NO. 7 THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000200100012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 15, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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August 15} 1952
Security Information SECURITY INFORMATION
NO. 7 -- THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
I. National Estimates
1. The organization and procedures established since
October 1950 for the production of national intelligence
estimates have now been proved in practice. These estimates
effectively draw upon the resources of the entire intelligence
community and can be materially improved only as we strengthen
these resources. These estimates derive authority from the
manner of their preparation and from the active participation
of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final
review and adoption. Agency dissents are encouraged where
estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure
agreement.
2. A production program for national estimates now pro-
vides for (a) closing gaps in estimative coverage; (b) projection
of selected estimates from short to long term; and (c) thorough
re-examination of such fundamentals as global Soviet capabilities
and intentions. This program should be accomplished during
FY 1953.
3. Close coordination between intelligence and policy
and between intelligence operational planning is basic. Some
progress has been made, notably through CIA participation in
the NSC Staff and in the improved relationships in each agency
between intelligence and planning components. Further progress
is needed, and will be pressed for, in order that policy
planning may be more effectively served.
4. "Post-mortems," designed to reveal gaps and shortcom-
ings in the preparation of given estimates, and to stimulate
corrective action, are expected to strengthen future estimates.
II. Political, Social and Cultural
1. The status of political, social and cultural intelli-
gence is very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of
information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collect-
ing it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence,
however, are adequate only for the most urgent needs of the IAC
agencies. Less pressing do-hands can be met only partially and
Inadequately.
2. The principal deficiency in this field is in the
effort devoted to the research-in-depth on which sound estimates
and analysis on current development depend. Only the USSR can
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be regarded as adequately covered in this respect, with China,
the European Satellites and Western Europe nearly so. On
medium priority areas, such as Iran Indochina and India, there
is considerable lag between production of immediate interpreta-
tion and analysis of longer-term factors. On low priority areas,
such as Africa and Latin-America, such factors receive even less
study. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, is satis-
factorily covered with respect to party strength, political
maneuverings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines.
Research into matters of organization financial support and
infiltration into political and social organizations is
inadequate.
3. Correction of the above deficiencies largely depends on
increased personnel for more intensive research on the areas
indicated.
III. Armed.Eorces Intelligence
1. Operallonal Inte ligence
Intelligence needed in support of military operations
in Korea is generally excellent. Information on installations
and on developments in Manchuria such as the movement and
activities of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean
units north of the Yalu River, is inadequate. Reliable in-
formation of the enemy's long-range plans and intentions is
practically non-existent. Little improvement in these defic-
iencies can be expected in the near future despite our efforts.
2. Order of Battle and F uq_ 1pment
Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equip-
ment is generally adequate in respect of nations outside of the
Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations for
reason of circumstances beyond our control. Order of battle and
equipment information on the USSR, Communist China, and - to a
lesser degree - the European satellites is partial and in-'
adequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of collec-
tion. However, intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equip-
ment in most areas with which the United States or nations
friendly to the United States are in contact is more nearly
complete and reliable.
3. Targeting
Basic target research is progressing favorably on the
economic and industrial vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union and
satellites; less adequately on Western Europe and the Far East.
Complete target intelligence on the Soviet atomic threat is
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handicapped by gaps in data on Soviet weapons, stockpiling
arrangements and delivery capabilities. The Bombing
Encyclopedia must be greatly expanded to meet ultimate goals;
current target system studies are reasonably adequate for joint
and operational planning. Initial production priority of
combat target materials is almost complete for the USSR, but
varies considerably for approach areas. Extensive tactical
target coverage is completed on areas adjoining the Korean
Theater but is still in initial stages elsewhere.
1- ? pE ~ +poi.-,t for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The United States has filled NATO requests with the
best available intelligence consistent with the National
Disclosure Policy. In addition to providing intelligence to
assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files for the
NATO echelons, the U. S. continues to furnish releasable
current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the
mission of the NATO major commands,
IV. Economic In?elligence Research
1. Apart from the NIS program there is a continuing
economic intelligence research effort which is designed to
provide basic studies directly related to national security
problems. As a general proposition this intelligence is now
good for most of the broad conclusions required by the
estimators; however, it is often not possible to define clearly
the degree of reliability of certain data or to provide the
amount of detail that is required to make the intelligence
sufficiently precise or meaningful. This limits its value both
for operational use and for estimates. However, economic in;
telligence has improved considerably in this respect within
the past year and measures currently underway should not only
provide new sources of data but improved analytic techniques.
One example of this is the program of the past year to collect
data and develop techniques for analysis of factory markings
on equipment and components. Within the next year reports
under this program should provide intelligence on numbers of
equipment components and end-items, including military end-
items produced in the Soviet Bloc.
