CUBA/CENTRAL AMERICA MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: UPDATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001503710011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 30, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT . Cuba/Central America Memorandum for the President: Update
1. Last week the Interagency Group met a number of times to work out an"
agreed draft memorandum for the President. On Saturday, 24 October, we met
for many hours in McFarlane's office at State and reached nearly complete
consensus. (S)
2. The following Tuesday, 27 October, a "Summary Memorandum for the
President" drafted by Assistant Secretary Enders, was circulated for comment.
To the surprize of most participants, that draft moved back toward vagueness
and ambiguity on several of the key issues- -perhaps because Enders had not
participated in meetings of the previous week. At a rather intensive meeting25x1
of the Group on Tuesday evening, said, for example, "I have
read through 17 drafts of the in and I find this 15-page
j -Y Summary impossible to understand or follow." 25x1
3. On 28 October another draft was circulated and led to the attached
comments and response to State of 29 October. inintly agreed upon and signed 25X1
by Messrs_
Significant issues which must be resolved by the NSC meeting:
4. The CIA comment of 29 October informs State and Defense that we expect
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Central American guerrilla groups to move auickl` and
preemptively in the next several months to strengthen Nicaragua and help the
Salvadoran guerrillas and to prevent the March 1982 elections. 25X1
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6. The State paper (28 October draft) failed to provide this assurance
because it conditioned any US military action on a Nicaraguan challenge of a
multinational ultimatum that would tell Nicaragua "not to import additional
heavy weapons or Cuban forces".
7. This is a multinational ultimatum which would be hard to get, but it
would, in any case, provide no basis for action for months to come because only
after the_passage of time could one decide whether or not Nicaragua had violated
the ultimatum ing, for example, an additional 2,000, 4,000, or 6,000
25x1
Cuban troops.
8. Therefore, CIA has said that the ultimatum must also include the
condition that Nicaragua "must terminate all help for destabilization of other
countries", i.e., it must stop subverting subversion. This could be acted on
within two to three weeks because we have the means to verify whether or not
Nicaragua is continuing to export subversion, and this condition also provides
a reasonable basis for othAr - ,erican countries to take action against 25X1
an aggressive government.
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9. Defense agrees with this in principle, though Secretary Weinberger must
obtain clear-cut commitment about the operational implications of this from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Certainly Dr. Ikle and others at Defense share the above
10. Second Issue -- Defense agrees that the US should give weapons- and
economic .support to anti-Cuban guerrilla forces in Africa (Ethiopia, Mozambique,
etc.). -State continues to delete this obvious, risk-free pressure tactic.
25X1
I
11. The third major difference with State--where Defense also agrees with
us--is that we feel there must be a much more active political communications
strategy here and abroad which emphasizes the moderate groups and reforms in
El Salvador, tells the truth about repression in Nicaragua and its current
export of subversion and which gives visibility to the cumulative number of
victims caused by Cuban-backed terrorism and repressive regimes in Africa and
12. Also attached is the brief update paper on Nicaragua you wanted.
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Latin America. The Enders draft recommended a "low-key" approach on these tree. I I
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO:
29 October 1981
Defense via Dr. Ikle
State via Mr. McFarlane
Dr. Ikle
Judge Clark
Gen. Gorman
Mr.
McFarlane
Asst. Secy. West
Mr.
Burt
Dep. Asst. Secy. Sanchez
Mr.
Bremer
Messrs. Wolfowitz/Roche
SUBJECT: Comments on "Cuba/Central America" Summary for the President
(Draft of 1200 noon, 28 October 1981)
CIA has a wide array of information suggesting that Cuba, Nicaragua, and
the Central American guerrilla groups will move quickly and preemptively in
the next months to:
(1) reinforce the Nicaraguan Government with Cuban or other troops
introduced in a deceptive way--such as approximately 225 Cuban "special troops"
who arrived in recent weeks on airplanes along with teachers;
(2) provide jet aircraft and additional amounts of other heavy weapons
to Nicaragua which could permit it to intimidate or threaten Honduras and
Costa Rica if they permit MI "anti-Nicaraguan activities" on their soil;
1(3) strengthen guerrilla/terrorist groups in El Salvador (the Sandinistas
have called for volunteers to fight there), Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica--
for expanded military/terrorist assaults in January-March 1982; this might
well occur simultaneouslyat different levels of violence in the various
countries for both military and political purposes--such as convincing
Mexico and the Socialist International (meeting in Caracas in February 1982)
and the US Congress that the guerrillas will eventually win and further help
to the threatened government is hopeless or too costly.
