NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010048-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: March 28, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Pr AV.. AV AV AV AV AV AV AV AV AAF
1
IA-RDP79T00975A02990Q(d~0,.7 ~6e8c ret
~~UU ,
(Security Classification) 25X1
CONTROL NO.
0
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
Monday March 28, 1977 CG ATIDC 77-071C 0
0
State Dept, review completed
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret 25
(SecurityY
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029 00010D 8-8
Adw AW AAV Adw Adw Adw AW Adw 4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010048-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010048-8
 Approved For ReI4
National Intelligence, Dail Cable for Monday, March 28, 1977.
The i a e is tor e
urosp
pe o in orming
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
THAILAND: Coup Attempt
Page 1
THAILAND: Situation Report
Page 3
INDIA: Cabinet
PAKISTAN: General Strike
Page 4
Page 6
CUBA: Castro-in Angola
Page 8
INTERNATIONAL: US 200-Mile Fishing Zone
Page 9
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A049900010048-8
 Approved For Re
THAILAND: Coup Attempt
//The former deputy commander of the Thai army,
General C a at Hiranyasiri, launched an unsuccessful attempt to
seize control of the Thai government early today. Supported by
elements of the Ninth Division, Chalat seized Supreme Command
Headquarters, the Tactical Operations Center, and Radio Thai-
land--all in Bangkok. Although the rebels appealed for support
from other units, they were joined by only one battalion, in
which Chalat's son was an officer.//
//The Chalat group named the current deputy com-
mander of the army, General Prasert, as its leader and issued
communiques in his name, but he was apparently an unwilling hos-
tage, along with the army chief of staff. The First Division
commander, Major General Arun Thawatsin, was killed by the reb-
els.//
//Chalat has threatened to move against the govern-
ment on earlier occasions. His maneuvering a year ago was defused
by the opposition-of the King. His alleged coup plotting last
October against the new military council brought about his abrupt
retirement from the army. Although this incident was short-lived,
it will put further strains on the political stability of the
country. F7 I
Approved For Re
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010048-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010048-8
 Approved For Rel
THAILAND: Situation Report
Taiwan has balked at accepting the five Thai army
officers who led the abortive coup attempt on Saturday. Ap-
proaches to other countries in the region have brought similar
rejections.
Following these unsuccessful attempts to exile the
o. icers, the government reportedly will try them on charges of
treason.
I IIn order to secure the release of two high-ranking
nos ages eld by the rebels--deputy army commander General
Prasert and army Chief of Staff General Pralong--the Thai gov-
ernment agreed to safe passage out of the country for retired
General Chalat and the four other officers who led the rebel-
lion. The five now are being held in a "safe place," which the
US embassy believes may be the army's special warfare center
near Bangkok.
The government has announced plans for a thorough
investigation of the affair, which may implicate others.
//Chalat's move with such a limited force--some 300 men--and
with no initialasupport from the critical Bangkok garrison ex-
cept for his son's battalion, seems ill-planned and impetuous. 25X1
He may, however, have thought he had prior understandings with 25X1
key Bangkok troop commanders.
//Chalat's initial attempt to conceal his own role
by naming General Prasert as the leader of the coup attempt was
probably designed to give a sense of legitimacy to the rebel
cause. The government's early announcement that Prasert was an
unwilling hostage, which called into question the rebellion's
Approved For R$Iease 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A
 Approved Fora Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T009f75A029900010048-8
leadership and intentions, probably gave pause to any would-be
allies. Moreover, the murder of General Arun Thawathasin, com-
mander of the First Division who is close to the royal family,
undoubtedly cooled any nascent impulses to join the rebels.//
//Dissatisfaction in the army has simmered since
direct military rule was ended by the student rebellion in 1973.
It has been fed by the absence of strong leadership in the army
and sustained by the ambiguity of its political role since the
coup last October. Although a military council guides and checks
the current civilian regime, many in the army argue for a
stronger and more direct military role.//
//While Chalat was clearly attempting to exploit
these feelings, his action was essentially spurred by his own
excessive ambition and frustration. Lacking what have been the
essential ingredients of successful intervention--the ,support
of the First Division, acquiescence of the King, a general con-
sensus among the top military leadership and their perception
of a recept ublic mood--Chalat's coup was foredoomed to
failure.// ive
INDIA: Cabinet
I I Prime Minister Desai has apparently resolved the dif-
erences among leaders of the disparate groups supporting him,
and the remaining members of the new Indian cabinet will be
sworn in today. The difficulties with the cabinet, which arose
over a fairly minor matter, do not augur well for the govern-
ment's ability to handle more serious problems.
