NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010034-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 19, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday March 19, 1977 CG NIDC 77-064C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
State Dept 40KW 8 t 9se 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00975AO2990001 Q0C -3 cation)
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National Intelligence Dail Cable for Saturday March 19, 1977
e D Ca e is or the purpose o in orming
senior o icials.
CONTENTS
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: D
issidents and the Regime
Page 3
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Mil
itary Situation
Page 4
CONGO: Assassination of President
Page 6
PAKISTAN: Demonst
rations in Major Cities
Page 7
SOMALIA: Red Sea
Summit Planned
Page 9
FRANCE: Municipal
Election Runoff
Page 10
SPAIN: Reaction t
o Amnesty Decree
Page 12
GREECE-TURKEY: Military Exercise Page 13
V
INTERNATIONAL: Law of the Sea Page 14
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dissidents and the Regime
Zdenek Horeni, the deputy editor of the Czechoslovak
party daily, recently discussed with the US ambassador the re-
gime's policy toward dissidents; he is the first Czechoslovak
official willing to do so with a US diplomat.
Horeni, however, broke no new ground. He began by not-
ing that the US added "quite a new dimension" to bilateral rela-
tions when the State Department issued its statement in January
supporting the dissidents. He rejected the statement as intoler-
able interference in his country's internal affairs, as the
Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry had done earlier.
The newspaper official declared that Czechoslovak
strategy is to "isolate" the signers of the Charter 77 manifesto.
Asked whether the regime would use expulsion, imprisonment, or
simply propaganda attacks, Horeni did not rule out the possibil-
ity of bringing the Chartists to trial.
The Charter 77 document, he maintained, is an "illegal
pamphlet because it was issued by an organized movement not
registered with the government. He hinted that the signers
might be charged with "espionage" or treason because of the
challenge that their activities pose to the country's political
system.
Horeni did not foreclose less severe options. He made
vague references to possible "reconciliation" and reiterated
the government's earlier statement that the signers were free
to emigrate. Horeni also maintained the regime's assertion that
no dissident has been arrested only for signing the manifesto,
although some had been jailed for other illegal acts.
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ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Military Situation
situation in the Shaba region of Zaire. Zairian military units
apparently still hold Mutshatsha and Kolwezi on the road to
Lubumbashi.
There has been little new reporting on the military
I The weather is probably a significant factor affecting
troop movements. I Ia Zairian 25X1
unit that started tor Sandoa several days ago became mired in
mud from the heaviest rains in 15 years in that area. Even in
good weather, the drive from Mutshatsha to Kolwezi can take up
to four hours. Both the advance of the Katangans and reinforce-
ment by the Zairians will clearly take considerable time.
In addition to the weather and the poor transportation
network, the Zairian military is continuing to have communica-
tions difficulties throughout the Shaba area, particularly
with forward units. Moreover, the US defense attache reports
that Zairian intelligence on the Katangan force is abysmal.
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The Angolans may want to guard against a possible
airian is rike in retaliation for the Shaba invasion--earlier
this month Luanda publicly asserted that Zaire would mount a
large military operation against Angola later this year.
Angolan press yesterday reported that Zairian-based guerrillas
had massacred civilians in Angola.
It is also possible the Angolans are preparing an at-
tack of their own into the Bas-Zaire region to retaliate for
continued Zairian support for National Front activities. The
he must significantly reduce the insurgency in order to get
the economy back on its feet and restore some semblance of
social order.
Angolan President Neto has clearly embarked on a
strong course of action to reduce his serious insurgency prob-
lem, which he realizes will take years to eliminate. He knows
Yesterday Luanda announced the impending visit of
Cuban President Fidel Castro to Angola. The timing is still
not known--Castro will be in Tanzania at least until Monday,
and then apparently is scheduled to visit Mozambique. His first
trip to Angola, particularly at this time, is likely to be the
occasion for important statements on Cuba's Africa policy.
against "Soviet-hired" troops from Angola. The article also
suggested that the Soviets tried to use the invasion to sabo-
tage the Afro-Arab summit conference earlier this month. It
carefully avoided any mention of Cuban involvement in the Zaire
action.
