NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030100010004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 3, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tuesday May 3, 1977 CG NIDC 77-102C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, May 3, 1977.
e NID Cable is tor the purpose of informing
PAKISTAN: Bhutto Gains Respite
JAPAN-USSR: Fishing Negotiations
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PAKISTAN: Bhutto Gains Respite
Disagreements within the Pakistani opposition have
given Prime Minister Bhutto a respite, although it remains far
from certain that he can remain in power very tong.
A major disagreement arose late Sunday when former
air force commander Asghar Khan, now a leading figure in the
opposition, released a statement calling for Bhutto's resigna-
tion as a precondition for negotiations. Other opposition lead-
ers had been considering--and may have been ready to accept--a
compromise which called for the new national assembly election
they have demanded, but which would have allowed Bhutto until
the election to head a coalition government including the oppo-
sition. The acting head of the opposition is taking an even
softer line in public, saying that the question of holding an
election is itself negotiable.
Asghar emerged as the leading spokesman for the oppo-
sition during the election campaign last winter. Should Asghar
be as inflexible on this issue as he has been on others in the
past, the other opposition leaders would face a dilemma.
I If these leaders agree to a compromise without Asghar's
ng, they risk splitting the opposition and greatly dimin-
ishing its chances for victory in an early election. Several
have been willing to consider an interim government under Bhutto
until the election because they expect an election victory that
would force Bhutto to leave office.
If they join Asghar in refusing to negotiate, the
onus for continuing political unrest would be much more clearly
on the opposition, making military leaders even more reluctant
to intervene in its favor. The opposition might, however, still
have enough backing to create the kind of widespread disorders
that would force the army's hand.
I In the meantime, Bhutto's confidence has been bol-
stere by his estimate that his attacks on the US are gaining
him support, by the failure of the opposition to produce its
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heralded massive demonstration last Saturday or to counter dem-
onstrations by Bhutto's followers on Sunday, and by the mili-
tary's continuing support of the government. Bhutto is likely
to be less willing to make concessions to his opponents and will
probably increase his efforts to exploit their differences.
he has demonstrated an acute political
sensitivity an as shown a remarkable capacity for political
survival. He has been able to restrain himself at key moments,
and further, his striking out at external targets in some
crises in the past has increased his popular support.
JAPAN-USSR: Fishing Negotiations
J Japanese Agriculture and Forestry Minister Suzuki is
sc edu e to reopen fisheries negotiations with the Soviet Un-
ion in Moscow on Thursday, but government leaders in Tokyo are
pessimistic about the chances for progress in the face of the
uncompromising Soviet stand.
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At this point, the Japanese are prepared to wait for
g flexibility from Moscow. Soviet intransigence--includ-
ing an attempt to link the sensitive Northern Territories prob-
lem with a resolution of the fisheries impasse--has prompted
Japanese opposition parties to close ranks behind the govern-
ment. Prime Minister Fukuda is unlikely to see any advantage
in making political concessions on the territorial issue.
The most difficult problem from Japan's viewpoint is
the Soviet demand that the Northern Territories--a group of is-
lands off northeast Japan seized by the USSR in 1945--be in-
cluded in the USSR's new 200-mile fisheries zone. Essentially,
the Japanese argue that such an arrangement would undercut
their legal claim to the territory. As a result, Tokyo has
pressed Moscow to uncouple the islands issue from the fisher-
ies talks.
I IThe USSR probably will eventually agree to separate
the territorial issue from the fisheries negotiations. The pub-
licity surrounding the problem, however, will make the search
for an acceptable compromise more difficult.
Tokyo has refused to accept the Soviet call for a
I a ance in the fishing catch. The Japanese now catch about 1.8
million tons a year in the Soviet zone, about 15 percent of
Japan's total catch, compared to a Soviet catch near Japan of
only about a half million tons.
The Soviet emphasis on a balanced catch is a result
o the R's desire to make up in its own fishing zone the
substantial fishing catch it will lose because of the imposi-
tion of 200-mile zones elsewhere. Soviet officials have re-
jected Japan's contention that the two sides should maintain
the status quo. At the same time, Moscow has demanded--and
Tokyo rejected--the right to fish within Japan's newly pro-
claimed 12-mile territorial sea. Most of the USSR's catch in
Japanese waters is taken within 12 miles of the Japanese coast.
