DAILY DIGEST MAY 19 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T01146A000200210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1951
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Date:
DAILY DIGEST
MAY 19 1951
49189
COPY NO, 39
NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been
prepared primarily for the internal use of the
Office of Current Intelligence. It doesnot
represent a complete coverage of all current
reports in CIA or in the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2, Comdents represent the _preliminary views of
the Office of Current Intel4geqce.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as
follows:
*AR ? items indicating. Soviet?Communist
intentions Or capabilities
*BN important regional developments
not necessarily related to Soviet/
Communist intentions or capabilities
ItCP ? other imformatiOn indicating trends
and potential developments
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25X6
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JAPANESE PEhCE TREATY
ZOMMMNT: In the Soviet effort to
delay cone us on o the treaty, the USSR very likely counted upon US-Anglo
differences as one of the most propitious means of obstruction. However,
present indications are that the principal differences, i0 e., those re-
garding Chinese Communist particip tion in the signing of the treaty and
the limitation of Japanese shipping, are being eliminated and will not
hinder Western accord on the treaty.
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
v_p_M Rumored SoviteeteRetfteepe_Igrgelieleeernment. US Legation Damascus
reports that sev ral nationalistic and irresponsible Damascus newspapers
have published the owimmAry of a note allegedly delivered by the Soviet
Minister in Tel Aviv to the Israel foreign Office protesting Israeli ag-
gression. According to these papers several main points of the Soviet note
were: (1) the USSR considers entrance of Israeli forces into Arab states
an aggressive act; (2) the USSR looks with concern at the course of Israeli
policy and considers that its subjugation to the US represent a danger to
Middle East peace; and (3) that persistence by Israel in aggression against
Syria serves the imperialist designs aimed at occupying Syria and South
Lebanon. The Legation doubts the accuracy of the report that there was such
a note, but calls the report significant in view of current anti-US senti-
ment in Syria. (R Damascus 627, 16 May 51)0 COMMENT: That the USSR de-
livered such a note to the Israeli Government is extremely unlikely, in
view of the Soviets long-term non-committal attitude to Arab-Israeli tension
and disputes. The current Syrian-Isra li clashes have been largely ignored
in Soviet propaganda, and comment has avoided taking sides by blaming the
fighting on US-UK nimperiali mon The USSR, however, has been assiduously
wooing the Arab States in an effort to gain their neutrality, while de-
nouncing Israel as a pawn of US aggression. They would thus not be adverse
to encouraging such rumors, circulated by extreme nationalist groups, in
their efforts to win Arab friendship, incite anti-US anti-Israel feeling, and
influence Arab countries to reconsider their policy towards the West.
genrlet Air Capabilities Increasing in Europe. CINCUSAIE summarizes
recent developments in Soviet Air Force units in occupied Europe: (1)
higher performance jet light bombers have recently appeared for the first
time at Soviet fields in Eastern Europe ; (2) other evidence indicates
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possible acceleration pf the reequipment of Soviet fighter units with jet
aircraft - including the appearance of jet trainers near Berlin; (3) there
is also evidence of continued airfield construction and improvement. A
review of available information has led CINCUSAJB to the conclusion that
Warsaw is making an effort: (1) to increase the capabilities of Soviet
Air Force personnel; (2) to increase the tempo of the Soviet reequipping
program; and (3) to extend defensive ca acilities to include a si nificant
increase in offensive capabilities. 25X1A
17 May 51).
or EASTERN =ROPE ALBANIA. Food Situation Deterioratin Information
emanating from mebers of the Albanian resistance in Rome indicates that
the food situation in Albania has become desperate as a result of the
drought and the governmentos requisitioning of grain. Throughout the
country the populace appears emaciated and spiritless. Even though the
people are angered by their lack of food and clothing, they are powerless
to act against the severe security measures which the government has taken
25X1A to maintain itself in power. COMMENT:
Although the conditions described in the above report may be exaggerated,
25X1C states that the Communist collective farm system in
Albania has proved a boomerang to the Russians who must ship cereals to
feed the population so as to compensate for the decline in food production.
