NEW DIRECTIONS IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000400030011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 4, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
New Directions in Japanese Foreign Policy ?
Secret
4 January 1972
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNORAUINO AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
4 January 1972
SUBJECT: New Directions in Japanese Foreign Policy?
The Current Phase -- Declining Reliance
on the US 1
Japan's Neighbors Beckon 7
Immediate Japanese Response -- Caution 12
The Longer Term -- Search for a New Balance 14
This memorandum has been discussed with the Office
of Current Intelligence.
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Excluded from automatic
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
4 January 1972
SUBJECT: New Directions in Japanese Foreign Policy?
The Current Phase -- Declining Reliance on the US
1. For the past two and a half decades -- beginning
with the unexpectedly (to the Japanese) benign US occupa-
tion period -- Japan has found a secure haven in its over-
all close relationship with the US. Generous US economic
assistance and general succor helped the Japanese over the
difficult early recovery years. Then, as the nation got
back on its feet, easy access to the huge US market --
both in terms of imports and exports -- played an important
role in Japan's phenomenal economic growth. So too did the
US sponsored entry of Japan into various international
economic organizations. As of today, 30% of Japan's exports
are to the US, which also supplies 29% of Japan's imports.
OB UP 1
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Despite Japan's ever-broadening world trade, the US remains
its single most important trade partner, unique in the capa-
city to absorb the products of Japanese fast growth industries
such as autos, steel, and electronics. Moreover, the US re-
mains the chief source of technological knowhow vital to the
development in Japan of even more advanced industrial tech-
niques such as production of nuclear energy.
2. Aside from the economic assistance from the US,
Japan's astonishing rise to third place in GNP among world
nations was facilitated by the secure environment provided
by the US security commitment. In the tense and turbulent
postwar years of the "Cold War" period, Japan was able to
concentrate its attention, resources, and energies on the
economic sector -- and even now expends less than one percent
of its GNP for maintenance of a modest defense establishment
(in contrast to 9 percent for the US). Even now when the
Japanese see no immediate threat, the leadership values the
mutual security link with the US, particularly the "nuclear
umbrella" aspect.
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3. In addition to valuing US protection in terms of
its own security, Japan -- as a trading nation -- has looked
to the US as the principal agent for preserving stability in
East Asia as a whole. Again, for the same economic inter-
ests, Japan has associated itself with efforts by the US to
maintain political equilibrium on a worldwide basis. This
consonance of basic interests between Japan and the US has
been evident in the various debates and voting conducted
over the years in the UN and other world forums.
4. Although in recent years Japan's relationship with
the US has evolved from that of a client status toward a more
equal partnership, the Japanese have continued to regard the
arrangement as being a special one. The US has been both
mentor and understanding friend, protector and staunch ally.
In a sense, the Japanese have viewed the US as their inter-
preter to the West in the same way they have tended to think
of themselves as being a bridge for the US to China.
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5. At the same time, aside from the recent so-called
China and economic shocks from the US, other, more basic
factors are at work to alter the Japanese-US relationship.
Foremost, perhaps, is a natural desire on the part of the
Japanese to avoid "having all of their eggs in one basket."
Domestic politics now require at least the appearance of
more independent policies on the part of the Japanese govern-
ment, and as Japan becomes more assertive, long submerged
divergencies in national interests will probably emerge to
complicate the relationship. Although for the foreseeable
future the political control of Japan is expected to remain
with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the trend
in the leadership of this broadly structured party is away
from the ultra-conservative wing which is most closely
identified with the US. The emerging leaders in the years
ahead promise to be more in tune with opposition demands
for less reliance on the US. Moreover, even though the oppo-
sition parties seem unlikely to upset LDP rule, at least over
the next several years, collectively they represent roughly
half of the people in terms of the popular vote. In a
consensus society, opposition viewpoints can and do have a
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strong impact on government policy. Finally, the younger
Japanese generations that are moving into political promi-
nence display a nationalism that is unfettered by either
guilt feelings over the last war or gratefulness at the
largesse shown by the US to a former foe.