2. Another major deficiency in the field of economic
intelligence has been the shortage of professional personnel
with general -.ialytic competence, as opposed to the commodity
expert. Under -,Xrosent recruitment programs It is anticipated
that this p.ro,;iem will have diminished with the next year.
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3. Sum rt for Ma or Programs
In addition to providing support for departmental
operations and national estimates the major intelligence
programs in the economic field under NSCID 15 are as follows:
&. Economic Warfare: Implementation of NSC 104/2
and the Battle Act programs is requiring increased economic
intelligence support. It is expected that the newly established
coordinating committee will assist in bringing available in-
telligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions arising
under this program. However, the potential demands for detailed
operational intelligence in this field are virtually unlimited,
and are and will continue to be well beyond the capacity of the
intelligence agencies to satisfy.
D.. Target Research; The target intelligence
activities outlined in Section III (Armed Forces) involve de-
tailed assessment of economic and structural vulnerabilities
which can be done except for the gaps noted in that section.
c. Soviet Bloc Ca abilit Studies: Among the high-
est priority tasks of the economic inte ligence community is the
continuing study of Soviet Bloc economic capabilities for war.
This study currently employs for the first time a modified
form of input-output analysis which is expected to lead to more
accurate and meaningful estimates.
V. Sc ientifIc and Technical
1. Scientific and Technical intelligence regarding the
USSR and the satellites has made important progress since the
beginning of Fiscal Year 1951. Current knowledge, however, is
partial and inadequate in terms of national security needs.
2. The current estimates of Soviet accomplishments in
the production of fissionable materials and their conversion to
atomic weapons are believed to be more reliable than was possible
a year ago, although little is known with any degree of certain-
ty concerning the current program and nothing is known of
developments which can lead to radical changes in the future.
Knowledge of Soviet biological and chemical warfare programs
is poor. A number of important intelligence "finds" in Soviet
have been made within the
last year. Intelli ence on air defense as determined by the
although there are still enormous voids withsrespectmtoothe,
developments which lead to radically improved or unique systems.
Knowledge of current Soviet guided missiles programs is poor
although certain projects based on German developments are fairly
well, known.
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3. Scientific and technical intelligence on conventional
military weapons and equipment of all types is good so far as
standardized items in current use are concerned. Necessarily
knowledge of weapons improvements in many cases must await
Service use. In regard to development of new aircraft, infor-
mation-is partial and inadequate especially with respect to
all-weather interceptors.
4. Intelligence is good and improving on the basic
scientific research of the countries behind the Iron Curtain
and of their resources in scientific manpower, institutions,
and organizations.
5. The division of responsibility for production of
scientific and technical intelligence activities has been under
study by a special ad hoc committee appointed by the IAC. The
committee has submitted a report which is awaiting action by
the IAC.
VI. Psych
1. Overt and covert propaganda and psychological warfare
programs have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past
two years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall large-
ly within the framework of political and sociological intelli-
gence, but the orientation and organization of the material for
the psychological warfare user calls for unaccustomed depth and
detail both in the field reporting and in analysis.
2. The primary responsibility for the production and
coordination of psychological intelligence now in State, has
not been adequately met, largely because vigorous and continuing
efforts to obtain adequate funds have thus far failed. Initial
efforts to develop interagency coordination have diminished
for the same reason.
3. Efforts to eliminate duplication and to improve con-
sultation between agencies in the area of research performed
under government contract by private institutions have been
encouraging; but much remains to be done. The overlap between
the intelligence-research responsibility and the operational
responsibilities of the propaganda and psychological warfare
agencies complicates the problem.
VII. Bic Intelligence
1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS),
which was begun in 1949 as an interdepartmental cooperative
venture, was designed to meet the U. S. Government's needs for
encyclopedic factual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since
the NIS program was begun 1,252 individual sections have been
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produced on 57 of the 108 NIS areas, which is the equivalent of
approximately 20 complete NIS. Based upon the rate of produc-
tion established during the last quarter of FY 1952, a produc-
tion goal of the equivalent of approximately 10 complete NIS
has been set for FY 1953.
2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS
priorities and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of
the latter have precluded production of NIS on all JCS high
priority areas and made it necessary to undertake partial
surveys on some areas. However, NIS production on the group of
24 areas of highest priority is approximately 45% complete,
whereas the entire program is about 22% complete. NIS on eight
individual areas are over 75% complete, and five of these are
in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research support for
NIS has been excellent.