It has been reported previously that a great shortage of food exists in
normally productive areas in Albania, and that little sustenance is pro-
vided for political internees. The tight food supply probably compelled
the decision on 13 March 1951 of the Albanian Government to reduce the
compulsory delivery quotas of agricultural products by 2$%.
.0SBN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Transit Agreement Signed. with Poland. The Czechoslovak
news service has announced that a Polish-Czechoslovak agreement was signed .
in Wareaw on 16 May, granting the latt r country preferential freight rates and
tranSit,arrangemente across Poland, and leasing it space in Stettin harbor.
The US Ambassador in Praha comments that the agreement is consistent with
the Soviet orbitos attempts to lessen its economic dependence on the West
and provides Czechoslovakia with a measure of protection against possible
future action by the Western occupation powers to deny it transit privi-
leges across Germany (BL 731S, 16 May 51; C Praha 720, 16 May 51).
COMMENT: The new greement will probably result in the development of
the Czechoslovak entrepot in Stettin harbor, an island which has lain
dormant for the last two years. It may also result in a return of Czecho-
slovak maritime traffic to Polish ports, from which it shifted to West
European ones last October when revaluation of the zloty rais d Polish
transit fees.
POLAND. Peace Propaganda Aggressively Anti-US, According to the US ,
Embassy Warsaw, the propaganda promotion of the nationwide Polish peace
plebiscite has assumed a more aggressive anti-US tone. The Embassy re-
ports that it has been informed from private Polish sources that the theme
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of mpunishment for American criminals guilty of aggression in Korean is
predominant in the prepared speeches of Communist Party agitators,. This
theme first appeared in the Warsaw press on 12 May and was repeated on
16 May. The Embassy believes that unless this theme is developed on a
major scale by the Polish radio and press it is intended to excite
flagging popular interest in the peace plebiscite rather than inaugurate
a camp ign for effective punitive action. (C Warsaw 896, 16 May 51).
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia Votes for UN Embargo Resolution., The Yugoslav
delegation to the UN on 18 May voted for the UN General Assembly resolution
supporting a strategic embargo on areas under the control of Communist
China and North Korea. The day previously in the UN Political Committee,
the TUgoslav delegate abstained from voting on the preamble to the resolution
on the grounds that it was based on the 1 February resolution on which
Yugoslavia abstained. (The 1 February resolution condemned Communist China
for supporting egression). The Yugoslav delegate, in voting for the opera-
tive provisions of the strategic embargo resolution, explained that his
Government recognised that Communist China had clearly persisted in support
of aggression and had been singularly unresponsive to negotiation efforts.
(U Mimes, 19 May 51; S Belgrade 173, 17 May 51; U New York 1547, 18 May 51).
COMMENT: This is the first major resolution regarding Korea which the
Yugoslav Government has supported. The Yugoslav vote reflects the gradual
change in Yugoslav thinking concerning the Korean war and its possible
consequences on Western solidarity in the face of Soviet-sponsored ag-
gression. On earlier important issues the Yugoslays have usually abstained,
holding to the hope that a peaceful solution could be obtained if a cautious
approach was maintained.
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN
0Bw L.; Dc STRIA, Israelis Bitter Concerning UN Sec ?. Council Resolution.
