YUGOSLAVIA-THE USTASHI AND THE CROATIAN SEPARATIST PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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MEMORANDUM
Yugoslavia - The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem
Confidential
27 September 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 September 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Yugoslavia -- The Ustashi and the Croatian
Separatist Problem*
The hijacking of the SAS plane in Sweden and the bombing
of two Yugoslav tourist offices in Australia by Croatian
emigre terrorists (Ustashi) are the most recent episodes in a
series of dramatic and violent acts intended, among other
things, to demonstrate to the world the undying hatred borne
by Croatian patriots for Tito and for the unified Yugoslav
state. Belgrade has for some time been concerned about
Ustashi actions abroad and alleged Ustashi complicity in
Croatian separatist stirrings at home. It is apprehensive
that the problem may be growing, partly as a consequence of
Ustashi activities within large colonies of Yugoslav workers
in the West. And it is unhappily aware that much more is
involved here than the terrorist acts of a small, militant
group. Like AZ Fatah and the IRA, the Ustashi represent
only the militant peak of a large movement whose beliefs and
resentments and aspirations are rooted in a troublesome past
and are nourished by the prospect of a turbulent future.
1. Yugoslav officials have in recent months approached a
number of Western governments in an effort to secure their active
This memorandum has been produced in CIA by the Office of
National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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cooperation in controlling the activities of Yugoslav emigre
groups. Austria, Australia, West Germany, France, Sweden, Canada,
and the United States are known to have been the targets of these
diplomatic efforts. The lengthy aide memoi,re.s.ubmitted to Washington
last month is devoted almost entirely to Croatian emigre groups.
Serbian emigre groups are given very little space, apparently
because Belgrade does not consider them a major threat at this
time. Presumably the Croatian element dominated the aide memoires
addressed to the other Western capitals as well.
2. One of the constants of Yugoslav political life since
the formation of the state in 1918 has been the tendency of Serbs,
Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Albanians to think of them-
selves primarily as members of those ethnic groups and only
secondarily, if at all, as Yugoslavs. The rivalry between the
largest single group, the Serbs (who are traditionally Orthodox
in belief and Balkan by temperament) and the second largest group,
the Croats (who are traditionally Roman Catholic and somewhat more
Western-oriented) has been particularly intense. During the prewar
and war years many Croats in Yugoslavia joined the Ustashi Movement,
which advocated violent resistance to Serbian influence and the
establishment of an independent Croatian state. In its search
for allies, the movement turned to Mussolini and Hitler and became
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pro-fascist. Many of the wartime Ustashi emigrated to the West
after the defeat of their cause, and the movement gradually
fragmented. But more than a dozen Ustashi-like Croatian emigre
groups continue to exist.
3. In recent months Tito and other Yugoslav leaders have
been giving a great deal of public attention to Croatian emigres
and Croatian separatism. Clearly, the Yugoslav government is
treating the issue as if it involved a threat to the regime and
to the survival of the federal state. But why should Belgrade
be so troubled at this particular time?
4. In their recent discussions of the Croat issue, the
Yugoslavs have put much emphasis on a single incident. In late
June, according to Belgrade, 19 armed Ustashi (some of whom came
from as far away as Australia) crossed the border from Austria,
hijacked a truck which carried them several hundred miles to the
little town of Bugojno (in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and thereafter
fought a running gun battle with troops from the Yugoslav security
forces, killing 13 of them before being killed themselves. The
Yugoslav regime said they received no popular support.
5. There have been other Ustashi incidents in recent months,
beginning with the assassination of the Yugoslav Ambassador to
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Sweden in April 1971.E But most of these have been relatively
minor. Even the raid from Austrian territory had a certain bizarre
aspect in that some Yugoslav citizens apparently thought at first
the 19 gun-waving men were making a movie.
6. If, as most Western observers at first assumed, these
incidents had involved only the Ustashi from World War II days,
Belgrade would have been inclined to shrug them off as the last
gasps of a dying movement. But Belgrade apparently believes both
that the Ustashi have somehow been revitalized and that they are
developing new and dangerous contacts in the broader ranks of
Croatian separatists. The Yugoslav government has had to concern
itself frequently with the problem of resurgence of nationalistic
feeling in the Croatian Republic. Indeed one severe crisis in
Croatia reached an acute phase last December.l With the purge of
certain Party officials and the arrest of student leaders and
1/ Other incidents during this period include the bombings of the
Yugoslav Airlines office in Belgrade (December 1971), the
Zagreb office of the Party newspaper Borba (January 1972), a
Stockholm-to-Belgrade Yugoslav airliner (January 1972), and the
Yugoslav tourist office in Stockholm (March 1972). Twenty-seven
persons died in the airliner crash and one died in the Borba
office affair. Otherwise there were no fatalities.
2/ For an examination of the December events and their immediate
consequences see ONE Memorandum, "The Crisis in Croatia",
5 January 1972,
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intellectuals believed responsible, Belgrade managed to reassert
control. But a certain nervousness has persisted among ranking
Yugoslav officials.