3. The quality of the NIS is good and can be expected to
improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions
are published under the Maintenance Program which was started
in FY 1952. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC
agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable
liaison is maintained with the JCS.
VIII.Warning t - Cjjrrent t i nc
1. As noted above, factual information on the Soviet
orbit is partial and inadequate. Accordingly, conclusions con-
cerning Soviet and Communist intentions to initiate hostilities
at any given time must be tentative generalizations drawn from
inadequate evidence. They are often based on estimates of the
over-all situation rather than on detailed factual information.
2. The IAC Watch Committee provides a sound foundation
for extracting maximum benefit from partial and inadequate in-
formation. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelli-
gence agencies make elaborate and careful cross-checks of in-
formation from all sources against an exhaustive analysis of
possible indicators of Soviet intentions, This method is not
relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being
tried.
3. There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able
to give adequate warning of attack prior to actual detection of
hostile formations. Certain last-minute defensive and offensive
preparations on the Soviet periphery may, however, be detected;
opportunity for detection of indications of Soviet or satellite
attack varies from fair in the two border areas of Germany and
Korea to extremely poor in the Transcaucasus and Southeast Asia.
Each agency maintains its own 24 hour Watch arrangements to
handle any information that is received.
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4. In general there has been improvement during the past
two years in the ability of current intelligence to provide
prompt notice and preliminary evaluations of events and develop-
ments in the Soviet as well as in the neutral and friendly
areas. This improvement is attributable to increased skill and
knowledge of intelligence analysts and to a deepening sense of
common purpose among the IAC agencies.
IX. Collection
1. The Fp eign Se vice
In general, the collection activities of the Foreign
Service are satisfactory. Intelligence needs are met most
adequately in the political field, less so in certain aspects
of the economic field, and least satisfactorily in the
scientific, technical and psychological fields. These deficien-
cies are generally attributable to a lack of specialized com-
petence in those fields which are not closely related to the
basic diplomatic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial
action has been taken by establishing a comprehensive economic
reporting program and a continuing program of providing Foreign
Service posts with more complete and effective guidance on
intelligence needs. Additional remedial measures in progress
concern the greater use of overseas personnel of certain
operational programs in collecting basic intelligence informa-
tion, particularly in the psychological and sociological fields;
the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the
national intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign
Service Manual to include for the first time specific and
detailed intelligence instructions; and finally by studying
possible measures to meeting needs for basic scientific
information.
2.grv c Attache System
The Service Attache System furnishes extensive useful
military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain.
Attaches in the Soviet-bloc countries obtain and transmit a
considerable volume of valuable information although, under the
restrictions imposed on them by Communist governments, the
coverage which they provide cannot be considered adequate. The
Service Attache System has been strengthened since the begin-
ning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices
and the assignment of additional officers to important posts.
Constant efforts are being made to improve the collection
capabilities of Service Attaches by the development of new
collection guides and techniques.
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3. Overseas CoUan
Armed Forces Commands in Europe are active and
moderately successful in collecting information. While
intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is partial
and inadequate it is good in the Eastern Zones of Germany and
Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European
Commands from returned PW's, escapees, and refugees.
Collection of intelligence in the Far East is
adequate on friendly and neutral areas but is partial and
inadequate on Communist China and Eastern Siberia. Tripartite
Agreements for exchange of intelligence on Southeast Asia
have considerably enhanced collection capabilities in the
area and are expected to improve this situation.
4.
The Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully
their overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Because
of increased current capabilities the contributions of photo
reconnaissance are improving. The contributions of radar
reconnaissance are only fair as compared to photo reconnaissance,
but are being improved. Photo interpretation capability is
generally deficient in the Armed Services. Corrective measures
underway include a research program to improve interpretation
techniques, the establishment of new schools, and improved
training methods. Research and development effort is being
expended on free balloons, guided missiles, and satellites to
overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles.
5. (ibis paragraph is be
distribution. for security reasons.
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8. Foreign Materials and Eauipment
The collection by various means and the technical
analysis of manufactured items and raw materials from the Soviet
orbit, although undertaken relatively recently, is providing
useful scientific and economic information. Notwithstanding
other means of collecting to date the most lucrative source of
Soviet manufactured material has been in Korea. The variety of
this equipment has enabled the intelligence agencies, through
coordination with the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency, to
assess USSR technical capabilities in a wide range of fields.
Collection in other areas is not as good although procurement
through covert channels is expected to mitigate this deficie.
Monitoring of Radio Jamming
Under NSC 66/1 the agencies undertook the construction
and organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on
Soviet jamming and related activities in the radio frequency
spectrum. A pilot operation involving a very limited number of
stations is being established. Adequate information as to the
extent of Soviet jamming, concentration of the jamming stations,
and related information must await the implementation of a
much-expanded program.
