TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000900010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 12, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 February 1964
REVISED DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Trod:: in the World Situation
1. The decade of the 1950's witnessed fundamental changes
in the structure of world power. The development of Soviet long-
range missile capabilities, the Soviet bid for world leadership,
the rise of Communist China, the creation of new nations, rapid
economic development in the advanced nations of the West, and the
birth of the space age -- all altered the outlook for many of the
world's peoples. By the end of that decade -- in contrast to its
beginning -- the US no longer enjoyed military invulnerability,
unchallengeable world power, or unique economic superiority. It
was clear that the world was entering upon a new era. Not only
was there a new political and military relation between the major
powers, but new leaders were '~_vriving upon the scene, political and
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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1O a1/CDF Pages 1 & 3 thru 4r.
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social instability had become epidemic in the southern two-thirds
of the world, and schisms and heresies were appearing within the
Communist camp itself.
2. The first years of the decade of the 1960's have witnessed
the further development of many of the trends in world affairs which
appeared during the 1950's as well as the emergence of several new
ones. The bipolarity of world politics has further declined, the
cm in the underdeveloped areas has intensified, questions
concerning the operation of military deterrents remain, and judgments
regarding the risks involved in international initiatives still
perplex policy makers. Among the new tendencies are mounting
economic difficulties in the Communist states, the increasing
effort of the Soviet leaders to inject a new atmosphere into US-
Soviet relations, and the readiness of the current European leaders
to undertake broader political experiments at home and to explore
new programs and policies abroad. Moreover, the new style brought
by President Kennedy to the conduct of foreign relations, the
erection of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban crisis of October 1962, the
death of President Kennedy, and the succession of Lyndon Johnson
See NIE 1-61, "Estimate of the World Situation," dated
17 January 1961, for a more comprehensive review of the 1950's.
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were all major international events which have had a profound effect
upon international relationships.
3. In the paragraphs which follow we discuss these various
developments under four main headings: (a) the evolving role and
relations of military power; (b) the problems of the Communist
world; (c) emerging tendencies within the advanced non-Communist
states; and (d) problems and trends in underdeveloped areas.
Finally, we discuss the significance of these in terms of the out-
look for US interests and the reduction of international tensions.
4. The military situation in the world today, as it has
been for the past several years, is essentially one in which both
the US and the USSR can inflict enormous damage upon the other. The
US possesses greater striking power than the USSR and could wreak
much greater damage in the USSR than the latter could manate in
the US. Nevertheless, whatever the precise balance of military
power might be, a general nuclear war -- whether brought about by
design, accident, or miscalculation -- would kill many millions of
people, destroy the capital accumulation of many decades, render
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large sections of the earth uninhabitable, and destroy the power
of most of the modern nations of the world.
5. The crucial current questions concerning strategic
military power are not the size, armament, and operational capa-
bilities of opposing military forces, but the manner in which the
US and Soviet leaders now view these forces in relation to their
own objectives and to the will of their opponents. In this age of
mobile striking forces, hardened missile sites, and developing anti-
missile and air defense systems, it does not appear possible to
build a military force capable of destroying an emeny's capabilities
and simultaneously protecting oneself from unacceptable damage.
Even extremely large numbers of bi.ghi-fr s . t weapons would provide
no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if there is any
valid and rational concept today upon which to develop and measure
a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.
6. But one cannot find any rule for determining that a
stated level of forces will deter and that another will not.
Deterrence is a mental state, and it depends to a preponderant
degree not upon a precise level of forces but upon a variety of
other factors such as how the party to be deterred estimates the
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military forces arrayed against him and the balance of military
power, how desperately he wants to achieve a given objective, how
he estimates the determination and will power of his opponent, how
he estimates the chances of a political confrontation leading to
hostilities, and how he estimates the chances of hostilities leading
to a general conflict. While it is most unlikely, for example, that
the Soviet leaders will choose to carry out actions which they know
to carry a high risk of general war, such knowledge is not easy to
come by. On most issues which have arisen or appear likely to
arise, a good deal of uncertainty has been and is likely to be involved.
7. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 has helped to emphasize
the consequences of taking action when uncertain of -- or under
misapprehensions regarding -- the consequences of such action. The
Soviets probably undertook this initiative either in the expectation
that the US would accept it or in the belief that the US reaction
could not be so accurately predicted as to preclude making the
effort. In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the
Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still riding high,
and the US probably appeared to them to be uncertain and cautious.
The US had chosen not to run the political risks necessary to save
the Bay of Pigs expedition, the US had accepted the erection of the
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Berlin Wall with little more than verbal pyrotechnics, and the US
had accepted the neutralist solution in Laos. US formal statements
regarding Cuba conveyed an air of studied uncertainty. In military
planning, despite substantially increased programs of missile deploy-
ment, the US was adv'ccating a greater conventional capability and
a counterinsurgency program. Thus, it probably appeared to the
Soviets that the diplomatic and military stance of the US was that
of a power seeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its con-
sequences, and perhaps therefore a power which could be subjected
to a series of setbacks without high risk of. forceful.resist.ance.
8. The rapidity and magnitude of US mobilization after the
missile installations were identified, and the firmness and
sureness with which President Kennedy dealt with both Khrushchev
and Castro, no doubt surprised both; the misconceptions of the
Soviets were dissolved and the missiles, bombers, and military
forces withdrawn. Thus, the Cuban missile crisis helped to reduce
the uncertainties or misapprehensions under which the Soviets had
operated. The effect is likely to persist for some time, and the
unmistakable effort of President Johnson to demonstrate the continuity
of US policy will contribute to its persistence. But some uncertainty
will always exist; it is in the nature of arms and politics in
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this era. Each situation is to some degree a special one. Other
crises can arise in which the dimensions of interest and determina-
tion on each side will be different, and these differences may
permit uncertainties and misapprehensions to play a critical role
in policy determination.
