INSURGENCY AND INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902340023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 9, 1981
• Content Type: NIE

prgyq,4fnpraiRelease 2006T05/25~: CIA-RDP84B00049R00090234bOp3Icret
11 1
n Central
Insurgency and Instability
in Central America
M O R 1115454
(RIPPUB)
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lop Secre
INSURGENCY AND INSTABILITY
IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Inforna'tion as of 4 September 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estivate.
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 Approved For
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 7
The Cuban and Soviet Roles .................................................................................. 7
Regional Trends ...................................................................................................... 7
Nicaragua's Military Buildup ................................................................................. 8
The Spread of Revolution ...................................................................................... 11
Other Key Players .................................................................................................. 11
Implications for the United States ......................................................................... 13
Annex A. Country Outlooks ...................................................................................... 15
Annex B. Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence ........................ 21
Annex C. Central America: Guerrilla Strengths, Economic Growth Rates,
1960-81 .................................................................................................................... 27
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KEY JUDGMENTS
k
Communist exploitation of trends in Central America constitutes
the most serious challenge to US interests and freedom of action in the
hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR. A continuation of
the present trends could result in victory for the extreme left in El Sal-
vador, and such a victory would heighten prospects for the revolutionar-
ies in Guatemala. It may be that those Communist and radical Arab
forces providing external support and management help to the insur-
gencies intend to make Central America a battleground over the next
few years which would distract, weaken, and undermine the United
States in other parts of the world. The evolution of these scenarios
would bring the revolution to Mexico's border, thereby raising the risks
of internal destabilization and infiltration by radical leftists.
We believe that prospects are dim for halting Central America's
slide toward increasing instability within the next 12 to 15 months.
During this period, political extremism and economic deprivation
probably will intensify, producing domestic conditions conducive to
further revolutionary growth.
Perceiving a weakening of US influence and capability and
opportunities to undermine US prestige, Castro since 1978 has increased
virtually all types of assistance to revolutionaries in the region, including
arms, funding, and training. Under the present circumstances we see
little likelihood that Cuba will alter its present course.
The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has
gradually expanded its involvement-efforts complemented by East
European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and the PLO.
Given the current situation, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.
,/e principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America
are to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and to use
Nicaragua as a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in the
region.')ndeed by virtue of its location, cooperation with Communist
and ot1 er radical advisers, and support for Central American insurgen-
cies, Nicaragua has become the hub of the revolutionary wheel in
Central America.
External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build what is
already the region's largest standing army; Nicaragua's armed forces
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 will overshadow those of its Central American neighbors by 1983.
Managua's leaders consider that they must protect the Sandinista
revolution by building up Nicaragua's armed strength. At the same
time, however, this buildup is intimidating governments in the region
and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of
revolution.
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With Moscow and Havana-and now Managua and others-
providing material resources, training, and organizing expertise, home-
grown radical movements in other Central American countries are
gaining direction and strength.
In El Salvador, the flow of supplies through Nicaragua to the
insurgents has been climbing slowly in recent months. As long as the
guerrillas continue to receive outside support, we see little prospect for a
marked shift in favor of the armed forces. Hence we expect the war to
drag on indecisively for the next 12 to 15 months.
We believe that arms shipments will continue to grow in coming
decisively shift momentum against the government.',
mdnths, fueling an insurgent offensive aimed at sabotaging the economy
and disrupting the elections scheduled for next March. Further econom-
ic deterioration or a series of spectacular guerrilla actions could
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' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the last sentence
should instead read, "And in the event of further economic deterioration or a series of spectacular guerrilla
actions, the chances would be even that momentum would shift decisively against the government."
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Some 12 Latin American states have condemned the recent
French-Mexican statement recognizing the legitimacy of the left in El
Salvador. Moreover, the Christian Democrats of Europe and Latin
America for the most part still support President Duarte. Nonetheless,
international political support for Central American revolutionaries,
especially by West European socialists and Mexico, is likely to continue.