The Semi-Emigres
7. When Belgrade considers possible new linkages between
the Ustashi abroad and the Croatian separatists back home, it
naturally gives principal attention to the large group of semi-
emigres -- those Yugoslavs permitted by the regime to work outside
the country. Prior to 1965, only a few thousand were in this
category. But in 1965, in connection with the introduction of the
economic reform program, controls were relaxed. Since then, and
particularly since early 1968, the number leaving each year has
increased sharply, and the number returning each year apparently
has declined. By now there may be a million such workers abroad,
most of them in their twenties or thirties, plus a small number of
their dependents. This would represent about five percent of the
entire population of Yugoslavia.
8. The political danger which might lurk among these semi-
emigres can best be appreciated if two additional points are con-
sidered. First, the largest single ethnic group among the semi-
emigres are Croats. Perhaps as many as 400,000-450,000 people,
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which would be about 10 percent of the Croat population of
Yugoslavia, may be working abroad.* Potentially then, the Ustashi
could have in this group a large source of young recruits and
contributors. And the restive students in Zagreb could have in it
friends and associates of their own ages with whom to share grievances
and heresies.
9. The second point is that the Yugoslav regime, by its own
admission, has failed to keep accurate track of the activities -- or
even the numbers -- of these semi-emigres. In June of this year, for
example, a Yugoslav Federal Government committee in charge of
external migration conceded that for every worker who bothered to
register with the State Employment Office, there was likely to be
another worker who made his arrangements through private "channels".
Apparently such statistics as are provided by Yugoslav officials
at exit points are completely insufficient. In order to obtain
even an approximate count of non-registered workers, the regime
has evidently had to rely on data published in the host countries
plus whatever the Yugoslav diplomats in these countries have been
able to provide. Such inexactness seems extraordinary by the
In April 1972 Archbishop Kuharic of Zagreb, spiritual leader
of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, told the US
Ambassador that there were 600,000 Croats working abroad --
a figure which seems too high.
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standards of any European government, let alone a Communist one.
Obviously if the Yugoslav regime cannot properly identify or count
its workers abroad, it must be having a very difficult time in
keeping track of their political activities.*
10. And indeed the last few months have produced indications
of ties provided by the semi-emigres between the older Ustashi
elements abroad and the nationalists back home. Many of the 19
Ustashi who infiltrated from Austria were far too young to have
belonged to the World War II organization, and so quite likely
had been working outside Yugoslavia. A number of other Croat
nationalists brought to trial this year have been identified as
former workers abroad. A case of some interest involves two
20-year old girls indicted on 30 August 1972 for their part in
the Ustashi assassination of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Sweden.
According to the Yugoslav press account, they went to work in
Sweden and while there they sought out the Ustashi (rather than
the reverse). Only after they returned to Yugoslavia, presumably
to continue their Ustashi activities, were they apprehended. Still
YugosZav intelligence may or may not have a better fix on the
number of fuZZ-fledged emigres (as distinct from the workers
abroad). One Yugoslav journal reported in July 1972 that there
Were 200,,000 YugosZav emigres of various nationalities organized
in political. groups. Obviously, however, the distinction between
fuZZ-fledged and semi-emigres is by no means clear-cut.
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another indicator -- not negligible in appreciating the depth of
national feeling -- is a report from Western visitors to Zagreb
University that as of last spring the students in the dormitories
were singing Ustashi songs.*
11. Ironically enough, the economic advantages of allowing
Yugoslavs to work abroad are increasingly under challenge. At first
Yugoslav economists described the semi-emigration as a necessary
adjunct to the economic reform itself. If these workers were not
permitted to emigrate, these economists assumed, unemployment would
tend to rise sharply, because of the expected natural increase in
population and the planned modernization of the economy (e.g.,
the elimination of older and less efficient enterprises). Moreover,
the earnings to be remitted by these workers promised a useful source
of hard currency. Also, many of these workers would be in a position
to acquire new skills abroad, which would enable them to contribute
to the modernization of the Yugoslav economy when they returned
home -- hopefully within two or three years.
12. But it now appears to some Yugoslav economists that
many of those going abroad are not those who would be otherwise
unemployed. Physicians, engineers, teachers, and other skilled
As an 18th Century European nationalist put it, if in the Zong
run he could write his nation's songs he would not care who
wrote its Zaws.
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personnel are leaving or passing up employment opportunities in
Yugoslavia in order to secure higher income abroad. Some of these
persons take unskilled jobs simply because of the favorable income
differential. Consequently certain parts of Yugoslavia are
suffering from a brain drain. Moreover, there are now reported to
be local shortages of unskilled and farm labor, particularly in
Croatia.
13. Then too, although worker remittances are at an all time
high, a lot of money earned abroad is being spent abroad, contrary
to the regime's earlier expectations. (In all likelihood, some of
it is ending up in Ustashi coffers.) A lot of money which is brought
or sent home is being put in the wrong places. That is, it is being
used either to buy consumer goods in short supply, which contributes
to inflation, or to obtain large amounts of real estate, which the
regime (Tito in particular) opposes on economic and ideological
grounds.
