the headquarters of the Dai Viet nationalist party in
Hanoi and summarily arrested 100 of its members.
25X1X
stands that warrants have been issued for the arrest of several
high party figures and hints that some of these leaders may flee
the country and join Nguyen Huu Tri, ex-Governor and Dai Viet
leader, in Hong Kong. (C Saigon 2054/ 24 May 51). COWENT:
Although not ,yet confirmed, this report is credible, Nguyen Van Tam
is a Vietnamese by race, but he is, like his close associate,
Premier Tran Van Hull, a French citizen by naturalization and his
career indicates that he considers himself a Frenchman. He has
served French interests consistently and ruthlessly, and is generally
feared and hated by Vietnamese nationalists.
"B"
Extfeme Indignation Among Vietnamese at French Brutality.
The US and UK Consulates Hanoi have received copies of a declaration
signed by 22 non-government Vietnamese community leaders denouncing
the "Dalat massacre" (recently instigated by a French police qfeicial)
and demanding measures to insure that a recurrence of such crimes
is impossible. The British Consul believes that the last statement
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is aimed at many other such reprisals which, though less publicized
than the Dalat incident, are known to be constantly taking place.
(S Hanoi 674, 24 May 51). COMMENTs The Dalat murder of 20 Vietnamese
prisoners is not without precedent during the history of French rule
in Indochina.
25X1X
"A" CHINA. Communist Offiei
"C"
supporting the UN embargo and ignored retort that Peipinggs
attitude "had not been helpful." Whe expressed the hope
that Peiping would not retaliate by promoting difficulties in Hong
Kong, the Chinese replied that Peiping "might have to impose
sanctions, altheugh he wished to see Hong Kong prosperous. The
Chinese added that the Hong Kong government was "obviously more
worried" than he. (S London 61389 24 May 51). COMMENTs The
Hong Kong government is aware that the Communist threat to the
Colony is increasing, as trade restrictions decrease Hong Kenggs
value as an entrespot for Peiping and as the Communists improve
their military position in Kwangtung. However, the Chinese
Communists appareetly still regard Hong Kong as of greater value
to them in British hands than in their awn. Despite recent rumors
of an imminent attack on Hong Kong, Peipinggs propaganda does not
indicate an intention to assault the Colony at this time.
Horegtliptutisports to China Increase Sharply in March.
Hong Kongge exports to China (including a small amount to Taiwan)
in March 1951 totaled HK$ 272 million (HK$6 equal US$1), up
25 percent free. the level of the preceding month and virtually
equal to the record figure reached in January 1951. Rubber and
rubber manufaeturee (e.g. tires and tubes) constituted the principal
Item of export. Over HK$ 100 million of crude rubber and rubber
manufactures were shipped in March from Hong Kong to Communist China.
(C State despatch Hong Kong 16669 I May 51). COMMENTs Hong Konggs
exports to China tnareased sharply in the fall of 1950 and have
been at high levels since. In large part, this step-up was caused
by the increased purchasing activities on the part of the Communists
in anticipation of forthcoming embargo restrictions. The broaden-
ing of Hong Konggs exptert control list toward the end of March and,
even more important, the ban on rubber shipments in May are expected
to effect a -substantial drop in Hong Konggs export trade to Communist
China.
"IC" KOREA. Abortiv Communiet Attempt to Capture UN-heldsnear
Wonsan According to the US Navy, North Koreans in the Wonsan area
made a number of abortive attempts during the nights of 24 and 25
May to recapture four or five UN-held islands in Wonsan Bay. None
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of the attempts were made in sufficient strength to accomplish
their mission. (S DA CINCFE Telecon 4747, 25 May 51). COMMENT:
As reported in CCI Daily Digest of 21 May, ROK intelligence had
foreknowledge of this recapture attempt. UN-held islands in Wonsan
Bay fulfill an important mission as fire control and intelligence
posts in the vital Wonsan Region.
25X1C
"B" KOREA. Communist Armored Units Reupales1 Entering Korea. Three
recent reports have alleged the arrival and movement of new major
25X1C Communist armored units in Korea,
the arrival in late April of a Chinese
Communist Mechanized Corps, equipped with 400 T-34 tanks, 200
self-propelled artillery pieces, and 700 trucks. A USAF report
of late April states that a "Special Mechanized Brigade", trained
in Tungwha, Manchuria, entered North Korea, This Brigade is
25X1C reportedly equipped with 60 tanks and 60 self-propelled artillery
pieces0
along the .jSth k'arailel, reports movement
the 8th Parallel re ion of 1 t" a
25X1A e ese mos recen reports rema n un-
con rmed, it is very possible that an additional North Korean
armored unit (with from 50 to 100 tanks) has entered Korea from its
Manchurian training area. Despite frequent reports of Chinese
Communists units being equipped with Soviet armor, no confirmation
of the presence of such units in Korea has been received. As of
early May, the US Far Eastern Command estimated the North Korean
Army to have from 150 to 175 tanks, primarily in western Korea.