I IThe Japanese apparently see little Soviet interest
in an early agreement, and they are probably right. Japanese
leaders regard Moscow's tough tactics as a reflection, in part,
of simmering Soviet displeasure over last year's MIG-25 affair
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and over Japan's recent expressions of interest in making eco-
nomic and political progress in relations with China. The So-
viets, on the other hand, probably believe that pressures from
Japan's powerful fishing lobby eventually will make Tokyo more
amenable to compromise.
I In any event, Moscow's behavior has combined with the
considerable reservoir of anti-Soviet sentiment in Japan to
forge a solid--and unprecedented--domestic consensus behind the
government's stand. All five opposition parties united with the
ruling Liberal Democrats yesterday in support of the Diet's
adoption of Japan's own 200-mile economic zone and 12-mile ter-
ritorial waters limit. Japanese press coverage and editorial
comment on the bilateral standoff have been universally criti-
cal of Moscow.
I _j Japan's sizable fishing industry has been excluded
from Soviet waters for almost a month. The opposition parties
have not attempted to exploit the industry's problems and con-
tinue to side with the government.
Moscow's veiled hints that the impasse could also af-
fect the prospects for Japanese investment in Siberian develop-
ment have also failed to produce pressure on the Fukuda govern-
ment. Indeed, business leaders were cool to Moscow's suggestion
last summer that the.Japanese step up their long-term involve-
ment in Soviet development programs, and the Soviets' current
approach is likely further to reinforce their skeptical atti-
tude.
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LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT: EC
//This is the last in a series of articles exam-
ining the points of view of the participants in the London Eco-
nomic Summit on May 7 and 8.//
//The European Community will be represented at
the summit by EC Commission President Roy Jenkins and by Brit-
ish Prime Minister Callaghan, current president of the EC Coun-
cil. Jenkins' role, however, remains a point of contention
among the nine EC member states.//
//In finally agreeing in March to Jenkins' atten-
dance, French President Giscard d'Estaing stipulated that Com-
mission participation be restricted to those matters in which
the EC has a clear jurisdiction. In order to "facilitate" this,
Paris has since suggested that such topics, presumably trade
and North-South issues, be grouped together and raised on the
second day of the conference with Jenkins present.//
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//Callaghan may be receptive to this plan. The
ormu a is u likely to please the smaller EC members, however,
who see the Commission as their proxy. The Dutch finance minis-
ter, for example, has recently stressed that the Community's
jurisdiction goes beyond trade and North-South matters to in-
clude the broad economic and financial questions that will be
emphasized at the summit.//
//In fact, the Community also has a role in other
questions on the summit agenda, including energy, nuclear non-
proliferation, and aid to Portugal--where the Commission is try-
ing to be helpful to US efforts by promoting a new EC lending
facility. Restrictions on Jenkins' participation could detract
from the development of "European" positions on these issues.//
/Another potential source of discomfort to the
West Europeans not invited to the summit may be the quadripar-
tite meeting set for the third day to discuss Berlin and German
matters, from which not only the Community but also Italy, Can-
ada, and Japan are excluded. The countries not included in the
quadripartite meeting recognize the legitimacy of this four-
power session, usually held along with a NATO ministerial meet-
ing, but suspect that political discussions among the four may
be more far-ranging and substantial than those at the summit
itself.//
//The Commission believes that the differing lev-
e s or economic well-being among member countries are a key ob-
stacle to West European unity. In order to help recovery in the
weaker member states, it favors expansionary economic policies
in West Germany--and in Japan and the US. The Commission advo-
cates restrictive policies for Italy, the UK, and France; it
believes these countries cannot afford to stimulate more rapid
growth for fear of fueling already rapid inflation.//
//To help slow inflation, the Commission usually
recommends an incomes policy and in some cases manipulation of
exchange rates. To assist in financing balance-of-payments def-
icits, Commission members favor expansion of multinational lend-
ing facilities, and Jenkins will endorse efforts to supplement
the capacity of the International Monetary Fund to aid deficit
countries.//
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I //The Commission, although under protectionist
pressure om various industries as well as some member govern-
ments, strongly endorses liberal trade policies. It has blunted
attempts to retaliate against the US for imposing quotas on im-
ports of specialty steel and has publicly applauded President
Carter's decision on footwear. Although Commission members
talked tough earlier this year in order to put pressure on
Tokyo to reduce its huge trade surplus, they have avoided re-
taliatory measures by seeking to negotiate voluntary restraints
with the Japanese.//
//The EC has long believed that the US was holding
I
up progress in multilateral trade negotiations, particularly by
insisting on treating agricultural tariff reductions in conjunc-
tion with reductions for other goods. While the Commission has
acknowledged that the time for procedural disputes is past, it
will nonetheless resist making concessions on agricultural pro-
ducts to gain concessions on manufactured goods. In the Commis-
sion's view, concessions on agricultural tariffs would weaken
the Common Agricultural Policy, the Community's major accom-
plishment toward economic union.//
I //The Commission is receptive toward, but still
wary o t, recent US initiatives on grain trade and reserves.
