NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010114-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 114
• Publication Date: August 10, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday August 10, 1977 CG NIDC 77-185C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, August 10, 1977.
The NID Cable is for e purpose o Informing
senior U o icials.
ETHIOPIA-USSR: Disillusioned
USSR-EGYPT: Charges and Commentary
TURKEY: Political Violence
Page 4
Page 5
Page 7
PAKISTAN: Political Problems
MOZAMBIQUE: Embassy Assessment
Page 10
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SUDAN:
Political Amnesty Decreed
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I IEthiopian Chairman Mengistu appears to be disenchanted
with the USSR and desirous of improving relations with the US.
We believe, however, that the strain in Ethiopian-Soviet rela-
tions may only be temporary. Mengistu obviously expected too
much from the Soviets; for one thing he hoped the Soviets could
deter Somalia from pursuing territorial ambitions against Ethi-
opia.
I Soviet news coverage of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict
indicates that the Soviets remain concerned over the fighting
in the Ogaden and are dissatisfied with the Somalis.
I IOn Saturday, Tass reported attempts by the Organiza-
Lion Unity to mediate Somali-Ethiopian differences,
and earlier had quoted Ethiopian Foreign Minister Feleke's ap-
peal for an observance of the OAU's charter, which calls for
strict observance of the principle of territorial integrity
and sovereignty. Tass also carried Feleke's warning that OAU
failure to mediate the Somali-Ethiopian dispute could lead to
border wars throughout Africa.
IOn Sunday Tass reported on Ethiopia's demand for a
withdrawal of Somali regulars from the Ogaden. The Tass report
also characterized rumors of Soviet pressure upon Ethiopia to
concede parts of the Ogaden to Somalia a fabrication created
by Arab diplomats in Mogadiscio.
I On the same day, Soviet domestic broadcasts carried
a statement by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian
and African Countries that again quoted foreign news services'
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reports on fighting in the Ogaden and Somali involvement. The
statement called for an immediate end to the fighting and a
settlement based on the OAU charter.
I IThe Soviets are taking care not to offend the Somalis.
The Soviets continue to quote foreign news services on the in-
volvement of Somali troops in the Ogaden, a standard procedure
for reporting facts without giving them official sanction.
I Meanwhile the USSR continues to supply Somalia as
we as Ethiopia with military hardware while attempting to
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USSR-EGYPT: Charges and Commentary
The USSR, in response to public and private Egyp-
Zan c arges, has denied that its aircraft tried to jam Egyptian
communications and radar during the hostilities between Egypt
and Libya. The Soviets have tried to be circumspect in their
commentary on the border clashes, refusing to comment on Egyp-
tian President Sadat's accusations regarding aZZeged Soviet in-
volvement., but apparently Cairo is intent on pressing its case
for Soviet perfidy. These charges cannot be substantiated.
I Izvestia sarcastically denied on 11onday that Soviet
snips were in a position to allow helicopters to "hinder" Egyp-
tian military communications. Previously the Soviets had ig-
nored Sadat's charges that the USSR had supported Libyan sub-
versive and terrorist operations prior to the fighting, as well,
as US press accounts that three Soviet military technicians had
been killed in Egyptian air raids on Libyan radar installations.
The Egyptian press reported earlier this week that
Foreign Minister Fahmi had met with the Soviet charge in Cairo
to discuss the Egyptian protest regarding Soviet interference.
Two weeks earlier, according to an Egyptian embassy official in.
Moscow, the USSR and Egypt had exchanged protests over their
respective public commentaries on the fighting.
I IThe Soviets have hitherto gone out of their way to
avoid an agonizing the Egyptians during the border clashes with
the Libyans. During the fighting last month, for example, the
Soviets even used Egypt's National Day to call for a normaliza-
tion of relations.
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//The Egyptians, on the other hand, seem intent on
using a ega ions against the Soviets to encourage greater US
support for Cairo and to provide the Egyptian public with a more
convincing justification for Egypt's military actions against
Libya. Sadat and his chief advisers have been giving almost
daily speeches and interviews outlining alleged Libyan and So-
viet misdeeds against Egypt and the reasons why Egyptian armed
forces were used against the Libyans.//
In his most recent round of speeches delivered to
Egyptian troops stationed along the Libyan-Egyptian border,
Sadat warned the Soviets that Egypt will not tolerate further
Soviet interference in the dispute. He has also stressed that
despite the Soviet ban on arms deliveries to Egypt, the Egyp-
tian armed forces are becoming well equipped with weapons from
diversified sources.