Peking made its first authoritative public statement
supporting Kinshasa's handling of the invasion yesterday. A
"People's Daily" article praised Zaire's "heroic counterattacks"
I Mobutu has told the US ambassador that Zaire is asking
Nigeria to take the lead in calling for an investigation of the
Shaba invasion by the Organization of African Unity. Nigeria
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has apparently offered its good offices regarding Zaire's prob-
lems with Angola; the Nigerians may have some influence in
Luanda because of their past strong support for Neto. Mobutu
has also asked the Belgians and French to suggest diplomatic
steps to help ease the crisis, and both reportedly agree that
the OAU initiative is the proper course. 25X1
CONGO: Assassination of President
Brazzaville radio this morning announced the death of
Congo ese President Marien Ngouabi, who was shot yesterday by
members of his guard. The announcement said an 11-man military
committee is now running the government.
//Ngouabi had been in power since leading a mil-
itary coup in 1968. The assassination may well have been part
of a plot by some of his disgruntled associates. Ngouabi's stand-
ing had eroded considerably in recent months because of his 25X1
failure to come to grips with the country's steadily deterio-
rating economic situation, and he had come under open criticism
from some members of the government.
the government has been having difficu ies in meeting its pay-
roll for government employees, including the military.//
I The country--already tribally and ideologically di-
va e --may be headed for a power struggle and a period of pro-
tracted turmoil. 25X1'
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PAKISTAN: Demonstrations in Major Cities
The security situation in Pakistan may be worsening
0 owing the arrest of five opposition leaders on Thursday and
Friday. According to press reports, demonstrations--all of which
resulted in clashes with the police--were held Friday in all
major cities.
25X1 The opposition has denounced the National Assembly
e ection of March 7 as fraudulent and is demanding Prime Minis-
ter Bhutto's resignation and new elections. Shortly before the
arrests they rejected Bhutto's proposal for talks and announced
major demonstrations for Friday.
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I I Bhutto had appeared to be trying to avoid any strong
action against opposition leaders. On Monday, for example, when
opposition leaders courted arrest, the police either ignored
them or detained them only briefly. Bhutto is certainly aware
of the dangers of his tougher policy. His own arrest in late
1968 contributed to the ferment that brought down President
Ayub Khan a few months later.
Bhutto may have ordered the arrests to limit violence
on Fri ay, a Muslim holy day on which demonstrations were like-
ly to draw more participants. If so, he might release the op-
position leaders quickly and limit the damage.
On the other hand, if Bhutto has concluded that he
osition's campaign only with strong measures,
o
th
pp
e
can counter
he has risked giving his opponents the issue they need to bring
him down.
h t mi ht have been somewhat encouraged by his
B
t
u
o g
ability to control the situation in 1975 after arresting Wali
Khan. Wali--whose wife was arrested Thursday--was the most
prominent opposition leader at that time, but his support was
limited to the two provinces on the Afghan border and many
Pakistanis believed he was plotting to break up the nation.
F r air force commander Asghar Khan, the most pro-
or me
minent of those arrested late Thursday, emerged as the leading
opposition spokesman during the recent election campaign. He
draws most of his support from the heavily populated provinces
which will determine Bhutto's political survival. The retired
air marshal is widely regarded as one of the few politicians
with strong principles and still commands considerable loyalty
in the military.
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Sudanese President Numayri is visiting Somalia prior
to a meeting with the leaders of Somalia and North and South
Yemen in Taiz, North Yemen, scheduled for Tuesday. Numayri, who
clearly has full Saudi Arabian and Egyptian backing, will urge
the South Yemenis and Somalis to limit Soviet and leftist influ-
ence in the Red Sea region.
The summit should indicate whether the four countries
are willing to cooperate in efforts to assure the security of
the Red Sea area. It may also give a clue to Somalia's reaction
to the increasing Soviet influence in Ethiopia--Somalia's bitter
enemy. Ethiopia has denounced the summit.
The summit closely follows Cuban President Fidel
Castro s trip to Ethiopia and Somalia, underscoring the fluid
political situation in the southern Red Sea region. In addition
to trying to promote a Somali-Ethiopian reconciliation, Castro
may have tried to dissuade the Somalis from turning to Saudi
Arabia and other wealthy oil states for badly needed economic
assistance.
Saudi Arabia is thinking of offering Somalia up to
$300 million in economic assistance in an effort to draw the
Somalis away from the Soviets. The Saudis are giving South
Yemen economic aid in a similar effort. Saudi support for
Numayri's efforts is suggested by a Sudanese newspaper report
that Sudanese Foreign Minister Khalid, who is traveling with
Numayri, will go to Riyadh directly from Taiz immediately fol-
lowing the summit.
