NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029700010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 5, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 Wednesday January 5, 1977 CI NIDC 77-003.
10 State Department review completed
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday January 5, 1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior o i.cials.
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WEST GERMANY - MIDDLE EAST
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USSR: Grain Harvest
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EAST GERMANY - WEST GERMANY
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PERU-CHILE-ECUADOR:
Arms Race
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FRANCE-EC:
MOZAMBIQUE:
ETHIOPIA:
European Parliament
Internal Problems
Government Reorganization
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Page 7
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FRANCE-IRAN: Energy Development
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West Germany is taking initiatives to encourage Mid-
dle East peace negotiations.
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Foreign Minister Genscher said last week that recent
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Geneva conference could be reconvened and that it would be
"useful" if all those interested in a Middle East solution
would take initiatives to promote the conference.
statements by Arab and Israeli politicians suggested that the
I I Genscher disclosed that he had recently sounded out
the ambassadors from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel
on the situation in the Middle East and how to arrange a peace-
ful solution there. According to a Foreign office official,
Genscher urged the three Arab ambassadors to seek to have their
governments influence the Palestine Liberation Organization to
recognize Israel's right to exist within secure borders.
The foreign minister said that he intends to visit
Jordan, Syria, and Israel in the next several months. He also
expects to play host to a visit to Bonn by the Egyptian foreign
minister.
ing involved in a detailed discussion of the border question
but reportedly will restate the West German position that final
borders should be "almost identical" with those existing before
the 1967 war.
Genscher reportedly plans to use his trip to urge
both patience and greater initiative by the states directly in-
volved in a possible peace settlement. He hopes to avoid becom-
According to the Foreign Office, the West Germans
raised the idea of an EC initiative on the Middle East during
a meeting last month of the EC political directors, and Genscher
wants his EC colleagues to discuss the Middle East at a minis-
terial meeting already scheduled for January 31.
I In a radio interview last week, Genscher said that
any EC endeavor on the Middle East would be made in "close co-
ordination" with the new US administration. He dodged a question
in the interview concerning possible participation by the PLO
in Geneva, but he reportedly held a general exchange with the
Arab ambassadors on the issue of PLO participation.
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//West German willingness to pursue initiatives on
the Middle East will depend on whether they receive support from
the US and the EC.//
The Soviet need for sizable grain imports most years
LS ue in part to excessive harvesting losses. We estimate that
as a result of poor grain growing and harvesting technology, at
least 10 percent of the grain grown in the USSR is not harvested,
a loss rate more than double that of the US. If the Soviets
could curtail these excessive losses, they could either reduce
their dependence on foreign grain or use the additional grain
as.feed to increase production of meat, milk, and eggs.
I Annual losses of unharvested grain may range from 15
to 25 mi ion tons. Although it is impossible to harvest grain
without any loss, if the Soviets could cut their loss by even
one half, the increased yield would more than exceed the 6 to
8 million tons per year they have agreed to import from the US
between 1976 and 1980. Without improved harvesting, Soviet grain
production is likely to remain 10 to 15 million tons short of
actual needs for several years.
]In addition to causing grain losses, Soviet harvesting
practices and weather conditions at harvest time adversely affect
grain quality, contributing to additional losses during post-
harvest transportation, processing, and storage. Both harvest and
post-harvest losses exacerbate grain shortages in low-production
years and limit Soviet capability to build up reserves in years
of abundant harvests.
Because of shortcomings inherent in the varieties of
grain grown in the USSR relative to climatic conditions, the So-
viets usually harvest their grain while its moisture content is
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too high for efficient harvesting and storage. Moist grain is
prone to mechanical and biological damage that reduces its value,
especially for such high priority uses as feed, seed, and stra-?
? tegic reserves.
25X1 Insufficient equipment generally delays Soviet grain
harvesting long after the prime harvest period. As of 1974, each
Soviet combine was required to harvest 2.2 times as much crop
area and 1.7 times as much grain as harvested by a combine in
the US.
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The actual load on Soviet combines is even greater
than these figures indicate because, in contrast to US practice,
the Soviets also use many of their combines to cut the grain into
windrows for curing before it: is gathered and threshed. Moreover,
over three quarters of the combines are based on an outdated
model introduced in 1962. At times up to one third of the combine
fleet is inoperable because repairs are needed.
Increased application of chemical fertilizer to grain
crops in the USSR, now 4.5 times the 1965 level, contributes to
higher loss rates as well as higher yields; the larger volume of
grain plant mass-produced by fertilizer is more difficult to
harvest. The Soviets have not. complemented the increased appli-
cation of fertilizer with better grain varieties and harvesting
equipment or improved harvesting practices.
Soviet measures to reduce the grain-loss problem do
not appear adequate:
--New grain varieties will be introduced between now and
1980, but they will seed only one third of the grain area,
and may of the new varieties have the same shortcomings as
the old ones.
--A planned 50-percent increase in the number of farm trucks
would not eliminate all of the bottlenecks in transportation
of grain.