We judge that Mexico's influence will weigh against US interests and-
as the conflict in El Salvador drags on-the United States will continue
to encounter friction in relations with Mexico, France, and other states
over Central America policies.
In Nicaragua, meanwhile, given a continuance of present circum-
stances, we judge that the Sandinistas will be likely to maintain their
evolution toward a totalitarian Marxist state over the next 12 to 15
months, giving ground temporarily on individual issues but continuing
efforts to isolate and politically emasculate democratic forces. The
stagnating economy will remain the Sandinistas' major vulnerability,
since no foreign government, not even the USSR, seems likely to assume
the financial burdens.
Because the US interpretation of events and trends in the region is
not shared by many governments, any US effort seen to be stifling
revolutionary forces will carry political liabilities. Failing to rise to the
Communist challenge, however, would have serious costs for the United
States. The hemisphere's political landscape could be altered signifi-
cantly if the generally weak governments are left to fend for
themselves.
Inaction could lead to still more brazen outside radical interference
and make the anti-Communist players less amenable to US influence.
US credibility would suffer accordingly.
Any defensive interdiction effort would have to center on Hondu-
ras. Increased efforts there could significantly damage the Salvadoran
insurgents' lifeline, but whether this would make them a containable
threat is uncertain.
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Disruption of the support network funneling into El Salvador is
central to thwarting further guerrilla gains. Even success in this matter
would not in itself remedy the many basic causes of instability. Minimal
economic growth in El Salvador and Guatemala would come only at
tremendous financial costs.
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DISCUSSION
1. The Communist exploitation of trends in Central
America is the most blatant challenge to US interests
in the hemisphere since Castro transformed Cuba into
a radical Marxist state. Cuba, the USSR, and other
entities are now boldly attempting to undermine the
United States in its own sphere of influence and, in the
process, to distract it from other strategic concerns.
The internationalization of the struggle in Central
America by Cuba and the USSR and the buildup of
Cuban, Nicaraguan, and insurgent military strength
assure the Soviets and the Cubans some net gain: either
they will succeed in the bid for new client states, or
their ejection will come only at high cost to the United
States. The longer they have to consolidate their
inroads, the costlier it will be for the United States to
try to reverse the trend.
2. Central America's slide toward increasing insta-
bility probably will accelerate within the next 12 to 15
months. The greatly expanded arms shipments from
the USSR to Cuba, the continuing flow of weapons and
trained guerrillas from Nicaragua and Cuba to El
Salvador and Guatemala, and the Sandinistas' military
buildup underscore a pattern of actions designed to
exploit conditions already receptive to insurgency and
revolutionary growth.
3. During the period of this Estimate, a continu-
ation of these actions will intensify political extremism
and economic deprivation throughout the region. As
violence increasingly is accepted as the only hope for
real change, insurgent groups will continue to expand.
Government efforts to remedy national problems will
be further inhibited by a scarcity of resources, wide-
spread violence, and the deep-rooted nature of the
difficulties.
The Cuban and Soviet Roles
4. Havana, acting vigorously to take advantage of
these factors, is unlikely under present circumstances
to moderate its course. The Castro regime saw the
Sandinistas' toppling of Nicaragua's Somoza as symp-
tomatic of a regional climate receptive to destabiliza-
tion. Perceiving a weakening of US influence and
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capability and opportunities to undermine US pres-
tige, Castro in the past three years has increased
virtually all types of assistance to revolutionaries in
Central America, including arms, funding, and
training.