9. The Cuban affair following upon failure of other Soviet
foreign policy initiatives of the past few years must have caused
the Soviet leaders to become somewhat disillusioned about the value
and uses of the strategic military power which they had striven so
hard to acquire. To be sure, possession of this power contributed
greatly to Soviet prestige and established the USSR in a position
of strength far above that of any other nation except the US. But
the Soviets almost certainly believed that an intercontinental
striking capability plus an arsenal of high-yield nuclear weapons
would bring tangible benefits, preferably in the solution of such
problems as that of Berlin on favorable terms, but at least .'better
bargaining position and a greater capacity to frighten or to'blackmail
smaller powers into acceding to Soviet wishes. This has not occurred;
moreover, the US in response increased the tempo and size of its
own arms program, thus confronting the USSR with the need to pursue
still more costly programs if it was not to fall further behind.
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Thus while strategic military power has become substantial on
both sides, it has not been particularly useful in the achievement
of particular objectives.
10. The acquisition of substantial strategic power by both
sides has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the
achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circum-
scribe the use of other instruments of military power. It has
become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to
project its military power in conventional form into other areas
of the world or into disputes which may arise. Any movement of
military power into a new area -- and particularly into an area
geographically proximate to the other -- tends to be regarded as
one which threatened to upset the world balance of power or to alter
the political alignment in the area concerned.
11. This situation -- namely, the rise of new inhibitions upon
the freedom of action of the great powers both with respect to
brandishing their strategic capabilities and projecting their con-
ventional ones -- has caused the secondary and minor powers to view
their own military capabilities in a more sanguine facia n.. Some of
them, believing that this provided them an opportunity for developing
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greater stature and influence in their own regions, have sought to
acquire modern arms from the great powers; others have developed
their own. Egypt and Indonesia, for example, have very substantially
improved their capabilities through the acquisition of Soviet arms.
France embarked upon a nuclear weapons program in the apparent
belief that in this way it could improve its base for playing a
more independent role in world affairs.
12. Weapons acquisition and development programs of this type
have in fact enabled some of their possessors to play a somewhat
more active role in their regions or in world affairs. It has made
them more secure at home and has made them forces to be reckoned
with by the peacemakers. Nevertheless, these programs probably
have not and probably will not fulfill all the hopes which have
been placed in them. A nuclear capability in the hands of other
than the two great powers is a nuisance and a potential trouble
maker, but it is not much of a factor in the world balance of
military power or indeed in the respect accorded to its possessors.
On the regional level, those possessing significant military capa-
bilities tend to deter each other or to be deterred by the
possibility of great power intervention should open hostilities
occur. Leaders of these smaller powers have come to recognize these
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limitations upon their actions, and have come to limit military
activities outside their own lands to such expedients as the ship-
ment of arms, the dispatch of instructors, or the training and use
of guerrillas.
13. We do not mean to imply that military power in the hands
of the great powers or of the lesser ones has become or is becoming
a matter of minor importance in international politics. The Soviet
leaders may have become somewhat disillusioned about the value of
their strategic power in the resolution of disputes; the great
powers may have found it very difficult to project even their con-
ventional forces into situations around the world where they have
an interest; the lesser powers may not realize all the benefits
they expect from the acquisition of greater capabilities. But
possession of military power remains a major, though perhaps not
a predominant, factor in determining a nation's role on the world
stage. In the case of the two great powers, the possession of
substantial capabilities is indispensable to their security and to
the maintenance of their positions of leadership. What is happening
is that the use of military power is increasingly being inhibited
because of its growing magnitude and because of the risk that any
undertaking involving the active use of force may involve extremely
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high stakes. This situation may not obtain indefinitely; the
Soviets, for example, would almost certainly seek to derive full
advantage from any scientific or technological breakthrough in
weaponry which they might achieve. Nevertheless, for the present,
the military situation in the world -- plus the problems which the
Communist world is experiencing today -- suggests that the likeli-
hood of a military confrontation between the great powers has been
somewhat reduced.
14-. The obvious problems within the Communist world today are
also spectacular ones: the open quarrel and exchange of polemics
between the two great Communist powers; the magnitude of the economic
failure in China -- so great that it led to thousands of people
pushing against the gates of Hong Kong last year; the spectacle of
the USSR, after the boastful claims and plans of a few years ago,
coming to the West hat in hand to buy wheat and to ask for large-
scale credits. These phenomena are not passing difficulties, nor
are they merely the consequences of misfortune. The source is deeper,
and the problem will not soon go away. It lies fundamentally in the
nature of communism itself, how it should be defined, how its
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objectives should be translated into reality, whether it can be
15. What communism is and what policies should be followed
to bring it about have always been subjects of debate within the
European revolutionary movement. There have always been dissidents
claiming descent from Marx, and in Russia itself there were a variety
of groups and doctrines which persisted after the Bolshevik seizure
of power and were only gradually overwhelmed. Yet even the
dissenters sought unity; they believed that true communism was not
susceptible to a variety of interpretations. In Stalin's time
Communist unity existed, partly because of Stalin's measures to
enforce conformity and partly because there was no alternative center
of authority. During the last twenty years this singular situation
has ended. The expansion of communism brought a diffusion of
political power and a concomitant dissipation of doctrinal authority.
Moscow's influence remains substantial, but its authority has ended.
First Yugoslavia and then China exhibited the phenomenon of heresy
allied to national power, and Moscow was unable to compel obedience.
