NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010012-7
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 7, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 NATIONAL INT#rrLIGENC---E DAILY C-A$LE
Monday March 7, 1977 CG NIDC 77-053C 0
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, March 7, 1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose o in orming
senior US o icials.
CONTENTS
ROMANIA: Earthquake Assessment
Page 1
EAST EUROPE: Air Traffic Control Systems
OECD: Lower Trade Surplus
GHANA: Internal Problems
IRAN: Human Rights
NICARAGUA: Somoza Denies Charges
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 10
Page 11
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ROMANIA: Earthquake Assessment
25X1 r The damage resulting from Romania's severe earthquake
on FrlcdL ay is still difficult to assess, but it is sure to add
to the country's existing economic problems. Major industrial
centers and possibly key oil and gas fields have been affected.
Damage to industrial facilities and destruction of
thousan s of houses have been reported. Three petrochemical
complexes are said to have been partly destroyed in Ploesti;
refineries there produce 160,000 barrels per day in products,
about one third of Romania's total refinery capacity. Approxi-
mately 300 oil wells were damaged in the Ploesti oil fields,
which account for about 40 percent of Romania's oil production,
or 120,000 barrels per day.
In Bucharest--Romania's largest industrial center,
contributing 18 percent of industrial output--three power
plants and a major engineering plant were damaged.
I I The epicenter of the earthquake was about 30 miles
northeast of the Brasov industrial center. Major installations
in this center produce 13 percent of Romanian engineering goods,
such as heavy and light industrial machinery, aircraft, and
railroad equipment, as well as chemicals. We do not know how
much damage was sustained in the Brasov area; major plants ap-
parently were operating yesterday.
There are no reports of destruction in the gas fields
that pro Tice 3.2 billion cubic feet per day and account for
over half of Romania's domestic energy requirements or to the
two gas pipelines passing about 25 miles from the epicenter.
I IA significant slowdown in the production of oil, gas,
and mac inery would be a considerable blow to an already
strained economy and balance of payments. Even before the earth-
quake, Romania was unlikely to meet its overly ambitious eco-
nomic goals, which called for an 8-percent annual rate of
growth during the five-year plan period, 1976 to 1980. Presi-
dent Ceausescu had been counting on large increases in domestic
energy supplies to spur industrial growth.
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If this supply is reduced as a result f th
e ear-
qua e, more oil will have to be imported
Romania'
b
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s
alance of
payments is already in deficit and its hard-currency debt has
risen to $3.2 billion.
I I Ceausescu has asked for emergency aid from the West
and is certain to use the disaster to reiterate past requests
for Western financial help.
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EAST EUROPE: Air Traffic Control Systems
Most East European countries appear to be turning to
the West, especially to the US, for civilian air traffic con-
trol equipment to meet anticipated increases in civil traffic
that cannot be handled by purely manual methods. In addition,
this would allow these countries to operate under International
Civil Aviation Organization standards. There also is evidence
that Warsaw Pact officials have been concerned about getting
an integrated flow of data into their air defense systems on
nonmilitary flights.
I /Czechoslovakia already has a US air traffic
control system in operation, Bulgaria has one on order, and
Poland is negotiating for one. Hungary has shown interest in a
US system but has not yet solicited proposals; Romania appar-
ently prefers a French system. East Germany has yet to show
interest in a Western air traffic control system.//
I I There are minor differences among the various systems
being purchased or under discussion by the East Europeans and
the models of radars and communications equipment varies, but
the systems are essentially the same. They are modest but use
some very good, proven equipment, which undoubtedly was a ma-
jor attraction to the new customers.
In the typical system, primary or skin tracking ra-
ars provide location data on the aircraft, but altitude and
velocity information comes from secondary radars using trans-
ponders on the aircraft. The Czechs are using domestically
produced primary radars for their system, and the Bulgarians
will use Italian ones identical to those proposed for the Swed-
ish system to be used by the USSR.