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Numayri's Red Sea security offensive presents Somali
President Siad with the need to make some immediate choices. If
Siad should refuse to attend the meeting in Taiz, he would risk
further isolating Somalia from its Arab neighbors. Turning his
back on the efforts of moderate, pro-Western Arab states to
transform the Red Sea into an "Arab lake" would also jeopardize
his hopes for economic assistance from them.
Should Siad attend, however, he would be clearly sig-
naling the Soviets of his disapproval of their growing ties with
Ethiopia, and that he has other friends.
Numayri is laying the groundwork for the summit with
his current visit with Siad in Mogadiscio. He will move on to
Aden for talks with South Yemeni Presidential Council Chairman
Ali and North Yemeni President Hamdi tomorrow and Monday.
I
FRANCE: Municipal Election Runoff
The second round of voting tomorrow in the French mu-
nicipa elections will pit the unified center-right forces of
the governing coalition against united leftist slates in 65
cities with populations of over 30,000. The result of the run-
off will significantly shape public opinion and help determine
strategies for next year's parliamentary election.
The Socialist and Communist opposition has managed to
stick together for the most part and has agreed to present sin-
gle lists in nearly all cities where its candidates competed
against each other in the first round. How many voters will
shift their votes from one leftist party to another remains to
be seen, however. The governing coalition has agreed to run sin-
gle slates in all but a few cities where two competing conser-
vative lists threaten to give victories to the left.
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About 78 percent of eligible voters participated in
the first round. The second round may bring out additional con-
servative voters concerned about gains by the left in the first
round. How the ecologist vote--10 percent in Paris but only 2
percent in the nation as a whole--is distributed will be impor-
tant in the capital and a few other cities.
The first round made it painfully clear that President
iscar will have to abandon his long-held hope of building a
new majority around the center by lopping off a portion of the
right-wing Gaullists and attracting moderate Socialists. The
governing coalition will need all the Gaullist votes it can get
if it is to check the left, which won 52 percent of the vote in
the larger cities and gained control in 32 cities previously
held by the governing coalition. The centrists as a whole did
badly; if this trend is confirmed by the second round, it is
likely to result in some cabinet changes.
mayor (responsible for the budget) in return for the Independent
Republicans supporting Chirac in the Paris city council's vot-
ing for mayor. They agreed only that each will withdraw his list
in those districts where the other had come out ahead.
In Paris, Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac has refused
to give Minister of Industry d'Ornano the post of assistant
I IChirac, who is virtually assured of the mayoralty be-
cause of his list's lead over d'Ornano's, has indicated that his
deputies will not create any problems when parliament reconvenes
that might lead to an early election. Gaullist Secretary General
Jerome Monod has admitted that the party needs a year to prepare
itself for the contest with the left next spring.
Chirac continues to insist, however, that the good
showing of the right in Paris, as opposed to elsewhere, is due
to his tactic of confronting the left rather than following Gis-
card's more conciliatory approach. The relationship between Gis-
card and his former prime minister promises to be thorny despite
their need to work together. A conservative victory in the mod-
erate stronghold of Paris, culminating in Chirac's election as
mayor, may prove more bitter for Giscard than the defeat of his
coalition elsewhere in France.
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SPAIN: Reaction to Amnesty Decree
Spain's troubled Basque provinces have given a posi-
tive but guarded reaction to the broadened amnesty decree pub-
lished on Thursday. The government issued the amnesty in part
as an effort to restore calm to the area, which recently has
been the scene of bitter clashes between Basque extremists and
the Civil Guard; the effect of the amnesty will rest in large
part on how soon and how widely the government chooses to
implement the new measures.
The new decree extends the royal amnesty of last July
to all prisoners not convicted of murder or crimes of bodily
harm. Those imprisoned for "blood crimes" will have their
sentences reduced by periods of up to 12 years. The government
also has reserved the power to pardon, commute sentences, or
grant conditional liberty to those convicted of crimes not
covered by other provisions of the amnesty.
The government thus appears to have broad latitude to
meet even the most extreme Basque demands for the early release
of the nearly 200 political prisoners. It feels constrained to
move cautiously, however, in order not to upset conservative
members of the military.