Ancolying o US Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv's, Isrde Is top officials have
clearly stated that Israel is wextremely upset" over the 18 May UN Secur-
ity Council Resolution which includes a request for a suspension by Israel
of the Hule drainage project, In general, the Israelieleel that the re'
solution puts a premium on aggression, In particu1a4the Israelis are
opposed tog (1) the ??iosi of the Rule drainage projettpand (2)
.permitting the return to the demilitarized zone of those Palestinian
,Arabs removed by the Israelis several weeks ago, Davie fearS that a
Wave of Israeli cynicism may develop against the UN ?that Israel may
even try to prevent implementation of the VW resolution. Meanwhile, US
Minister Cannon in Damascus disputes the two major Israeli objections to
the UN resolation. Cannon feels that the issue concerning (1) the Hule
drainage scheme is not the project itself-but r ther the right of Israel
to take unilateral action-adversely affeeting-the interests of local
Palestinian Arabs-in an area'whose aovereigntk is still in dispute, Con-
cerning (2) the Israeli allegation that the Arabs who-were removed are
whappy w and do not desire to return to laudir homes, Cannon points out
that the Arabs bitterly fought to stay on their land and that UN ob-
servers were not allowed to see the displaced,. Arabs because they were
'quarantined, (C Tel Aviv MAXI KV 51? S Tel Aviv 771, 18 May Si
S Damascas 641, 18 May 51)0 ?COMMENta The bitterness of the Israeli-
Syrian border dispute made it oert`ain that if the Security Counoil took
any strong action at alp there eould be strong opposition to the reso-
lution from one or both of the parties concerned, The Israelis clearly
oppose the Security. Council measure, Alich was passed by a 10-0 vote,
because the Israelis fear that any temporary suepension of the Hule
drainage scheme may result in a longer stoppage. The Arab reaction will
probably be favorable one, since even a temporary suspension of the
Buie drainage scheme will show that the UN opposes unilateral action
in the area.
SOUTH ASIA. Three Abstentions in UN General AsSembl Vote on Chinese
tEgaro7,---On 1B-May? gh s an 'ia, an s an a s aine
UN General Assembly vote recommending embargo on the export of war
materials to Communist China, In spite of its abstention, India pledged
that it would not permit exports of items covered by the embargo. Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan did not commit themselves, (U NY Times 19 MAY"
Si). COMMENTg These abstentions reflect general South Asian fears of
provoking World War Ills dislike of taking sides in the East4est con-
flict, and uncertainty over future trade relations with China,
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"C" INDIA. Violent Protest Greets Cuzbing Fret
Speech, nation-wide storm of protest has greeted the bill introduced
by Pithne Minister Nehru in Parliament on 12 Mays in which it was recome.
mended that the Indian Constitution be amended to curb the right of
freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the security of
the states friendly relations with foreign countries s public orders
decencys and morality." The explanation that the "citizen's right to
freedom of speech and expression has been held by some courts to be so
comprehensive as not to render a pepson culpable even if he advocated
murder and other crime of violence" has not been accepted by the op-
position. The f-ar has been expressed that the amendment mould be used
by the Congress Party to muzzle its opponents in the forthcoming
national elections. (U NY Times 13$ 162 189 19 May 51). COMMENT:
The apparent Strength of Indian feelingabout the right of free speech
is notevorthy. Certain fears regarding Co gress Party Use of the pro-
posed amendment may lasll be justifieds but it is believed that much '
of the opposition has overlooked the probable real purpose of the bill.
This is almost certainly to facilitate re-imp.sition of controls on
the Communist Party of India and other subversive groups 9 two State
bans on which have recently been lifted following high court decisions
that they ware unconstitutional. This sign of the Government's de-
sire to maintain freedo of action in discour ging subversive activities
is of interest in substantiating other recent indications that the
Government is becoming increasingly are of the dangers of international
Communism,
"B" AFGHANISTAN. US mbass Fears Re ardine Af han-Pakistani Situation. The
WERNgii-in Kabul while recognizing that recent Afghan allegations re-
garding Pakistani military activity along the border are merely part of
Afghanistan's long-standing propaganda campaign for Pushtoonistans never-
theless feels that Afghan-Pakiatani relations lave deteriorated sufficient-
ly to make UN observation of the situation advisable. (C Kabul 357s 16
May 51)a COlaalaTt In the pasts Afghan-Pakistani tension has frequently '
mounted intdirect proportion to the growth of Indo-Pakistani difficulties.
At presents Pakistan is protesting the move made by the-Government of
Indian-held Kashmir to convene a uonstitnent Assembly against the ex-
pressed desires of the UN Security Councils and it may be that recent
Afghan propaganda is designed to take Pakistani minds off the Kashmir
question. It is believed that the current situation will not deteriorate
to a dangerous point since previous situations of similar nature have
proved innocuous.
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"B" MALAYA s =wore Chinese Said To Be Veerin To Anti-PRC
Position. The following information from a source evaluated
F-3 has been received by the US Consulate Generals An esti-
mated 150,000 Singapore Chinese who in the past may have been
susceptible to overtures from the Chinese Communist regime
are now tending to become hostile to that regime, a position
which many may take publicly during the next six months.