6. Economic factors will also increasingly affect
Japan's relations with the US. Heavily dependent as it is on
external sources of raw materials, Japan is accelerating its
efforts to move away from overdependence on any single import
market, whether it be oil from the Middle East or coking coal
from the US. To a lesser -- but still important -- degree,
Japan is also anxious to diversify its export markets on a
worldwide basis. This trade diversification effort, carried
out to the extent that Japan seems willing to carry it, por-
tends a more flexible foreign policy and a blurring of identi-
fication with any single power bloc.
7. In the security field, the growing nationalism in
Japan, the pacific inclinations of the Japanese people, and
the current climate of international detente combine to make
a potent force for downgrading Japan's military ties with the
US. Under such circumstances, we can expect increasing
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pressure for a phasing out of US bases in Japan at a rate
faster than the US -- or even Tokyo --perhaps might wish.
The strong American military presence on Okinawa, which is
to remain virtually intact after reversion this year, will
be the main target. Even at this stage, criticism among
the Japanese of this continued presence has been so strong
that the Sato government has been compelled to promise that
it will seek a retrenchment of US bases on Okinawa after
reversion. And, once Okinawa is safely back in the Japanese
fold the government may be less able or willing to resist
pressure for a reduction of the US presence there.
8. As Japan's own conventional forces gradually are
strengthened under build-up plans projected over the next
decade or so, the Japanese people may come to feel even less
need for a continued US military presence. Moreover, in the
absence of any felt external threat, many Japanese already
regard the US presence as not only superfluous but detrimental
to the development of a genuine independent foreign policy
aimed at friendly relations with all nations, particularly
Communist China. Even the tough-minded Sato government now
appears disturbed by the implications of its designation of
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Taiwan as an important security factor for Japan in the
context of the basic 1969 agreement with the US on Okinawa's
reversion. In addition to a latent fear that the US military
presence may draw them into hostilities not of their own
choosing, many Japanese suspect that US emphasis on defense
burden sharing is aimed at propelling Japan into an unwanted
regional security role.
9. The Japanese are also unsure of the scope and pace
of US military withdrawal from East Asia under the Nixon
Doctrine, Many Japanese question the validity of US security
commitments to Japan, and these doubts will grow as the US
further reduces its presence. In time, this uncertainty is
likely to lend impetus, on the one hand, to the build-up of
Japan's Self Defense Forces, and, on the other, to the adop-
tion of a more neutral -- or independent -- foreign policy.
Japan's Neighbors Beckon
10. Sensing unusual opportunities, both Peking and
Moscow are attempting to exploit the political ferment and
uncertainty existing on the Japanese scene today. China
has stepped up its "invitational diplomacy" and the USSR has
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refurbished its "smiling diplomacy" toward Japan. Both to
disarm critics of Japan's close identification with the US
and to satisfy its own interests, the Sato government is
assessing possible avenues opened up by such overtures.
11. Peking has been blatantly courting those Japanese
deemed favorable to its cause while rebuffing those considered
enemies. Responding to the bait, ambitious Japanese politicians
and trade-hungry businessmen are scrambling to be invited to
Peking for talks. Joining in the rush -- along with selected
members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party -- are leaders
of all the opposition parties with the exception of the Japan
Communist Party, currently on the ideological outs with Peking.
12. In discussions to date with sympathetic Japanese,
Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials have listed varying
prerequisites for normalization of relations, the most basic
being: recognition by Japan that the People's Republic of
China (PRC) is the sole legitimate government of China --
including Taiwan -- and abrogation of Japan's 1952 peace
treaty with Taiwan. The Chinese are holding out the promise
of diplomatic relations, a peace treaty, and even a friendship
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and non-aggression pact if Japan meets these conditions. The
full, extent of Chinese demands for a broad rapprochement is
unclear. Although renunciation of Japan's security ties with
the US was a key demand in the 1960's, Peking has not pressed
for this lately. On this and other issues the Japanese pro-
fess to see considerable flexibility on Peking's part.
13. There already has been a considerable shifting of
Japanese policy gears toward China. Washington's unilateral
opening to Peking has telescoped Japan's timeframe of debate
on the critical issue of recognizing China and has added
impetus to already widespread sentiment for better relations
with Peking. Sato now speaks in favor of early normaliza-
tion of relations and recognition that Taiwan is part of a
"one China." His would-be successor, Foreign Minister
Fukuda, is cautiously attempting to strike an even more
accommodating posture.