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Although responsible Basque leaders have reacted fa-
vora y to the amnesty, they insist it must be implemented ex-
peditiously if it is to help restore calm to the area between
now and parliamentary elections this summer. The amnesty's ef-
fectiveness has been undercut by a wave of violence in the
Basque provinces which has resulted in four deaths since
March 8. Basque extremist groups have threatened further retali-
ation for the Civil Guard slaying of two suspected terrorists
last week and subsequent Civil Guard brutality against demon-
strators.
Civil Guard. The new head of the Civil Guard is considering
moving his command posts out of the major population centers
in a possible effort to reduce the likelihood of future serious
The cycle of violence is likely to continue until the
government can dampen the hatred between the Basques and the
GREECE-TURKEY: Military Exercise
//Tensions between Greece and Turkey may increase
wi the beginning next week of Turkey's annual series of air
and naval exercises aimed in part at underscoring its substan-
tially increased claims in the Aegean.//
//As with earlier exercises, the one scheduled for
March 21 to 28 will be held over international waters, but it
has drawn Greek protests because it will interrupt communica-
tions between the Greek mainland and the easternmost Greek is-
lands for a considerable time. It also ignores a Greek claim
to sovereignty over a 10-mile airspace around Greek islands,
which the Turks had accepted until 1974. Turkey now acknowledges
only the more traditional six-mile limit.//
Both sides have tended to adopt a rigid approach in
pre-exercise jockeying to protect their respective claims, but
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they have shown more caution during the exercises. The Greeks
have indicated that they may be less tolerant of future Turkish
incursions into Greek-claimed airspace or of being cut off from
their islands, however.
Recent informal discussions in Geneva among partici-
pants in the UN Law of the Sea conference indicate that sub-
stantial differences remain on the issue of deep seabed mining.
This issue has been one of the most contentious in
the Law of the Sea negotiations. The Geneva meeting was called
to present positions and seek compromises on questions con-
nected with seabed mining--access to the seabed, financing of
the proposed international machinery for seabed exploitation,
and production controls--before the next formal session of the
full Law of the Sea conference in May.
I I The division over the issue of seabed mining is
square y drawn between the developed and the developing coun-
tries. The developing countries argue that the seabed and its
mineral nodules are the "common heritage of mankind" and that
any financial benefits from their mining should belong to all
people, primarily the needier nations.
The developing countries have argued that an inter-
national authority with broad and discretionary powers should
be set up to supervise seabed development and eventually to ex-
ploit the seabed exclusively through its own mining entity,
known as the Enterprise.
The demand for exclusive seabed exploitation by the
proposed international body is at the center of the dispute.
The major industrialized states, which alone possess the tech-
nology to mine seabed nodules, insist that any treaty contain
explicit assurances that states and their nationals and corpor-
ations--public and private--will have equal opportunities to
exploit the seabed's resources.
The developed states argue that they have already
granted a major concession to developing-country demands by
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proposing a "banking system." Under this proposal, a mining
entity would apply to the international authority for the right
to mine two tracts; the authority would decide which one of
the two the mining entity could exploit and reserve the second
tract for its own mining activities.
The developing countries do not accept the banking
system as a sufficient compromise. Most developing countries
recognize that, at least for the short term, the financial and
technological resources of the developed states are indispens-
able to seabed mining. The developing states continue to in-
sist, however, that there can be no automatic guarantee of ac-
cess for private entities and that any parallel access--if
some form is eventually worked out--would only be on an interim
basis, probably from 20 to 25 years.
Developing-country demands are accelerating on other
aspects of the seabed mining issue as well. Most conference
participants have informally. accepted the principle of limit-
ing seabed production of nickel to a portion of the growth in
world demand for the mineral. At the Geneva meeting, however,
some leading developing states wanted to impose explicit pro-
duction limits for all nodule minerals--copper, cobalt, manga-
nese, and nickel. These production limits, moreover, would re-
main in effect until comprehensive commodity agreements on all
these minerals are worked out internationally.
The Geneva meetings of the past two weeks reflected
the willingness of the participants to work toward some reso-
lution, even if positions remain far apart. The meetings also
indicate, however, that the longer the seabed mining issues
remain unsettled, the stronger the motivation will become for
the developing states to link limited objectives in the Law of
the Sea negotiations to the broader question of a readjusted
North-South relationship. F7 I 25X1
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