UN air observers continue to report isolated tank sightings in
North Korean rear areas.
25X1A
"C" JAPAN. Police Raid Communist Press Offices. More than 1000 Communist
and Communist-front organizations throughout Japan were raided and
some 300 persons placed under arrest on 24 May as the Attorney
General's office launched another crackdown on the Red press.
Government agents closed down four major Communist publications in
Tokyo and rounded up their editorial staffs and local distribution
agents. (R FBIS, 24 May 51). COMMENT: This action, which is the
third major raid on the Communist press this year, was taken under
a Government ordinance which prohibits acts inimical to the Occupation.
While these arrests disrupt the Party's publication system, long-term
effectiveness of the raids is hindered by the fact that the Communist
press does not own'its own printing equipment - consequently new
publications spring up almost overnight to replace those banned.
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"C" JAPAN. YOSHIDA Reshuffles Cabinet. Premier YOSHIDA Shigeru replaced
his Agriculture-Forestry and National Construction Ministers on
25 May. Liberal Party Secretary General, SATO Eisaku, was appointed
the new National Construction Minister while the Party's Political
Affairs Bureau Chief, NEMOTO Ryutaro, was given the Agriculture-
Forestry Portfolio. (R FBIS, AFP, TOKYO, Advance Ticker, 25 May 51).
COMMENT: The reshuffle has been rumored as imminent for several
weeks and appears to be something of an annual reassigning of Party
political "plums", the plums in this case being both Cabinet port-
folios and Party officers' posts. It is considered probable that
the Cabinet revision has not yet been completed and the additional
reshuffling will be designed to eliminate factionalism within the
Premier's Party. A further possibility is that two or three tanking
Democrats might be invited into the Cabinet fh order to insure the
support of that conservative party during the peace treaty negotiations.
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"C" JAPAN. YOSHIDA Reshuffles Cabinet. Premier YOSHIDA Shigeru replaced
his Agriculture-Forestry and National Construction Ministers on
25 May. Liberal Party Secretary General, SATO Eisaku, was appointed
the new National Construction Minister while the Party's Political
Affairs Bureau Chief, NEMOTO Ryutaro, was given the Agriculture-
Forestry Portfolio. (11 FBIS, AFP, TOKYO, Advance Ticker, 25 May 51),
COMMENT: The reshuffle has been rumored as imminent for several
weeks and appears to be something of an annual reassigning of Party
political "plums", the plums in this case being both Cabinet port-
folios and Party officers' posts. It is considered probable that
the Cabinet revision has not yet been completed and the additional
reshuffling will be designed to eliminate factionalism within the
Premier's party. A further possibility is that two or three tanking
Democrats might be invited into the Cabinet in order to insure the
support of that conservative party during the peace treaty negotiations,
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
"C" GERMANY. AntieCommunist Gear Russian Fri?s4p Society Farmed? An
?antiomairur=n7Fgaont ague or man- ussian men s ip as
been founded in west Berlin with the purpose of promoting genuine -
understanding in the West of the Russian people as distinguished from
the Soviet regime. The League, which held its first public meeting
13 May, is jointly sponsored by west Berliners and Russian refugees?
? Among the German sponsors are the well-known anti-Communists Ernst Reuter,
? Mayor of west Berlin, and Rainer Hildebrandt, leader of the Fighting
Group Against Inhumanity. (U Berlin Unnumbered, 18 May 51) COMMENT:
The League will provide ap anti-Communist counterpart to the Communist
"Society, for German-Saviet Friendship". At the same time, it may be
dangerously susceptible to penetration by these who have friendship for
the Soviet regime as well as the Russian people,
Favorable Outlook fel. Schuman Plan Ratification. US liaison
officialsirH7TOW?noontinue to believe that the Schuman Plan mill be
ratified by a safe parliamentary majority, despite the reservations on
the part of some elements in the Government coalition and the resentment
caused by recent developments in the Saar (see OCI Daily Digest, 24 May 51).
The government is still preparing the necessary legislation, which is
scheduled to go within ten days to the Upper House, Where consideration
is expected to take several weeks. After that, the bill would be debated
for at least as long by the Lower House. Doubts have also been expressed
by party leaders on the advisability of German ratification prior to
approval by the new French Assembly. (C Bonn 884, 24 May 51) COMMENT:
Chancellor Adenauer has been anxTbus to speed ratification of the Schuman
Plan over Social Democratic opposition, provided the Western Allies meet
certain conditions such as abolition of the Ruhr Authority and restoration
of German control over steel and coal allocations.
