NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010065-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: July 11, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
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Monday July 11, 1977 CG NIDC 77-159C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
IMENNES
State Dept. review completed Top Secret
curitY Classification) 25X1
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for MonCay, 1.1 July 1977
25X1
The NID Cable is for e purpose
senior o icials.
NORTH KOREA: Troop Withdrawal
ALBANIA-CHINA: Sharpening Conflict
POLAND: Economy and Human Rights
NETHERLANDS: Moluccan Situation
CHAD: Rebels Gain in Northwest
LAOS: Insurgent Activities
JAMAICA: Impact of Economic Crisis
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NORTH KOREA: Troop Withdrawal
II North Korea is becoming increasingly critical in its
public reaction to the US plan for withdrawing ground forces
from the South, although it is still taking care to avoid di-
rect attacks on President Carter. In a "commentator" article
carried by the party organ Nodong Sinmunt on Sunday, North Ko-
rea responded to Secretary Vance's address to the Asia Society
on June 29 by expressing its dissatisfaction with the with-
drawal plans. It labeled the planned withdrawal of ground
forces only a "superficial and partial" measure that does "not
fundamentally change the US imperialists' forceful occupation
of South Korea."
The article, the North's most authoritative media
message addressed to the US since President Carter took office,
also attacked the US intention to continue supporting South Ko-
rea. Pyongyang criticized Secretary Vance's proposals for si-
multaneous admission of the two Koreas to the UN and for the
"cross-recognition" formula for improving relations. Any action
that would formalize a situation that suggested recognition of
the two Koreas is anathema to Pyongyang, and such proposals
have been the target of heavy propaganda treatment over the
past several months.
The article ignored, and thereby avoided closing the
oor of/ the Secretary's proposals that suggested negotiations
to replace the Armistice Agreement of 1953 and multipower talks
on stabilizing peace.
I While still forgoing its harsher propaganda vocabulary,
Nor orea's response to the Secretary's speech confirms a
trend, evident since early June, of lessening reluctance to
criticize US intentions.
I I On June 21, North Korea began a flurry of criticism
o continued US support to Seoul, the partial nature of the
planned US troop withdrawal, and the sending of US aircraft and
ships to the South. Much of this commentary is apparently linked
to the traditional anti-American month that runs from June 25
to July 27.
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Among the specific targets of this propaganda are US
B-52 training flights over South Korea, US - South Korean joint
military exercises held earlier this spring, and the arrival of
A-10 ground attack aircraft in the South. In a more general vein,
North Korea followed its criticism of Secretary Vance's speech
with a commentary on Tuesday noting that recent remarks of Sec-
retary Brown on US treaty commitments mean that the US intends
to maintain an aggressive policy in Asia.
I I Although it is increasing criticism of the US, North
Korea is still leaving the door open for possible policy ad-
justments. North Korean treatment of the troop withdrawal issue,
in particular, indicates that President Kim Il-song has not
firmed his own position on how to deal with the Carter adminis-
tration. In two interviews this spring--one with the Japanese
Yomiurit in April and the second with Le Monde in June--Kim
has taken the line that it is premature to judge President
Carter.
This wait-and-see attitude was evident in the response
to Secretary Vance's speech. Pyongyang represented the views
presented by the Secretary as his own and made no reference by
name to the President.
Kim, in commenting on President Carter, has expressed
satisfaction about the "favorable" US attitude toward North Ko-
rea and about the President's "pledges" to withdraw US forces
and to press the human rights issue in the South.
I The North Korean leader, however, has balanced this
by voicing misgivings about whether these pledges would be
fully met. Kim noted in particular that a four- to five-year
timetable for withdrawal would extend beyond President Carter's
current term of office. Further, Kim has hinted that some ad-
ministration officials--Vice President Mondale was mentioned
specifically--might attempt to undermine the President's de-
cision.
Where views of the President himself must be addressed,
Norrea has turned to the Voice of the Revolutionary Party
for Reunification, which Pyongyang asserts operates clandes-
tinely in the South. On June
2,
Pyongyang used
the radio station
to assail the President for
his
comments on th
e possible
use
of tactical nuclear weapons
in
Korea. F77
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ALBANIA-CHINA: Sharpening Conflict
I 4The Albanian attack Zast week on the basic tenets of
Chinese foreign policy is the Albanian regime's most serious
public criticism of Peking since the Chinese-Albanian alliance
was formed 16 years ago. If Peking should feel compelled to re-
fute publicly the Albanian arguments, the ensuing polemic would
delight the Soviets, who have Zong hoped for a break in Sino-
Albanian relations. It might also result in the cutting off of
Chinese economic assistance to Albania, which would cause seri-
ous economic difficulties for Tirana.