This attitude is attributed to a reaction to Chinese Communist
land reforms, rather than to the Korean War. (S Singapore
1104, 18 May 51). COMMENTs Singapore has one of the wealthiest
Chinese communities in Asia. The Singapore Chinese have, like
other Chinese communities in South Asia, tended toward a policy.
of "accommodation" toward the PRC. This was partly a case of
following the UKus lead in recognizing the PRC. It has
previously been reported that local Chinese would be more
likely to take an anti-Communist stand if the UK would "clarify"
its own position toward the Mao regime. More stringent British
measures toward trade with Communist China should encourage
anti-Communist feeling among the local Chinese.
"CU
THAILAND. V etnam Minister in Beulgliok Wants Joint Action for
pmatl_mltilah_Agtat. US Minister Heath in Saigon strongly
endorses the suggestion of the Vietnam Minister to Thailand
that the US, UK and French Embassies jointly urge the Thai
Government to expel Nguyen Due Quy2 the chief Viet Minh agent
and propagandist in Thailand. This endorsement is made on
the grounds that Quy has become so notorious and such a
symbol or Thai hospitality to the Viet Minh that his expulsion
would be "important and timely." If the Thai Government is
adamant on Quyos right to asylum, Heath suggests that the
minimum positio to take vis-a-vis the Thai is to ask that
Qay be obliged to drop all political and propaganda activity
on pain of immediate expulsion. (S Saigon 2011, 17 May 51),
COMMENZs Quyls expulsion from Thailand would not seriously
hinder Viet Minh activities in Thailand.
"B" INDOCHINA. Indian Official Rebuffs Cambodia. The Cambodian
Minister-designate to the US described two recent incidents
Indicating India's attitude toward Cambodia 1) The Indian
Consul General in Saigon stated in a discourteous reply to
the Cambodian Government that India found it "hardly necessary"
to accept Cambodiais offer of six tons of rice for famine
relief since India was in the market for considerably greater
quantities; 2) the Indian Congen refused to accept innocuous
Cambodian Government tourist literature on the ground that
this might imply Indian approval of the Cambodian regime.
(C Saigon 2017, 18 May 51). cOMMENTs India's feeling that
continuing French control precludes recognition of Vietnam
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applies with still greater force in the case of Cambodia s and
is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
Cambodia ProtAAII_Erggeh Ouster of Indonesia Newsmen. French
Surete officials in the Cambodian capital of Pno Penh have appre-
hended two Indonesian journalists who had fast arrived by plane
and returned them to Bangkok by road. The journalists had been
originally recommended by the French military attache in Djakarta
and visas has been issued them in Bangkok by the Cambodian
Charge and the Vietnamese Minister thart. French Sureta officials
in Pnom Penh, howev r, have told the US Charge there that they
have definite information that the journalists were making reports
for the Ho Chi Minh regime. The Ca bodian Government has pro-
tested the action of th French Surete to the French Commissioner
i Cambodia. (C Saigon Unnumbered, 18 May 51). COMMENTs As
with numerous other cases of friction between the French
authorities ad th regimes whieh they have sponsored in Indoe
chinas this incident has little significance in itself. Neverthe-
less, the accumulation of such infringe ents of native "sovereigntel
primarily the result of French tectlessgesss produces an atmosphere
prejudicial t. effective cooperation between France and its
Indochinese allies. Moreovers such fneidents tend to vitiate
the efforts of the Western Powers to persuad Asian governments,
especially India arid Indonesia, of the independence of the
Indoehintee states.
IC" CHINA. CoarjamistsCommarodseri4gjdot?rboa.ts in Canto e
The Intelligence chief for the economic director of Macao
P.J. Lobos reported to the US Consul Generals Hong Kong, that
Chinese Communist authorities- in Canton have been "detaining"
motor-drivert river boats in that city since April. More than
200 were reportedly collected by 1 May0 The US Consul General
evaluates this source and report "Q-6? (S State Hong Kong 3425y
18 May 51). COMMENTs There is probably some truth to this
report. Commandeering of small vessels in the Canton area in
April was reported by anot er source this activity tumid be
related to enforcement of the new customs law, which emphasizes
the problem of smuggling. If the Communists confiscated in the
Canton area all vessels suspected of 'smuggling or of belonging
to "reactionaries", they would amass a large number which could
be used for military purposes and custom patrol.