"A" AUSTRIA. anviets Dodge Question of Austrian Treat . During his visit
25X1X to
Soviet leaders that the four occupying powers would soon reach an agree-
ment on the state treaty for Austria, and then withdraw the occupation
forces, The Soviet political adviser reminded that Austria 25X1X
was an enemy of the Soviet Union during the last war, and that it had
had about one million men in military service. (S Vienna 2775, 23 May Si)
COMMENTi The cryptic Soviet reply to observations is typical
25X1X 3f-Efi-e-inanner in which Soviet representatives haveS-beenndodging any
serious discussion of the Austrian treaty in recent months.
"B"
? Oportunity Seen for Closing Soviet Resatriatian Missions.
The US High ommissioner in Aus ria se isves ha a avora e si uation
has been created for Western Allied action to terminate the Soviet
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repatriation missions inthe western zones of Austria, as the mission
in the US zone has just been caught using two DP's for espionage. Without
connecting the termination with the espionage case, Donnelly intends to
inform the Soviet High Commissioner on 25 May that the mission in the DS
zone must be withdrawn by 8 June. Its British have been informed, and
have agreed to proceed with termination of the mission in their zone at
the end of the current Paris talks. Donnelly wii.l urge the French to
take parallel action at an early date. 05 Vienna 2754, 23 Mat 51)
commEtin' In March, Donnelly proposed joint tripartite action to terminate
the Soviet missions, which have completed their legittnate functions
and now operate mainly as intelligence and propaganda agencies. The
French, who were unwilling to take action at that time, may fall into
line if the US and British have already proceeded The USSR may be
expected to retaliate.
25X1C
"C" 'TAU. Friction Between Communists and Nenni Socialists Reported
TNEFgasing.tommunist leaders
Togliatti ay wrwi of the pro-
Communist Socialist Party (PSI), at Nenni's request; to clarify relations
between the two parties. The three men discussed regent symptoms of
resistance in various PSI organizations toward that Party's complete
subservience to Cominform policy and the PSI's inability to compete
successfully with the new =tip-Communist Socialist Party (PS) for this
reason. Togliatti and Secchia proposed that both parties be united "to
avoid public opinion reaction" to further reduction Of PSI strength.
Nenni felt that unification of the PSI with the Communist Party would
compromise PSI effectiveness ih the "peace" campaign. He "poorly concealed
his rebellious attitude", against the requirement that the FSI follow the
Communist Party line or lose its subsidy. 111. 25X1A
25X1A COMMENT: This is the second report of friction between the
ommunis s and pro-Communist Socialists, whose policies hitherto have
coincided (see CCI Daily Digest/ 12 May 5l). It is Unlikely that Nenni
will fail to support the pro-Communist bloc in the forthcoming municipal
elections, for which he has been campaigning vigorously. His apprehension,
however, suggests fear that certain of his following are likely to vote
for the new anti-Communist Socialist Party (PS) ticket in tbase elections,
and even that important numbers may go over to the party in time to
affect the national elections or 1953.
25X1C
. _
"A" Rumored Plana for General Strike anctChange
Conkunist-COUr011ed General Labor COnfeaeratian.
the directorate of e Cammunist Party (POI)
is pressing e ommunis .ominated General LaborOorifederatiOn (CGIL)
to call a,24-hour general strike exploiting the discontent of government
workers and other labor groups. Rumors persist that CGIL chief Di Vittorio
will be_replaced,because of labk of revolutionary fervor ancttransferred-
to the presidency of the CGIL 'Workers Relief Agency.
25X1A
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25X1A
RignCOMMENT: In View of the imminent local elections and the
s relaxation of its previous hard attitude toward State
employees who struck ori-8 May', it is improbable that the non-Communist
unions would support a Communist-called general strike. (see OCI Daily
Digest, 12 May Si) Without their support, t general strike mould have
little prospect of success. Di Vittorio hal consistently opposed PCI
n efforts to make the CGIL an instrument of party policy, In view of the
great personal loyalty of many CGIL members to Di Vittorio, his replacement
would undoubtedly arouse serious repercussions within the membership and
might cause numerous withdrawals from the organization, 25X1C
25X1C "B" Italian Police Arrest Rumanian Agent0
the arrest on 21 May of the
umanian c a ieur() 'uman an ga on in Rome, The chauMmT reportedly
had classified Italian documents in his possession when arrested. He is
reported to have talked freely since his arrest, ttating ttmt, the Rumanian
Minister feared Italian countermeasures following the arrests by the
RumanianGovernment in aucharest of an Italian priest and an Italian
Legation employee, (TS-SOFD 0199 Rome B-2, 2)4 May 51) COMMENT: The
reported arrest bears out an earlier =report that an Italian decision
was recently reached to arrest Rumanian personnel in Rome in retaliatiOn
for the arrests of Italian citizens by the Bucharest Government?