The dispute arose over the manner in which Desai was
selected. Members of his Janata Party and Jagjivan Ram's party
had planned to elect the prime minister and to act as a single
party in parliament. At the last minute J. P. Narayan and an-
other elder statesman intervened and, in effect, appointed Desai
prime minister.
I Socialist leader Fernandes publicly criticized the
method o selection and Ram--who had been a candidate for prime
minister--refused to participate in the government or to merge
Approved ForiRelease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T0097fA029900010048-8
 Approved For RO
his party with Janata. After a major effort to soothe Ram, re-
portedly including the promise of the deputy prime ministership,
Ram apparently relented and a list of cabinet ministers was
released late Friday.
Ram changed his mind almost immediately, however, and
ministers from both his party and the socialists failed to at-
tend the swearing in ceremony on Saturday. A public plea from
Narayan subsequently brought Ram around, and he will serve as
defense minister.
I IThe main consideration in selecting the cabinet ap-
pears to have been distributing ministries in rough proportion
to the strength of the various groups that supported Desai and
awarding the most important portfolios to their leaders. The
four parties--from Hindu nationalists to Marxist Socialists--
that make up Janata and Ram's party each received about the
same number of portfolios. The Marxist Communists--who are dis-
tant allies--were not included in the cabinet.
I The appointment of Atal Behari Vajpayee as External
Affairs minister is probably more indicative of the need to
give the leader of the Hindu nationalists an important portfo-
lio than it is of the future direction of India's foreign pol-
icy. Vajpayee's Jana Sangh party has consistently favored a
hard line in foreign policy, and has not been particularly
friendly to the great powers. His appointment is likely to cause
concern in Islamabad, where many believe that the Jana Sangh
favors the conquest of Pakistan.
State politics may pose the most immediate test of
the new government's unity. Congress party governments through-
out north India are in serious trouble; should they fall, the
selection of candidates for state elections could cause consid-
erable friction among Desai supporters. Two regionalist parties
are probably supporting him mainly to have a free hand in form-
ing governments in their home states--Tamil Nadu and the Punjab.
Although there is no immediate prospect of trouble, control of
states by regional parties and Congress governments in most of
south India could eventually lead to, major difficulties.
Desai faces more immediate problems in Kashmir and
West Bengal. Serious trouble could erupt in Kashmir, where po-
litical groups range from a minority that favors union with
Approved For Rel$ase 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0;9900010048-8
 Approved Forl
Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975 029900010048-8
Pakistan through most Muslims, who would like greater autonomy,
to a large Hindu minority that fears Muslim oppression. The
state's chief minister--who has spent most of the past 30 years
in jail for advocating greater autonomy for Kashmir--resigned
and called for new elections after the Congress Party withdrew
its support of his government. Rioting has broken out in the
state capital.
25X1
The general strike on Saturday to protest the opening
of the National Assembly probably succeeded in encouraging the
opposition to continue its campaign to bring down Prime Minister
Bhutto. Major cities were paralyzed, but violence was scattered
and the security situation is still far from the conditions in
which the military might consider removing the prime minister.
The US embassy believes that any chance for compromise
ee weenBhutto and his opponents disappeared even before the
strike. Bhutto has made it clear that he will use repressive
measures to keep himself in power. He has arrested almost all
major opposition leaders, and thousands of their followers are
reportedly under detention. The two most troublesome cities-
Karachi and Hyderabad--are under military control, and Bhutto
seems willing to use the army elsewhere if necessary.
Approved Forl
 Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T0097PA029900010048-8
The opposition alliance seems determined to continue
its campaign against him. It apparently believes that any mod-
eration of its demands will weaken its position and has re-
jected all of Bhutto's efforts
ected at
leaders have also 7
designed to win them to his side.
The embassy believes that the opposition's ability to
sustain its campaign is the key question. With its leaders and
many lower level workers in jail, it might have difficulty or-
ganizing further demonstrations. It may lose support because of
the disruption and economic problems the campaign is causing.
Some reports suggest that the opposition is falling
under t e control of more radical leaders and bombings Saturday
turn increasingly to violence. Several aition
could well indicate that at least some members of the opp
have already turned in this direction.
I ;~ The opposition hopes that the army will eventually
remove utto. The embassy believes, however, that the army is
basically satisfied with Bhutto and that united action by the
military would be hindered by a division between the chairman
of the joint chiefs--who owes his job to Bhutto--and the army
chief of staff.