--New Soviet combine models are being introduced too slowly
to cause rapid improvement in the combine fleet, and even
the new models have design problems that limit their use-
fullness.
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The quickest way the Soviets could reduce grain losses
would be to make major changes in harvesting procedures, such
as reducing the need for the combines to collect the straw, and
encouraging more local initiative in adapting the local condi-
tions. There is some indication that such chan es are under con-
sideration.
East Germany introduced measures last weekend appar-
ently aimed at strengthening its claim to full sovereign control
over East Berlin.
New visa procedures have been imposed on all non-German
visitors entering the East German capital from West Berlin. In
effect, visitors must now obtain a visa even for one-day visits,
valid only until midnight of the day of issuance. Previously,
foreigners were permitted an overnight stay in East Berlin with-
out a visa. The new regulation does not apply to West German
citizens, permanent residents of West Berlin, or members of the
Allied forces.
In addition, according to personal observations by
Allied officials, the East Germans have removed border control
points at the East Berlin - East German boundary. The control
posts were used primarily to ensure that visiting Westerners
had proper visas for East Germany and, as a practical matter,
to prevent Allied vehicles from straying beyond East Berlin.
Removal of the posts may be part of the Honecker re-
gime's effort to get rid of symbolic anomalies that undercut its
contention that East Berlin is an integral part of East Germany.
I I Propaganda explaining the new procedures has empha-
sized East Germany's right to exercise full sovereign control
over its capital. In his New Year's address, party boss Honecker
implicitly echoed this theme and repeated in strong terms that
Bonn must accept the existence of two independent, sovereign
German states as a precondition for cooperation.
East German leaders have been adopting a more strident
position toward Bonn. In part, this attitude reflects the lead-
ership's sensitivity over West German media exploitation of East
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Germany's internal problems, particularly over reports about the
rising numbers of applications to leave East Germany. Honecker,
for example, attacked increasing "provocations" from West Ger-
many against the boundaries of East Germany and noted that the
regime "has made enough proposals" for normal relations with
Bonn--suggesting that no new initiatives can be expected from
the East German side for the time being.
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that the Honecker regime may seek to impose new procedures for
West Germans wishing to travel to East Berlin. Each year, about
1,300,000 West Germans travel to the East German capital.
//The governments of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador are
attempting to calm tensions stirred recently by rumors of troop
movements and by the resurgence of historical animosities over
disputed borders. Although all sides have sought to emphasize
their peaceful intentions, the underlying reasons for their
rivalry--and the continuing arms race in the region--are likely
to keep relations strained.//
//Concern by Peru's neighbors seems certain to be
heightened by the departure for Moscow this week of a high-level
Peruvian air force delegation. President Morales Bermudez an-
nounced at a press conference last week that his country is buy-
ing "air materiel" from the Soviets--an apparent confirmation
of earlier speculation that a. deal had been concluded for SU-22
fighter-bombers.//
//The Peruvian air force mission may be wrapping
up ails o the agreement and arranging for delivery of the
aircraft. A recent disclaimer of aggressive intentions by the
Peruvian President and his reiteration of earlier assertions that
the aircraft purchase is intended only to replace obsolete equip-
ment will do little to calm fears in Chile or Ecuador.//
I //Efforts to reduce tensions include a warm ex-
change of New Year messages between the Peruvian President and
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his counterparts in Santiago and Quito. Another step in this
direction was an announcement that Peruvian Prime Minister Arbulu
will visit Chile in early March to reciprocate a visit by Chilean
Defense Minister Brady last October.//
I //Chilean and Bolivian officials are stressing the
importance of friendly contacts with Peru, suggesting that they
are trying to avoid further friction. Ecuador's ambassador in
Lima, meanwhile, claims that communications between Ecuador and
Peru have improved substantially since the furor caused by can-
cellation of a visit by Morales Bermudez to Quito last month.
Cross-border visits by military commanders are now planned and
invitations for other high-level exchanges are being contem-
plated.//
//The flurry of excitement over the prospect of
hostilities is likely to abate, but the longer-range danger of
a military confrontation will not. Although there are some signs
that discussions on the Bolivian corridor question might be re-
vived or that summit talks between the Chilean and Peruvian
presidents could be arranged, the chances for resolving complex
regional problems remain slim.
FRANCE-EC: European Parliament
//France's Constitutional Council last week de-
clared that a government proposal for election of French repre-
sentatives to the European Parliament through universal suf-
frage is constitutional.//
//The decision virtually assures passage of the
bill wien it comes before the French parliament in April,
thereby eliminating this issue as a major political problem
for President Giscard. It should also give a major boost to
EC efforts to hold direct elections to the European Parliament
in 1978.//
I //Ultranationalist Gaullists had joined the French
Communists in maintaining that the proposal was unconstitu-
tional, and had threatened to block any attempt by Giscard to
amend the constitution if the Council ruled against the gov-
ernment. With the favorable ruling, most of the Gaullists will
now support the bill.//
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//Socialist leader Mitterrand expects some diffi-
culty getting the left wing of his party to support the bill.