In the light of this information, years of Cuban success in exporting
subversion, Castro's well-established understanding of propaganda and the US
political process and his tendency toward the fait accompli, the following.
suggestions are made concerning the latest State draft 28 October 1981).
Att: Proposed Text Changes
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NICARAGUA--THE CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE TRENDS*
Contents
Summary
I. The Sandinista Directorate and its External Activities
and Support
-- power base within Nicaragua
- continued Nicaraguan support for subversion and terrorism
-- Cuban and other communist/radical support
-- Table: Overview of Foreign Financial Support
II. The Moderate Groups
III. Groups Associated with the Somoza Regime
IV. Conclusion and Probable Trends
Appendix -
A. The Extreme Left--Overview
B. Examples and Chronology of Sandinista Repression--
1979 to Present
C. Democratic/Moderate Groups--Overview
Pag
1
*This analytic paper was written at the request of the DCI by the NIO/LA
with A/NIO/LA input and benefited from information provided by ALA/MCD
staff. It has not yet been formally coordinated with NFAC/ALA/MCD, but that
step is now being taken. It is intended as background for a forthcoming
NSC meeting.
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NICARAGUA--THE CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBABLE TRENDS
Summary
The Marxist-Leninist Directorate is in virtually complete control of
Nicaragua,__It leads a Cuban/Soviet Bloc-trained secret police, a new army of
19,000-24,000 with ever increasing amounts of tanks, other heavy weapons, and
a variety of political mass organizations.
Moderate groups still exist. Despite a recent upsurge in the repression
which began in 1979 and the recent arrest of democratic party and business leaders,
the five democratic parties, two non-communist trade union federations (35,000
members), business associations (COSEP has 75,000 members), organized Indian
communities, and the popular Catholic Church could--with outside help--become
even more effective as a political opposition and source of support for anti-
Sandinista liberation groups.
Presently about 2,000 Cuban military and police personnel are in Nicaragua
among a total Cuban presence of about 6,400. The recent introduction of 250 or
more Cuban Ministry of Interior "special troops", in a deceptive way aboard
airplanes carrying the well-publicized groups of Cuban teachers to Nicaragua, is
an ominous portent of likely additional Cuban troops and deployment. This is
especially true when combined with indications that Cuba or some other entity
may provide jet fighter aircraft in the near future. Nicaraguan jet fighter
pilots are due back this month; air fields are being prepared; 22 MIG-21s arrived
in Cuba, the crates then moved to Holguin Airfield (PHOTINT 27 Oct.) to which 114
new special Soviet advisers are also being sent (SIGINT 24 Sept.). There is
also a high level of Cuban military activity at key airfields, testing of SAM
sites and the like which could suggest testing, concern about US reaction to
Soviet moves in Poland or concern about US reaction to a Cuban donation of jet
fighter planes to Nicaragua in the near future.
A variety of information suggests that Cuba, Nicaragua, and the guerrilla
force will move in the next months to increase their strength and accelerate
violence in the target countries. Therefore, unless the US prevents the
deployment of additional Cuban troops and/or jet fighter aircraft, it may not be
possible to obtain Honduran and Costa Rican cooperation for special activities
needed to turn back the Nicaraguan export of subversion and increase the prospects
for the moderate groups to take power in Nicaragua. Failure to act soon will mean
a considerably increased probability-of communist success in all of Central America
within 2-3 years.
