NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: December 16, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA-RDP79T00975A0296000 028- 2 ~ 3
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Thursday December 16, 1976 CI NIDC 76-293C
DIA review(s) completed.
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Top Secret
(Security I ~ 'f' i n 25X1
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National Intelli ence Daily Cable for Thursday, December 16, 1976.
25X1
T e NID a e is or t o purpose o in orming
senior US o icials.
CONTENTS
ZAIRE: Watching Rhodesia
Page 1
ISRAEL-UK: Submarine Delivery
Page 3
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Brezhnev Visit
Page 5
ECUADOR-PERU-CHILE: Strained Relations
Page 5
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EC: Fishing Zone
Page 8
PORTUGAL:
Election
Page 10
CANADA:
Foreign Borrowing
Page 11
FINLAND:
Coalition Survives
Page 12
JAMAICA:
Election
Page 13
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ZAIRE: Watching Rhodesia
Zaire's President Mobutu is watching Rhodesian devel-
opments with growing concern. A civil war or a radical regime
there would have grave economic and political consequences for
Zaire. Mobutu can do little to influence the course of events
in Rhodesia, however, because his open opposition to the win-
ning side--the Popular Movement--during the Angolan civil war
has cast him in the role of odd man out in southern Africa.
Mobutu's major concern is for safe and economical
transpor ation routes. Zaire has always had to rely on exter-
nal transportation to carry a large share of its imparts and
exports, as its own meager rail and port facilities are unable
to handle the country's needs.
The disruption of Angolan facilities--the Benguela
railroad and the port of Lobito--has forced the Zairian govern=
meat to divert a large share of its traffic to South African
parts via Zambian and Rhodesian rail lines. In addition, Zair-
ian copper producers purchase some $37-million worth of coke,
coal, and corn from Rhodesia annually. These supplies would
probably be jeopardized by instability in Rhodesia.
Mobutu has had to concentrate primarily on improving
his political standing with former antagonists in order to open
up his options.
Mobutu would like to re-
gain use of the Bengue a rai roa , ut wants assurances from
Luanda that Zaire's access will not be subject to political
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Mobutu is also seeking better relations with
Lagos--Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba is tentatively scheduled
to visit Kinshasa this month--and is attempting to strengthen
his contacts with Moscow. His effort apparently coincides with
a Soviet interest in improving relations. The Zairian commerce
minister is currently in Moscow to initial several commercial
and cultural accords.//
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Mobutu's prospects for success in mending fences and
pro ec ing Zaire's interests are not promising. His past ac-
tions will limit his ability to maneuver in southern Africa.
For some time to come, he is likely to find himsel the
eri her in affectin develo ments in the re ion.
ISRAEL-UK: Submarine Delivery
//Israel recently took delivery of the first of
three 500-ton small attack submarines from the UK, according
to the US defense attache in London. The submarine reportedly
sailed for Israel in late November.//
//The other two submarines apparently are sched-
ulec or e ivery in 1977. Israel is considering the purchase
of additional submarines, pending close evaluation of the per-.
formance of the first three.//
//The Israelis have had only one submarine--a
World War I vintage, British-built submarine. It has been
used primarily for training, and we expect it to be phased out
before 1980.//
//The new submarines probably will be based at
u? a an 11GPC~ in the Mediterranean for coastal defense
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YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Brezhnev Visit
After meeting in special session last week, the Yu-
gos av party leadership has issued its own report on Soviet
leader Brezhnev's visit from November 15 to 17. The statement
reaffirms Yugoslavia's desire for good relations with the USSR
but leaves little doubt that significant differences persist,
particularly where Soviet emphasis on "international solidar-
ity" is concerned.
The report stresses Yugoslavia's ri ht t
pursue an in ependent road to socialism."
Wh tever tactics were pursued, Moscow and Belgrade
a
have now each gone on record with an official account of the
Brezhnev visit, illustrating the continuing disparity in view-
points. The USSR earlier had issued a statement on the visit
in which it redictabl stressed the socialist dut of inter-
nationalism.
ECUADOR-PERU-CHILE: Strained Relations
//Relations between Peru and Chile and between
Peru an Ecuador are under new strain.//
//Ecuador's cancellation of a stopover by Peruvian
Press en orales Bermudez last week while he was en route home
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from a visit to Colombia and Venezuela, a stalemate in Chilean-
Peruvian talks on a proposed Bolivian outlet to the sea, and
Peru's continuing arms buildup are the major causes of the in-
creased uneasiness.//
//Since Chile early this month bluntly rebuffed
eru s proposal to establish a ~~orridor to the sea for Bolivia
with a jointly administered coastal enclave, there has been a
hardening of positions by the two countries. The foreign minis-
tries seem prepared to explore ways to resume talks, but mili-
tary leaders in both Peru and Chile may be demanding a tougher
stand.//
//Tension between Ecuador and Peru appears to
e tied mainly to the Ecuadorean internal situation. Ecuador's
always-shaky Supreme Council of Government has weakened percep-
tibly in recent weeks. It appears to have seized on rumors of a
Peruvian mobilization near its border and the recall of the
Peruvian ambassador following the cancellation of the presiden-
i- i ~ l