16. The process of debate and redefinition going on today is
distinguishing one national Communist party from another and one
regime from another; it is creating diverse currents of opinion
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within the various parties and regimes; above all, it has openly
split the Communist movement into two warring camps and created
within these camps Satellite groups which distinguish themselves
to some degree from its leadership. All the causes of this -- in
addition to the expansion of communism and the historical termina-
tion of Moscow's unique position as the only Communist state --
cannot be discussed here. one major factor is certainly the diversity
in the world itself. Despite its claim to universal truth, Communist
doctrine simply can not apply equally to all national circumstances;
some individual parties and leaders have found it necessary to adjust
their doctrines in order to make their system work where they have
won power or to prevent the party's decay as a political force where
they were seeking power. Another factor of great importance is
nationalism, which orthodox Communists have always considered an
outmoded evil associated with the capitalist system. Yet, in
attempting to create Communist societies, the Communist leaders
themselves have come increasingly to conform their doctrinal positions
and their policies to the historic national policies of their states.
17. The absence of a center to enforce orthodoxy has produced,
not only doctrines which in the previous era would have been
heretical, but a decline in the importance of ideology itself.
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The Sino-Soviet schism, the association of Albania with China, the
ambivalence of North Vrietnam, the independence of Yugoslavia, the
growing divergence of the Eastern European states from the Soviet
model, the tendency of Western European parties to criticize Moscow
and to develop their own political programs, the competing influence
and Castroism in Latin America -- all reflect peculiar national or
regional interests. In some cases these phenomena may be excused
as tactical variations, but more often they have been elevated to
the level of doctrinal differences. We can confidently expect
that this situation will continue and that communism in the future
will come to possess still less doctrinal uniformity than it now
has. Indeed, the national and doctrinal antagonisms which exist
may occasionally lead to armed conflict, and the Communist world
come to be as diverse and undisciplined as the non-Communist world.
18. An even more serious and certainly more immediate problem
than that of disunity is the problem of making the Communist economic
system work. A Communist system may be very efficient for bringing
a backward society quickly up to date in terms of infrastructure
and basic industry, but it is evidently not very good for achieving
adequate agricultural production; many aspects of agricultural pro-
duction require the attention and devotion which collective
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organization does not inspire. Moreover, as Communist societies
become increasingly large and complex -- in short, when they become
developed -- the central planning and organizational methods which
worked during the period of initial economic development tend to
break down. These two problems have plagued the Soviet system for
some years and have survived all the expedients improvised to deal
with them.
19. In more specific terms, Soviet growth rates have declined
in the 1960's. The investment rate has faller., and defense costs
have risen. Agricultural output has failed to keep pace with growing
demand, bread grains have been curtailed, and livestock is being
prematurely slaughtered. The Soviet leaders are buying grain in
the West and have initiated a large-scale program des.igned.to-
quadruple fertilizer production. In order to finance the exterial
purchases involved, the Soviets have drawn down their gold reserves
and are seeking foreign credits. None of this means that the Soviet
economy is about to collapse; these are symptoms of disease, but
there are no indications that the disease will prove fatal.
20. The problems of Communist China are infinitely worse. The
Chinese have recovered slightly from the disasters of 1960, 1961,
and 1962, but the prospects are worse than ever. The population is
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immense and bound to grow without check for many years to come;
arable land is short and weather unreliable, economic experiments
based upon ideological predilections and revolutionary compulsions
have complicated what were already intractable difficulties. The
Chinese are devoting increased attention to agriculture, but it is
doubtful that per capita consumption can be increased for many years
to come -- if ever. Without large-scale outside aid, little solid
progress can be made in industrial development. Things seem likely
to get worse and no reversal seems in sight. The economy is not on
the verge of collapse, but we are becoming increasingly convinced
that Communist China, as now ruled, will at best remain stagnant.
At worst, starvation, disease, and political disaffection could
bring about a violent upheaval.
21. While the economic morbidities which China suffers may
indeed prove fatal, they are not all to be attributed to the
policies which the Communist regime has adopted. Any regime would
have staggered under the enormous problems of population and food
supply. By contrast, the economic problems which the USSR confronts
are tractable, but it is still uncertain that the USSR can solve
them without fundamental changes in its ideological outlook. A
fertilizer program will increase agricultural production, but it
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will not make the collective farmer a happy and a constructive
worker. Continued detailed central planning will keep the economy
going, but it will not keep it going very efficiently. There have
been some indications that the Communists leaders in the USSR may
be gradually coming to realize that they must make some adjustments.
The practices of Yugoslavia have been noted and perhaps taken to
heart; greater contact with the West and with Western scholars may
convince them that more flexible methods of planning and control will
give greater production and stimulate greater initiative. Meanwhile,
Soviet economic problems have contributed to some greater prudence
in Soviet policy and particularly to the current Soviet efforts
to create a more friendly atmosphere in US-Soviet relations.
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22. The disunity, indiscipline, and decline in ideology which
have developed within the Communist world have been matched by a
similar development In the West. The Atlantic alliance has suffered
a further lessoning in its unity of purpose, the UK has been rather
rudely disinvited to participate in the European Economic Community,
and US influence in Europe has been reduced. At the same time,
within the various Western European states, conservatives have
become more liberal and radicals less revolutionary. Along with
a?1ecline in the intensity of domestic politics, there has developed
a greater readiness to experiment with economic questions and to
pursue foreign policies based upon national interest rather than
upon those of the Atlantic community as a whole. These changes
derive in part from the reconstruction and growing strength of the
European economies; they also reflect the personal characteristics
of the new leaders who are arriving on the European scene.
23. Even before the decade of the sixties began, France began
a major crisis of regime. General de Gaulle now thoroughly dominates
the French scene, the old political parties have decayed, the French
colonial system has been largely liquidated, and the French
governmental system has been remodeled. It is still not possible
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to determine whether G u1:;.iom as a political force will remain an
essential element In the roliti :al system, but de Ge+alle? o impact
upon France, together wit .h. she fundamental changes in French life
and attitude which have o,7onrred in the past few years, mole a
full return to the old ways most, unlikely.