I
The systems employ commercially available minicomput-
ers fitted with special interfaces to match other equipment in
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the systems. Redundancy of computing equipment is included for
reliability, but no auxiliary storage is provided for automatic
recovery from system failure.
I I The air traffic control systems being purchased can
contribute to Warsaw Pact air defense capabilities by provid-
ing, for the first time, accurate and timely data on the flight
paths of cooperating aircraft. The systems cannot track nonco-
operating aircraft because they rely on transponders on the
aircraft to provide some of the information, such as altitude.
The technological benefits to communist air defense
capabilities from the civilian systems being purchased are apt
to be minimal, although they would provide some systems expe-
rience and software knowledge. The systems' electronic modules
meet military specifications but reverse engineering of the
equipment for military use would be very difficult if not im-
possible.
I I Both the hardware and software of the systems are
tailore to the intended air traffic control uses and it would
require time-consuming major development programs by the re-
cipient countries to extend the air defense roles of the sys-
tems.
The military usefulness of the civilian air traffic
control systems is further decreased because the West controls
the necessary spare parts and other support, which would be
cut off in the event of hostilities. Thorough knowledge of the
systems by the West would also make it eas to take effective
olt-ctronic warfare measures against them. 25X1
OECD: Lower Trade Surplus
The combined trade surplus of the 24 industrialized
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development with the less developed countries that are not mem-
bers of OPEC dropped from $22 billion in 1975 to an estimated
$6 to $8 billion last year.
Preliminary data indicates that OECD imports from
these developing countries rose more than 20 percent last year
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to nearly $80 billion, as economic recovery in the industrialized
countries boosted import demand. Higher coffee and copper prices,
combined with higher demand for these products, contributed to
the increase. OECD exports to these countries were only slightly
higher than the $85 billion achieved in 1975. OECD export prices
remained stable.
The OECD posted a deficit with Argentina last year,
reflecting Argentina's good wheat harvest and aggressive mer-
chandising. Increased purchases of consumer goods--particularly
textiles--also put the OECD in deficit with Taiwan.
The non-OPEC developing countries were able to contain
import growth from the developed countries last year. A good
harvest enabled many countries to cut back agricultural imports
and build grain inventories. India, for example, reduced grain
imports from 7 million tons in 1975 to less than 6 million tons
last year and has curtailed orders because of inadequate stor-
age.
Many of the larger developing countries, including
Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, restricted imports to prevent
further erosion of their international credit positions.
The tremendous trade improvement eases the acute
financial pinch for many developing countries. Their reserves
were up roughly $7 billion in 1976, reflecting in part a
record level of borrowing in private capital markets. The im-
provement in the trade balance also enhances some of the finan-
cial ratios that banks use as indicators of creditworthiness.
A large portion of the trade gain may prove temporary.
Export prices for OECD goods, after remaining stable for a year,
have begun to rise at a 5- to 6-percent annual rate. Several
countries that had used controls to cut their import volumes
may not want to continue controls. Moreover, the level of food
imports will depend on weather conditions, which were favorable
in 1975 and 1976. F7 I 25X1
Ghana's political and economic woes seem to have be-
come more acute over the last few weeks. Although General
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Acheampong's position does not seem immediately threatened,
some kind of antiregime activity could occur without much warn-
ing.
Part of the problem is of Acheampong's own making.
public knowledge in Ghana through an antiregime publication pro-
duced in London and mailed to key people in Ghana.
His use of government funds for personal enrichment is becoming
The economy is in poor shape. Inflation is continuing
at an annual rate of between 70 and 80 percent. Food supplies
are tight, especially in the countryside. Foreign exchange
shortages have led to periodic cutoffs in petroleum shipments
from Nigeria and the USSR. The resulting gasoline shortages in
Accra have caused widespread public displeasure.
Acheampong's move in January to begin the formation
or a union government" that would start the process of return-
ing the country to civilian rule has been strongly criticized
as insufficient by students and the influential bar association.
