NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 9, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday April 9, 1977 CG NIDC 77-82C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturda April 9, 1977.
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T e a e is tor e p o s e =-=rfzyj7~~
senior US officials.
Beginning April 7, NID Cable articles will have a lead,
summary paragraph to assist the reader in scanning the cable.
CONTENTS
ZAIRE: Situation Report
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Day of Struggle
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PHILIPPINES: Referendum
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ZAIRE: Situation Report
Moroccan troops began arriving in Zaire
roops defend the key mining center of Kolwezi
a major objec-
,
tive of the Katangan invaders. Moroccan troops may also be sent
to forward positions along the main road to the west of Kolwezi
so they can be brought to bear before the Katangans reach the
town's outskirts.
The Zairian military's main shortcoming since the in-
vasion began last month has clearly been an unwillingness to
fight. The infusion of Moroccan troops into Shaba may stiffen
Zairian resistance to the invaders and perhaps even provide the
government with the means to counterattack.
Moroccan aroun
are Considered
they are used
in a defensive role or can employ conventional tactics, they
should be effective against the Katangans.
I IThe Moroccans may. run into difficulties, however,. if
e Katangans rely heavily on such guerrilla tactics as am-
bushes, sniping, and night fighting. Over the past year, at-
tempts by Moroccan forces to fight a guerrilla war against the
Polisario Front in Western Sahara have been largely ineffective,
and it is possible that, if confronted with similar tactics in
Shaba, the Moroccans will lose interest in aiding the Zairians.
The Moroccans will most likely be used to help Zairian
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While Moroccan troops are arriving in Zaire, the
Katang are again pushing eastward in Shaba.
arentl
ans app Y
Jews of-the impen i.ng arri -
roccan troops may give renewed impetus to the Katangan drive.
e is now receiving military assistance from
i
Z
r
//
a
France, Belgium, and Morocco, with the possiblity of Egyptian
support to come when the high-level Egyptian team now in Kin-
shasa returns to Cairo next week with its report. China is also
sending an aircraft and a ship, probably carrying military equip-
ment. Nonmilitary assistance, mostly food, has been sent by
Uganda and Ivory Coast.//
rocco King Hassan's decision to send troops
M
o
motivated by a desire to demonstrate
tiall
y
to Zaire was par
his solidarity with moderate African states, such as Zaire,
that have supported Rabat in its continuing dispute with Al-
geria over Western Sahara. Rabat has announced that the troops
were sent in response to Zaire's appeal to the members of the
OAU for assistance. The Moroccans also probably hope that their
support for Zaire will result in future diplomatic support or
additional arms sales from the US and other Western powers.//
Belgium, and Egypt have all
France
,
//Morocco,
been deeply concerned over the spread of Soviet influence in
Africa since the Cuban intervention in Angola. In what they
perceive as the inability of the US to provide direct military
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assistance to Zaire, these countries apparently concluded that
a more meaningful West European advisory role, coupled with
relatively well-trained troops from moderate North African
states, could serve to bail the Zairian President out of his
predicament in Shaba.//
I
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SPAIN: Day of Struggle
I I Several Basque political parties plan to go ahead
wz pu is celebrations of Basque National Day in Vitoria to-
morrow, despite a government order prohibiting the gathering.
The government cited the likelihood that extremist groups,
which have called for "a day of struggle," would threaten pub-
lic order. Confrontations between the Basques and Spanish secu-
rity forces are likely.
Many Basque prisoners are still in jail, despite
assurances the Basques say they had from Prime Minister Suarez
that the prisoners would be free by tomorrow; this also is
playing into the hands of extremists. Relatives of the prisoners
began a hunger strike in Vitoria this week to publicize their
goal of total amnesty.
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PHILIPPINES: Referendum
I IOnZy about a week remains before a referendum is
e on self-government for the 13 southwestern provinces of
the Philippines, including five with strong Muslim majorities.
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President Marcos has all but assured the Christian majority in
the southern Philippines that the central government has not
altered its traditional position and is not about to allow
genuine autonomy in the south.
I IThe Muslim rebels probably realize that the most
ey can ope for in the referendum on April 17 is for the
five provinces with strong Muslim majorities to elect autonomy.
The questions on the referendum allow individual provinces the
right-to opt out of the proposed autonomous region.
I ILeaders of the Moro National Liberation Front, the
-us im separatists' political organization, have not yet ac-
cepted the agreement on establishing an autonomous region
reached by Libyan President Qadhafi and Marcos' wife in mid-
March.
In accordance with the agreement, Marcos has offered
15 Muslim rebel leaders, including the Moro National Liberation
Front leader, posts in an interim provisional government for
the autonomous region, but only a few have responded affirma-
tively thus far.
25X1 The Philippine government may yet postpone the refer-
enaum 1 arcos considers there is a risk of renewed hostili-
ties. The Philippine armed forces remain on alert, and radical
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Muslims are preparing to fight if the agreement fails.
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