24. Also in recent months, c!.gnificant changes in
Italian politics have occurred.
Italy, a new political experiment has been undertaken by the leaders
of the Christian Democratic party in forming a coalition with the
Italian Socialist party, which in turn has broken its political
ties with the Italian Communist party.
25. These changes -- the readiness of France to accept a
national leader, the strengthened national consensus in West Germany,
and the successful creation of a Socialist-Catholic coalition in
Italy -- reflect what appears to be a new desire not to get bogged
down in ideological debate, a recognition that revalution might
destroy more than it accomplished, and a willingness to accept
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society's institutions as a basis for going ahead with progress and
reform. This is not to say that there is a general acceptance of
things as they are, but there appears to be a growing tendency among
leftists andyounger leaders to shun wholesale revolution and to
move at a prudent pace.
26. One cause of this new cautious attitude toward revolu-
tionary change has been a realization that it was not necessary to
nationalize industry and finance in order to achieve the objectives
of socialism, and that much the same ends could be achieved through
welfare programs and through proper use of the mechanisms of modern
fiscal and monetary systems. Perhaps more important is the fact
that the economies of Western Europe have continued to expand at a
fairly rapid rate and that new economic arrangements were being
forged and institutionalized -- to the benefit of nearly all Western
Europeans -- through the Common Market. The Common Market has now
G >11s?ieu4~
reached the point where it iv--pi ~nl g many aspects of the economies
of its members; moreover, the process is already so advanced that
it is almost irreversible. The only questions are those of who
shall benefit by the readjustments which are being made.
27. Another factor which has contributed to the declining
intensity of domestic politics is the change which has occurred
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within the Roman Catholic Church since the accession of John DKIII.
His response to gestures from the Communist states (gestures
prompted largely by a Communist recognition that the Catholic
populations of Eastern Europe were not giving up the Church and
by a consequent desire to develop some kind of a modus vivendi),
his withdrawal of the Vatican from an active role in Italian party
politics, his apparent willingness to accord the national episcopates
greater freedom, and his encouragement of ecumenism -- all these
have contributed to a reduction in confessional tensions and a decline
in anti-clericalism as a political force. Above all, they have
given the Roman Catholic Church a new image, one of liberalism and
progressivism, and thus reduced the appeal of the prophets of
revolution. Pope Paul's visit to the Holy Land and the reception
accorded him by the leaders and peoples of the Eastern Churches
has further spurred the ecumenical movment and contributed to the
growing feeling that progress without radical change is possible
not only within Europe but within all of Christendom.
28. This generally more tolerant and more flexible approach
of Europeans to political, international, economic, and religious
questions has had a number of significant consequences. The
movement toward European political unity of the type widely discussed
fifteen years ago has been halted; many of those who were previously
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drawn to the idea now see better chances of progress within the
national context. Such interest in political unity as appears from
time to time now seem: to be directed more toward con't;rolling the
Brussels bureaucracy or toward providing another forum for the
assertion of national. interest than toward the creation of true
central institutions.
29. The new European attitudes have also given a somewhat
greater respectability to the Communist states of Eastern ba.rope
and to the Marxist parties of the West. in West Germany, for example,
it became possible to accept negotiations with the East Germans
over the issuance of Christmas passes to East Berlin and to hype
that this might be a step toward resolttion of the Berlin problem.
In Italy, it became possible for Catholics to vote for Marxist
parties and to enter a government with Marxian Socialists. It has
become possible to consider large-scale credits to the USSR and the
Eastern European countries. In general, it has stirred new hopes
that an East-West accommodation can somehow be developed which will
enable Europe as a whole to live in peace and prosperity.
30. One major consequence of changes in the leadership and
attitudes of the Western Europeans is the changed role of the US
in European affairs. De Gaulle's foreign policy is clearly designed
to reduce that role and to enhance that of France. He sees himself
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as an historic figure who will not only restore France to its
rightful place in world councils but use that position to resolve
some of the world's problems. De Gaulle's objectives are not shared
by his neighbors, but they have increasingly come to share some of
his precepts -- particularly his opposition to standing still while
the USSR and the US determine the fate of Europe and his preachments
that Europe can and must develop its own power and solve its own
problems. Nevertheless, not de Gaulle and still less his neighbors
are ready to hazard their own security by destroying NATO oJV so
weakening it that it loses its deterrent value. All the European
members of NATO but France still regard the predominant US position
in the alliance as an indispensable element of their security.
This does not mean that they will accede to US wishes or make
concessions to help the US solve its problems. US proposals, such
as that for the multilateral. force, are examined with care and even
skepticism. US trade and balance-of-payments problems are under-
stood, but there has not been, nor is there likely to be, much
movement to ease them.
31. Finally, the differences between the US view of the world
situation and that of the Europeans have become even more striking
than in the past. Europeans have always viewed the Communist
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threat in a somewhat different way; it has always seemed to them
that the US overestimated the danger of military attack and under-
estimated the Soviet reluctance to become militarily engaged.
They have always believed that it was the threw: of force combined
with domestic subversion and diplomatic maneuver which was the
preferred Soviet strategy in Europe. Thus, they have tended to
look upon the Atlantic alliance and the presence of US forces in
Europe not so much as a defensive arrangement as a deterrent to
threats, coups, or a collapse of will. They have believed, and
continue to believe, that the principal problem of the alliance
is to strenghen its deterrent effect by providing a greater measure
of European control over its military forces and particularly over
its nuclear strategic arm.
