NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010045-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: June 27, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA-RDP79T00975A03020001004 -6 217
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Monday June 27, 1977 CG NIDC 77-148C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Dail Cable for Monday, 27 June 1977
IT he NID Cable is tor e purpose o intorming
senior officials.
EUROCOMMUNISM: Quarrels with Moscow
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CHINA: Provincial Leader Removed
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EUROCOMMUNISM: Quarrels with Moscow
The stinging attack on Spanish Communist leader
Santiago Carrillo that appeared in the Soviet press on Thursday
will seriously strain Soviet relations with the Spanish party
and is certain to have a serious impact on Moscow's relations
with the large French and Italian Communist parties. Moscow
undoubtedly hopes to drive a wedge between the Spanish party
and its Eurocommunist allies.
The attack has no parallel in Moscow's past quarrels
with the Spanish or other independent-minded Western parties.
It falls just short of formally reading the Spanish leader out
of the Communist movement and is comparable to Soviet attacks
on the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.
I IThe attack, which took the form of an unsigned edi-
toria article in the journal New Times, charged Carrillo with
"crude anti-Sovietism" and tacit collaboration with "imperial-
ism." The specific provocation for the attack was the views on
Eurocommunism and the defects of the Soviet system that Carrillo
expressed in a book, Eurocommunism and the State, published in
April. The authors of the attack charged that Carrillo's views
were designed to "counterpose" the communists of East and West,
to "discredit" Soviet-style communism, and to perpetuate the
"division of Europe" by strengthening the "aggressive NATO
bloc." Finally, the editorial warned that Carrillo's views, if
put into practice, will lead to a split in the Communist move-
merit.
I IThe only notable sign of restraint is the fact that
the., attar appeared in a Foreign Ministry publication, rather
than in one of the more authoritative journals of the Soviet
party. The article's length and the fact that it was unsigned
indicate, however, that it has the imprimatur of higher author-
ity.
The article clearly is intended for a wider audience
than the members of the Spanish party. Communists in Italy and
France, who along with the Spanish Communists form the core of
the Eurocommunist movement, are intended targets. These parties
are united by their formal adherence to the principles of West-
ern democracy. Their efforts to make this position credible by
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criticizing the dictatorial features of the Soviet system have
aroused Moscow's resentment and contributed to its difficulties
with political dissidents at home and in Eastern Europe.
Moscow's decision to bring the quarrel into the open
at this time may be because it is frustrated by the failure of
the lobbying efforts. Carrillo was no doubt chosen as the tar-
get of the attack because he has been the most outspoken of the
Western Communist leaders in his criticism of Moscow and be-
cause his party is the smallest and least significant of the
big three of Eurocommunism.
The Soviets doubtless hope the French and Italian Com-
munists will draw back before a schism with Moscow develops. If
they do, the Soviets will regard an aggravation of their quarrel
with the Spanish party as a small price to pay. If they do not
retreat, the Soviets will be faced with a difficult choice be-
tween ignominious silence and a possibly irreversible split with
the principal West European Communist parties.
I The early signs are that the French and Italian par-
ties will not retreat. The French Communists reacted Friday in
their newspaper L'Humanite, describing the New Times editorial
as "ill-considered" and "badly timed." The Italian Communist
newspaper L'Unita that same day said that the Soviet attack con-
tained "mistakes and ambiguities."
I The Spanish party's Central Committee responded over
the wee end with a communique strongly supporting Carrillo and
the concept of Eurocommunism. It called the Soviet criticism
an attack on "all Communist parties which want a democratic
way to socialism," thereby seeking to broaden the issue to in-
clude the Italian and French parties. If the Soviet attack was
intended to split the Spanish party, it failed; the communique
was reportedly endorsed with only one abstention amon the ap-
proximately 180 members of the Central Committee.
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NORTH KOREA - US: Relations
I I North Korea is increasing its criticism of US military
suppor or South Korea. Pegged to the 27th anniversary of the
start of the Korean War, the North's commentary on June 24 hit
out at recent reports of increased US military aid to the South
Korean armed forces and at US participation in joint military
exercises in the South.
North Korea does not portray the US activities as
rea ening its security nor does it mention President Carter
or the US plan to withdraw ground forces. The North is never-
theless signaling its displeasure with US efforts to reaffirm
its security commitment to Seoul.