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An editorial in the authoritative Albanian party paper
last Wednesday severely attacked the theory of the "three worlds,"
which has been the fundamental principle of Chinese foreign
policy since the Cultural Revolution. Without openly naming the
Chinese leadership, the article implicitly accused Peking of
being soft on the US and supporting the industrialized West. It
described Peking's foreign policies as "anti-Marxist" and against
the interests of the "proletariat."
ino-Albanian disagreements have been particularly
no ices e since the emergence of the post-Mao leadership in
China last year. Tirana has not supported the new Chinese re-
gimes purge of its radical opponents and has challenged China's
claim to the leadership of revolutionary Maoist splinter par-
ties worldwide.
By disseminating the full text of the article in En-
glish, the Albanians have called international attention to
their political and ideological differences with Peking. Once
considered China's staunchest ally, Albania now has opened the
Chinese to ridicule by the Soviets and to further attacks on Pe-
king's claims of ideological orthodoxy.
I IThe present accentuation of Sino-Albanian differences
may have created strains within the Albanian leadership. Party
leader Enver Hoxha, even though reportedly in poor health,
still appears to retain complete control over the party and
security apparatus and in the past has managed to purge all
who opposed his policies. As long as he remains in charge, Al-
bania's foreign policies are likely to be both solidly anti-So-
viet and anti-US.
I lUp to now the Chinese leadership has managed to ignore
publicly Albania's ideological needling, and China continues to
provide economic and military assistance to Albania although on
a significantly reduced scale. The latest attack may, however,
prompt the Chinese leaders to reconsider their policies toward
Tirana.
China may decide to cut off military and economic aid
that it had previously contracted to deliver to the Albanians.
This should place Tirana in serious economic difficulties and
could force the Albanian leaders to find alternative sources
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of aid. Albania has made efforts in recent months to increase
economic ties with Greece, Turkey, and some other West European
countries.
The Soviet Union, which broke with the Albanian leader-
ship years ago, may expect to gain from the growing differ-
ences between Tirana and Peking. Moscow has an ax to grind, since
Albania's siding with china in the early 1960 damaged Soviet
prestige among communist parties.
The Soviets may believe that the sharpening polemic
,
and deteriorating Chinese-Albanian relations could lead to the
downfall of Hoxha and the emergence of a new Albanian leader-
ship less opposed to the restoration of ties with Moscow. The 25X1
Soviets may also hope in the long run to regain access to the
strategically located harbor of Vlore, once the only Soviet
naval base in the Mediterranean.
POLAND: Economy and Human Rights
In speeches to the parliament last week, Polish
leaders gave a sober presentation of the economic tasks the
country faces and indicated that they will continue their
moderate approach towards the regime's critics.
Premier Jaroszewicz' speech reiterated a basic theme
presented, in his review of the economy in May that Poland has
made little headway in alleviating its acute meat shortages.
He indicated that during the first half of 1977, market supplies
of meat were down 3 percent from the previous year despite curbs
on exports and the import of 150,000 tons of meat and lard.
The continuing shortages were attributed to poor grain
and fodder harvests over the last three years, the subsequent
decline in livestock production, excessive growth in wages, and
the continuation of the price freeze on meat and other basic
foodstuffs.
The Premier also foresaw no improvement in meat sup-
plies during the third. quarter of the year, in spite of the
government's success in halting the decline in livestock pro-
duction on private farms. We expect meat supplies to remain be-
low 1976 levels for the remainder of the year, even with con-
tinued imports and reduced exports. Moreover, shortages could
even intensify in the fall as the government begins to stock-
pile meat for the Christmas holidays.
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lthough shortages may get worse and consumer tempers
may get shorter, widespread unrest is not expected. Sporadic
violence, however, may continue to occur in some areas. In the
past, such outbreaks were contained by local police and by
bringing in extra meat supplies.