"B"D.......-AritiskISEldlEaaREEMI-E&ILE2-2113412kfa-PrIaMEA-I2
Peemm_W_EkSgat. The British destr.yer COSSACK was reported to
have intercepted the British freighter NANCY MOLL ER on the
high seas 18 May and to have started escorting her back to
Singapore with her 3700-ton carg of rubber destined for Communist
China (U Ticker London Reuters 28 May 51)0 COMMENTs The strict
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enforcement of this embarg by the British is indicated both by
this interception and measures taken to prevent the Panamanian
flag NORBAY from clearing Malaya with 740-750 tons of rubber for
Communist China. Recent reports indicate that the Chinese are
expected to attempt to shift their rubber importing activity from
Malaya to Indonesia soon. It is not yet known whether the UK
intends to prevent British shipping from participating in that
trade, should it develop.
"C" KOREA.. Economic Conditions in the ROK. Ambassador Mucci?,
commenting or economic conditions within the ROK since June 1950
observes that price levels in South Korea have risen by an
average of four times in prosperous southwest Korea and by
six times in the crowded Pusan-Taegu area. Meanwhile, daily
wages paid by contractors have risen an average of five times
for skilled labor and four times for unskilled labor.- The
Ambassador further reports that recent Bank of Korea financial
statements tend to indicate that the ROK Government is making
some progress in curbing its deficit spending. (S Pusan 964,
18 May 51). COMMENT8 The pacing of the rising cost of living
within the ROK by almost comparable wage increases will do
much to quiet any unrest at the inflationary spiral among the
Korean population,. The basic fact remains, however, that the
Korean economy cannot be expected to provide any major measure
of productivity or materials for the UN war effort without a
large increase in the flow of imports for civilian consumption.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
MAW& 4oreialtetseSeekeElectoral_11111aneeS. The _French Socialist
(SF101 Congress ic close May subordinated all con-
trovereial issues to the exigencies of the electoral campaign)
P Particular4 notemor*, arng the statements of party policy are a
resolution reverbtng the SFIOgs former Pppopition to the mar in
Indochina and 4'reso1ution which implies eiettUal acceptance of a
German defen#e contribution. The Party favors the broadest possible
eleotoral alliancIss excluding Only the Communists and the Gaullists.
AA a conciliatery gebture toward the Popular Republicans (MRP)9 SFIO
Spokesman made it plain that they would not make a campaign issue
of,Sociallst oppolition to church schools. (C Paris 70229 17 May 51).
COMMENTs Althoug$ the Socialists are expected to retain their pres-
EraFength of 9? members in the NationaleAssemblys SFIO leaders
are'undoebtedly 4ttery about the Steady swing to the Rights parti-
culary since recent indications point to the Communists retaining
more eupport thin had seemed 'possible earlier? Since the newly
created ,Ifourth ferc0 of non-Gaullist Rightists could limit SFIO
electoral-allianct possibilities to the MRP, the group expected to
suffer the test sere losses in the coming elections the Socialistsv
pre-el ction position seems now to be less favorable than when the
new electoral refprm was voted.
'ITAig. De Gae e M mei; Parliament As. EleCtien Ma,neireier. Premier
ilirVasperi Ise a ourne ParlieWu="Wne,-Wifit-iTthe angry
protests of the Cemmunists (POI). The latter deeamded a debate en
the partieipption of Catholic ?cluirohmen in the campaign for the forth-
comimg local elections. (R FBISs 18 May Sig U NY TAlopp, 19, May Si).