14. Not unexpectedly, the trend in Japan toward a
rapprochement with China has elicited a countereffort by
the USSR. For the past few years, as part of its contain-
ment strategy against China, Moscow has been engaged in an
effort of sorts to curry favor with the Japanese, but in
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recent months the Soviets have been trying harder. In dis-
cussions with various Japanese officials and political figures
in both Tokyo and Moscow, the Soviets have been probing whether
they can capitalize on Japan's resentment of recent US political
and economic initiatives. Preparations are also underway for
resumption of annual meetings of Foreign Ministers, suspended
since 1967; a Gromyko visit early this year is being discussed.
15. In conversations with the Japanese, the Soviets
are taking the line that Japan has little to gain from normalizing
relations with China, arguing that economic relations with the
USSR offer much greater potential. In this connection, the
Soviet ambassador is reported to have urged the Japanese recently
to dispatch a top-level economic delegation to Moscow. The
ambassador claimed that the Soviets would greet such a group
with a warmer reception than accorded previous Japanese missions
and would respond with a "dramatic initiative." This might
involve a more substantial infusion of Japanese technology and
capital into Siberia for joint exploitation of natural resources.
16. The Japanese, perhaps wishfully, recently have de-
tected indications of possible flexibility on the part of the
Soviets in the so-called Northern Territories dispute. This
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concerns Japanese claims to several islands off the northern-
most main island of Hokkaido, which were seized by the Soviets
at the close of World War II. The disputed islands are of
little intrinsic value but are of strategic military use to the
Soviets who have built elaborate anti-submarine defensive sys-
tems on the two northernmost ones. Aside from purely national-
istic instincts to recover lost territory (a smaller version
of Okinawa) the Japanese would breathe easier if the Soviet
military presence were removed beyond eyesight .(the closest
islands are visible from Hokkaido on rare fog-free days). In
recent years, the Soviets have brusquely rebuffed repeated
Japanese requests to discuss the issue, contending that the
matter is closed. For its part, Japan refuses to sign a peace
treaty with Moscow -- formally ending World War II hostilities
-- until the islands are returned.
17. Now however, faint hopes have been raised among the
Japanese that the Soviets might be willing to return the small
islands closest to Hokkaido. If a suitable formula could be
achieved which would leave open Japan's claim to the others
-- the two southern Kuriles -- it is possible that Sato or
his successor might make a trip to Moscow on the strength of
a half-a-loaf victory.
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Immediate Japanese Response -- Caution
18. How is Japan responding -- or is liable to respond
-- to these various and frequently divergent influences? In
the short range, there is little reason to expect any abrupt,
marked change in Japan's foreign posture. The Japanese are
a cautious and deliberate people, and -- despite some antici-
pated shifts in emphasis -- the basically conservative nature
of Japan's leadership should prevail for the foreseeable
future. Barring the emergence of an external threat or the
occurence of severe economic disruption, Japan will have
the opportunity to make necessary or desired adjustments in
its national policies in an unhurried fashion.
19. Stabilization of relations with the US is of
immediate concern for the Japanese. Despite present strains,
this relationship remains the keystone of Japanese foreign
policy. Congruent basic interests in the maintenence of
world order plus Japan's present degree of economic and
security reliance on the US impel the Japanese toward accom-
modation rather than resistance in differences with the US.
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20. Actually, the various "shocks" absorbed in recent
months by Japan have had a sobering effect on the Japanese,
heretofore prone to complacent introspection after so many
years of unusually intimate association with the US. The
ultimate result of these shocks probably will be to hasten
the coming-of-age process of a renascent Japan, whose econo-
mic attainments have far outstripped its international
political maturity. The Japanese are likely to emerge more
self-confident, and more prepared psychologically to stand
on their own feet. The trend in Japan toward a fully equal
and, independent relationship with the US has been in train
for many years, but has now been accelerated.
21. Manifestations of a more independent approach to
foreign policy by the Japanese are already becoming apparent.
