NICARAGUA: HILL CONCERN ON U.S. OBJECTIVES PERSISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902260004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN

PERATION'p~,c~49~o~~goo4-4
News Bulletin
From the WASHINGTON POST, pg A-1
Nici'agu~: Hill Concern
Persists
By Patrick B. Tyler
wu uneton po i am wetwc
Seeking to defuse reports that the
$eegan_._administration is trying to
topple Nicaragua's Sandinista gov-
ernment, CIA Director William L
Casey has told key members of Con-
grew that the administration's chief
objective in supporting covert oper-
ations against Nicaragua is stopping
the flow of arms to guerrilla forces in
nearby El Salvador.
According to Capitol Hill sources
familiar with Casey's closed-door
briefings during December to con-
gressional committees overseeing
U.S. intelligence activities, his assur-
ances satisfied some members and
prompted no major protests, but left
a number of questions unresolved.
The uppermost concern expressed
by oversight committee members is
whether the United States can avoid
a deepening military and paramil-
itary involvement in Central Amer-
ica =. i ben- _::g"r"w
Nicaraguan exile groups whose open-
ly stated goal is the overthrow of the
current Sandinista leadership. _
-Questioning Casey's contention
that the administration is doing this
only to interdict arms traffic to Sal-
vadoran. guerrillas, one congressional
oversight committee member said,
"You can't get people to fight for
interdicting arms."
The Casey briefings added anoth-
er layer to the continuing controver-
sy over the Reagan administration's
objectives in Nicaragua, whose 3-
year-old Sandinista government has
established increasingly close ties to
Cuba and the Soviet Union.
The policy conflict was under-
1 January 1983
Item No. 1
n U.S. Objectives
scored by statements of senior State
Department officials as recently a
November indicating that arms in
W. vivwvN .. . ~IV~rVWV a Iu uuuf
goal in the administration's strateg;
for Nicaragua.
These officials told members o
Congress and reporters in back
ground briefings that the adminis
tration's primary goal was to isolat4
and pressure the Sandinista' govern
ment until it becomes more- demo
cratic and gives up some control t(
more moderate political forces in the
country.
Reacting to reports of eecalatint
CIA activity against Nicaragua, Con.
grass banned any. U.S., support foi
the overthrow of the Nicaraguar
government
But congressional emcee said
Casey successfully lobbied congres
sional leaders to tone down the Ian
guage of the prohibition and leavc
the Cu free to continue givint
money and other support to severe
thousand Nicaraguan exiles based it
camps along the Honduran border
and inside Nicaragua.
These groups conduct what ad-
ministration officials have character-
ized as "harassment" in raids against
Nicaraguan militiamen in the coun-
try's sparsely populated northern
frontier regions.
The Casey briefings came a year
after President Reagan signed, on
Dec. 2, 1981, a presidential "finding"
required under the National Security
Act to justify as a matter of law and
national interest the "support and
conduct of political and paramilitary
operations against the Cuban pres-
ence and Cuban-Sandinista support
structure in Nicaragua and else.
But press disclosures in the wake
of that decision have made. the
Nicaraguan campaign one of the
least secret covert operations in CIA
history. An assessment of the pro-
gram, according to officials who have
monitored it, indicates that the ad-
ministration has achieved very lim-
ited results:
? The Nicaraguan government
continues to provide logistical sup-
port to the supply of arms to Salva-
doran guerrillas. The Sandinista
leadership continues its close two
with Cuba, and has made no discer-
nible move toward accepting a U.S.
demand that Nicaragua reduce the
size of its large standing army and
militia forces before negotiating im-
proved relations with the United
States.
? Though the overland routes
from Nicaragua through Honduras
to the Salavadoran frontier are bet-
ter protected against arms traffic,
guerrilla resupply is still active via
air corridors along the Pacific coast-
line.