1. The Sandinista Directorate and its External Activities and support
The main institutional elements of the coercive apparatus already built by
the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista Directorate since July 1979 are: the new secret
police, a strong new army, political mass organizations of the usual totalitarian
kind, and a significant Cuban and other foreign communist and radical Arab
presence (see Appendix A for an overview). The steady buildup of the Sandinista
military-security forces is evident from these facts:
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current strength of the security forces, 19,000-24,000
about 25 tanks there. . . Nicaragua claims 40 and expects 80 more
for a total of 105-120 in 1982
-- massive Cuban/Soviet air-sea shipment of weapons included more
than 435 flights and more than 40 shiploads in about 12 months
16 new military installations have been built and the 9 from
Somoza days have been expanded
runways to accommodate jet fighters are being expanded at three
airfields while Bulgaria provides pilot training and new MIGs
arrive in Cuba
Soviet tank ferries have been practicing as has a new Nicaraguan
airborne unit
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The Sandinista repression of the democratic groups, including those who
joined to overthrow Somoza, began in August 1979 and has continued at an
increasing pace since then (see Appendix B for a chronology of repression since
1979). The Directorate has tried to walk the path of deceptive commitment to
"pluralism" in order to disarm its potential domestic opponents and mislead the
international community--especially the US--long enough to consolidate power and
obtain large amounts of international economic assistance. This strategem has
been used by most new communist movements (Hitler called it Gleichshellttung) and
was precisely the technique used by Castro in Cuba from 1959-T9when he shifted
from saying he was for "Jeffersonian Democracy" and revealed that he had "always
been a Marxist-Leninist". The current continuation of the deception strategy
is the Directorate's denial that is provides help to armed guerrillas in the region.
In fact, a recent, excellent NFAC report summarized a wide array of Nicaraguan
actions on behalf of the violent left in Central America including*:
-- transshipment of arms, funds, guerrilla command and control,
communications-sending and intercepting
-- training of terrorists/guerrillas from El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, etc.
-- covert action, including attempts to target terrorist operations
and Nicaraguan incursions in Honduras and attempts to penetrate
Honduran/Costa Rican political parties and other groups through
bribery and persuasion
-- calls for "volunteers" to fight in El Salvador and apparent
preparations to send additional Nicaraguan or other Latin American
guerrillas into nearby countries.
Despite the Enders ultimatum of mid-August 1981, there has been no decrease
in the level or pace of these subversive and aggressive actions by Nicaragua.
Nor has there been any positive response to the US request that Nicaragua
*NFAC, Nicarayuan Support for Central American Revolutionaries, 20 October 1981
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"re-export" some of its new tanks or the US proposal that both sides refrain
for some weeks from hostile public statements. In fact, shortly after the
August 1981 Enders mission and the subsequent trip of a Sandinista leader to
Libya, an ever-increasing torrent of anti-US statements and propaganda began.
This included the visit of Philip Agee in mid-October, his public call for
"the Nicaraguan people" to burn the US Embassy and take the US diplomats
hostage "as in Iran" and reported rehearsals for just such a possible embassy
takeover by a special Cuban police unit which works with the Nicaraguan police.
Among recerVIt hostile statements by Sandinista Directorate members are the
following:
-- Daniel Ortega at the UN blamed the US for most of the world's
problems, accused the US of 200 instances of "interventionism"
in Central America and the Caribbean, and hinted at possible
repudiation of the Nicaraguan (and other LDC) debt to US banks
(US-UN mission cable, 8 Oct. 81)
-- Daniel Ortega also alleged the "reemergence of a warlike policy
in the US" (FBIS, 23 Oct. 81).
-- Bayardo Arce on 16 September said to a US Embassy official, "When
will you Americans ever understand that nothing and no one will
prevent us from helping our fellow guerrillas in Central America?"
(Managua Embassy cable, 17 Sept. 81)
-- Bayardo Arce replied to US charges about the Nicaraguan export
of subversion that Washington "lies" and that Nicaragua's fate
is sealed and its rifles must be cocked" (FBIS, 14 Oct. 81).
In addition to the military/secret police type of help from Cuba and other
Soviet partners, the Sandinista Directorate also has obtained other important
international support:
-- from the Soviet Bloc--funds ($110M), diplomatic and propaganda
support
--- from Libya and various Palestinian terrorist formations--military
training, funds ($lOOM+), weapons
-- from Mexico ($260 M) and the Socialist International-funds,
training, immensely important propaganda help
-- from many democratic nations funds ($5OM+) and diplomatic support
-- from international financial institutions to which the US is a
heavy contributor--major financial support ($120M+)
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Sources of Financial Support for Nicaragua Since the Sandinista Victory, July 1979
Million
Currenta
Cumulative to Dateb
Democratic Nations
$52
$500
International Financial
$120
$320+
Institutions (IAD3, IBRD)
Mexico
$260
$360
OPEC
$18
?
