VALIDITY OF ESTIMATES ON SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020027-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 3, 2006
Sequence Number: 
27
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 28, 1964
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020027-2.pdf240.44 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020027-2 EG' ZET. 28 April 1964 R : Dr. Victor Heyman Office of the Assistant Secretary of ` Defence (Comptroller) Validity of Estimates on Soviet Tactical Aircraft Strengths 1. In a reeceut conversation with representatives of this office and of CIA/OR , you requested our written comments an the reasons for revisions in National intelligence :.stinnitees of the strength of Soviet Tactical Aviation in recent years, as well as the reasons underlying current estimates of future trends in Tactical Aviation. As we were all aware at the time of our conversation, recent estimates have contiaed upward revisions in estimated Soviet tactical air strength at present and over the past several years.* The most recent estimate for the future predicts a decline in total strength., but this decline is more gradual than that predicted or implied in earlier estimates. modernisation of the force through the introduction of current and advanced model &Ircraft and the retirement of older model aircraft Is predicted. 2. The national estimates of 1960 and 1961 were heavil influence that the U embarked on a major military reorganization and force reduction, which was to include sharp cuts In theater force manpower and obsolescent equipment. - hilee it still seen s clear that the Soviets iaa needed to carry out substantial reductions, we have found In retrospect that the cuts in Tactical Aviation were Seea the detaile4 review of pertinent estimates since 1959, provided to you by CIA/O.ORR. in h4arch 1964. ,MORI/CDF, dr~l Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020027-2 Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020027-2 SECRET, *cipitous or l loved to s the contributors to national prepared. ak-arTAO reductions rather than car and military roan sons. The notional estimate 1 aircraft h ce redoeti ns #. bore at tacti+ air bases. Ado the craft, is not fly understood, we that they are active and not m+ balled. re. tbuaed retention of older nio atrcra t production and delivery of newer model . The eattviate of *arty 196 aaaastl estate dealing speeci#lt*ll Aviation, w W and as you know, it super this estimate predicts a draddnsl declin five years or so. a c recent Tactical eahna aircraft will be phased + bac eleaaecea does not suggest that the production A will be stopped up to rates comparable . Newer model tactical aircraft are more complicated than their pred.cessors, Lug requirements are greater. ?tons, the improved performance as arena cent ewa missile defene forces. round forces mcertataty ctical Aviation, especially in light of the changes in the Diet progr Factors which might influence the i3.. to maintain a larger force of tactical atrc-raft than we have estimated include: a has account of the avat ty of Communist China; low Soviet confidence in surface-to-air missile systuns to provide grouse forces. the other 3eered, the +er a very sharp cut to tactical air tee cause them to r they instituted to I' ors and reduced international tensions tat eUigeaacs estimates hold is likely to he decisive. Thvio invited warfare with the West; significant make seer toes preparations for the contingency 'T forces in Zurope greater Soviet concern forces are like M various factors conclude that changes In be grradosl rather than drastic. /S/ LN "NI ssistas.t Director National Lsttmate1 Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79R00967AO00900020027-2 ore* r