//Sadat and his advisers seem to be relying more
and more heavily on the theme of Soviet-Libyan collaboration in
their attempts to gain public acceptance of their decision to
engage Libya militarily and to bolster morale among troops that
participated in the fighting. By stressing the Soviet angle,
Sadat presumably believes he will strike a sensitive chord not
only among his own people but also among moderate Arab leaders,
who have been somewhat hesitant to support Sadat openly against
a fellow Arab, even if it is the troublesome Qadhafi.//
//The Egyptians also seem to be using allegations
ot ovie involvement with Libya to gain greater support from
the US. The Egyptians have for some time felt that the US does
not fully appreciate the dangers Qadhafi poses to US interests
in the Middle East, and they probably believe Washington will
be more readily persuaded that Egyptian actions against the Lib-
yan regime were appropriate if Egypt can prove a strong case of
Soviet-Libyan collaboration. Moreover, Sadat has been trying for
some time to convince the US that Israel is not the only bulwark
against the USSR in the Middle East and that Cairo can perform
this role as well as if not better than Tel Aviv.//
//The intensity of Egypt's propaganda attacks on
both the Soviets and the Libyans suggests that Egyptian leaders
are not only trying to justify past actions but may also be pre-
paring their case for renewed hostilities.
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Political violence in Turkey has quickened and is
forcing the new government to admit that coping with such vio-
lence will be among its principal tasks. To the extent that
the unrest is leftist-inspired, the conservative Demirel cabi-
net should have few qualms about moving against it. Dealing
with right-wing activists could be a problem for the govern-
ment should they become involved. In any event,, the government
wiZi. have to take the attitude of the military into account as
it deals with the violence.
Turkey has had nearly three years of civil unrest,
consisting mainly of left-right confrontations on university
campuses. There has been an increase in leftist urban terrorism
in recent days. Murders, shootings, and bombings have rocked
the major cities. The murders have apparently been planned as-
sassinations of rightwingers rather than the often random deaths
associated with student violence.
I I The character of these incidents strongly suggests
the an of illegal, extreme left-wing groups that see oppor-
tunities to further their own ends in the confusion surrounding
the recent election and change in government. If the problem
could be limited to these groups, there would be little threat
to the stability of the government. The extreme left, by itself,
is not strong enough to mount a real threat to the status quo.
I I More worrisome to the government is the possibility
that suc violence, combined with threatened labor activism,
could lead to similar action by undisciplined youthful adherents
of the legitimate left. The latter are disillusioned and frus-
trated over the inability of the Republican Peoples Party to
form a government despite winning a near-majority in the June
election.
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The chances of this happening will increase signifi-
cantly if the urban terrorism of recent days persists into fall,
when the universities reopen. The renewal of left-right campus
violence will likely accompany the reopening of schools, and
the situation could become explosive.
Prime Minister Demirel has a good man to lead the
anti-terrorist campaign in Interior Minister Ozal, who has al-
ready mounted at least one wide-ranging police search for ter-
rorists and weapons in Ankara. Similar efforts before the elec-
tion were quite effective, certainly more so than government
attempts to deal with the intractable campus problem.
The extreme right has remained quiet throughout the
recent outbreak. This quiesence may be in deference to National-
ist Action Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister Turkes, whose
tacit leadership of the far right is undisputed but who has been
talking like a moderate of late. He is seeking a modicum of re-
spectability to match his role in the government, enhanced by
substantial electoral gains.
If the leftists' activities continue, however, the
__4 right wi eventually retaliate.. In that event, Turkes can be
expected to come down hard against any proposed government ac-
tion that would affect his followers. This in turn would compli-
cate Ozal's job and incite leftist charges of government complic-
ity in the violence.
The government's concern about the domestic unrest is
matched by its preoccupation with how the military leadership
perceives the government's handling of the problem. The current
military leaders, controlled by Chief of General Staff Sancar,
have shown considerable tolerance for government ineffective-
ness in the past few years, but Demirel is working to minimize
chances that new leaders may seek a more active role. The mili-
tary has intervened in the political process twice in the past
18 years.
The government's attention is currently focused on
the select ion of a new commander of the ground forces, a power-
ful position in its own right and traditionally a stepping stone
to the even more prestigious post of general staff chief. A
new man is slated to take over the army job on August 30, and
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if Sancar retires as Chief of the General Staff as expected,
the new man could assume the job as early as March of next
year.
I The leading candidates are General Adnan Ersoz, who
is widely respected in military circles and much more inclined
toward political involvement than Sancar, and General All Fethi
Esener, who is less well thought of in the military but who is
perceived by Demirel and his colleagues as more amenable to
civilian control. Demirel may have to make the difficult choice
between a hardliner who nonetheless would be unlikely to make
any rash moves and a malleable but weak chief of staff who
might be unable to restrain younger officers from adventurist
actions.
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I _J Pakistani Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-uZ-Haq
is running into problems in trying to implement plans for fair
and peaceful national and provincial elections on October 18.
Two of the four members of the ruling military coun-
cil reportedly are urging Zia to prosecute former prime minis-
ter Bhutto and to postpone the election until after the trial.
I I Bhutto himself is flouting Zia's ban on political
rallies. On Monday, an attempt by about 10,000 of Bhutto's sup-
porters to greet their leader at Lahore airport led to fighting
with the police and violence against prominent members of the
nine-party Pakistan National Alliance.