Approved For RelealM41ODP84B00049R000902260004-4
 . Approved For Release 2006/04/19 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000902260004-4
o The efforts of Nicaraguan a& activities for the purpose of over-
groups to unite in an attractive al- throwing the government of Nicara-
ternative to the present Sandinista gua or provoking a military exchange
regime Continue to be hamstrung by between Nicaragua and Honduras."
an aver-representation of former na. White House officials appeared
tional guardsmen who served the content With the prohibition, but one
government of the late Gen. Anse. congressional staffer familiar with
a--t_ --A L__ .t .. ,
fhb region said its language
of
one of the most popular exile lead- man" that left the CIA ufree to pur-
ers, Eden Pastors, to join them. sue a host of harassment activities.
? A planned 1,000-man peramil- The only public comment that
nary force, described in the CIA's' appeared to acknowledge the narrow
proposal to Reagan in November, ' distinction the CIA has drawn for
1981, as undergoing training in Ar- itself in its Nicaraguan campaign
gentina, was never deployed in the was made by Sen. Daniel Patrick
region. And in the aftermath of the Moynihan (D-N.Y.) after Reagan
Falkland Islands war, during which signed the congressional budget res-
the United States provided support olution containing the limited pro-
to Britain in its fight against Argen- hibition language.
Una, the Argentine commitment to Moynihan, vice chairman of the
working with the U.S. covert forces Senate Intelligence Committee, said
hes b: an lir+- j to pfo:: * about ;it is "difficult to draw the line be-
three dozen advisers to exile groups. tween harassment activities and a
'Z don't see where we've accom. deliberate, overthrow a attempt to destabilize or
plished a damn thing said one con- V
greesional critic reviewing the impact Moynihan would not comment
of the CIA program, this week on whether he was satis-
The only measure of success in fied after Casey's Dec. 9 presenta-
the Nicaraguan campaign Vas- tion to the committee that the CIA
case officers and agents who have
claimed by a senior Pentagon official been operating in the region have
in October, when he said in an in- adhered to the policy - distinctions
terview that arms interdiction and that are being drawn in Washington.
surveillance assistance provided to One congressional oversight commit-
Honduras by U.S. forces has "tight- tee member said, "We haven't gotten
ened the screws" on the Cuban- any good answers on that."
Nicaraguan supply line to Salvador- Another congressional source said
an and Guatemalan insurgents. that when Casey was confronted
'That there have been violations with the question during one brief-
of the border, absolutely nobody is ing he replied with "one-liners" and
going to deny it," the official said. "slo
aneering"
g
But he added that the success of the However, this source added,
operations had led to false claims by "some (members] felt better" after
"screaming Sandinistas" that Hon- Casey's briefing because they were
duras and Nicaraguan exile forces able to discuss bluntly press reports
were preparing for an invasion. that covert operations against Nic-:
In the closing weeks of the last aragua have intensified to the point
session of Congress, Sen. Christo- of involving as many as 150 CIA per-
pher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), who along sonnel and refocused toward toppl-,
with others has expressed misgivings ing the Sandinista regime. "
about the administration's objectives Casey reportedly said the total
in Nicaragua, introduced legislation number of CIA employes in Hondu-
that would have banned the use of ras has never reached that level dur-
g
y
forces or paramilitary groups oper- ' present number assigned to the op-
ating in the Central American re- eration is 'perhaps less than 60."
11?m The congressional source said the
But an administration lobbying oversight committees have blocked,
effort led by Casey, according to con through the almost unanimous op-
gressional sources, persuaded both position of their members, CIA plans
houses to adopt less restrictive lan. to train a large paramilitary force of
gunge offered by mocha aneEdward P. w of the as many as 500 Latin American-Boland House Intelligence Committee. commandos, whose mission would be
e rohib'ta the Unit to' stake at economic targets inside
That lan
ua
In recent months, the Reagan ad-
ministration has incorporated into
this covert strategy the concept of
"turning on and off" the CIA-backed
harassment tactics to reward and
punish policy changes inside Nica-
ragua several officials said.