32. In more recent years, as the US has become increasingly
engaged in disputes and undertakings all over the world, they have
felt that the deterrent effect of the alliance has been somewhat
dissipated. They view disputes between the US and the USSR outside
Europe as peripheral to the vital interest of both the US and
Europe. They do not want the US to be defeated or humbled outside
Europe, but neither do they wish the US to create, or to allow
itself to be confronted with, issues of a critical character outside
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Europe. They are inclined to believe that the US makes too much
of Latin American, African, and Far Eastern problems, that it
overdramatizes them and makes them more significant than they
really are, and that steps should be taken to minimize, to quiet,
or to neutralize them. France in particular, but the UK and. the
others to some degree also, would prefer to calm the situation in
the Far East by dealing with China, North Vietnam, and North Korea,
would prefer to treat the new leaders in the underdeveloped areas
with less obvious slympathy and more severity, and would prefer the
US to take a more cavalier attitude toward Latin American revolutionary
develo rents.
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V. PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN UND1DEVELOPED AREAS
34. While the powerful and developed nations of the northern
third of the world have been coping with the problems of military
power and moving with both greater prudence and flexibility toward
political and economic change, revolution and disorder in the
southern two-thirds of the world have been intensifying. In four
major areas, Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast
Asia, indigenous political forces -- in some cases with the assistance
and encouragement of other powers -- were overthrowing governments,
forming political alignments, and impinging to a degree hitherto
unknown upon the concerns and even vital interests of their more
powerful northern neighbors.
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35. There remains a large common denominator among the countries
of the underdeveloped world despite the cultural and historical
diversity which exists. Nearly all these nations are beset by
problems arising from rapid population growth, lack of develop ent
capital, rising popular expectations, internal political strife
and competing ideological pressures, lack of administrative and
technical competence, and an inadequate sense of national identity.
Mary have adopted strongly socialist methods; some have held to
constituitional methods with only the greatest difficulty and
others have abandoned them; some have thrown out bloody dictators
and some have acquired then. Most profess some form of neutralism;
only a few have chosen to ally themselves with one or other of the
major powers. Despite these general similarities, it has become
increasingly apparent that each of the major areas of the under-
developed world has developed political forces and tendencies more
or less peculiar to its particular problems, geographical location,
and political history. In the paragraphs which follow, therefore,
we discuss emerging trends in terms of the major world areas involved.
LATIN AMERICA
36. The pace of social and economic change in Latin America
has greatly quickened during the past few years. In some countries,
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industrialization and the more rapid pace and broadening base of
economic activity in general have enlarged ua?hh the middle class
and the urban proletariat. Rapid population growth and migration
to the cities have created large slums and large numbers of restless
and disaffected people. In those countries stall largely under-
developed and governed by the traditional ruling classes, pressures
are developing for modernizing society. Nearly everywhere in
Latin America there is a high degree of political instabil i-by,
the combination of strong pressure for change from growing numbers
of dissatisfied people, revolutionary plotting -- some of it
stimulated from abroad, and the very difficult economic problems
which most countries confront have kept the political pot boiling
and will continue to do so for many years to come.
37. In most countries where this high instability exists, the
causes and the political forces involved are almost exclusively
indigenous. The Communist parties of Latin America are for the
most part under Moscow oriented leaders, incapable of overthrowing
or exercising strong influence in any regime, and largely unsuccessful
in acquiring a mass following. The Castroist groups which have
come into existence have greater appeal to the growing mass of poverty.
stricken end frustrated urban and ruxal workers. The promise of
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,quick suceess through force and terror has proven more attractive
than the more rational plans and more deliberate pace which the
Communists have adopted. While Castroist-type movements have
been aided and encouraged by the Castro regime, for the moat part
their activities and their doctrines arise from their own passions
and from the exam )le of Cuba.
38. The political forces which pose the most serious thveat
to existing regimes -- whether they are traditionalist or progressive
in character -- are not those who call themselves Communists or
Castroists, but leftist-na;tionslist groups who blame their own
and their nation's troubles upon what they believe to be an alliance
of foreign -- especially US -- capitalists with local capitalists,
land-owners, militaxy leaders, and political adventures. These
forces represent, for example, the Peronist tradition in Argentina
and the Brizola group in Brazil; their political program is strongly
anti-US and leftist in ideology and demagogic in method. They
attack progressive and traditionalist regimes alike, and they are
not reluctant to accept Ca munist and Castroist support.
39. There are in a few places encouraging signs of more
responsible forces for change developing. Some countries have
genuinely accepted the Alliance-for-Progress concept and program
and are pushing toward its goals. In some countries groups and
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individuals striving for change have joined in the Christian
Democratic movement end are acquiring significant political
influence. President }3etancourt of Venezuela has not only sum'rived
a long and intense tesroriatic attack from Communists and Castroists,
but has succeeded in his goal of a peaceful. transition to a freely-
elected successor.
40. On the whole, however, we believe that the Latin American
scene for many years to come will continue to be one of turmoil
with much civil disturbance, plotting and counyerplotting, political
warfare, and terrorism. Some of the leftist-nationalist forces will
probably succeed in acquiring power. 'nose revolutionaries who
take Castro as their model, inspiration, or guide will exploit
whatever opportunities are open to them, either within the leftist-
nationalist movement or among the d. ssatisfied and frustrated masses.
In some cases, military leaders of a more traditionalist character
will almost certainly seek to head off !oftist -nationalist and
Castroist groups by establishing military regimes; the consequence
of this may be to drive the moderate revolutionaries into the
radical camp. In any event, the presence in the Western Hemishphere
of a Communist state backed by the USSR will continue greatly to
jeopardize US interests throughout the continent and to complicate
the problems of US diplomacy.
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41. The situation in Africa is at least as unstable as that
in Latin America, but considerably less likely to result in major
revolutionary changes. The African states are by and large less
developed. there are fewer edneated people and fewer technicians;
the middle class is small; the urban proletariat, though growing
rapidly, is less class-conscious and less aware of its power.
