NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010067-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: July 12, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday July 12 1977.
1 e is zor Me- purpuciu 01 Informing
senior officials.
CONTENTS
USSR: Record Big Grain Harvest
JAPAN: Upper House Election Results
USSR: 15-Year Plan Hits a Snag
THE BAHAMAS: Election Prospects
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USSR: Record Big Grain Harvest
//The USSR appears headed toward a second consecu-
tive record grain harvest. Both CIA and the US Department of
Agriculture currently estimate Soviet 1977 production at 225
million tons, slightly above last year's record output. Moscow
probably will buy no more than 10 million to 12 million tons
of grain for delivery in marketing year 1977-78.//
//The excellent prospects for this year's harvest
are built on expectations for a record winter grain crop. We
estimate output of winter grains at 72 million tons, about 8.5
million tons greater than the previous record and some 2 mil-
lion tons higher than our initial projection in late May. The
upward revision reflects slightly better yields for both winter
rye and winter barley, which account for about one third of the
USSR's winter grain area.//
The Soviets, however, face some problems in harvest-
ing the winter crop. Harvesting, which began in late June in
the southern region around the Black Sea, is especially diffi-
cult this year because of heavy rainfall in June. The USDA's
winter grain team reported extensive lodging--flattening of
grain stalks by rain and wind--in the eastern Ukraine.
//Wet conditions are also delaying mechanized
field operations such as haymaking, and in turn, these opera-
tions are overlapping the early wheat harvest in parts of the
northern Caucasus. Heavy weed growth--another consequence of
the excessive rainfall--will add to harvesting difficulties.//
//Unless a drying trend develops soon, the milling
and breacma ing quality of winter wheat will be substantially
reduced by excess moisture and mold growth. Soviet grain drying
capacity has expanded in recent years, but these facilities
will face a stiff test in coping with this year's crop. Storing
grain with a high moisture content usually results in molding.
Flour from such grain is unsuitable for bread.//
//Spring grain production is now estimated at 153
million tons, 10 million. tons lower than last year's record
harvest but still the third largest spring crop ever. Overall,
prospects for higher yields are somewhat better than last year,
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but a 3- to 4-percent reduction in the spring sown area makes
the likelihood of back-to-back record outputs remote. Total
spring grain seeding, which includes corn, was completed in
early June on about 99 million hectares. Allowing for normal
abandonment, about 97 million hectares of spring grains will
be harvested.//
//During June and early July, unusually heavy
rains occurred throughout the European USSR from the Baltic
states to the North Caucasus. Some localized flooding occurred
in the Ukraine, but we expect the overall impact of the rains
on this year's crop to be unusually favorable. Yields of both
winter and spring grains in the southern Ukraine adjacent to
the Black Sea could be as much as 10 percent above the area's
previous record.//
//In the major spring grain areas east of the Ural
mountains, spring soil moisture was above normal and signifi-
cantly better than last year. Parts of northern Kazakhstan ex-
perienced a reduction in surface soil moisture in early May,
but improved markedly as a result of numerous local showers
during June. In West Siberia favorable crop conditions have
existed since early spring and show no signs of deteriorating.
A short-range weather forecast indicates a stationary weather
system that will provide adequate rainfall in most of the
spring grain area through mid-July, mostly from late afternoon
showers.//
//To achieve another record total grain crop,
adequate soi moisture levels must continue in the drought-
prone spring grain area. With 95 percent of the total grain
crop yet unharvested and with two thirds of the spring grain
yet to ripen, the outcome is far from certain. Prevailing
weather and crop conditions from now to late harvesting in
September will have substantial impact on the size and quality
of this year's crop.//
Because of the prospects for a second record crop,
the USSR again is likely to make relatively modest grain pur-
chases for delivery in marketing year 1978--10 million to 12
million tons compared with about 12 million tons the previous
year. Trade sources report that in late June Moscow contracted
for 6 million tons of wheat and corn for delivery beginning
this fall.
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I Some of these contracts undoubtedly will be for US
grain. T e Soviets must buy at least 6 million tons from the
US, evenly divided between wheat and corn, under the second
year of the US-USSR long-term grain agreement. In addition,
the Soviets reportedly are interested in buying about 2 mil-
lion tons of soybeans compared with the 1.5 million to 2 mil-
lion tons that will be delivered by October 1977.
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Chilean President Pinochet has announced plans
to return the country to civilian rule by 1985. His blueprint
for a return to "normalcy," the delivery to Washington of an
advance text of his speech of last Saturday, and recent reports
that he is considering restricting the power of the notorious
National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), all suggest that
Pinochet has finally become convinced that draconian measures
are no longer necessary in Chile and that it is time for a new
image.