5. The Soviet Union has come to share Castro's
optimism for revolutionary prospects in Central Amer-
ica. Eager to embarrass the United States in its own
sphere of influence and intent on discrediting Wash-
ington in the eyes of the Third World, Moscow has
gradually expanded its involvement-efforts comple-
mented by East European nations, some Communist
and radical Arab states, and the PLO. Nevertheless,
Moscow sees the area as less immediately important
than does Cuba. The USSR is also concerned with
protecting its diplomatic and commercial ties in Latin
America, and recognizes that its actions there could
further strain its relations with Washington and rally
the US public behind tougher actions. These con-
straints and Cuba's success in Nicaragua underlie
Moscow's willingness to let the Cubans take the lead in
advancing regional revolutionary causes, a tack it is
unlikely to change. Soviet leaders almost certainly
consider that their Central American course confronts
the United States with a serious policy dilemma: in
their view, if Washington does not respond forcefully
in Central America, insurgent strength there will
grow; and, if the United States does respond forceful-
ly, Moscow will count on exploiting widespread world
criticism of US "imperialism" in Central America-
and in the process distract attention from Soviet
embarrassment in Afghanistan and Poland.
Regional Trends
6. With Havana-and now Managua and others-
providing material resources, training, and organizing
expertise, the radical movements have gained direc-
tion and strength. The psychological boost of having
allies to counter the United States, and the practical
impact of reasonably steady resupplies, have signifi-
cantly bolstered their potential. The importance of
external factors varies, however, over time and from
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country to country. They are a major element in the
staying power of the left in El Salvador, for instance,
but not nearly so important yet in Guatemala.'
7. Nevertheless, no country in the region is immune
from destabilizing trends.
- In El Salvador, the 24,000-man armed forces
and police are stalemated by 4,000 to 4,500
generally well armed and trained insurgents.2
We expect the war to drag on indecisively over
the next 12 to 15 months. Despite interdiction
efforts, the guerrillas are continuing to receive
outside support sufficient to sustain a protracted
war of attrition. A more widespread insurgent
offensive is likely late this year or early in 1982.
Meanwhile, the government remains vulnerable
to the corrosive economic and political effects of
the insurgency, and it is possible that further
economic deterioration or a series of spectacular
guerrilla actions could decisively shift momen-
tum against the government.3
'See annex
situations.
I It should be stressed that information on insurgent strength,
casualties, recruitment, and supply links is incomplete. Our esti-
mates are based on intelligence from a variety of human sources and
other means of collection.
8 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army, believes that the last sentence should instead read, "And
in the event of further economic deterioration or a series of
spectacular guerrilla actions, the chances would be even that
momentum would shift decisively against the government."
Nicaragua's Military Buildup
8. For Cuba and the USSR, the immediate objective
in Central America is consolidating the Sandinista
revolution in Nicaragua. Support of insurgency else-
where-while a complementary and important goal-
is one with a more elastic time frame.
9. The issue of the Sandinistas' survival raises the
stakes for these players-immensely so for Havana.
Cuban prestige is deeply committed and a secret
defense pact has been concluded. Under most circum-
stances, Castro would be willing to send Cuban troops
to defend the regime in Managua against a serious
challenge.' We believe that only impending US mili-
' See annex B for details on the Cuban armed forces and the
Soviet military presence in Cuba.
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tary retaliation and the strongest of Soviet warnings
would deter him.
10. Havana's determination to help consolidate the
Sandinista revolution and its desire to use Managua as
a support base for insurgents throughout the region are
underscored by the substantial Cuban presence
throughout the country-a total of 5,200 to 5,650
personnel,,' including approximately 1,500 military
and 150 to 200 security advisers. Moscow's physical
presence is small but growing-45 to 68 personnel,
including 35 at its Embassy. It has provided military
advisers and instructors, and has delivered some trans-
port aircraft.
11. External support-primarily Cuban-has been
instrumental in allowing the Sandinistas to transform a
fragmented guerrilla force of 4,000 to 5,000 men into
Central America's largest standing army. Nicaragua,
with a population of only 2.5 million, has an estimated
22,000 to 27,000 men on active duty plus an equal
number of organized reservists. (In contrast, Somoza's
National Guard had only 10,500 men in 1979.)