Revolutionary groups on the classic model are small or non-existent,
and there are few Communists. Plotting and violence occur, but
they are not usually directed against the existing social and
political system; their aim is usually simply to replace those
enjoying the privileges of office by others who would like those
privileges themselves. Often the atmosphere of political developments
is that of the comic opera rather than that of social crisis.
4+2. There are many problems in Afr-A*.ca which will cause serious
difficulties. Nearly everywhere there is governmental weakness,
ineffectiveness, corruption. Economic growth is slow, and many
economies are virtually stagnant. The countries of northern and
eastern Africa are over-populated in terms of available resources;
the race problem will cause great troubles in southern Arica;
development capital is scarce and qualified people are few; expeeta*
tions are rising and unlikely to be fulfilled; many cities are full
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of semi-literate unemployed people who are still unaroused and
complacent. There have been assassinations and assassination
attemits, a few governments have been changed, some leaders are in
danger of overthrow, and some have clamped down on the opposition
to protect themselves. Marc situations such as those in Algeria,
the Congo, and the Horn of Africa are very fragile. Nkrumah is
an unstable man who has created and will create considerable
instability in West Africa. Even na.tioni led by mature and able
leaders, such as Nigeria and Senegal, have deep divisions. Devel-
opments of the type which recently occured in East Africa will be
probably repeated there and elsewhere; "reliable" regimes left
behind, by the departed colonial power will be thrown out, and the
succession will be a source of conflict between leftists and moderate
nationalists.
h+3? Some of the new states in Africa may continue to be
relatively stable and may even grow in strength. But in most of
the continent the picture appears much more clouded than it did a
year or two ago. There are likely to be many more eruptions of
violence and perhaps some changes of a major character. By and
large, the drift seems to be toward political and social chaos.
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Although revolutionary forces of a serious and dangerous character
remain largely undeveloped or unmobilized, the milieu Is one in
which these forces may become suddenly generated and difficult to
control. The area is certainly becoming increasingly vulnerable
to meddling from the outside.
THE NEAR BAIMIDT
4+. Arab nationalism is still seeking a form and defin:stion
acceptable to all. It has become increasingly apparent Qat no one
of its competing doctrines or models is likely to win an early or
decisive victory. While Nasser remains secure in his own country
and indeed seems to be making progress in reforming and developing
it, no other Arab country appears likely to accept him as its leader
or Egypt as its model. While, by contrast, the Beathist movement
is inter-Arab and not based upon single-nation dominance, it lacks
the strong popular base upon which to construct a new Arab political
union. Nevertheless, the idea of an "Arab Nation" persists, and
the belief in a wholesale reconstruction of Arab society continues
to dominate the political thinking of intellectuals and middle-class
Arabs everywhere. The monarchies in Jordan,, Saudi Arabia, and
Libya are making, in varying degrees, some efforts to modernize,
but even in the case of the most advanced and energetic of these,
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namely Jordan, there is serious doubt that the monarchy itself
will not in time be swept away by the forces it is releasing and
encouraging.
45. It will be a long time before the political turmoil among
the Arabs subsides. The various politicaal currents and the various
national interests are likely to remain in conflict for some years
to come. While the monarchies and the sheikdoms, so long as they
persist, are likely to remain fairly accommodating to Western
interests, especially Western oil interests, there is likely to
be a continuing and steady pressure to bring the Western powers
into a more supplicant posture. At the same time, the Arabs are
not likely to move to terminate oil contracts or so to hinder oil
company operations as to cause the companies to withdraw or curtail
exploitation; they know they need the oil revenues and are beginning
to appreciate the importance of the companies in the marketing of
oil. Also, despite their maiilingness to make peace with Israel,
they continue to recognize the danger of forceful action against
Israel. They respect Israeli military power, and some at least
realize that the West would prevent them from destroying Israel
even if they could. Thus, while turmoil will continue as the Arabs
quarrel among themselves and apply pressure on the West, the chances
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are good that this turmoil will not spill over into conflicts
likely to be seriously damaging or critical for Western interests.
16. In two of the non-Arab states of the region an interesting
political experiment is under way. The royal regimes of Iran and
Afghanistan have become, at their rulers' initiatives, Instruments
of revolution. The more dramatic case is that of :Iran, where the
Shah has turned against both the upper and middle classes, made
common cause with the peasants, and begun a large-scale land and
political reform. His effort seems to have flagged in recent
months, but there is no sign of his turning back. Indeed, the
Shah is so committed that he cannot turn back; if he fails or
falters, his regime may go down with his program. In Afghanistan,
the royal Initiative has been less dramatic and more deliberate.
Steps toward more rapid modernization and toward political reform
are being taken cautiously, and there are a number of difficulties
to be surmounted. As the pace of change accelerates so will the
pressures for its continuance; it is still too early to determine
whether the King will have the courage to go ahead when the going
gets harder.
47. Developments affecting India which have occurred during
the past few years are an interesting example of the manner in which
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changes in the Communist world have led to a major change in the
structure of world power. The Chinese attack upon India in 3.962,
although to some degree a response to Indian provocations, was
nevertheless opposed by the USCR and inconsistent with Soviet
policy toward India. The Indian leaders, despite their protestations
of neutralism, turned to the US and UK for military assistance. This
obliged the USSR to extend additional military aid to India to
protect its stake, and this further aggravated Chinese-Soviet
relations. US aid to India in turn upset the Pakistanis, who
feared the consequences of Indian rearmament. The Pakistanis then
prodeedcd to improve their relations with China at the expense of
their hitherto cordial relations with the US. Thus, while the
formal relations among the powers involved have undergone but
little change, in fact the structure of power, and especially the
international posture of India, has fundamentally changed.