Tokyo is pushing ahead more rapidly than expected with
recognition of Mongolia, while expanding its political con-
tacts with North Korea and North Vietnam. Implicit in these
undertakings is the desire to maintain the diplomatic
initiative in East Asia so as not to be caught off guard
again by possible future US moves. But it is on the central
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issue of China that the Japanese are concentrating their
main efforts. Despite the hurdles involved, Japan's leader-
ship seems determined to precede the US in establishing
diplomatic relations with Peking; the Japanese estimate
that they have ample time to bargain and accomplish this
with dignity. While the Japanese do not expect much
actual movement to occur during the remaining prospective
six months or so of Sato's tenure, they will be using this
time to prepare the way for possible rapid progress there-
after. Although the Japanese have been fairly candid about
their moves thus far, the US Embassy in Tokyo no longer
takes it for granted that there necessarily will be full
prior consultation in such matters.
The Longer Term -- Search for a New Balance
22. In the somewhat longer-range, the Japanese have
considerable potential for maneuvering within the developing
power relationships in the Far East. The Sino-Soviet rift,
the US-Soviet nuclear standoff, and US efforts to reach a
detente with Peking while maintaining a stable relation-
ship with Moscow create a climate for Japan to balance off
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its relations among the other three members of the new
Pacific quadrilateral power arrangement. For example,
Tokyo probably feels that in negotiations with Peking for
normalization of relations it can extract more favorable
terms by exploiting China's heightened concern over
growing Soviet "encirclement" in South Asia. But basically,
Japan probably counts on the attraction of its economic
capabilities as the more solid foundation for possible
closer relations with both the USSR and China.
23. It is in Tokyo's future relations with Peking
that the greatest potential lies for a significant change
in Japan's international posture. The Japanese appear to
have made the strategic decision that their longer-range
economic interests as well as concerns for regional sta-
bility can be served by achieving an effective relationship
with the Chinese. After their abortive championing of
Taiwan's right to retain UN membership, the Japanese have
taken the attitude that they have discharged their moral
obligations to the Nationalists. The Japanese seem confi-
dent that they can meet Peking's demands on the Taiwan
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issue -- recognition that Taiwan is an integral part of
China under the sole legitimate government of the People's
Republic of China -- and still maintain their economic
interests on the island during an indefinite interim
period during which the Chinese themselves resolve their
differences. In effect, this would amount to a reversal
of the already shifting pattern under which Japan's major
economic enterprises handle trade with Taiwan while dummy
companies carry out parallel activities with the mainland.
The Japanese are also sanguine that they can sidestep
China's demands that Japan abrogate its 1952 peace treaty
with Taiwan. Taking the line that this issue can be
negotiated in the course of discussions with Peking on
normalization of relations, the Japanese feel that the
treaty will become a dead issue and "fade away" naturally
as Japanese-Chinese relations are restored.
24. Although anxious to expedite a settlement with
China, the Japanese must overcome some internal problems
in addition to facing stiff bargaining with the Chinese
on terms. Despite the expanding "China mood" in Japan, the
strong opposition of the dwindling, but still influential,
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pro-Taiwan advocates must be considered. This opposition
may well retard and complicate the task of achieving a
rapprochement with Peking, but it is not strong enough to
derail the effort.
25. While not altering Japan's basic pro-Western
orientation, relations with Peking could serve as a counter-
poise to the Japanese feeling of overdependence on the US.
Tokyo, no doubt, is encouraged by the flexibility exhibited
toward Japan by Chinese leaders in private discussions;
many Japanese have been impressed by Premier Chou En-lai's
remarks to visiting Japanese businessmen to the effect that
the economies of the two countries are complementary, that
China needs Japanese trade to accelerate its economic deve-
lopment, and that competition for overseas markets need
not become a problem because of China's concentration on
its domestic growth.
26. As regards the expansion of Japan's relations with
the USSR, prospects are that this will move slowly. More
extensive mutual economic projects for the exploitation of
Siberian resources may be worked out as time goes on, and
greater accord probably will develop over Japanese fishing
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rights in the seas north of Japan. In time, some compromise
solution may even be reached in the Northern Territories
dispute so as to permit the signing of a peace treaty.
Japanese distrust and dislike of the Russians is still deep,
however, and an intimate relationship would be a long time
in emerging -- if it ever did. Japan's approach to the
USSR will be influenced by two main considerations:
(1)
the intrinsic value of whatever economic deals are possible;
and (2) the leverage provided in dealing with China.
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