US and British diplomats in Ghana agree that the
overall outlook for Ghana is grim. Last month, they thought
Acheampong was exercising more authority and the regime appeared
stable, although his popularity was eroding because of economic
problems.
In a recent meeting, the diplomats agreed that there
is no evidence of coup plotting. The Westerners speculated that
if a coup were attempted this year, it would probably involve
younger, relatively unknown officers, as most potential leaders
are closely watched. 25X1
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IRAN: Human Rights
Iran's popular Empress, Farah Diba, has joined in the
government's counterattack against critics of its performance
in the field of human rights. In an interview with a Canadian
journalist, the Empress acknowledged that Iran should have con-
fronted its foreign critics long ago, and reiterated her coun-
try's standard arguments.
--The worldwide campaign against Iran is motivated by
political opponents of the current government and of its
policies, particularly on oil, rather than by an objec-
tive concern with human rights.
--Inquiries by foreign governments about protection of
human rights are both hypocritical and an interference in
Iran's internal affairs.
--The Western media is biased; recent press reports about
torture and death in Iranian jails were fabrications,
while reports that reflect favorably on Iran do not get
published.
I IHoveyda, in his annual address to an American group
in Tehran, emphasized that differences between the US and Iran
are to be expected, but sympathy for Iran's so-called political
prisoners is misplaced. They are, said Hoveyda, criminals who
deserve to be so treated. He denied prisoners are being tortured
and said Iran has opened its jails to certain individuals to
see for themselves.
Hoveyda probably was referring to a British television
team that visited selected Tehran jails last year, and a Belgian
journalist who did the same last month. According to the British
embassy in Tehran, the TV crew found that prison conditions were
not harsh and that a prisoner alleged by Amnesty International
to have been tortured and crippled was alive and walking nor-
mally. The embassy asserted that the team's report has never
been published in the UK.
The Belgian journalist was allowed to visit a major
Tehran prison last month and to interview eight prisoners al-
leged by the Amnesty International branch in Belgium to have
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been mistreated. The journalist reportedly was satisfied he had
seen the individuals he wanted to see and thought that prison
conditions were reasonably good.
I I The Shah has been stung by criticism on human rights
an e ieves it both naive and unfair. His opening of certain
prisons to outsiders and his increased responses to requests
for information in human rights cases demonstrate a willingness
to make improvements in Iran's posture on human rights, but we
foresee little likelihood that he will relax his basic stance
toward political dissidents at home. He is convinced the are
forei n-backed and linked to local terrorist groups. 25X1
NICARAGUA: Somoza Denies Charges
In a discussion with the US ambassador, President
Somoza has denied charges made by US Catholic priests in Nica-
ragua that National Guard troops have indiscriminantly killed
and tortured a number of peasants over the past two years.
The priests accused the regime of massacring 86 ci-
vilians in two recent separate incidents in a remote area north--
east of Managua. They alleged that most of the peasants were
killed because they were suspected of collaborating with the
Sandinist National Liberation Front, a leftist guerrilla group
that has been active sporadically in Nicaragua since 1961.
In the past, the priests have been reliable reporters
of developments in isolated northern areas of Nicaragua. While
some of their allegations may be accurate, it is difficult to
accept them completely because of the second- and third-hand
nature of the information.
Somoza has told the US ambassador that the deaths of
some innocent peasants are one of the unfortunate consequences
of the struggle his government has been waging against the
guerrillas. The National Guard has been conducting an all-out
campaign since 1974 to destroy the guerrilla group.
The President is convinced that the clerics' charges
are par of a campaign by his political opponents and Sandinist
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supporters aimed at discrediting and overthrowing his govern-
ment. Although he clearly is concerned over the effect the
charges will have on his government's relations with. the US,
Somoza showed little interest in conducting a full investiga-
tion.
Somoza believes that the growing criticiser. in the US
o human rights abuses in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the hemi-
sphere will adversely affect broader US interests, alienate
friendly governments, and encourage his enemies' efforts to
undermine his rule.
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