12. Given present goals and recruitment patterns,
together with a continuation of current levels of
external supply, we expect the Nicaraguan armed
forces to reach 40,000 within the next year, with an
additional 40,000 reservists sufficiently trained to be
integrated into the army. Substantial numbers of less
trained militia will serve as an irregular territorial
backup. Managua's leaders consider that they must
protect the Sandinista revolution by building up Nic-
aragua's armed strength. At the same time, however,
this buildup is intimidating governments in the region
and is giving the Sandinistas added confidence to
expand their export of revolution. Managua's armed
forces will overshadow those of its Central American
neighbors by 1983-sooner but for a shortage of
trained officers and NCOs, problems with logistics,
and a lack of proficiency with newly acquired
weapons.
13. The Soviets are closely collaborating with Ha-
vana on the flow of military supplies to Nicaragua.
Current inventories reflect major increases over the
last two years in almost all categories of ground force
5 The total includes 2,000 teachers who returned home in July
1981 but will be replaced by February 1982.
light weapons, including undetermined quantities of
rocket-propelled grenade launchers, Czechoslovak ri-
fles and submachineguns, and Soviet AK-47s. The
Sandinista arsenal also includes at least 12 Soviet 152-
mm howitzers; 23 to 28 Soviet-made T-54/55 tanks;
and an undetermined but large number of SA-7
surface-to-air missiles. In addition, preparations for
the introduction of MIG aircraft reportedly have
accelerated, and they could arrive by early 1982. This
would enable Nicaragua to offset Honduras's present
air advantage.
14. Havana's historical links to the Sandinista move-
ment, and especially its close relationship with the
dominant Sandinista clique, point to a further deepen-
ing of ties. Cuban training programs are extremely
broad and reinforce Cuban influence on the Nicaraguan
Army structure, strategy, and philosophy. In addition to
training provided by Cubans in Nicaragua, several
hundred Nicaraguans are also training or studying in
Cuba at any one time. Recent and planned acquisitions
of Soviet weapons will increase dependence on both
Cuban and, to a lesser extent, Soviet technicians and
advisers. The surge in Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba this
year apparently in part includes weapons to be trans-
shipped through Cuba as well as replacements for
Cuban arms previously shipped to Nicaragua.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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The Spread of Revolution
19. By virtue of its location, its cooperation with a
host of Communist and other radical advisers, and its
support for Central American insurgents, Nicaragua
has become the hub of the revolutionary wheel in
Central America. The initial emphasis on aid to the
Salvadoran insurgency has already expanded to in-
clude the training of Honduran and Costa Rican
leftists, and the assumption of a larger role in efforts to
unify and supply Guatemalan guerrillas.
20. Aid to regional insurgents is an integral part of
Managua's military as well as political strategy. The
Sandinistas hope to tie down the armed forces of their
neighbors while organizing an insurgent fifth column.
As Nicaragua's military capability grows, its export of
the revolution is likely to increase because it will be
less susceptible to outside pressure. The Sandinistas'
internal control is already extensive enough to protect
sub rosa operations.
21. Domestic political and economic difficulties
will probably not slow either the Sandinistas' conven-
Approved For R
tional military expansion or the growth of their insur-
gent support network. If anything, pressures from the
Nicaraguan democratic opposition and from armed
counterrevolutionary bands will accelerate the Sandi-
nistas' military schedule and stiffen their commitment
to Central American insurgents. The belief that their
domestic opponents are linked to the United States
and to conservative regimes in the area strengthens the
Sandinistas' willingness to aid revolutionaries in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala as a means of
ensuring their own security.
22. The steady buildup of a diversified support
capability points toward significantly increased weap-
ons flows to El Salvador later this year. The slowdown
in aid earlier this year was clearly a tactical reaction to
the defeat of the guerrillas' January offensive and US
diplomatic pressures. We believe the flow of supplies
has been climbing slowly in recent months and is now
sufficient to maintain present levels of rebel activity in
El Salvador. Both Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guer-
rillas reportedly plan increased shipments during the
November-February period because of favorable dry
season conditions and the Salvadoran left's desire to
disrupt the scheduled March elections.