At the beat of the controversy
over a covert campaign is a deep di-
vision in the intelligence community
over the effectiveness of clandestine
paramilitary operations. There is
I also some concern about the nega-
tive impact of such operations on
US.ppublic opinion after they are
'There are professionals in the
CIA who were afraid when we
started this thing [in Nicaragua] that
it was something that would come a
cropper,* one congressional oversight
committee member said.
He added that there also was con-
cern in the intelligence community
that strong regional and nationalistic
strains in Central America, and par-
ticularly in Nicaragua after the oust-
er of the repressive Somoza dictator
ship, would strengthen, not weaken,
the Nicaraguan regime if it is openly.
threatened by U.S.-backed exile
forces on its northern border.
"I may disagree with Ronald Rea-
gan on a lot of things, but if some.
one was threatening our country,
you'd see me in lock step with the
president," this source said. "It's as
though nobody 4as read about the
Bay of A definitive Iieview of the CIA
program has yet to reach the public,
but perceptible changes and shifts in
the administration's approach to
Nicaragua have been visible along
the wav. Foremost has been the cool-
ing of administration rhetoric toward
the involvement of Cuba in the
Nicaraguan support for Central
American insurgencies.
uvu-bw, tary of state Alexander
K Haig Jr. threatened at the outset
of the 1981 planning for a new Cen-
tral American. policy to "go to the
source," meaning Cuba, to stop the
arms flow to insurgents The
minutes of the Nov. 16, 1981, Na-
tional Security Council meeting on
Central America noted that "covert
activities under the CIA proposal
would be intended to . take uni-
specLial paramilitary action against
Cuban n UrgetO
g
g
ed States only from providing 'mil. Nicaragua, disrupt Its economy and'
n equipment, mill drain mihW//oaway WB00049R00 02260004-4 3
tlq~
ary or Re
ear-old campaign and the
the
in
advice
or other support or m~htary El Salvador.
 Approved For Release 2006/04/19 CIA-RDP84B00049R000902260004-4
Congressional s urces said recent-
ly those plans ware'never executed
a teruntmtwwith stiff congressional,
quoted Ben.'
oppodfion. One source
goirry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) as, react-
ing to this propoosat by toning a CMAI
caw earlier this year. 'You've got
to be out of your f----- mind.'
"Clearly there has been a soften-
of the rhetor c' said another I
congressional source. noting that the
Pentagon had also opposed any mil-
itary action against CCuuban arms sup-;
pay targets on the gro uids that h
could not predict whether the Soviet'
Union t respond to such a move
by t bW tary' action elsewhere
During the late summer and early
fan, reports from the region indi? {
cated that the flow of money and
equipment to Nicaraguan exiles had
been stepped up ag the Pentagon
prepared to assist the Honduran:
d to stage large-scale mil-
itary maneuvers on the Honduran-
Nicaraguan border. The exercise was
to have included the mobilization of
Honduran military forces and their,
rapid transport to strategic locations
in the border region.
But the exercises, were postponed
abruptly an prepared for his
late awing through Latin
America, which included a stop in
Honduras for talks with President
Roberto Suazo Cordova.
In the and, one of the most mod
erating forces in the administration's
covert planning for Central Amer-
may be Reagan. Some CIA of-
ficials reportedly have expressed
frustration that the White House
and State Department have tightly
controlled the CIA program and,
have been unwilling to approve
stronger covert measures against
Nicaragua.
One senior administration official
who was present for the NSC discus-'
sons on Nicaragua a year ago said in
a later interview that, in initially ap-
proving cross-border operations
against economic targets by CIA-
backed paramilitary groups, Reagan
was seeking the least life-threatening
harassment tactic to pressure the
. Nicaraguan leadership.
"Ronald Reagan has the reputa-
tion of being a gunslinger," this of. final and, "but ? the most cau-
tious, conservative guy in those
meeuugs. sie'll air, and he'll sit and
he'll listen to' every side :.:. [but]
he never wants to do anything that
ia long
to don't an American think the coune try in / 9 I
dbgw? !Grnlabout him
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