THE ITALIAN POLITICAL CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020038-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: May 17, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTLMATES
17 May 1960
NiETiCRAI1?UM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CE1:TRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT e The Italian. Political Crisis
Summery. The disintegration of the center as the stabilizing
influence in Italian politics has left Italy in the grip of a
fundamental political criais which has bean only temporarlY;
eased by parliamentts reluctant acceptance of the T,-rbron:I
"caretaker" government. The future of Italian pa ?J iameritawry
democracy will probably hinge in large degree on developments
within the next few months. We believe it unlikely that the
center coalition can be reconstituted and 'oi7italized. The creation
of a center-left government with tacit Sccial.st support would
provide sore opportun -ties for achieving a: yaw political equilibrium
oxciud&ng the estreri3ts of right and left from po"ser. H,-)we -er,
i'' ; would risk splitting the CD, and arousing bitter oppoeO.-tion
from the right and right center, It might also open the way for
a further leftward trend is Italian politics, The only alte:^nad
Live appears to be a dr'L:''t toward political disintegration, with
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a divided and impotent center caught between the threat of a coup
by an increasingly emtbit eyed and advv.~ntwroiw ri.gt:v and growing
p 'ess?tre from an increa4:Lngly, assertive left,
fl TRCDUCTIO11
1. The Italian parliamentts reluctant acceptance of the
TGAhroni "caretaker" govern-mez_t leaves unresolved the basic
differences which left Italy leaderless and in a state of
par 1.amenta y paralysis for more than two months? The Ta?brcni
formula, ir`!rclving acceptancE of noo-Fascist votes to pr'ou de a
parliamentary major 2 :,y, was vetoed once by the ruling Christian
Democratic Party (Co) and finally accepted only after all othex
candidates and formulas had been discarded and Tambroni had pr, raised
to confine himself to carrying out previously agreed national
policies. Tembroiii himself has long been an object of fear and
mistrust among his party colleaguues, and his manen,7crirg during
the present crisis has almost certainly intensified these mis~7l..vings.
2. With the iriportart local and provinc"al elections normal y
held at this time indef'iri.:e ly postponed, Tarribroni may be -ble to
survive until the end of parliamentary vacations in late sumner,
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thus providing a basis for passage of the budget and other routine
legislation. However, Italian political leaders tid4ill sooner or
later have to face up to the basic problems posed in the present
crisis, which threatens to turn into a crise de regime.
3. The basic characteristic of the present crisis - and
the reason for its unusual gravity ..,. is the fact that it repre.
sents a disintegration of the center as the stabilizing inf'li.ence
in Italian politics.. For 121 years the CD and the smaller
parties of the center - the Liberals (PLI), Republicans (MI),
and Covial Democrats (F'SDI) provided Italy with moderate
coalition government and served as a b,ufer between the
Communists (FCI) and Sociali6a (T?O I) of the left and the fascist..
tinged extreme right, Beginning with the GD4s loss of an absolute
parliamentary majority in 1953, however, the strength and cohesive.
ness of the center has slowly declined. Especially over the last
few years, the electorates center of gravity has &Lfted leftward
as a result of popular disillusionment over the immobilise of
successive CD?dominated goverments, growing disinclination to
regard M control of the government as necessary to prevent a
Communist takeover, and the increased stature and respectability
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of the PSI, The latter has moved away from its former close
association with the Communists at the national levol, even though
it still cooperates with them in the labor and cooperative fields
and in many local administrations. At the same time, Italy's rapid
economic growth has led to a rejuvenation and expansion of the
political right.
. As a result, strong centrifugal tendencies have developed,
both among the smaller parties of the center and within the CD
itself, The present crisis has been marked by a growing split
between the PLI, a big..buciness supported party whose withdrawal
of support from the Segni government precipitated its col.lapce,
and the PSDI, which has become increasingly corxerned to demonst2ate
its socialist principles and to avoid association with conserva.
the elements. The crisis has also brought into the open a similar
division in the CD. The CD left and much of the center has in.