SOU1'F3''A0,T ASIA
48. Of all the underdeveloped areas of the world, that in
which the interests of the major world powera are most heavily
engaged is Southeast Asia -- an immense area extending from the
Indian subcontinent to Melanesia. The two major problems in the
area, the future of Indo-China and of the great island areas to
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the south, involve China, the USSR, Britain, the US, France, and
Australia. The problems of this area have loomed large in world
affairs since the end of World War Ii; they are now reaching
critical proportions. The major change of the past few years has
been the growing inability of the great powers to control the
situation. Local leaders and local political movements have
become Increasingly powerful -- in large part as a relult of the
receipt of military material from foreii sources -- and less
disposed to follow the dictate or advice of others.
1.9. In Irido-China the guerrilla war for control of Vietnam
is entering its fifth year and no end appears in sight. The
Viet Cong in the south, dependent largely upon their own resources
but under the direction and control of the Communist regime in
the north, are pressing their offensive more vigorously than ever.
The political mistakes of the Diem regime inhibited the effective
prosecution of the war, which is really more of a political contest
than a military operation, and led to the regime's destruction.
The counter-guerrilla effort continues to flounder, partly because
of the inherent difficulty of the problem and partly because Diem's
successors have not yet demonstrated the leadership and the
inspiration necessary. There remains serious doubt that victory
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can. be won, and the situation remains very fragile. If large-scale
US support continues and if further political deterioration within
South Vietnam is prevented, at least a prolonged stalemate can be
attained. There is also a good chance that political evolution
within the country and develo.nents upon the world scene could
lead to some kind of negotiated settlement based upon neutralization.
50. Larger stakes are involved in the contest between
Indonesia and Malaysia. The ostensible issue is the 2-it-are of
the territories of northern Borneo, but we believe Sukarno and
his Indonesian supporters have more fundamental objectives in mind.
Among other things, they fear Malaysia and particularly the greater
energy and efficiency of the Chinese in Singapore and North Borneo,
who they believe will come to dominate the new state. Believing
as they do that Indonesia is the greatest nation in the area and
feeling a new strength from the acquisition of Soviet arms and the
successful termination of the W4at New Guinea affair, they also
believe that they cannot tolerate a rival state of major stature.
They no doubt see a vision of Indonesia as a great world leader
negotiating in equality with China, the USSR, and the US -- after
having destroyed Malaysia and having brought the Philippines and the
mainland states under Indonesian hegemony. The struggle will not
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be easy for Indonesia. its economic problems will be intensified,
and the interested Anglo-Saxon powers will try to prevent Malaysia
and the Philippines from falling in behind Indonesian designs.
But Malaysia, too, will have its problems. There is serious doubt
that it can attain itr main purpose, namely, to create a state
controlled by Malays which will utilize the energies and ingenuity
of the Chinese without allowing them to dominate. The outcome
seems likely to remain uncertain for years to come.
51. French initiatives in Far Eastern politics have added
a new factor to an already unclear picture of great power influence.
British influence in Malaysia and the still strong TUS position on
the mainland are a brake upon both Indonesian aspierations in the
south and Chinese designs in the north. The USSR, while it has
not entirely given up its efforts to retain some Influence in Laos
and North Vietnam, has evidently decided that its position is too
weak to enable it to strive for decisive influence on the mainland;
in any case Indo-China is not a good place for the Soviets to
challenge Communist China. They have sought instead to gain
influence in Indonesia, in part to block the Chinese, but even so
they probably regard their Indonesian policy as a low cost venture
for a potentially high profit rather than as a matter of vital concern.
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The French recognition of China, in the context of its continuing
position in Hanoi and its quiet activities in Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam, may not involve an intention to take further
diplomatic steps in the near future, but it does set up the
conditions under which de Gaulle, if he chooses, can move gradually
toward the creation of new equilibrium in the Far East and particularly
in Southeast Asia.
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VI.. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RELATIONS OF POWER
52. The preceding paragraphs clearly indicate that the
structure of world power -- which had already undergone profound
changes during the 1950's -- is again undergoing major modifica-
tions. The fact that the two great powers have found it diffi-
cult to bring their very substantial military power to bear in
order to achieve their objectives, or to project this power into
parts of the world where they have an interest, has had important
consequences. It has inhibited the major powers -- while maintaining
their substantial strategic and conventional capabilities --
from commitments and undertakings which might call these capabilities
into action. This, in turn, has enhanced the role of discussion,
diplomacy, and negotiation at the great power level. It has at
the same time released the natural centrifugal forces within the
major power blocs and accelerated the rising national and cultural
forces outside the two major power centers. Release of these
centrifugal forces has permitted the efflorescence of those national
and ideological concerns which had been submerged either by the over-
whelming superiority of the US and USSR in their respective spheres
or by the fear that the exposure of these concerns would create
dangerous and exploitable weaknesses. These forces within the two
power blocs were probably bound to emerge in time, but the changing
relations of military power has helped to free them.
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53. Such phenomena as the gathering strength of India,
the continuing vision of Arab nationalism, the increasing importance
of African and Latin American developments in world affairs, the
growing proclivity of emerging nations such as Indonesia or Brazil
to plow an independent course, all these represent a strong secular
trend which is probably irreversible and which in itself has de-
preciated the role and influence of the great powers. As a consequence
of both these phenomena and the progressive disintegration of the
two power blocs, a pluralistic world order is rapidly coming into
being. World power is proliferating, divergencies are emerging,
and diversity has been encouraged.
54. It would be easy to go too far in appraising the
results of these changes in the structure of world power. The
strategic situation in the world does not make general nuclear
war impossible, but, it makes it a highly irrational method of re-
solving international disputes. The fact that the Communist world
has become undisciplined will not force it to abandon Communism
or to renounce its objectives, but it makes progress more difficult
and. inhibitions more compulsive. Discord within the West is not
destroying NATO or undermining the predominant role of the US in
the non-Communist world, but it is forcing the Western nations to
recognize the underlying diversity of their concerns. The rise
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of independent naticmalisms and centers of power outside the North
Atlantic basin does not foreshadow the destruction of Western
civilization, but it does greatly reduce the chances that Western
ideas and Western methods will gain wide acceptance.
