CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO OTHER AMERICAN STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020067-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: January 8, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8 January 1962
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Cuba as a Military Threat to the United States and to
Other American States
1. There are a number of ways in which Cuba might become a
source of military danger to the US and other American states:
a) The Soviets might give the Cubans weapons capable of
posing a serious threat to the continental US itself --
long-range missiles, bomber aircraft, nuclear weapons.
b) The Soviets might establish bases in Cuba from which
to operate cimilar strategic weapons themselves.
c) The Soviets might build up Cuban armed forces on a
scale and with the kinds of weapons which could permit
the Castro regime to undertake overt military aggression
against other Latin American states.
We believe, for the reasons given in the following paragraphs, that
none of these courses of action is likely to be undertaken by the
USSR,
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Soviet Advanced Weapons in Cuban Hands
2. Even in the unlikely event that the practical and security
problems involved in training the Cubans to use advanced weapons
could be handled to Soviet satisfaction, we believe it out of the
question that the Soviets would give the Cuban regime the power to
threaten the US on its own initiative. This they have done for no
otb*rr ally, and it would run counter to their consistent policy of
retaining in their own hands control over all decisions involving
any serious degree of risk,
Soviet-Controlled Advanced Weapons on Cuban Territoty
3. There are some reasons why the possession of missile bases
on Cuban territoty might appeal to the Soviet leaders, They would
regard it as a dramatic demonstration of the shift in the balance of
power which they constantly proclaim, and from which they expect early
and favorable consequences for Communism's world-wide struggles They
would regard such bases as an additional means of military and politi-
cal pressure on the US$ which could be used in the whole range of
disputes between the two powers, including those related to the
presence of US bases around the Bloc. And they would regard bases
in Cuba as a still firmer guarantee against a US attempt to overthrow
the Castro regime by military means.
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4. Nevertheless, we thnkUtha1tV
he Soviets will not undertake
to put missile bases in Cuba, for reasons which will appeal to them
as even more persuasive. To do so would in their view heighten the
risk of war, either by provoking US action to prevent the building
of such bases or, once established, to eliminate a threat so close to
US shores and so vulnerable to US attack. Missiles in Cuba would
add little to the Soviet strategic threat against the US which exists
already, and would involve serious security and control problems.
Above all, such bases would give Soviet policy, in Latin America and
elsewhere, the appearance of harboring aggressive military intentions,,
which is entirely incompatible with the image of their policy they
wish to project. They would believe that the appearance of the USSR
in the Latin America in such a military role would actually check the
growth of the native revolutionary forces upon which they rely for
the eventual triumph of Communism in Latin America.
It is possible, though we think unlikely for substantially
the same reasons as those advanced against the stationing of Soviet
missiles in Cuba, that the Soviets will seek to use Cuban facilities
in a supporting role to augment their strategic capabilities against
the US. Facilities in Cuba for refueling and supplying submarines
would enable them to extend the time on station in the Western
Atlantic and Caribbean waters of their missile-firing submarine fleet.
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k_ Lk)j-y aczivrty, Cuban
airfields could be made ready for emergency landings by Soviet
bombers employed in attacks on the continental US. Although we
believe that the extensive developments of submarine and air facili-
ties for Soviet use is unlikely, we rate the chances higher that they
will be built than that Soviet missile bases will be built because
they are not in themselves Soviet weapons of war but only a potential
augmentation of Soviet strategic capabilities. There is no evidence
at present of any Soviet intention to prepare submarine or air bases
for these purposes.
Cuban Forces as an Instrument of Aggression
6. A buildup of Cuban forces on a scale and with the kinds of
weapons which would permit the Castro regime to export its revolu-
tion to other Latin American states by military means would have
little appeal for the Soviet or Cuban Communists. They would know
that in such attempts they would be opposed by the vastly superior
forces of the other American states, including those of the US.
Castroism would be completely discredited throughout Latin America
and the end result might well be the fall of the Castro regime itself.
7. Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba during 1960 and 1961 have
in fact consisted of weapons suited to defense and internal security
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needs rather than to the development of an offensive capability.
(See Annex,) Items supplied have included fighter aircraft, armored
vehicles, artillery, small arms, and trucks and jeeps. No missiles,
bombers, surface warships, submarines, or other weapons primarily
suited to an offensive role have been included. It is noteworthy
that Cuba's airlift and sea transport capability hau not been
significantly increased, The 12 IL-14 transports which have been
delivered are being integrated into the Cubana airlines and do not
appear to have been procured primarily for military use. The fact
that Cubana has been selling Viscounts and some of its other Western
aircraft seems to indicate that the Soviet transports are replace-
ments and not intended as a net addition to Cuba's airlift capacity.
On the whole, Cuba's military buildup is what would be expected in
view of.its fears of infiltration and invasion, and there is no
evidence that missile, air, or submarine bases are being constructed
in Cuba for offensive warfare.
The Real Soviet Policy in Cuba
8? The Soviets will continue to prize Cuba as a symbol of a
spontaneous and successful popular revolution in Latin America to
which they are giving disinterested support and they will seek to
exploit its appeal to reformist and revolutionary groups throughout
the area. They will support Castro's propaganda and subversive
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activities to the utmost and will assist him in using Cuba as a
base for the training of Communist leaders and of agents of sub-
version and clandestine activity, Th jwill make use of Cuban terri-
tory as a depot for the supply of leftist and Communist revolutionary
groups throughout Latin America, including the supply of arms when
appropriate. It is on this whole array of subversive tactics, which
can be so effectively developed from the Cuban base, on which the
Soviets and the Castroists rely to achieve their aims In Latin
America, Their aim is not military conquest nor even the mounting
of a military threat, but revolution -- a revolution which they
confidently believe can feed successfully on the inflammable materials
present in abundance in Latin America,
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