creasingly favored a deal with Nenni for Socialist support of
Cthough not participation in) the government as a means of
getting on with progressive social and economic legislation and
this refurbishing the CDs pop?+lar image. However, this has been
bit-terly and thus far successfully blocked by the CD right, which
represents only a sm&Ll f action of the organized party, but F~'.ti_ch,
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with the support of conservative elements within the Vatican, still
commands important power within the party apparatus, The CD, as
the principal party of the center, has thus been left floundering
and virtually paralyzed, with its popular eppeal flagging and its
organizational unity gravely threatened.*
The Choice Before the CD
5. Hrw the CD will go about the task of restoring its
position - and the specific formulations that may be attempted
involves a welter of shifting personal relationships and influences
which will to a considerable extent overshadow the broader issues
involved. In general, however, the CD must choose among a limited
number of general lines of action - none of which is without hazard
6, The_'2ening to the Right,'t The CD could attempt to
carry on with a government generally rightist in orientation either with a CD cabinet accepting external rightist support (as
does the present Tambroni government) or with one in which the
The current disposition of party strength in the Chamber of
Deputies reading from left to right ist Communists (PCI) 1'}1
Nenni Socialists (PSI) 87, Democratic docialiets(PeDI) 17,
Republicans (PRI) 6, Christian Democrats (CD) 273, Liberals
(PLI) 18, Monarchists (PDI) 24, Neoa?Faacists (NSI) 24, Others 6,
.5 a
dwat-
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right3,.et parties are specifically includod. This course ^culd
certainly appeal to some CD leaders, peseJb?W Tarrbreni
who, despite his past support of a to t~center formula., might
follow this course to perpetuate himself in off-1--o, However, even
if considerable influence a.a1 inducements were brought to bea^,
a preponderant nurber of the CD deputies, already nervous over
their Party2s popular image,, will almost certainly demand that
the stigma of fascist support be removed as soon as possible.
Thus we consider it unlikely that a rightist-orierited government
could be long sustained except by extra-constitaticnal means.
0 Restoration of the Center. Efforts to patch over the
cleavages which have developed within the CD and to restore the
unity of the center as a whole will almost certainly be made.
However, we seriously question whether the status c ante can
in fact be restored .. except possibly under extreme and sustained
fear of the alternatjvew.
Restoration of the center would require
a sudden reversal of long-operative divergent tendencies and
urdider circumstances in which personal animosities among the center
leaders are at a high pitch. A CD decision to close ranks wcuI1d
not long satisfy those who fear that a continuation on dead center
would involve a further stagnation of internal policy and ~,?o:., s
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progressively sap popular support for the party. A reconciliation
of the PLT and the FM at this stage would appear to be even more
difficult, to achieve in view of the increasingly conservative
attitude adopted by the P AI. dux-: ng the last year and the growing
interest the PSDI has d : pj_ayed In closer association with the PSI.
8 The 11aen xg, to the Lef,,," Such men as President Groxichi9
ex-Preri.er 'anfani9 and CD Secretary Moro., reflecting the prcbable
desires of a majority of the CD rank-andcyfile9 will probably con.
tinve to favor development of a CD-led :Left-center got ern Pent
which enjoys e. terrna 2 Socialist support w.., a solution which is
being ag ,? ~s ively encouraged by th.e PSDI and the FRIL, Neun-1,
for his part., has thus far appeared willing to commit the
Socialists to support such a government by abstaining on important
Chamber votes., provided that i pushed ahead with liberal., social,
and economic legislation and did not insist en a clear-cut Socialist
break with the FCI iz all respects. Such an arrangement would
provide a parliamentary basis for a CD effort to restore its
popular image as a party of moderate reform and would lay a
foundation for additional efforts to rid the PSI of its Commnist
ties and rehabilitate it as a responsible democratic party.
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9. However, the right wing of the CD will almost certainly
cost nue its all.-out opposition to such a forrma,la., threatening
that if necessary it would walk out en masse., thereby splitting
the party and possibly bringing d-xa the governmeruc in the process.
It is uncertain., how ma. of the 30 to 60 CD deputies associated
with the right wing would in fact jeopardize their positions and
prerogat -ves by carryi.ng cut`, such a threat. Although conservative
elements in the Vatican have been prominent among those opposing
an opening to the left., it is also uncertain whether the Pope would
wish to push matters so far as to risk splitting the Christian
Democrats, Nevertheless., the danger of a walkout by the right.,
including a number of the more prominert CD leaders., is clearly
one to be reckoned with. Indeed, there is some danger (discussed
in paragraph 12 below) that an embittered right (including some
CD members) n ht take even more drastic action if it felt others.
wise unable to block an opening to the left. At best, a PSI-
supported government would be subjected to heavy and poesib2~
disabling pressure from the right,,
10, At the same time, the possibility cannot be excluded
that Nennits present ;pose of respectable moderation is a cynical
tactical gambit primarily aimed at encouraging the breakup of
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the CD and thus opening the way for PSI (or PSI-PCI) dam'nation
of Italyf s domestic and foreign policies, Even :?Lf this should
prove to be the case and Nenni later sought to raise the ante
for his support, the Cl) would be In a better position to success-.
fully appeal to the electorate for a new mandate of their o~.m
In any case, however, there would also be some risk that the
acceptance of the PSI as a more or loss legitimate partner might
lead to a shift of popular opinion and pci ier f ;tether, to the left.