II UNITED KINGDOM. Lord Pakenham succeeds Viscount Hall at the Admiralt
Prif2rirre7 Attlee has appoin ora e am irs'Lord of the
Admiralty in place of Viscount Hall who resigned in favor of a younger
man. Lord Hall, nearing 70, had held the post since 1946, (U NY Times,
25 May- 51). CONANT: Lord Pakenham, who is 45, entered the governigEr
in 1946 as Pianiatary Under-Secretary for War, Before becoming
Minister of Civil Aviation in 1948, he held an important position in
the administration of British affairs in Germany and Austria. A convert
to Roman Catholicism, Lord Pakenham has a standing in the Labor Party
which depends partly on his connection with the Roman Catholic Trade Union
Group and partly on a somewhat erratic personal brilliance, There is
no reason to anticipate any significant change in the administration of
the Admiralty or in Anglo-American naval cooperation from the appointment.
"CI' UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, Union Approaches UN Discussion of South-Wet
Africa in UnyieldIEFkoodo The Union Government has no -671VM
ZW1lingneSTTO-Yait'icipate in discussions with a special five-
nation committee on the question of the former South African mandated
territory of South-West Africa. (U NY Times 9 25 May 51) COMM: This
action does not mean that South Africa is any closer to accepting last
'years conclusion by the International Court of Justice that the UN has
a supervisory responsibility over this former German colony which has
been virtually incorporated in the Union by the present government,
Prime Minister Malan told the House of Assembly on 16 May that, while
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not yielding on any matter of principle, South Africa had agreed to
negotiate with the UN committee on South-West Africa in an endeavor
to find an acceptable solution *doh would also put South--West Africa
beyond UN jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
MAY 25 1951
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/N14..
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He believes this is roughly the maximum attacking force owing to factors
?of terrain. If the outside assistance mentioned above is not forthcoming
he wouid'fall back on Oochinchina. Meanwhile, his Clean-Up operations in
the delta are handicapped by the lack of a Vietnam Army capable of taking ,
over pacified areas. (S, SA Saigon 2044, 23 May 51). COMMENT: De Lattrels
estimate does not appear to be unduly optiMistid, The lack:of.an effective.
Vietnam Army remains one of the most serious shOrtcomings of anti-CoMmunist
action in Indochina, both from the immediate and long-run viewpoints*.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT SA CABLES
25 May 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" IRAN. Iran Pressing for Early Control over Oil Company. On 24 May, the
Iranian Finance Minister informed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that, un-
less it appointed a negotiator by 30 May, Iran would be left with no
choice but to act in accordance with the nationalization, legislation.
More detailed information concerning Iranian intentions is contained in
an unconfirmed Parliamentary Oil Committee "blue print" for action which
has reached the British Embassy in Tehran. This reported Iranian plan
provides for: (1) establishing an Iranian managerial board to direct the
oil industry; (2) taking over of the AIOC administrative officesin_Tehren
and then in Adaban; (3) offering a two year contract to most of the British
technicians now employed by AIOC; and (4) progressively assuming control of
the production and refining units. (3, S/S Tehran 2929, 23 May 51; Plain,
Tehran 2955, 24 May 51). COMMENT: The Finance Minister's statement does
not necessarily mean that Iran would take over the company immediately inas-
much as the nationalization law passed 30 April provides a maximum of three
months to arrange for implementation. Serious differences have apparently
arisen in the parliamentary oil committee, but the radicals seem to "be defin-
itely in control. If the "blue print" ad outlined above indeed represents
the government's plans, there remains little basis for negotiation, as the
amount of participation left the British under the plan would be unsatis-
factory to them.
"B" INDOCHINA. De Lattre Certain He Can Sto ? Chinese Communists . In conversa-
tion with Minister Heath, De Iattre stated that he feels that the Singapore
Conference removed any doubt in the minds of the US and UK delegates as to
the extreme importance of the military campaign in Indochina. De Lattre
acknowledged the presence within Tonkin of several thousand Chinese Communists
serving with the Vietnamese rebels, but reported no indication of Chinese
units. With his scheduled reinforcements, De Iattre said he could handle
the Viet rebels plus 50,000 Chinese "volunteers", providing the attack did not
cobs before October. In the event of a post-October invasion, he hopes, with
the assistance of unnamed allies to the extent of four infantry divisions and
an aircraft carrier, to be able to repulse a Chinese attack of up to 1501,000.
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