23. The supply and support patterns flow in part
from Cuba's return to more militant backing of Latin
American revolutionaries, and the strong seconding of
this policy by Moscow. The Soviets have comple-
mented Havana's increased activism by encouraging
the formation of an umbrella revolutionary organiza-
tion in El Salvador and by urging the Communist
parties in Guatemala and Honduras to join broad
revolutionary fronts. The USSR has also played a role
in the supply of arms from both Cuba and third
parties such as the Vietnamese. With Havana making
eventual armed revolution in Honduras one of its
objectives, Moscow has undertaken paramilitary train-
ing of Hondurans in the USSR for the first time since
the mid-1960s and will participate in political training
of Hondurans in Havana.
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26. Many West European socialists have been so-
bered by repressive Sandinista policies and are con-
cerned over the anti-Americanism that their vocal
criticism of the United States has helped to inspire.
They will probably ease away from their mediation
initiative in El Salvador and express revolutionary
sympathy with more discretion-for the small socialist
party in El Salvador, for instance, rather than unre-
servedly for the entire left.
most West Europeans remain
skeptical that Washington is willing to accept what
they view as inevitable and necessary social transfor-
Latin America have for the most part continued to
support President Duarte and the Salvadoran Chris-
tian Democrats, while opposing the extreme left as
well as the extreme right. Meanwhile, if the conflict in
El Salvador drags on, the United States will again
encounter friction in relations with some West Euro-
peans and others. And a rapid buildup of opposition to
US policies-keyed to leftist gains in the area-
remains an ever-present possibility.
28. Mexico's regional policy has become somewhat
more pragmatic-especially toward El Salvador
29. Venezuela will continue as the strongest sup-
porter of US policy in the area, but it is probably
approaching the practical limits of its involvement.
Increasingly pessimistic over trends in Central Amer-
ica, it will probably soon move to a harder public line
toward the Sandinistas. The Venezuelans will continue
to pump financial and political aid into El Salvador,
but they see the country's two greatest problems-the
deteriorating economy and the external support of the
insurgents-as requiring substantially greater US ef-
forts.
30. Colombia has even greater cause for apprehen-
sion, having been the recent target of Cuban-sup-
ported subversion. This concern has caused the Turbay
government to seek increased political and economic
ties with neighboring countries and to begin a modest
military modernization program. Military leaders in
Argentina and Chile consider the crisis in Central
America primarily a US problem. They would like to
be supportive of governments in El Salvador, Guate-
mala, and Honduras I
ments ot balance, such as tinancial aid to all regional
governments, are outweighed by ideological affinity
and material backing for radical causes.
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33. Moscow and Havana aim to see leftist ideology
spread and, over time, to see leftist regimes come to
power, as underscored by: support networks that lace
Central America; Cuba's sponsorship of a guerrilla
assault on Colombia, showing that Havana's subversion
is not restricted to rightwing dictatorial governments;
and the Castro regime's continuing assistance to revo-
lutionaries throughout Latin America.
34. In this context, we expect that the USSR and
Cuba would move quickly to take advantage of any
opportunities that arise in the Caribbean. Neverthe-
less, their attention will remain focused primarily on
current objectives in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala.
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Implications for the United States
35. Dealing with the challenge in Central America
will be complicated by the fact that the US interpreta-
tion of events and trends in the region is not shared by
many governments. Not only will the nonaligned
countries continue for the most part to sympathize
with the Central American revolutionaries, but so will
Mexico and much of Western Europe-and parts of
the US public as well. International leftist propaganda
has been enormously successful, and US credibility
remains low.