14. The semi-emigration has also had unforeseen political
effects back home, particularly in Croatia. Croat nationalists --
in the universities, the Party, and elsewhere -- accuse Belgrade
of following economic policies which favor other, more backward,
republics and which in effect force Croatian workers to seek
employment abroad. At the same time, they blame Belgrade for labor
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shortages that occur in Croatian villages. And when Belgrade seeks
to relieve these shortages by encouraging other Yugoslav nation-
alities to migrate to these villages, the Croats have a pretext for
complaining about "foreign" occupation. Such complaints obviously
provide a rich source of inspiration for Ustashi propagandists and
other Croat separatists.
Belgrade's Limited Options
15. There doesn't seem to be very much that Belgrade can do
to relieve the root causes of the economic and political problems
presented by the semi-emigres. For example, in the economic plan
for 1971-1975 Belgrade has set a goal of reducing overall unemploy-
ment, and Yugoslav economists hope this will induce some workers to
return home at an early date and discourage others from going abroad.
Indeed the Republic of Croatia has established offices abroad in an
effort to attract these workers home, especially those with needed
.skills, through various economic inducements. The problem here is
not simply one of jobs; it is also a matter of income and general
living conditions, and it seems very doubtful that Yugoslavia will
ever be able to compete with, say, West Germany in these areas.
16. Within the last year the regime has put tighter controls
on travel to Yugoslavia in an effort to prevent emigre infiltra-
tions, while simultaneously clamping down on the number of
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Yugoslavs permitted to go to the West. But border and travel
restrictions are difficult for a country such as Yugoslavia which
depends heavily on tourism and has become accustomed to the travel
of its citizens across its borders.* And even the best efforts by
the Yugoslav security services to monitor workers leaving in the
future will hardly improve surveillance of the thousands who
evidently have escaped their notice up to now.
17. The increased activity of the Ustashi, their success in
recruiting young Yugoslavs, and the gap in information on the
workers abroad help to explain the current Yugoslav diplomatic
approaches to Western governments. Belgrade wants the officials
of these governments to help keep tabs not only on the revitalized
Ustashi groups, but also on the activities of the larger groups of
Yugoslav workers in their countries. So far, the Yugoslavs have
not achieved a great deal of success. Two years ago Bonn signed
an extradition treaty with Belgrade, which theoretically hampers
Ustashi activities in West Germany. But other governments have not
followed Bonn's lead. And in general, Western governments have
indicated that they draw a clear distinction between actual
Yugoslav official statistics -- which are probably not very
accurate -- claim that there were more than 5 million tourists
to Yugoslavia in 1971, that the equivalent of nearly 12 million
Yugoslavs travelled abroad for one reason or another in 1971.
This latter figure counts several trips by an individual as the
equivalent of several individuals.
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preparations to stage terrorist acts from their countries and
purely political activities. And in disputed cases, Belgrade
has been given to understand that it will bear the burden of
proof.*
18. The regime is also tightening up on nationalist manifesta-
tions at home. Additional trials of Croat student leaders and
intellectuals are scheduled, and more Party members may be purged
for nationalist deviations. Nevertheless, the regime has not
reached the stage, Tito told a public gathering on 10 September,
where it must "take who knows what draconic administrative and
other measures". Instead, Tito is calling for such remedies as
more "Marxist" educational courses to deter youth from nationalism
and other sins of the spirit.
19. New efforts at political education and lectures on
"workers' self-management" seem dubious means of undercutting the
appeal of Ustashi tracts for the students at Zagreb. Even if
these have a measure of success, there is a fair assumption that
some of the students' cousins working in Stockholm or Sydney will
As an indication of Western attitudes, the Australian press
reacted sharply to lurid allegations in the Yugoslav press
concerning an "Ustashi " rifle range used by some of the 19
infiltrators. The place in question, according to the
Australians, is a fully legal gun club, with no Croat connec-
tions whatever.
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continue to join or at least contribute money to the Ustashi? And
if the Ustashi, fortified with youth, are willing to make certain
desperate gestures now, they are the more likely to try harder when
Tito goes.
20. Moreover Belgrade is concerned that after Tito's
departure some foreign power -- particularly the USSR -- will seek
to exploit Croatian discontents in order to increase its own influence
in Yugoslavia. Certain Ustashi spokesmen have claimed that the
Soviets have offered some form of encouragement, and one Yugoslav.
Party leader has charged that "powerful intelligence services"
(presumably he means Western services) are backing both the Ustashi
and "fascist organizations" inside Yugoslavia itself, So far the
evidence to sustain either set of claims is insufficient. Still,
the barest possibility of an outside power's meddling in Yugoslavia's
ethnic rivalries clearly adds to the general anxiety in Yugoslav
official quarters..
21. In any case, the problem of the nationalities for
the regime is, and will remain, broader than the threat from foreign
based or foreign supported terrorists. It involves the persistence
within Yugoslavia itself of severe regional discontents, economic,
political, and cultural. No Yugoslav official can be confident that
the correct prescription for these grievances has yet been written
in Belgrade.
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