TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCI

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790008-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 20, 2006
Sequence Number: 
8
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 28, 1982
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790008-9.pdf156.44 KB
Body: 
25X1 1102790008-9 ~ 25X1 28 September 1982 Talking Points for the DDCI I . Stafi~, she South African Mi 1 itary Activity i nto Angola The six week long South African military operation into southern Angola ended in late August, but military activity in the area is again on the Sough Africa pt'gt~biy has expanded .,3ts zone of control i n southern Aege~e~~lvhch may now extend further to the north and to the west as the result of the July-August operation. (see map) II. Status of the Cuban Withdrawal Issue With most details in the Namibia negotiations wrapped up, Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner's current trip to Luanda to secure specific commitments on a Cuban troop withdrawal occurs at a time when Pretoria. leas fu~~-.t~te~d-::its;~osition.on the issue,, -- South Africa now demands that all Cuban troops leave Angola three months after the settlement's implementation phase begins. -- According to press reports, Prime Minister Botha also reserves the right to keep some South African troops in Namibia even after a settlement. While this and other recent tough talk may be due to political pressure from the riyht wing, it will` make concessions on the Cutiar~ questson more- di f fiot~lt< SECRET Approved For Rele - 02790008-9 The private Angola pQSiton an_Cuban troops is not yet knowrr-~ but Luanda continues to take a tough public position on the issue. South African military pressure, however, will strengthen the position of MPLA hardliners who do not want to allow the Cubans to leave Angola. Other African players in the negotiation process meanwhile appear to be on the sidelines. -- SWAPO has been largely cut out of negotiations on Cuban troops. -- The Frontline States publically support Angola's position that there can be no linkage between a Cuban withdrawal and a I~a~nibia settlement. We do not believe that they are being helpful behind the scenes. We have no new evidence that the Cubans and their Soviet backers are more willing than before to see the Cubans leave or the Western-backed settlement effort succeed. III. UNITA A ~najar Angolan-Cuban offensive evidently was launched late last month against UNITA-controlled southeastern Angola. -- UNITA leader Savimbi says that his forces lost some ground, including two towns, in the early stages of the offensive, but they have since regained some positions. -- UNITA has recently claimed that the Cubans and Angolans are preparing for yet another offensive against them in southern Angola. An Angolan and Cuban push against UNITA would be part of a more intensive effort in the southeast in comparison with previous operations there. -- The number of Angolan and Cuban troops at Menongue, the main garrison in this region, is three times what it was a year ago. -- Supply lines to the region have been also improved in recent months. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele T 8001102790008-9 25X1 Approved For Releas UNIT[; ~r :its ~~ ~:ntr"etes to conduct guerrilla operations thrcn+ghQUt _ ~osir iii` _ sduthern two-thirds of the :,.Fount ry. -- Operations include raids on small Angolan garrisons, ambushes of government convoys, and disruptions of the Benguela Railroad. -- The guerrillas have continued to be particularly active in west-central Angola, where their tribal supporters are concentrated. 25X1 25X1 -- Although reliable information on the guerrillas' numerical strength is limited, we believe, on the basis of 25X1 press sources, that the insurgency has een growing fairly steadily and now has around 20,000 men, includiny some 10,000 to 15,000 full-time armed combatants and the rest "auxiliaries" in various stages of training. Approved For Rele ,.,SEC.R,?T1.,? ~~~~.~,.,.,.1?~,.,. ds~ - 25X1 25X1 ? -.- Approved For Rele Pretoria sees the southern Africa region as containing several fundamentally troubling forces: exile guerrilla forces linked to domestic dissidents, hostile neighboring black states either in the Soviet orbit or heading that way, and a growing presence of the Soviet Union and its allies who are manipulating the Africans for their own needs. By hitting various transport and other facilities in Angola and Mozambique, the insurgents also reinforce Pretoria's economic hegemony, ensuring that South Africa's landlocked neighbors to the north are unable to reduce their dependence on transportation routes through South Africa. Approved For Rele 498001102790008-9 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790008-9 A n g fl ~,a~", 'Possible expanded Cehemp area of control ~, ~lNupa , ~' J~~ o ~'~ Ar a of Q South" ican control piva ~Operet i/N1TA controtted area ~'Fv vango Rundn C.2Pr~V~ try ": Namibia A#lantic Ocean ~n72,i ~~. _~_ r %Zambia Ji C l ~~ i gOtSVVatta 'Angola ^~-~ Namihia, 3 ~Soutb-> eo~~da~y ,o P,ese~iaeoo ~a - Africa ~m ~e~assa~~iy a~momar~o. ... Approved For Release 2006/05/25 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001102790008-9