36. In this situation, almost any US effort seen to be
stifling the revolutionary forces will carry political
liabilities. Particularly, any action smacking of mili-
tary intervention will revive the historical nightmare
of the Yankee big stick throughout Latin America,
even among such countries as Venezuela and Brazil,
which tend to support overall US policy.
37. Yet, failing to rise to the Communist challenge
will almost certainly involve serious costs for the
United States. The hemisphere's political landscape
could be significantly altered if the generally weak
governments are left to fend for themselves against the
multinational revolutionary offensive.
39. The US response to the insurgency in El Salva-
dor involves even greater risks. On the one hand, there
is no guarantee that the guerrillas will be decisively
defeated even if the United States substantially in-
creases its support to the government. On the other
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hand, inaction could lead to still more brazen outside
radical interference in the region, damage US credibil-
ity, and make the anti-Communist players less amena-
ble to US influence.
40. The challenges involved in slowing the insur-
gent threat pale beside Central America's socioeco-
nomic inequities. Even assuming that political vio-
lence could be reasonably controlled and that the
attitudes of the elite sectors of those nations directly
threatened would change, we estimate that: minimal
economic growth in El Salvador and Guatemala would
require a total of roughly half a billion dollars annual-
ly from foreign sources over the next three to
Apprq
five years; and the annual cost for the region as a
whole could approximate twice that amount.
41. Because development and stabilization are nec-
essarily long-range goals, and because dealing with
them is inhibited by continuing outside aid for the
Central American insurgents, the most critical prob-
lem for the near term is disruption of the guerrilla
support network funneling into El Salvador. Nicaragua
and Cuba-the sources of supply-could be targeted
offensively at high political risk.
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ANNEX A
Country Outlooks
El Salvador
1. Over the next 12 to 15 months, the war in El
Salvador probably will drag on indecisively. As long as
the guerrillas receive effective outside support, a
dramatic shift in favor of the armed forces is remote
(less than 10 percent); at best, improvements in the
government's military position will come slowly. In
the meantime, the junta will be vulnerable to the
corrosive economic and political effects of the insur-
gency. In the event of a steady economic deterioration
or a series of spectacular guerrilla actions, there is
some chance-perhaps 20 percent-that the momen-
tum could shift decisively against the government
during the period of this Estimate.'
2. Support funneled through Havana and Managua
is critical to insurgent capabilities, and at present is
sufficient to maintain current levels of activity indefi-
nitely. Rebel command headquarters in Nicaragua
coordinates tactical operations, resupply, and the dis-
patch of personnel. Programs in Nicaragua and Cuba
provide a reasonably steady return of trained Salva-
doran insurgents.
3. The guerrillas appear to have increased their
force beyond the 4,000-man level existing at the time
of the January offensive; we estimate that their
strength is now approaching 4,500. Whatever their
actual casualty and desertion rates-and our suspicions
suggest they are relatively low-
recruitment or impressment appear sufficient to en-
able them at a minimum to continue a protracted war
of attrition.
4. In addition, the guerrillas' communications net is
expanding, arms stores are up, and operations continue
' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army, and the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
believe that the judgment in the last sentence of this paragraph
should instead read, "... there is an even chance-50-50-that the
momentum...."
Approve
to gain sophistication. While there are significant
personality and tactical divisions among the various
groups, there is a consensus on the need for a pro-
longed struggle irrespective of domestic political cir-
cumstances. This insurgent strategy will result in
continuing attacks on economic and infrastructure
targets, together with hit-and-run operations to wear
down the government-all at minimal cost to the
guerrillas.
5. A more widespread insurgent offensive is likely
late this year or early next. Some planning has been
reported and the supply network is being made ready
for the November-February dry season. Even in the
absence of increased popular support, the guerrillas
will probably see a political need some time around
the election period for widespread, headline-generat-
ing attacks, which could snowball.