11, New E ect1ons If all else fai.ls,9 kres :dent G onchi
may feel obliged to call national electio8 in an effort to
break the existing stalen'lte of political forces. However? the
center parties are not nco? anxious to put their somewhat bru r4ed
popular image to a public test, and strong pressures will probably
be brought to bear against such a move. Gronchi, himself., has no
illusions about his own chances for reelection to the "residency
in the event that CD parliamentary strength (and especially that
of its center-left faction) 13 reduced in an election., and probably
hopes to delay until the electoral prospects of the CD appear
brighter than they do now. Moreover, he probably has little real
confidence that the selection of a new parliament w-111 greatly
facilitate his task of obtain: ng leaders capable of forming a
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government with a working parliamentary majority. The i nd"lea-?
tlons are that early new elections, while strengthenRng the
position of the extremes (and especially the ieft)$ :you"Ld not
sufficiently alter the Bala. oe to provide a clear-cut aol-Ition
to the e~. is:iso
Rob3 c7:.?' the Pol:#. tical-rtx~~.mew
12. A particularly ses !i_ous aspect of tho present crisis is
the growing restiveness and asses tiver. ess of the extreme right",
If the trend with ?n the Christian Democratic Party towards a
liaison with the PSI becomes more pr onoun.ced - or If a contr.. u d
impasse should appear to threaten a serious breakdown of govea-nient
functioning or popular confidc ce - there are a number of f _ ;u es
on the right who might be tempted to exploit the situation and
seize control of the government illegally. Although there are
no concrete evidences of coup activities in Italy at the moment,
such solutions have been rumored for some ti.xre. Indeed, l'~.,L _ otas,
h mself, who is probably Italy s, most ek llful oppow tunis t., might
use his present control of gove7-ximent machinery to consolidate
his power by extra-legal means. Furthermore, the public Es d_: s,.
enchantment with ineffective center governments over the pass z ;-.;r
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years might keep initial. popular opposition to such a move to
a mind-mum., especially if it were advertised as an end to
irnmobilism. However,, any rightist seizure of power., forcibly or
otherwise, would probably require the elimination or neutraliza-
tion of President Gronchi, More importantly, it would probably
drive the bulk of the CD, and most other center elements, into
opposition along-side the left.
13. The Communists are unlikely to take any drastic action
to influence the situation at this stage. For the moment they will
probably continue to concentrate on exploiting their opportunities
for discrediting and discomfiting the government and its CD
leadership, meanvriLle quietly attempting to head off any real
accommodation between the CD and the PSI/although they have
officially endorsed the concept of a center-left government
enjoying Socialist support., probably for tactical reasons. While
they would attempt to exploit the creation of such a goverritieut
as a ctory for the left they would at the same time seek to
undermine its lest it weaken their appeal as the party of reform
and result in their policical isolation. Should the present
political impasse become more critical, the Communists might make
some preparations for direct political action, but would probably
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vigorous popular front movement would soon be constituted, Under
these circumstances the reunited left would sooner or later directly
challenge the authority of rr.y rightist government, probably in
- - ---~. -1u .'Maio vrwc .ons by the fact that
they lack the necessary strength and discipline to seize power
and would probably fear. precipitating a rightist coupe However,
if political chaos extended over a long period, or if the right
did move (or appeared to be about to move) to capture power, the
old PSIS .PCI pact would almost certs?I4lly be quickly revived and a
the streets.
The Cuoj
14. Italy thus faces a period of severe tension, possibly
threatening the existence of the regime, Although installation
of the Tambroni, government may permit the crisis to drag on into $
fall without coming to a head again, existing political animosities
c o u l d nt at any timep and in any eve,nL- a
decisive resolution of the probably cannot be deferred for
more than a few months without risking a collapse of Italian
parliamentary democracy. We believe it unlikely that the old
center coalition-can be reconstituted and revitalized. Final
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resolution of the crisis probably involves a basic shift in
political power toward either the left or the rights Creation
of a centerileft goverment would provide Ita:ly at Least a fair
nice of establishing a new political equilibrium with prospects
for solid social progress. \,HHowever, it would risk splitting the
aroma. '' ?: g`bitt6f opposition from the right and right center,,
and it nrl.ght also open the way for a further trend to the left i.A
Italian politics. On the other hand, failure to achieve such a
solution would result in continuing political paralysis beneficial
only to the extremes of right and left, In these circumstances the
right could probably grow increasingly adventurous and might
attempt to seize power extra=-legal1y,a either to forestall a more
to the left, or to fill the vacuum created by the disarray of
the CD. For its part., the PSI would probably then be driven
back into close alliance with the Communists to escape isolation.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATICNAL ESTIMATES
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Cheirman
mda
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