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X. SuRnortand Coll2tion Facilities
1. Availability of Materials
With a few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive
intelligence, both raw and finished, is distributed among all
interested IAC agencies. In addition to the distribution of
current material, there is a continuing effort to locate and
extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelli-
gence material that was collected during and after the war, and
from other collections in overseas files. The sheer volume of
these materials presents formidable and as yet unsolved
problems. No IAC agency, utilizing existing techniques, is
in a position to record and store all this material and to make
the information contained therein readily available to analysts
requiring it. Remedy for this problem is being sought through
the refinement of agency responsibilities and the development
of machine indexing techniques.
2. Librar_--_v Facilities
While the libraries of the IAC agencies are not yet
self-sufficient, they are equipped to satisfy most of the major
needs of their users. Their utility can be increased and their
effectiveness can be improved in connection with indexing methods.
methods, reclaiming of loan documents, and reference service
staff, and an attempt will be made to do so.
3. Biographic Information
Each IAC agency maintains files of biographic data on
foreign personalities for its own particular purposes and makes
such data available to the other agencies upon request. Excel-
lent data can be made available on political, military, and
scientific personalities outside the Iron Curtain; coverage
within the Soviet Orbit is necessarily partial and inadequate.
Personalities in the economic and industrial fields are poorly
covered at present, although there is considerable information
available. Means of improvement are currently being studied.
4. GGrap,ics Material
The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain
photographic and related documentary libraries consistent with
their requirements and responsibilities. Material in each
library is available to all IAC agencies. While extensive
holdings are available within the IAC agencies, continuing
effort must be exerted to increase the quality and quantity
of this highly important source of intelligence.
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t.and_Reference S
Procurement of foreign-published mars and information
on mapping abroad is coordinated by serving
an interagency map committee. Results during the past three
years have proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps
and related information through the Foreign Service Geographic
Attache program. Increased emphasis is being placed on the
collection of maps and engineering drawings from domestic
sources and Service Attache channels are also being used. The
currently published foreign maps required for intelligence
activities are received on a continuing basis through exchange
arrangements between the Department of State and many foreign
official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to
those of an operational character maintained by the Military
Services. Excellent map reference services in support of
intelligence requirements are maintained by close working
arrangements between the map libraries serving the intelligence
areas.
6. Foreign Lang age Publ'C ca_ti onG
Most foreign language publications significant to the
intelligence effort are now being procured. Major gaps in
Chinese Communist material and economic and technical informa-
tion from the Soviet Union are the subject of increased
attention. Improved indexing arrangements for Soviet and
satellite publications have recently been inaugurated with the
help of the Library of Congress. More needs to be done, however,
in the technical fields.
Within the United States the main effort in the
exploitation of foreign publications is conducted by CIA for the
benefit of the community. Important work is also being done by
private institutions, some of which are on contract with the
Defense Department. Translation facilities for all necessary
languages are available, although the volume of material which
can be handled has fallen short of greatly increasing demands.
It is clear that at the present time the intelligence community
is not fully utilizing the information potentially available in
foreign publications. Additional measures are needed to ensure
that such information is systematically supplied to analysts
and an attempt is being made to do this.
Overseas Commands, particularly the Far East Command,
exploit all captured enemy documents and all other such foreign
language material that may be designated by the theater command
as falling within their interest. FES also accepts requests
from Department of Defense agencies for translation and exploita-
tion of foreign language material which could be performed more
economically in FEC than in the Zone of Interior.
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Although the situation varies with the agency and
the language involved, there are inadequate numbers of
intelligence officers and researchers who are able to read
the language of the foreign area with which they work. Training
programs are in effect which will gradually improve the
situation and determined efforts have been made particularly
with the Russian language, in which results are beginning to
show, Comparable efforts in the Chinese field have hardly
begun although there are a number of courses available.
7. External Research
The extensive use by the intelligence agencies of
external research, particularly in the social sciences, is
comparatively recent. The goal of this research has been the
development of basic data in support of intelligence, and the
application of scientific and technological findings to intelli-
gence problems. In addition, an effort is made to obtain the
results of the considerably larger volume of research done on
contract for research and operational Government agencies and of
research done by private organizations without Government
support. Considerable progress has been made in this field.
No accurate appraisal of the value of the research program as a
whole is possible, however, at this point. Considerable
difficulty has been experienced, in coordinating individual
research efforts and only partial success has been achieved in
avoiding duplicative research by both intelligence and research
agencies as well as policy and operational units, which are
sponsoring and monitoring work of this kind.
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