Jaroszewicz also defended the regime's proposed price
increases of last year as a means to ease the present difficul-
ties over meat shortages. He emphasized that the populace was
now suffering the consequences of the price-hike withdrawal.
The Premier's strong defense of the price rises continues the
regime's efforts to lay the groundwork for elimination of the
price freeze on basic foodstuffs next year.
Following this gloomy economic news, party leader
Gierek delivered a spirited defense of Poland's record in the
human rights field. As usual, he defined human rights in terms
of the state's satisfying the material needs of its people
rather than in terms of the rights of individuals against the
state.
I Gierek made no mention of the problem of dissident
intellectuals or of "antisocialist activity." He did say that
law and order must be observed and the dignity of the citizen
respected. This comment is probably directed both at party con-
servatives who favor harsher tactics against dissidents as well
as at the dissidents themselves.
L -1 In addition, Gierek repeated earlier themes about the
need or widespread public participation in the management of
the country. He claimed that "remarkable progress" had been
made and cited examples of party effort to bring citizens into
the decision-making process. 25X1
NETHERLANDS: Moluccan Situation
I I Tension in the Netherlands between the Dutch
and the 40,000 South MoZuccans remains high, and further inci-
dents are likely. //Rumors abound of plans for further South
Moluccan terrorist actions, ranging from more hijackings to
assassination of the rouaZ family.
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//In recent weeks, several disorders involving
South Mo an youths have received wide publicity, increasing
the public's uneasiness. Private citizens have begun to arm
themselves, creating the potential for intercommunal violence.//
//The Dutch probably have good reason to be
worrie about terrorist plans. Youthful Moluccan extremists re-
ject the relatively moderate policies of the Moluccan "govern-
ment-in-exile" and enjoy widespread sympathy within the Moluc-
can community. The terrorists who were killed last month when
Dutch marines ended the three-week siege at a train and school
were given a hero's burial.//
On June 22 the Justice Ministry announced a crackdown
on e outh Moluccan uniformed paramilitary groups and vigilante
organizations that had been tolerated until then. The government
said there! would be closer police surveillance of Moluccan areas,
more searches for illegal arms, and tighter conspiracy laws.
Lf these actions are to succeed, however, they will
have to be supplemented with programs to integrate the Moluccans
into the mainstream of Dutch life, bring them out of their en-
claves, and find jobs for their unemployed youth. The Dutch must
also persuade the South Moluccans to abandon their effort to re-
establish an independent homeland.
//The Chadian government is abandoning three of
z s northernmost military posts that had been threatened by the
three-week-old offensive of the Toubou Muslim rebels.//
//The ruling Supreme Military Council decided
Friday to order the immediate evacuation of the garrisons at
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Zouar, Ounianga-Kebir, and Kirdimi rather than risk their loss
piecemeal. Rebel attacks on Zouar increased after they captured
Bardai on Tuesday.//
When the fallback is completed, the Muslim rebels will
have gained a large portion of northwestern Chad, which will be
difficult for the poorly equipped government forces to recover.
I I
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LAOS: Insurgent Activities
The insurgents and government forces have frequently
clashed since the communist takeover two years ago. These in-
cidents continue to underscore the government's inability to
assert its control over the more remote rural regions. The Lao
communists remain concerned about the guerrillas' activity,
but the insurgents do not pose a serious threat to the govern-
ment's stability.
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JAMAICA: Impact of Economic Crisis
//Only a month after the government lifted the
state of emergency, Jamaica is increasingly feeling the impact
of its economic crisis. Incipient food shortages have already
led to one near riot, labor unrest temporarily shut down the
country's only oil refinery, and violence is spiraling in re-
sponse to growing unemployment.//
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Jamaican officials recently reached a tentative agree-
ment wi h the International Monetary Fund concerning a reported
$35-million loan this year. If approved--as appears likely--
this loan will give the government of Prime Minister Manley a
psychological boost but, will go only part way toward meeting
the island's immediate cash needs. Venezuela apparently has
also offered up to $20 million in balance-of-payments support
this year..
eKingston has been under pressure from the IMF to cut
the ev of government: spending, modify the exchange rate sys-
tem, and implement a stringent wage and incomes policy. The
Manley government will be hard pressed to satisfy such condi-
tions. The two major labor unions have already begun to press
for higher wages to offset increases in the cost of living and
rising inflation.
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