THE U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET-SUPPORTED INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102660023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 23, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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23 October 1981
SUBJECT: The U. S. Response to Soviet-Supported Insurgencies
As the Administration considers alternatives for countering Soviet- and
Cuban-supported insurgency in Central America, it is essential to bear in mind
that this is but one part of the much larger problem of Soviet support for
insurgencies and radical regimes throughout the Third World.
Beginning in 1974 and 1975, the Soviets undertook a new, much more aggressive
strategy in the Third World (1) based on their perception that the U. S. President's
hands were tied in that arena because of the Vietnam experience, (2) taking
advantage of a series.of events.and developments in the Third World itself which
made intervention attractive and' relatively risk free, and (3) a completely new
element--exploiting the availability first of Cuba and subsequently of other
countries to serve as Soviet surrogates or proxies (thereby limiting the political,
economic and military costs to the USSR). The Congressional defeat of assistance
for UNITA in Angola in the spring of 1975--following the U. S. evacuation of
Saigon by only weeks-bolstered Soviet confidence that the U. S. would not react
to this aggressive strategy.
In the ensuing six years the Soviets have supported, directly or indirectly,
radical regimes or insurgencies in virtually every part of the Third World:
1975 Angola Soviet support and Cuban troops enable MPLA to
take and subsequently maintain power.
Mozambique Soviets provide military assistance to newly-
.independent government led by Machel and enable
it to combat continuing insurgency of National
Resistance Movement (supported by South Africa).
Laos After DRV conquest of RVN, DRV moves to assert
control in Laos with support of Soviets (military
materiel and at least several hundred advisors).
Oman Soviets have provided military assistance through
South Yemen and Iraq to the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman. During the most active
phase of the insurgency in 1974-75, the Soviets
supplied it with significant amounts of weapons.
Even after collapse of the insurgency in November
1975, USSR reportedly has continued to supply
arms and assistance.
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1977 Ethiopia Soviets have supported Mengistu government since
its assumption of power in 1974. In 1977 they
organized its victorious campaign against the
Somali-supported insurgency--Soviet leadership
and material, Cuban troops transported by the
Soviets.
Angola-based rebels move into Shaba but are
defeated. No evidence of Soviet involvement
at that time but indications of Soviet military
support to the Angola-based front for the
liberation of the Congo since 1980.
Zimbabwe Soviets use Angola base to funnel increased
support to Nkomo, whose defeat in 1980 settle-
ment leaves Soviets in weak position.
1978 Kampuchea DRV moves into Kampuchea with the costs under-
written by the Soviets.
Namibia Soviets use Angola base to significantly increase
support of SWAPO (which they have been backing
since early 1970s).
Afghanistan After a coup carried out with at least Soviet
complicity, Soviets greatly increase assistance
to newly-installed communist government and
eventually (Dec. 79) move in their own combat
troops to help maintain the government in power.
PDRY A coup brings an outright pro-Soviet government
to power and Soviets increase their presence to
maintain government in power. East Germans and
Cubans take responsibility for security.
1979 Yemen Arab
Republic Using PDRY as base, Soviets back insurgents (NDF)
Chad
while simultaneously maintaining ties with and
providing support to YAR government.
After remaining aloof from earlier Libyan sub-
version, Soviets approve and give some support
to Libyan military take-over (apparently once
it becomes clear that other African states will
do no more than register unhappiness over Libyan
invasion).
Nicaragua Having remained aloof from anti-Somoza insurgency,
Soviets move in quickly to help Sandinistas
consolidate power. They provide military materiel
and some advisory and support personnel.
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El Salvador Encouraged by Sandinista success in Nicaragua,
Soviets back Cuban efforts in support of
insurgency. Soviet arms and equipment are
channeled through Cuba.
Polisario Although Moscow has not directly supported
the insurgency against Morocco for fear of
disrupting political and economic ties, Soviet
arms reach the group via Libya and Algeria and
Moscow has sought to suggest sympathy for
Polisario aims.
1980 Guatemala Moscow provides financial assistance and para-
military training to communist rebels and urges
the creation of a broadly-based revolutionary
front.