Pinochet's suggested schedule for a return to civil-
ian rule--culminates in limited popular elections in 1985. These
elections would choose two thirds of the delegates to a legis-
lative assembly that would then appoint a new president. Prior
to this, the junta in 1980 will name the members of a single
legislative chamber that will rule jointly with the armed
forces for four or five years.
L Pinochet warned that the entire plan depends on con-
tinued signs of "recuperation" from the Allende years. If the
announced timeframe is followed, Chile will be on a similar
but slower schedule of the constitutional changes announced by
the military governments of Bolivia and Peru.
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I IPinochet, undoubtedly reflecting his aversion to the
c,aos o he Allende years, has been dragging his feet on the
DINA issue. He probably believes that it is premature to cur-
tail DINA or to return the country to civilian rule before
1985. Characteristically, he lashed out during his speech
against foreign intervention in Chilean affairs under the
guise of defending human rights.
I I Pressure from his colleagues in recent months has
made Pinochet's stance increasingly unsupportable. The fact
that political normalization will be supervised closely by the
armed forces probably increased his willingness to make the
election announcement. An added inducement, of course, is the
announcement's expected beneficial effects on the government's
popular support and its human rights image. Actually, however,
very little in the present operation of the government will
change. F77 I
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JAPAN: Upper House Election Results
I I Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party seems
cer ain to retain its razor-thin majority in the upper house
of the Diet, according to unofficial returns from Sunday's na-
tional election. Although the Liberal Democrats won only 63
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seats--two Less than they needed to keep their grip on the
upper house--at least two newly elected independent candidat(
are expected to join the party.
I Overall, the Liberal Democrats held their own in
balloting both for upper house candidates elected from local
constituencies and on a nationwide level. At the local level,
for example, the ruling party regained the eight seats it lost
to the Socialists in 1971 by capitalizing on the opposition
parties' failure to cooperate in the smaller election dis-
tricts.
I uIn the nationwide races, meanwhile, the Liberal Demo-
crats benefited from their well-organized campaign and from
the opposition's inability to take advantage of either voter
dissatisfaction with the economy or the lingering memories of
the Lockheed scandal.
For the most part, the opposition's performance re-
flected the popular trend toward moderate reformists and away
from the militant leftists. The Clean Government Party, which
won 14 seats, and the Democratic Socialist Party, which won
six, were the major gainers, as they were in the lower house
election in December.
Their advances came at the expense of the Socialists
and the Communists; the Socialists lost five of the 32 seats
they had at stake, while the Communists--the major losers in
December--won only five seats on Sunday of the nine they had
up for election. Meanwhile, the New Liberal Club, the conserva-
tive splinter group which bolted the ruling party last year,
apparently ran well in a number of local races, although it
fell short of its election goal by electing only three of its
14 upper house candidates.
//The election results do not indicate any
major shift in Japan's political balance. The Liberal Demo-
cratic Party's performance has, however, given a boost to
Prime Minister Fukuda
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//Fukuda almost certainly wants to improve his
party's narrow four-seaLt majority in the more important lower
chamber as soon as is feasible, although a decision on calling
an election will clearly depend on other factors including the
state of the economy and sentiment among the party rank and
file.//
I I In the meantime, Fukuda and other party leaders will
continue elaborating their ties with the opposition in managing
day-to-day legislative business in the Diet. The success of the
moderate reformists in the December lower house election clearly
left the opposition inclined toward a more positive and workman-
like approach to cooperation with the ruling party; in general,
the outcome of Sunday's voting is likely to reinforce that
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I I
USSR: 15-Year Plan Hits a Snag
The USSR's efforts to formulate its 15-year plan
(1976-90) have hit a snag because of serious difficulties in
estimating and allocating energy resources and other raw mate-
rials, according to officials of the USSR State Planning Com-
mittee, or Gosplan. The officials told Western diplomats in
Moscow of these and other problems, one of which involves the
Long-term planning of foreign trade--especially with the West,
Their remarks indicate that the Long-term economic plan is far
from complete. In addition, public information on the 15-year
plan as well as more detailed information on the 5-year plan
for 1976-80 is Likely to be Limited.
The Soviets expressed concern about future manpower
shortages and alluded to general difficulties in obtaining all
the necessary data for the plan. According to Gosplan officials,
the 15-year plan was scheduled to be finished in May for Soviet
internal discussion. Soviet officials are now saying that it is
unlikely that the plan will even be published. They say that it
may become a set of general guidelines to be used only by gov-
ernment and party planners.