Soviet Bloc
$110
$110
Radical Arabs (Libya +
$100+
$100+
Totals
$660
$1,390
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Sources: a - CIA, OER report of 25 September 1981 and another report on
Soviet Bloc aid
b - Estimate by Amb. Middendorf (summer 1981)
Since Libya is now experiencing cash flow problems due to low oil prices
and the Soviet Bloc aid is mostly in the form of credits (as is some of the
other), the above data makes it c.l.ear that the US could try to persuade other
democratic nations, the international financial institutions, and Mexico to
cut off all further economic aid until Nicaragua fulfills two conditions--
ends the export of subversion and removes all Cuban military/police forces.
P. The Moderate Groups
Despite the recent increase in Sandinista repression and the arrest of key
leaders from the democratic parties and business federations, it is clear that
the moderate groups still exist and encompass (see Appendix C):
-- five political parties, including the Nicaraguan Democratic
Movement (MDN) with a good popular base, led by Robelo who just
had his passport taken;
-- two trade union federations with about 35,000 members--one is
supported by Venezuela and the International Christian Democratic
Trade Union movement and the other (CUS) by the AFL-CIO through
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD);
-- six business/professional organizations united in one group--COSEP--
with about 75,000 members (up from 10,000 in 1978) with support
from private sectorgrouRs in Venezuela, Mexico, and other countries
along with some of the US AID funds for projects which they administer
such as producer cooperatives;
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-- the Catholic Church with strong popular support--growing since
the revolution due to its functioning as a symbol of opposition
to communist dictatorship and the strength of the leader,
Archbishop Obando y Bravo;
the 150,000 protestant, English-speaking, Atlantic Coast Indians
whose strong family and religious orientation has produced
opposition to the emerging communist state, as already expressed
by massive civil disobedience in the summer of 1980;
-- the free media--one newspaper and 19 radio stations which have a
large and growing audience.
Political influence is hard to measure in any context, but especially in
dictatorships where the usual indicators such as public opinion polls, popular
votes, or legislative outcomes are missing or likely to be misleading.
What is the possible current role of these moderate groups which since June 1981
have more and more established an informal network of shared views, information
and tactical action? At present they cannot accomplish the following:
-- overthrow the Directorate without major external help;
-- prevent the Directorate from exporting subversion;
-- prevent the Directorate from bringing in ever larger numbers of
Cuban/Soviet Bloc/anti-Western-troops, teachers, advisers, air-
craft, weapons, etc.;
-- redirect the foreign policy of the Directorate toward real
cooperation with its neighbors and away from the Soviet/Cuban
axis.
However, the moderate groups can accomplish the following:
-- they can provide a favorable environment and a wide variety of
support for external and internally-based anti--Sandinista and
anti-Somoza liberation groups, both political and paramilitary;
-- they can act in economic, political, and symbolic ways to dis-
tract and weaken the Sandinista regime and partially prevent it
from doing more to export subversion and crush any uture
paramilitary or liberation movements;
-- their continued existence and opposition to communism provides
the most dramatic contrast to the lies and propaganda of the
Sandinistas in the international arenas--especially among the
Latin American and European democracies where the fate of the
moderate groups will make visible what awaits other democratic
forces if Central America becomes communist.
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There are two quite different immediate dangers facing these groups.
One is the mounting of a large scale, violent campaign of repression (probably
backed and directed by Cuban troops and secret police much as the Soviet/Cuban
apparatus worked in Ethiopia in 1977-78). This could so terrorize and decimate
the party, union, business groups and Church moderates that their institutions
fall apart. This is possible but not probable until after a revolutionary
victory in El Salvador because such a terror campaign in Nicaragua might turn
Mexico and other non-communist supporters of the guerrillas into advocates for
the threatened governments.
The other more proximate threat to the remaining effectiveness
of the moderate groups is that the anti-Sandinista struggle outside Nicaragua
falls under the control of Somocista elements backed by Argentina and that
this prevents the emergence of a visible, effective anti-communist and anti-
Somocista Third Force movement. The impact of a SomocistalArgentina led
external movement as the dominant or apparently dominant element in a US-backed
or approved anti-Sandinista coton oud well be the massive demoralization
of the moderate leaders and groups who would simply not be willing to take the
immense personal risks to help such a movement and who would see Somocista dominance a