COMMENTs By reeelsing Parliament until after the lbarelections
on TCM'ay an0 10'Ounes the Government may hope to forestall a dis-
cussion at this time of controversial legislation scheduled for
iMmediate debates ineluding the civil defense bill and the bill for
regulating labor pions. ,Sai_Teral aspects of both bills, particularly
the provisiop of OA lattersprOhihiting strikes by state employees,
have arciused stropg opposition among the anti-Communist labor organi-
zations. Pressure by the Government for parliamentary approval of
these measures prior to the electiens would afford the PCI an
opportunity to exploit this opposition and to divert from.the anti-
Communist electoral coalition a considerable percentage of the popu-
/ar vote. In attacking Church participation in the election campaign
the Communists expect to take advantage of the rising tide of anti-
clericalism in the country.
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"C" UNITED KINGDOMe Tore ii Office Concerned eith'Rise of German Neoe,
airraIery, r-1 high UK o flairr").a4"-eiTiFeWiar-iciln
Tnfain Officavs serious concern over the emergence of the neo-
Nazi Socialiet Reich Party (SRP) in Germany, particularly because
ofethe adveree effect it may- he on British opinio ' on German
rearmamentw He observed that itish opinion had flpretty well
come erounde before the Lower Saxony elections in which the SRI'
secured 11 percent of theeeote. Foreign Secretary Morrison will
include the SRP ip forthcemingediscussions with Adenauer.- (3 London
,
6012? 18 May 51). CO krNin Before the appearance of this new
ergumeOt that 'will against German rearmament? theile was a
fately! important Britisb. sentiment againat any such move (See OCI
D tly Digest? 12 Mar 51)., The UK.Governmente ammioesAo meet
this sentiment, has already felt it necessary to make great efforts
to eonvene a Foreign Ministers" conference wevidence of its
deeire to protote East4Vest understanding., before German rearmament
Will be generally accepted by the British public.
?Government Reported Like to Deliver Two Tankers
to Polani. Aecoraiiii77717exparanfio offroTal tT-I-Eirtilassy
1,,ZrariT likely that the British Government will decide
aot teantrefere with the delivery of two British-built tankers to
,poland. AccoMing to the British, it was recently discovered that
the t 6-saelk4a already the property of * Polielaaate Caerpora-
reetite the Britiebetear that the Poles 'would retaliate
thatr'eAppihg if the'BritisheAdmiralty reqeieitioned the
10 hitt boen'&eviouslY requested in April, by Poreign
0 The US bibasey in London believes ithighly desirable that
a note be delered by the US to the British expressing strong
desire that the British Government find means to prevent delivery
Of theee.vesselS. 0(3 London, 6016, 18 May 51). COMMENTs In light
of the TAIT* reluctance to curtail trade With East-fertilTope? and
.the. absence of any questioh of ownership, the British would normally
ltver.the'shipe. The two vessels in question were ordered in 194.8
by Ptiandy'and ate strailar in size to those currently in use by the
USSR to carry :petroleum products to the Far East. lierrent Polish
petroleum requirements are such that these vessageweeld not neces-
sarilY he required for regular shipments between the USSR aid
Poland.
bovrnment Sils en tit ,si, aa Air Service. The
BritiSh. Foreign ersniwiriaa Iie 'TgCzec Eta iligi-firiailaon that
British European Airways ?(BEA) has been forced to discontinue air
service to Praha as a, result of Czechoslovak actions and consequently
the Czechoslovak airline (CSA) will no longer be permitted to operate
a scheduled serviee between Czechoslovakia and the UK. -Discrimina-e
tion against BEA in the allocation of air freight was cited as the
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principal reason for the cision. Tile British pointed out. that
sinc& the proportion of freight made available for BEA has now
become negligible, its continued operation into Praha is uneconomi-
cal. Furthermore, according to the British Foreign Office 9 Cecho-
slovak authoritieS? have constintly obstructed the work of the BEA
office in Praha through the 1.',ieeeedation, 'arrest and interrogation
of atef members. (S London 60069 18 May 51). COMMENTg Continu-
ing 'loss of' revenue by ESA has filially compelled?ri-fritieh to
follow US policy laid d.Hn by a NSC directive in Jarniary 1950 which
deals Frith the containment of Eastern European airline aotivity
within-V.04,bn?
