US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800030006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 27, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 July 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR TIM DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: US-Pakistan Relations
25X1
The US-Pakistan relationship is coming under increasing
strain because of growing recognition on both sides that each
looks for something different from. the alliance. The US wants
support
the East-West confrontation. Pakistan wants reinforcement for
its position vis-a-vis India. This underlying incongruity will
increasingly irritate relations, although an outright repudiation
of Pakistan's pro-Western stance is unlikely, at least as long
as President Ayub re,,::ains in control.
This merorandura has been discussed with DD/P which concurs
generally in its substance.
25X1
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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1. US-Pakistan relations have experienced rowin[; strains
over the past two years. President Ayub has sharply criticized
Washington for failure to support its allies fully in their
struggles with neutralist countries, and has expressed great
skepticism about the value of CEVTO and SEATO. His recent
refusal to send troops to Thailand to support the Western
position in Southeast Asia is in striking contrast to his
willingness to do so a year earlier. Ayub has sought to ii,prove
relations with Coim unist China in full knowledge that such
moves would displease the US. Meanwhile, many of the politicians
in the newly elected parliament are calling for a more inde-
pendent foreign policy, and important elements of the press are
arcuing that the alliance with the West cost Pakistan the
friendship of the Communist and neutral nations while providing
no comparable benefits.
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I _..-S E- C--I(--Fr
; . ~
Basic Attitudes
2. US-Pakistan relations have long been hampered by
the differing aims of the two countries. For the US, Pakistan
was and is an ally in the struggle with the Communist Bloc.
Pakistan, on the other hand, accepted special ties with the US
almost entirely in the hope of strengthening its position vis-a-vis
India, which it has always regarded as the major threat to its
security. Given Pakistan's all-consuming fear of and pre-
occupation with India, combined with US commitments to help
India in r-conomic development, the path of US-Pakistan relations
could hardly be smooth.
3. New and more serious strains have emerged in the
past two years. The U-2 affair brought home to both the Pakistani
leaders and public their vulnerability to Soviet pressures and
their dependence on the US -- whose handling of the plane
incident Ayub found less than impressive. He quickly experimented
with accepting Soviet economic aid (for oil exploration) in the
hope of reducing Soviet pressure on Pakistan. Of even greater
concern to the Pakistar.leaders has been the prominence in the
present US administration of elements friendly to India and
believed to be critical of Asian military pacts, ASrub's successful
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US visit in mid-1961 only tem)orarily dampened down the fears
Pf' Pc' T;cn l.:uc?w w hat the US trould, a `tempt to engage
from its close alliance with Pakistan. Many of them probably
feel that only the importance of the special US facilities in
Pakistan prevents the US from giving top priority to its rela-
tions with India.
/+. In addition, divergent attitudes toward Afghanistan
have been a source of friction betireen Pakistan and the US.
Afghanistan's Pushtoonistan policy has long irritated Pakistan,
and Ayub appears convinced that the only way to force the
Afghans to back down is by a tough policy. Thus he closed the
Afghan consulates and trade agencies in late 1961 without consult-
ing the US, and has tended to see US efforts to mediate the
quarrel and to maintain a Western position in Afghanistan as
undercutting his policy.
5. More important than any specific problem, however,
is the growing awareness that the -tliance with the US is unlikely
to enable Pakistan to gain what it wants most -- "victory" over
India, speciilcally on the Kashmir issue. Indeed, many Pakistanis
now appear to have considerable doubt that the alliance really
provides them with much security against India. Uncertain as
to how effectively the US would aid them in the event of war
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with India, they are convinced that the development of a more
aggressive Indian nationalism following Goa means that the threat
from India has increased sharply. Though they claim that such
aggression is a present danger, their real concern probably
is with the period a few years hence when Indian defense
production capabilities are greater and India's reduced dependence
on foreign suppliers also lessens the restraining influence of
other countries.
6. To complicate matters further, few Pakistanis are proud
of the country's record in domestic affairs. Pakistan has still
to prove it can achieve a stable political system. Conflicts
between East and West Pakistan -- as well as within the latter --
remain strong, thus hampering national integration. Despite
impressive economic progress in recent years, the country's
basic economic limitations loom as large as ever. Thus all the
ingredients for intense national frustration are present, and
the US easily qualifies as a scapegoat -- expecially when it
appears to be making concessions to India and Afghanistan that
Pakistan regards as inimical to its interests.
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7. Clearly, future trends in US-Pakistan relations will
depend heavily on US policy toward India -- and to a lesser
extent, Afghanistan -- as well as toward Pakistan. Should there
be a marked change in US policy favorable to Pakistan, e.g.
more military aid and greater support in its quarrels with its
neighbors, many of the present doubts and suspicions would
recede. On the other hand, should the Pakistanis become con-
vinced that US policy had 'taken a clear cut turn in favor of
India, including US provision of significant military aid,
the reaction, as indicated in SNIE 31/32-62, "Probable Reaction
of Pakistan to the Provision of Supersonic Fighter Aircraft to
India by the US or Other Western Countries," dated 6 June 1962,
would be strongly adverse, possibly including Pakistan's
withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO, elimination of the special
US facilities, and adoption of a neutralist foreign policy.
8. Assuming that the US continues to treat both India
and Pakistan about as it has in the past, the present irritating
relationship in which Pakistan remains aligned with the West and
seeks greater US commitments and support while at the same time
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acting independently in a number of matters of concern to the Uest
as a whole is likely to continue indefinitely. There will be less
consultation on policies regarding India, Afghanistan, Communist
China, and the UN, and in general, the relationship will probably
be characterized by fairly hard and cynical bargaining on Palistan's
part. Every possible concession will be extracted from the US
in return for the special facilities. US efforts to explain the
importance of these facilities for the security of the entire Free
World may only raise the price of Pakistan's cooperation.
9. As long as Ayub remains in control, there is unlikely
to be any clear-cut repudiation of Pakistan's pro-Western stance.
However, over the longer run, as the doubts about the value of
the alliance felt by important sectors of the politically
conscious public make themselves felt and as trust and confidence
are eroded by constant irritation, the alliance could come to have
less and less practical significance. Should the politicians
once again come to exercise dominant influence over Pakistan's
policies, a formal shift to non-alignment might occur.
FOR TIDE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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SIIERMAN KENT
Chairman
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