55. The Soviet leaders themselves appear to have come to
a new appreciation of the world situation. In the months follow-
ing the Cuban crisis Khrushchev was apparently under some attack at
home and apparently won his battle. The battle was probably not
so much over his personal position as it was over the domestic, intra-
bloc, and foreign policies the UBER should follow. The result was
a decision to hold the line on defense expenditures, a determination
to stand fast against Chinese and Chinese-inspired attack upon Soviet
policies, and a decision to seek better relations with the West in
general and the US in particular. There is a good chance that this
stance will persist for some time to come, for it is based not only
upon a recognition of the changed situation in the world at large,
bup upon the continued evolution of Soviet society itself.
56. Even as the Soviet leaders were conforming their policies
to the changing atmosphere and power relations of the world, Western
leaders were doing likewise. President Kennedyts style and approach,
and particularly his capacity to combine firmness with restraint,
both encouraged the Soviets to seek a new kind of relationship with
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the Ua and made clear the limits of America TatieneA and hopese
fleneral de Gaulle, now preeminent in Europe and driven by a sense
of historic mission, has moved with boldness and atubbornaess not
only to reconstruct France, but Europe as well. While his policies
and manor have been widely deplored in the West, they neverthe-
less proceed not only f.,m d desire to enhance French prestige, but
also from a conviction that these policies are right, that they
are necessary in the present world context, and they will lead to
a new and preferable world equilibium.
57. Despite these changes in the world situation and in
the manner in which the world?s leaders look upcn it, the danger
of a general nuclear war with all its horrible consequences will
continue to be the overriding problem of our time. This danger
will continue to arise, as in the past, not from a deliberate
attempt to destroy a competitor, but from undertakings and
occurrences of a more limited character. The problem of calculating
the risks involved in such undertakings and occurrences will
remain a major concern of policy-makers.
58, N'vertheiess, the problems which will increasingly
preoccupy them will be those which arise from the diversity of
interests which has developed and the proliferation of power which
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has occurred, Problems such as Cyprus,, East Africa,, and Panama
may be quieted down by steps now being taken, but others like
them will flare up in the many places which contir.ize to be unstable.
Often an event occurring through accident or irrational action will
trigger political developments throughout an env:7re area and pro-
vide opportunities for political adventurers or revolutionaries who
otherwise would have remained obscure and ineffectual,. Aside
from alarms and excursions of this nature,, those continuing problams
which have been noted In the preceding sections -- Berlin,, Vietnam,
Malaysia-Indonesia., the Areb-Israeli dispute -- and many others
which have not been mentioned will create tensions. Some probably
will result in military hostilities and confrontations between the
great powers despite the strong interest of both sides in not per-
mitting confrontations and crises to develop.
59. Indeed,, despite any disinclination to get involved
in crises or any interest in a detente which may exist, the situa-
tion in most of the underdeveloped world is so disorderly that
many situations are likely to develop -from which the great powers
will have difficulty in remaining aloof or which they will have
difficulty controlling if they do get involved. Individuals and
groups calling themselves Castroists or Communists might stage
revolutionary attempts or initiate guerrilla movements., not on the
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orders of Moscow, Peiping, or Havana, but in the hope of gaining
their support, Similarly, individuals and groups may organize or
execute plots in the name of the US without American authority or
encouragement but simply to gain US support, In some case., of
course, the instigation will have come from the outside,, and in
many cases support will be forthcoming. Once outside powers do
become involved, whether by accident or design, crises can develop
which will engage their prestige to a degree incommensurate with
the intrinsic or strategic value of the area itself.
60, One consequence of this disorder and of the inhibitions
upon open involvement is likely to be an increase in clandestine
activities designed to influence the course of events in a desired
direction or to block similar activities by other powers, In
many places the situation may be so soft,, the issues so undefined,
and the parties so difficult to identify that no clear and
acceptable casus interventiori will exist. Thus, many situations
will be resolved by local leaders or groups sponsored and
supported covertly from the outside, This will be an attractive
course of action, not only because of the inhibitions upon open
intervention, but because it will often cost so little in money and
effort if an investm;ant is made early enough to be effective.
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61, it is possible in the present context of Soviet policy
-- particularly to the extent that this policy derives from the
USSR's appreciation of the military situation and from its own
difficulties at home and within the Communist world -- that some
movement toward the settlement of some international issues will
occur. But the obstacles to a general detente are very great, not
only because of the key character of such problems as Berlin, but
because of the new tensions and problems which will arise
from the disorderly character of so much of the worldo Thus, the
US will probably be confronted with many serious challenges to its
interests in many parts of the world and will have to live with
the paradox that -- while it disposes greater power than any
nation ever had -- it can use that power only as a backdrop and
not as an active element in protecting those interests*
62, Over the longer run, we continue to believe that the
gradual charges taking place in the USSR will diminish its
hostility to the West and the vigor of its revolutionary effort
outside the Communist worldo In particular, the climate of opinion
.within the USSR, the greater intellectual freedom permitted, the
sensitivity of the regime to intellectual opinion and popular pre-
occupations with peace and a better life, the greater weight accorded
to national interests and conventional modes of International
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conduct -- all these have already contributed to the decline of
Soviet aggressiveness and to a realistic appreciation of the
nature of the modern world. This process of change may be slowed
from time to time, or even halted, but it is probably irreversible.
But whether it proceeds or halts, the evolution which has taken
place, together with the c'n,?:c.,es which have occurred within the
Coimmunist camp and in the world at large, suggest that for
the next several years at least the world may be replete with
strife and disorder but not on the verge of nuclear disaster.
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