6. Internationalist fighters-who probably number
several hundred-are not a major factor, although
they do provide a psychological boost to the local
insurgents. Their battle experience will provide cadres,
such as a reported several dozen Costa Rican guerril-
las, that can return home to train others and foment
further unrest. Nicaragua almost certainly supplies the
largest single contingent. Moreover, the appearance in
El Salvador (or Guatemala) of Nicaraguan "freedom
fighter" Eden Pastora would, at least initially, serious-
ly unsettle government officials. Given Pastora's repu-
tation, we cannot rule out some spectacular operation
paralleling his takeover of the Nicaraguan National
Palace in 1978.
7. The military's counterinsurgency effort has
made some slow gains, but these have disrupted rather
than debilitated insurgent forces. Guerrilla command-
ers display both the confidence and ability to avoid
encirclement, in part because of the armed forces'
limited manpower. There has been no significant
breakdown in military morale. Interdiction and rapid-
reaction capabilities are inadequate and, to move
beyond essentially reactive tactics, the army requires
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improved transport, an increased air and naval capa-
bility, and better tactical and national intelligence.
8. The current balance of forces-some 24,000
government troops and police opposing 4,000 to 4,500
regular guerrillas and several thousand additional
"irregulars"-gives the Duarte government far less
than the 10-to-1 force advantage generally considered
necessary to defeat an insurgency. Government-and
indeed guerrilla-efforts to expand forces substantially
will be aided by the availability of manpower from
the large and unemployed young male population.
The government, however, will be hindered especially
by serious budgetary restraints and a critical shortage
of officers and NCOs.
9. In addition, junta efforts to attract civilian sup-
port will be hampered by its inability to control
indiscriminate violence by security forces and right-
wing death squads. This failure will also blunt at-
tempts to gain increased international backing.
10.
12. Although the elections pose a significant risk for
the Christian Democrats, they are unlikely to have
substantial impact on the insurgency over the next 12
to 15 months. The left is not likely to participate in the
electoral process, and the general populace-as well as
a significant sector of international opinion-will re-
gard the elections with cynicism. Nevertheless, a
contest held without major fraud or disruption would
increase the government's legitimacy.
Appr4
13. If the favored Christian Democrats emerge in a
strengthened position, they could attract labor, busi-
ness, and other sectors. Failure to make a strong
showing, however, would greatly increase the chances
that the Christian Democrats will be attacked and
perhaps shunted aside by military and private-sector
leaders. Any such sidelining of the Christian Demo-
crats-the only credible reform element in the govern-
ment-will significantly boost long-term insurgent
prospects.
14. Similarly, the guerrillas would gain from the
collapse of the government's agrarian reform program.
A lack of funds and technical expertise already is
hobbling implementation of the program-potentially
among Latin America's most sweeping. Moreover,
both extremes of the political spectrum perceive it as a
danger and are responding to it with threats and
violence.
15. The economy will probably be the country's
most serious problem over the next year. Severely
worsening terms of trade, guerrilla damage to the
infrastructure, and the loss of private-sector confi-
dence have produced an economic downturn that
even sizable sums of foreign aid alone could not
readily reverse. Until the violence can be arrested and
the private sector has some assurance of consistent
stabilization policies, foreign aid-even as much as
$500 million annually-will do little more than shore
up living conditions and provide basic necessities to
refugees. Without these measures, polarization and
political anarchy will accelerate and could, by default,
result in a radical Marxist victory.
16.
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Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Top Secret RUFF UMBRA
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
Central America: Guerrilla Strengths, Economic Growth Rates, 1960-81
1,000 I I I i -1
ci d: fi +15
c. 12/79-Havana
meeting on
El Salvador,
Guatemala
d. 3/80-Land reform in
El Salvador
f. 1 /81-Failure of
offensive in
El Salvador
Notes: Red line designates
numbers of guerrillas.
Black line designates
annual percentage
of GNP growth
in comparison with
previous year.
For 1960-77,
the data refer to the
average for the years
indicated.
The GNP axes do not
all refer to the same
quantity of change.
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