Since the Commission always has maintained that grain reserves
should be used in part as a price stabilization mechanism, it
sees US willingness to discuss stabilization as a step in the
right direction. It would argue, however, for price ranges that
would not require any adjustment in prices of heavily subsidized
goods.//
//The Commission has been critical of the continual
pressure world oil supplies and prices caused by growing US
import demand and is pleased by the announcement of a major US
conservation effort. Mindful that even with North Sea oil and
nuclear power, the EC countries still will depend on foreign
oil for some 40 percent of their energy supplies by 1985, the
Commission has been pressing for the adoption of policies that
would reduce heavy dependence on oil imports. It hopes the US
initiative will persuade member states to adopt a new conserva-
tion program it plans to submit in June.//
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//On nuclear issues, the Commission shares the
view of t e member states that the US must make a clear distinc-
tion between nonproliferation matters and the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. It has welcomed recent assurances that the US
delay in shipping highly enriched uranium for research reactors
will not be prolonged.//
//On North-South issues, the Commission generally
has ro a middle road between the Dutch and the conservative
West Germans. The commissioners were gratified by the decision
of EC heads of government in March to support some kind of com-
mon fund to finance commodity buffer stocks.//
/To spur the EC to take the initiative rather
than be a rollower, the Commission proposed a plan for sta-
bilizing the export earnings of developing nations long before.
the West Germans submitted a similar one for consideration by
the Community. The Commission expects the EC to introduce such
a plan later this month during meetings of the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation.
MAURITANIA: Guerrilla Raid
An attack by Polisario Front guerrillas on Mauri-
anta s vztaZ iron ore mining facilities near Zouerate on Sun-
day was the most serious guerrilla incursion inside Mauritania
since the raid on the capital city of Nouakchott last June.
The attack underscores Mauritania's vulnerability to continuing
guerrilla harassment and will increase domestic concern over
the government's ability to deal with the Algerian-based Poli-
sario Front.
I I The guerrillas, who oppose the Moroccan-Mauritanian
partition of Western Sahara, killed two French expatriate
employees and apparently kidnaped a Mauritanian and six French
workers. All French dependents have been evacuated from Zouerate.
The Polisario did considerable damage to the mining
aci i ies with mortar fire. A fuel depot was destroyed, and a
power station and one of three iron ore conveyer belts were
badly damaged. The primary impact of the raid however, will
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be psychological. The Mauritanians have stockpiled a three-month
supply of iron ore at the port of Nouadhibou to minimize the
economic impact of such guerrilla attacks.
The attack may have been timed to upset the quarterly
meeting of the French-Mauritanian economic commission, which
had been scheduled to convene in Nouakchott this week. The US
embassy now expects the meeting to be postponed. The guerrillas
may increase their harassment this month to demonstrate that
the Front, four years after its founding, has become a more
credible military force.
Since early February, the guerrillas have shown a
greater willingness to attack Mauritanian positions in force
and occasionally have inflicted significant casualties. The
guerrillas usually take advantage of seasonal sandstorms or
approaching darkness to elude pursuit, aadding to the Mauritanian
militar 's frustration with the seemingly endless guerrilla
war.
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