Each year at this time, North Korea conducts a month-
long drive to enlist political backing for its campaign to force
a withdrawal of all US troops from Korea. This year the campaign
was introduced by a special worldwide appeal in the name of
various North Korean. mass organizations. The appeal asserts that
"US military authorities" are seeking to occupy the South per-
manently and to reinforce the Pak government.
The appeal cites B-52 training flights over the South
and joint military exercises involving not only US forces there
but also US marines stationed on Okinawa.
The North Koreans also have released a long Foreign
Ministry statement alleging that the US instigated the Korean
conflict. Such statements have been issued before but are usually
reserved for the anniversaries occurring every five years.
I Since the Carter administration took office, North
Korea s treatment of the US has shown notable restraint. Presi-
dent Kim Il-song has publicly expressed satisfaction over the
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"favorable" US attitude toward North Korea and over President
Carter's "pledges" to withdraw US forces and press human rights
issues.
I I At the same time, Kim has voiced misgivings as to whe-
t er sucJ pledges would be fully implemented. He has noted cri-
tically, for example, that a withdrawal over a four- to five-
year period would extend beyond President Carter's current term
of office, that it would involve only ground troops and not the
US air force, and that it would involve consultations with South
Korea and Japan. Kim concluded that the North would "wait and
see" how US policy develops. There has, in fact, been a virtual
moratorium on public discussion of the troop withdrawal issue.
I uIn the past two weeks, however, Pyongyang has directly
criticize the actions of so-called "US bellicose elements."
The criticism has coincided with some increase in the level of
joint US - South Korean military training activities in the
South. An appeal issued on Friday reiterated these charges and
cited the activities as evidence of the unchanging nature of
"US imperialism."
Although North Korea has not yet adopted an official
position on the US withdrawal plans, it clearly has no illusions
about the general shape of these plans. The regime may be wait-
ing for what it regards as an authoritative statement from the
US before issuing a formal reply.
Kim Il-song undoubtedly welcomes any reduction as a
step toward the long-standing goal of complete US disengagement.
At the same time, Kim cannot be pleased with the prospect of
the South Korean armed forces gaining in strength through US
efforts to improve their training and equipment. The upsurge
in criticism from Pyongyang is in part a sign of Kim's uneasi-
ness on this score.
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CHINA: Provincial Leader Removed
Peking has removed a provincial leader who was a
staunch supporter of the now-fallen leftists and one of former
vice premier Teng Hsiao,-ping's most vociferous critics. Sung
Pei-chang, a military man who was party boss of Anhwei Province,
has been replaced by Wan Li, a close associate of Teng who was
dismissed by the leftists from his position as minister of rail-
ways last year after Teng had been ousted.
I IThe change in Anhwei's leadership brings to 13 the
number or provinces that have undergone shake--ups since the
purge of the leftists. Aside from the leftist stronghold of
Shanghai, however, the change in Anhwei is one of the most sig-
nificant. Along with the three Manchurian provinces, all of
which have undergone some leadership changes since the purge
of the leftists, Anhwei was one of the most outspoken in its
harsh criticism last year of Teng Hsiao-ping.
Sung Pei-chang has now been accused in a radiobroad-
cas 5T-making mistakes during the anti-Teng campaign, and like
some of his colleagues in the northeast, he has been attacked
for failing to pursue the anti-leftist campaign.
If there is a link between Anhwei and the northeast,
it appears to be Politburo member and military man Li Te-sheng,
who is the commander of the northeast military region but who
used to be Sung's boss in Anhwei. Li seems to have survived the
current roundup of leftist supporters, but the removal of
several of his subordinates could raise questions about his own
staying power.
The somewhat tardy removal of Sung, who seemed last
autumn to be an obvious candidate for purge, may have been the
result of strong support for him from Li. Sung's replacement
by Wan Li puts the province in the hands of a strong supporter
of Teng Hsiao-ping, whose rehabilitation is slated for later
this year.
Peking clearly wants to straighten out the leadership
problems in the provinces before convening a series of meetings
to restaff the national party and government apparatus. More
provincial changes may be in the offing, and this process, along
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with indications in provincial radiobroadcasts that a more thor-
ough implementation of the anti-leftist campaign is needed,
could cause some delays in the selection of delegates to the
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