In Central America, Southern Africa, North Central Africa, the Arabian Penin-
sula, and Southeast Asia the Soviet pattern seems to be to move quickly when
local circumstances favor success and then try to use a successful insurgency/
new radical regime as a base of operations against neighboring territories. Local
circumstances, of course, still determine the ultimate outcome and some victors
may eventually turn on the Soviets or run into unexpected resistance (e.g. Angola,
Afghanistan). But key to the strategy is establishing a firm base from which to
conduct regional operations. Moreover, in nearly all of the above cases, the
United States has confronted a situation in which the Soviets have been able to
provide significant quantities of arms on a prompt basis directly or through
proxies/surrogates either to insurgent forces, to friendly governments supporting
neighboring insurgencies, or to new radical regimes.
We must realize and sooner or later deal with the fact that it is much easier
and cheaper for the Soviets (or us in Afghanistan, our friends in Angola) to
support an insurgency than it is to resist one. As the list above makes clear,
we do not have either the military or the economic resources to help all countries
facing Soviet-supported insurgencies. The Administration therefore must decide
which insurgencies and instabilities it is vital to our national interest to
resist., which we should ignore or give only passing attention, and which bases
for insurgency--e.g. Nicaragua--we need to neutralize. In those countries where
we choose to help resist insurgency, we must be aware that covert action rarely
can do the job alone or even primarily. In those countries we decide to help,
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the Administration must be prepared to commit sufficient economic resources to
help a government seriously address its economic problems; we must be prepared
to commit the military resources necessary to interdict supplies to the insurgents;
and, if necessary, we must be willing to neutralize neighboring support for the
insurgency. In short, if the Administration and the Congress cannot politically
or financially support an overt program of substantial economic assistance and
military support to fight insurgency in key countries, the Administration must
recognize that its efforts in this arena are likely to fail--like those of its
predecessors and for the same reasons.
The Soviets or their friends are involved in virtually all of the insurgencies
listed above. Assistance to insurgencies and Third World governments hostile to
the U. S. is an important element of overall Soviet national security policy. If
we are not prepared to commit the resources successfully to resist in those places
of genuine importance to us, we need to rethink a policy which commits our prestige
but then saddles us with the loss. The Soviets and their associates seem certain
to continue their present strategy in the Third World as long as it continues to
work; indeed, in the absence of an effective U. S. response--even in our own
hemisphere--they are likely to be further emboldened. The U. S. needs to look
at Soviet-supported insurgencies as part of the broader Soviet challenge- and
decide whether and where we intend to compete with the resources necessary to
succeed. The piecemeal, "cost-effective" approach characteristic of the past six
years is a blueprint for continued failure.
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Assistant Secretary of State Clark will issue a statement at 1:00 in the name
of the President saying:
All Americans should get out of Libya
Letters are being sent to Chief Executive Officers of major oil companies
in Libya recommending they get out
Issuing passport restrictions on those wanting to go to Libya.
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DCI Talking Points
PFIAB Support
o Want to facilitate PFIAB's interaction with the full intelligence
community.
o Want it to be both as broad and as efficient as possible.
o Have askedi Director of the Intelligence Community Staff, to
take a personal in eres in your support.
o Focus of support on the Intelligence Community Staff will be the Office of
Community Coordination headed by
o Walt Elder, who also serves as Executive Secretary of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board will be the primary action officer.
o Several advantages to using the IC Staff:
- Insures PFIAB access to all Community elements.
- It is the same mechanism I use in dealing with the Community.
- Creates a natural interplay between my senior advisory bodies
(NFIB/NFIC) and the PFIAB.
- Good location -- just up the street from EOB.
o Each component of the Intelligence Community will, in turn, have its own
focal point for PFIAB matters.
- At CIA, my new Executive Director, John McMahon, will serve as
my action officer on your behalf.
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NOTE FOR THE DCI:
Prior to your presentation, matters of security pertaining to the
PFIAB and its functions will have been briefed to the Board by CIA
and Special Navy security officers.
The Chairman, Security Committee recommends, however, that a word
from you personally regarding unauthorized disclosure would be
very much in order.
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