Information on the 15-year plan, as well as more de-
tailed information on the 10th five-year plan for 1976-80, is
likely to be made public only "bit by bit," according to the
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Gosplan officials. In March, Gosplan officials confirmed that
Moscow did not intend to publish a detailed book on the five-
year plan because Gosplan specialists were concentrating their
efforts on drafting the 15-year plan.
I I The Soviets reportedly put off at least until next
e r recent Swedish proposals to buy natural gas. They stated
that they were engaged in a survey of the energy situation
through 1990 and that until the survey is completed, the So-
viets would not be able to estimate how much additional natu-
ral gas would be available for export. Their comments suggest
that several more months would be required to finish the sur-
vey.
matter with the Swedes appeared more concerned about the volume
of supply and levels of domestic demand than about possible
price rises on the international market and allocations among
foreign countries.
The long-term planning of foreign trade is difficult
under the best of circumstances. Soviet uncertainties about
Western pricing and credit policies and world trade in general
further complicate their task, particularly as the West's share
of Soviet foreign trade has grown steadily during the 1970s.
Gosplan officials mentioned the lack of long-term trade and
economic agreements as contributing to the problem.
Many of the difficulties in planning foreign trade--
Both Gosplan and trade officials who discussed the
even in the short run--can be traced to the USSR's energy and
natural resource sectors, where Soviet officials are now ad-
mitting problems. Recently, a Gosplan official quipped, "how
can we be expected to plan foreign trade when we cannot plan
production?"
Production from the energy and natural resource sec-
tors accounts for a substantial portion of Soviet exports, par-
ticularly to hard-currency countries. Developments in these
sectors also affect Soviet import plans because imported equip-
ment, es ecially from the West, plays an important role.
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France and West Germany are demonstrating closer
cooperation in civil nuclear policies and programs.
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I Although many of these programs have been under dis-
cussion for some time, in recent weeks:
I West German Chancellor Schmidt announced that his
country d refrain from exporting nuclear reprocessing tech-
nology for the time being. This statement brings West German
nuclear export policy in line with that of France. French Pres-
ident Giscard probably urged Schmidt to make the announcement
when Giscard visited Bonn in June.
France and West Geimdny implemented a major coop-
eration program in fast breeder research and marketing. At the
same time, West German officials proposed new limits on US -
West German fast breeder cooperation and suggested that the
French be brought into talks on the subject.
West Germany approved a new contract for French
reprocessing of spent West German nuclear fuel, despite recent
claims indicating that new reactors might not be licensed in
West Germany on the basis of such arrangements.
French and West German restraints on the sale of re-
processing technology are probably intended to soften US oppo-
sition to their plans. The restraints, however, mean little in
practice now because the French-Pakistani and West German -
Brazilian deals are not affected, there are no new customers
for reprocessing technology at the moment, and other sensitive
exports like fast breeder technology may continue.
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THE BAHAMAS: Election Prospects
Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden Pindling and his
Progressive Liberal Party face a tough election on July 19.
The fragmentation of the opposition is likely to allow Pindling
to retain power, although with a reduced margin in the lower
house of the legislature.
I I Pindling enjoyed wide popularity when he was elected
in 196-7 as the Bahamas' first black head of government. His
stature was further enhanced in 1973 when he led the country
into independence., hewing to a nationalistic but generally
moderate course.
In recent months, however, the Prime Minister's in-
creasing y personal style of leadership has fostered challenges
even within his own party. His growing awareness that he may be
in for a tough election led him to cut short his stay at the
Commonwealth conference in London last month so he could return
home and begin campaigning.
Although on the defensive, Pindling will probably be
saved by the fact that the opposition is even more divided than
his party. A few months ago, the main opposition groups at-
tempted to submerge their differences--which are based more on
personality than on ideology. Their efforts to agree on a single
list of candidates failed, however, and the two major opposition
parties are now each running nearly a full slate.
No matter who wins, there is little immediate prospect
of significant policy changes because neither of the ruling
party's main challengers offers a program that differs markedly
from the government's. Over the longer term, however, there are
forces at work that could effect profound changes.
Up to now, the country has been little affected by
the Caribbean area's more militant ideologies and movements.
Nevertheless, as young people from the isolated "out islands"
continue to migrate to New Providence and Grand Bahama, these
islands--overcrowded and plagued by unemployment--could become
breeding grounds for radicals.
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