I I The army might still act against Bhutto if it faced
the a ernative of having to shoot olafar rge bnumbers of its fellow
Punjabis. The opposition has not decisive campaign in the Punjab. Rawalpindi. has been far
quieter than in 1969. There have been violent confrontations
in Lahore, but police have been able to contain demonstrators
fairly easily. Clashes have been more serious in Lyyallpurnand
Multan, but have not been serio ire placi
25X1
either city under army control.
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ag29900010048-8
 Approved For a ease - 029900010048-8 25X1
CUBA: Castro in Angola
Cuban President Castro's visit to Angola continues
into its sixth day today. He may yet go on to Zambia, although
no date for his arrival has been announced. Soviet President
Podgorny is scheduled to depart Zambia tomorrow.
Approved For F9elease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T0097gA029900010048-8
 Approved For Rele
I I Castro has spent most of his time addressing crowds
in Angolan cities and taking part in ceremonial occasions.
Yesterday, Castro and Angolan President Neto attended a rally
in Luanda marking the first anniversary of Angola's victory
over South African forces.
I I During the rally, Castro emphatically denied what he
ca e alse accusations" from Zaire that Cuban officers are
leading the Katangan invaders or that Cuba has provided either
weapons or training to the rebels. He also said his country will
continue to furnish military aid to Angola, and to station Cuban
soldiers there--despite US "demands" for their withdrawal.
INTERNATIONAL: US 200-Mile Fishing Zone
I If the US strictly enforces regulations and quotas in
the recently imposed 200-mile fishing zone, the fish catch
by foreign nations off US coasts will be cut by nearly 30 per-
cent in 1977.
I US coastal waters, which are among the richest in the
world, have been heavily overfished in recent years. Under the
new quotas, foreign fleets will be allowed to catch only 2.1
million tons of fish during 1977, down 29 percent from the 2.9
million tons reported in 1975. Actual catches, particularly by
major fishing nations, probably have been much higher than re-
ported.
The Soviet fishing fleet, the world's largest and most
aggressive, will be among the hardest hit. Under. the current
allocations, the USSR has been assigned a quota of 649,000
tons, a decrease of 29 percent from its officially reported
take in 1975.
I I This reduction will not have a great impact on the
total Soviet take. During 1975, the Soviet catch in US waters
was only 9 percent of its worldwide production of 9.9 million
tons. The USSR will, however, be hit hard by the, worldwide pro-
liferation of 200-mile fishing zones; 91 percent of its total
catch comes from foreign waters.
Approved For Rel+ase 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900010048-8
 Approved Fot Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T009751A029900010048-8
Fish are an important source of animal protein in the
USSR. In 1975, fish comprised roughly 15 percent of the animal
protein in the average Soviet citizen's diet.
I I The USSR could lessen the impact of a reduced fish
catch on its citizens' diet, but only at the expense of badly
needed foreign exchange. Fish exports have risen sharply in
recent years to roughly 500,000 tons, while imports have re-
mained low.
Japan, with the largest fish catch in the world, will
fare considerably better than the Soviets under the US quotas.
Although Japan received the second largest cut, it still will
be allowed to harvest about 1.2 million tons of fish in US
coastal waters this year, a reduction of only 15 percent from
its reported take in 1975. Japan also will be less affected
than the Soviets by the establishment of 200-mile fishing
zones by other countries because only about 4-5 percent of its
catch comes from foreign waters.
Several-smaller nations that have depended heavily on
US is eries also will suffer substantial losses. Poland,
which has been taking about 30 percent of its total catch from
US coastal waters, will be allowed about 40 percent of previ-
ous levels in 1977. East German fisherman took more than a
quarter of their catch--some 85,000 tons--in US waters during
1975; their 1977 quota has been cut to 20,000 tons.
I I Enforcement of the fishing zone is a formidable but
not impossible task. Fishing vessels will continue to use es-
tablished patterns and known fishing grounds within the fish-
ing zone, so observation of foreign fishing operations can be
concentrated in certain areas. Random surveillance of other
areas will show development of new fisheries.
Until more sophisticated tracking equipment can be
used an until US observers are placed on all foreign Ships in
the zone, some overfishing can be expected. If violations are
detected, the US has the authority to seize the offending for-
eign vessel and bring it into port. The vessel would be subject
to a fine, loss of its catch, and possible exclusion from US
waters.
Approved For
 pr J~ AIF AIF AW AW AW AAW AW AW AIF
Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010048-8
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
1
0
i
r
1
Top Secret
(SecurigPWGQ *idaffmnRelease 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010048-8
AW