EL SALVADOR: THE INSURGENTS' OFFENSIVE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 6, 2006
Sequence Number: 
27
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 23, 1982
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2.pdf158.77 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 TeV Secret 25X1 Special Analysis SALVAV0R: The Insurgents' Offensive The guerrillas' latest offensive is primarily aimed at enhanc- ing their prospects in negotiations. The attacks, which generally have been against highly vulnerable military and economic targets, are intended to demonstrate a 'continuing ability to inflict losses on government forces and to disrupt the economy. The insurgents have not scored any major successes, however and thus are not likely to force a dialogue on their terms. 25X1 The offensive appears to be nearing an end, although -sabotage o erations and small-scale harassing actions continue. The government still has not used battalions to retake lost territory. The Army anticipates another major insurgent attack and hold its elite units in reserve. As a result, gents apparently have been able to consolidate and seize several additional towns in northern and Morazan Departments. reportedly wants to the insur- their gains Chalatenango Secret 23 October 1982 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 Secret Mixed Results This strategy has been only partially successful. The insurgents have overrun several small towns in Chalatenango and Morazan and captured or killed over 100 government troops, but they have not seized large popula- tion centers or trapped key Army units. Although their sabotage campaign has disrupted the transportation, com- munication, and electrical power systems in various re- gions, it has not caused any serious damage to the infrastructure. The insurgents nevertheless have displayed close coordination among their several factions, which they have not been able to do in the past. They also have shown that, despite the successful elections in March and the several subsequent military campaigns against them, they can still carry out disruptive actions. In addition, their ability to launch another offensive indicates they continue. to receive arms from Nicaragua. Outlook It is as yet unclear what impact the offensive will have on existing political strains in the government and military. Defense Minister Garcia already is under attack from rightwing backers of Assembly President D'Aubuisson for his support of political and economic reforms and for his alleged poor handling of the war effort. Although the Army's failure to launch an im- mediate counteroffensive may have been good tactics, it probably will im rove the position of those seeking to replace Garcia. The offensive also may have strengthened the hand of those who oppose negotiations. They can now argue that this is no time to talk. .Tep Secret Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 Treng- Secret President Magana's plan to form a peace commission to engage leftist political leaders in a dialogue prob- ably will be delayed.further. His objective is to split the leftist political leaders from insurgent militants and bring them into the electoral process before the scheduled elections in March 1984. Although the offensive is likely to cause new prob- lems for the government, it has not changed the basic military balance in the guerrillas' favor. Nonetheless, the continued military stalemate will not help the gov- ernment's worsening political and economic problems. D !'ep. Secret a Approved For Release 2006/05/25: CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001202920027-2