The Alliance, which expects to win the national elec-
tion, ca ed for a general strike today to protest Bhutto's ac-
tivities but canceled the strike after receiving assurances
that action would be taken against leaders of the pro-Bhutto
demonstration.
I I Zia can probably resist pressure from his fellow coun-
cil mem ers, at least for the time being, but if the politicians
continue on their present course he may have to crack down to
keep violence from spreading. To avoid a turbulent election cam-
paign he may have to limit political activity to such an extent
that the validity of the elections could be called into question.
There is speculation in Pakistan that Bhutto is, in
fact, trying to force Zia to take such a step. This would give
Bhutto an excuse to boycott the elections and--if Zia neverthe-
less held the elections--grounds to claim that the results were
meaningless.
MOZAMBIQUE: Embassy Assessment
I uIn an assessment of Mozambique's policies and
prospec s, the US embassy in Maputo concludes that President
Machel's government is in effective control throughout most
of the country. The government's two major preoccupations are
a deteriorating economy and Rhodesia.
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Despite a number of economic and military setbacks
wring the past year, Machel and the Front for the Liberation
of Mozambique, the official party, remain in control of the
country. Machel is the dominant force within the government
and the party, and he faces no opposition from other top
officials. Dissident organizations, some clandestinely sup-
ported by Rhodesia, are scattered and do not command signifi-
cant followings. The population is unhappy about the economy
but the embassy believes it continues to support the government.
Economic indicators continue to decline. The accumu-
lated budget deficit is expected to jump from $22 million in
1975 to $110 million for 1977. Droughts, floods, and recurrent
food shortages have compounded the country's economic problems.
The government is faced with severe shortages of skilled and
semiskilled manpower but heavy unemployment and underemployment
at the unskilled level.
IIn an effort to offset economic problems, the govern-
men wants to recruit Portuguese technicians to run the farms
and industries abandoned since independence and maintain its
economic links with South Africa. The government allows South
Africa to recruit Mozambicans to work in the mines, ships
South African goods from Plaputo, and sells South Africa elec-
trical power from the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric complex.
The government remains strongly committed to majority
rule in Rhodesia, despite heavy military pressure from Prime
Minister Smith's regime. According to the embassy, Rhodesian
security :forces carried out over 140 raids into Mozambique be-
tween March 1976 and March 1977. The Soviet Union is providing
more sophisticated military equipment and increased training,
but the results in terms of improved Mozambican combat effec-
tiveness have not yet become noticeable.
Mozambique's relations with Communist and socialist
countries--its "natural allies"--remain close, particularly
with the Soviet Union. The Chinese were inactive for much of
the past year and have not yet regained the influence they had
at the time of independence over two years ago.
The US has scored a few modest gains with the Machel
government during the past year, largely because of US involve-
ment in the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. Nevertheless,
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Mozambique's bias remains very much anti-Western as reflected
in a hostile Mozambican press and policies on global issues
antithetical to the US.
Looking ahead, the embassy expects that over the next
--Machel and his party will retain control of the country.
Machel will face no serious challenges from the party or
the army.
--The economy will continue to decline. Development will
lag because of a lack of manpower and shortages of govern-
ment revenues.
--Mozambique's support for the Rhodesian guerrillas will
continue. The embassy expects Mozambique to ask for Cuban
troops if the Smith regime launches a "punitive and pene-
trating" attack deep into Mozambique.
--The Machel government will maintain its close ties with 25X1
the Soviet Union, although relations with China probably
will improve somewhat. Relations with the US and the West
in general will show some slight improvement as diplomatic
contacts and trade and aid increase.
SUDAN: Political Amnesty Decreed
I Sudanese President Numayri on Sunday decreed
an amnesty for political prisoners and dissidents in exile. The
decree is part of an effort by Numayri to win over conservative
opposition groups, especially the Ansar Islamic sect and the
Muslim Brotherhood.
//The amnesty sets the stage for the return o
Sadiq al-Mahdi, exiled leader of Ansar dissidents.
e deputy head ot Sudan's Muslim
Brotherhood is also expected to return soon.//
I //Sadiq claims the allegiance of some 6,000
Ansar dissidents in Ethiopia and 2,000 in Libya. Numayri hopes
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his return will neutralize Libyan and Ethiopian efforts to use
exiled Ansar dissidents to undermine his government.//
Domestically, the decree will primarily affect an
unknown number of political prisoners previously sentenced by
Sudanese courts. Some 1,200 political detainees held without
trial had already been released preceding the amnesty.
opposition leader who receives Ethiopian and Libyan support,
apparently has rejected Numayri's offer. The conservative
Khatmiyya sect, a traditional rival of the Ansar, and the
Sudanese Communist Party probably will continue to oppose
I Reconciliation with the Ansars and the Muslim Brother-
0o wi help broaden Numayri's narrow political base, but he
will still face opposition. Husayn al-Hindi, another prominent
Numayri.
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