"Co
UNION'? OF SOUTH AFRICA.' Smith Africa Public Committed, to Assist
treTrniir6tTifirinar E air78-fressing grave angee?T-ortratirrinism
re, on FE-Hi vaOr.non-European majoritys, Prime Minister
Melan stated in Parliament on 17 May that South Africa would share
in the responsibility of defending the Middle East against Communist
ession? mid would imdertake the protection of neighboring terri-
es to the Tiorths, as far as could be agreed. (11 FBI London.;
18 .)teer 51). COMM-Elks This is the firstpublic commi'tment of South
AfriCh to ParliTerfplte in the defense of the Middle East against
Coeuniinist ateeck, although in mid-1950 the Cabinet secretly promised
one armored diVielon (but without equipment) for sucfla-Use
in the?T: eirent of rare D fense Minister' ErasmtiS had also stated early
Febreaey of this year that an attack on Africa would be considered
an attack on the Union, The Government has apparently given ups, -
for the time being, its earlier efforts to make its military comnit-
ments contingent on the formation of an African Defense Pact, in
which the Union hoped to play a leading part,. AS regards implement-
ing this new pledge, howeter9 South Africaus ground forces Agee in
suCh aState of negleit that the Director-Geners), or the La/Forces
has reportedthat he would be unable to send' 4,6 -Le ethapany
,1
to join the Commonwealth Division in Korea, arid the Union is actually
contributing only five officers to this division. Moreover, South
Africa has taken no stepSett obtain the equipreent'needed for the
armored division s cretlylitomised for the defense of the Middle
East, although the VS indicated some wp-eks ago its readiness U.>
assist the Union in procuring this equipment.,
,110,1, BOLIVIA. 1MR Atte 4 at Violence Quell,eaneue fez.? Embasty La Pas
thirire=e0R-65EFTgar:FariTrifeTraT6T6nario 7 a (W)
14exined outbreaks various pains Tarirarirr-Iay'.failed_to
Itititerialize. In only one district whett MIIR.ists tried to seize
.4 police station, was there some violenct, and this was quelled by
polie.MITRists say that their ranks he.ve been well-infiltrated
? by police agents who eletee fez lave been able to stalemate MNR plang,
25X1C MNR labor leader
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200210001-7
;
Approved Filelease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011.000200210001-7
TOP SECRET
Juan Lechin has left La Paz for southern Bolivia, where he will con
25X1C duct Strikes amon the miners 9 who are being armed for revolution.
he Bolivian airforce in Cochabamba
and 'Santa Cruz is-ti ec ed to loin the INR at the height of the
vat.
COMMENT g Thus fez the p011ice and armed forces have remained loyal
TrEga*Ita_ government although some Tro.41NR sentiment among minor
army Of!! hashas been reported. The airforce is of prime importance
in the rapid transportation of troops to suppress possible distur..
bances in remote parts of Bolivia.
TOP SECRET
12
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200210001-7
25X1A
)4, Approved Flpelease 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T011 000200210001-7
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST SUPPLEMENT
?
!;:ic3e
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/FE.
SECRET
, 39
/
49189_
ApprovedFor Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP79T01146A000200210001-7
Approved Foi"lease 2001/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T011.000200210001-7
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES
18 May 1951
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
"B" JAPAN. Vice Foreign Minister Desires Inclusion Chinese Nationalists in
Peace Treaty. The US Political Adviser, Tokyo, cables that Vice Foreign
Minister IGUCHI called on him on 19 May. In a diScussion of the problem
of a Chinese signature on the peace treaty, IGUCHI said the Japanese
Government under no circumstances desires the signature of the Chinese
Communist regime, He added that, basically, his Government wishes to rake
peace with the Chinese Nationalist Government which it considers deserting
of Japan's support. IGUCHI expressed the thought that failure to give the
Nationalist regime an opportunity. .to become a party to the treaty might
unduly delay ratification of the treaty by ttie US Senate. Because of the
25X6 fervent (Japanese) desire for an early "majority" peace, IGUCHI said, the
Japanese Government would be much disappointed if the signing of the treaty
were delayed reason of a ocedural question. S Too 2001 1* ; ?
25X6
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fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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