Left wing Socialists plan to support the Communist Party in
opposing the proposal on the ground that a directly elected
European Parliament will erode national sovereignty.//
1//Giscard's reported willingness to go along with
Socialist an Gaullist desires that French representatives to
the European Parliament be elected on a proportional represen-
tation basis--thus avoiding the need to create new election
districts--should also clear the way for quick action in the
French Parliament.//
//Several problems must be worked out in other EC
states, however, if the Community is to meet its goal of hold-
ing direct elections in 1978. The situation is most critical
in the UK, where passage of implementing legislation could be
held u12 by the debate in Parliament over home rule for Scot-
land.
(C) The US embassy in Maputo
growing uneasiness in Mozambique in recent months caused by
continuing economic problems such as food shortages, rising
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prices, and increasing unemployment, as well as by Rhodesian
raids into Mozambique. The government is sensitive to reports
of antiregime activity, and recently denounced the "Western
press" for spreading such reports.
ETHIOPIA: Government Reorganization
The reorganization of Ethiopia's Provisional Military
Administrative Council announced on December 29 apparently was
an effort to reaffirm collective leadership and to restore balance
to power relationships within the Council. The reorganization
would seem to limit some of the power of Council First Vice
Chairman Mengistu, but the US embassy doubts that his status has
changed significantly. The government has reaffirmed its inten-
tion to follow Marxist-Leninist principles.
I According to a Foreign Ministry press official, Men-
gis u is to concentrate on his new duties as chairman of the
Council of Ministers and has lost control over some organiza-
tions that contributed greatly to his personal power.
I I The Foreign Ministry official apparently believes that
Council hairman Teferi, largely a figurehead in the past, and
Second Vice Chairman Atnafu, who will now be responsible for
security matters, were the main gainers. The embassy doubts that
Teferi will be any more inclined to exercise his powers than
previously and notes that Atnafu's actual control of the secu-
rity forces is unclear.
I The embassy assesses the change as a very modest step
orwar in that it delineates responsibilities more clearly and
may lead to more moderate decisions. At the same time, the re-
organization suggests that the military is seeking to perpetuate
its control of the government rather than to pr are the way for
civilian rule.
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FRANCE-IRAN: Energy Development
France is deeply involved in the development of Iran's
energy program, particularly nuclear and solar power. The French
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believe their participation will give them a primary position
in Iran's developing energy program. France also will be able to
point to its experience with Iran in negotiations with other
developing countries for assistance to their energy programs.
Ur
France 73 1:
--Provide technical assistance to establish a nuclear re-
search center near Isfahan.
--Train Iranian technicians to operate nuclear reactors.
--Provide Iran with two 900-megawatt nuclear reactors, sched-
uled to be in operation by 1982 or 1933, and give Iran the
option to buy three more.
Other agreements permit Iran to participate indirectly in Euro-
dif, a European uranium enrichment consort-um, and provide Iran
with access to 10 percent of Eurodif's production.
der the terms of agreements concluded with Iran,
Iranian policy calls for using oil revenues to build
an agro-industrial base while preserving natural gas reserves
for use as chemical feedstock and as an energy source after oil
resources are exhausted. The Iranians want to build nuclear re-
actors to provide electricity for major cities and industrial
centers and to experiment with solar energy as a power source
for small, isolated villages.
I Iran's director of energy research believes solar energy
is the most attractive alternative for rural electrification over
the long term. A solar energy feasibility study has already been
completed as part of a cooperative program with the French Na-
tional Center for Scientific Research.
The Center is also developing a solar energy unit cap-
able o producing 100 kilowatts of electrical and 200 kilowatts
of thermal power. The first test models of the cells are likely
by mid-1977, and Iran will test them for a year. If satisfactory,
the cells will be mass-produced in Iran, both for use in Iranian
villages and for sale to neighboring countries.
Iran plans to install one solar unit in each small
village and two or more in large ones, making it possible to
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provide energy without a vast infrastructure of central power
plants and distribution systems. The thermal energy produced will
be used for refrigeration and air conditioning; Iran is seeking
US help in building the necessary conversion systems.
The cost of the solar energy cells under development
is conservatively estimated at $10,000 per kilowatt of capacity
by 1980, putting the price for the Iranian rural electrification
program in the billions of dollars. The project will also require
storage batteries for back-up power when solar energy is not
available. Once the Iranian government gains a clear apprecia-
tion of the huge expenditures required, it may be forced to re-
consider the practicality of the effort.
An important part of the Iranian energy program is the
eve opment of a native capability in both nuclear and non-nuclear
fields in Iranian universities and associated research centers.
The Iranians are acquiring substantial expertise in non-nuclear
areas in particular. The focal point of this effort is the
Materials and Energy Research Center, which has become a key
source of advice to the government on the merits of foreign
energy proposals. It also provides trained engineers and tech-
nicians for Iran's non-nuclear energy program and serves as a
test and evaluation center for items produced in cooperation
with other countries.
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