NOTICE TO OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY FROM GERALD R. FORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900110001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1976
• Content Type: PREL

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EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE FEBRUARY 18, 10,76
UNTIL le'L:00 NOON (EST)
Office of the White house Press Secretary
THE WFITE HOUSE
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE U14ITED STATES:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by Article II,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions
of law, I have today issued an Executive order pertaining
to the organization and control of the United States
foreign intelligence community. This order establishes
clear lines of accountability for the Nation's foreign
intelligence agencies. It sets forth strict guidelines
to control the activities of these agencies and specifies
as well those activities in which they shall not engage.
In carrying out my Constitutional responsibilities to
manage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the
Nation's defense, I believe it essential to have the best
possible intelligence about the capabilities, intentions
and activities of governments and other entities and in-
dividuals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence
agencies of the United States play a vital role in col-
lecting and analyzing information related to the national
defense. and foreign policy.
It is equally as important/ that the methods these
agencies employ to collect such information for the legitimate
needs of the government conform to the standards set out in
the Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and
civil liberties of American citizens.
the Executive Order I have issued today will insure a
proper balancing of these interests. It establishes
government wide direction for the foreign intelligence
agencies and places responsibility and accountability on
individuals, not institutions.
I believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable
activities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies
while at the same time permitting them to get on with their
vital work of gathering, and assessing information. It is
also my hope that these steps will help to restore public
confidence in these agencies and encourage our citizens to
appreciate the valuable contribution they make to our
national security.
Beyond the steps I have taken in the Executive Order,
I also believe there is a clear need for some specific
legislative actions. I am today submitting to. the
Congress of the United States proposals which will go
far toward enhancing the protection of true intelligence
secrets as well as regularizing procedures for intelligence
collection in the United States.
I-iy first proposal deals with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods. The Director of Central
Intelligence is charged, under the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, with protecting intelligence sources
and methods. The Act, however, gives the Director no
authorities commensurate with this responsibility.
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Therefore, I am proposing legislation to impose
criminal and civil sanctions on those who are authorized
access to intelligence secrets and who willfully and
wrongfully reveal this information. This legislation
is not an "Official Secrets Act", since it would affect
only those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to
whom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this legislation
could not be used to cover up abuses and improprieties.
It would in no way prevent people from reporting ques-
tionable activities to appropriate authorities in the
Executive and Legislative Branches of the government.
It is essential, however, that the irresponsible and
dangerous exposure of our Nation's intelligence secrets
be stopped. The American people have long accepted the
principles of confidentiality and secrecy in many dealings --
such as with doctors, lawyers and the clergy. It makes
absolutely no sense to deny this same protection to our
intelligence secrets. Openness is a hallmark of our
democratic society., but the American people have never
believed that it was necessary to reveal the secret war
plans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think
they wish to have true intelligence secrets revealed
either.
I urge the adoption of this legislation with all
possible speed.
Second, I support proposals that would clarify
and set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activi-
ties of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particular,
I will support legislation making it a crime to assassinate
or attempt or conspire to assassinate a foreign official
in peacetime. Since it definesla crime, legislation is
necessary.
Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of
Congress to try to develop sound legislation to deal with
a critical problem involving personal privacy -- electronic
surveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and the
Justice Department and other Executive agencies, we will
seek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. It should
create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant
authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.
I will also seek Congressional support for sound
legislation to expand judicial supervision of mail
openings. The law now permits the opening of United States
mail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of
criminal investigations. We need authority to open mail
under the limitations and safeguards that now apply in
order to obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence
information.
This would require a showing that there is probable
cause to believe that the sender or recipient is an agent
of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or
terrorism. As is now the case in criminal investigations,
those seeking authority to examine mail for foreign intel-
ligence purposes will have to convince a federal judge of
the necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon
their authorization to examine the mail provided in the
order of the court.
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Fourth, I would like to share my views regarding
appropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intel-
ligence agencies. It is clearly the business of the
Congress to organize itself to deal with these matters.
Certain principles, however, should be recognized by both
the Executive and Legislative Branches if this oversight
is to be effective. I believe good Congressional over--
sight is essential so that the Congress and the American
people whom you represent can be assured that the foreign
intelligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of
their activities.
Congress should seek to centralize the responsibility
for oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The
more committees and subcommittees dealing with highly
sensitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I
recommend that Congress establish a Joint Foreign Intelligence
Oversight Committee. Consolidating Congressional oversight
in one committee will facilitate the efforts of the
Administration to keep the Congress fully informed of
foreign intelligence activities.
It is essential that both the House and the Senate
establish firm rules to insure that foreign intelligence
secrets will not be improperly disclosed. There must be
established a clear process to safeguard these secrets
and effective measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.
Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by
the Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an
injunction of secrecy, should net be unilaterally disclosed
without my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the
Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no
individual member, nor committee, nor single House of
Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral
publication of classified information over the objection
of the President, by one committee or one House of Congress,
not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but
also effectively overrules the actions of the other House
of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both Houses.
Finally, successful and effective Congressional over-
sight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on mutual
trust between the Congress and Executive. Each branch must
recognize and respect the rights and prerogatives of the
other if anything is to be achieved.
In this context, a Congressional requirement to keep
the Oversight Committee "fully" informed is more desirable
and workable as a practical matter than formal requirements
for notification of specific activities to a large number
of committees. Specifically, Section 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, which has resulted in over six separate
committee briefings, should be modified as recommended by
the Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting should be
limited to the new Oversight Committee.
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Both the Congress and the Executive Branch recognize
the importance to this Nation of a strong intelligence
service. I believe it urgent that we take the steps I
have outlined above to insure that America not only has
the best foreign intelligence service in the world, but
also the most unique -- one which operates in a manner fully
consistent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.
GERALD R. FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 18,1976.
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UNTIL 12:0?) 'Toon(EST)
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
The President's Actions Concerning
the Foreign Intelligence Community
SUMMARY
The President has today taken the following comprehensive
actions to strengthen the United States foreign intelligence
departments and agencies: (1) issued an Omnibus Executive
Order establishing policy guidelines and restrictions for the
intelligence agencies and a new command structure and over-
sight mechanism for the intelligence community; (2) proposed
new legislation to protect the secrecy of particularly sensi-
tive intelligence information, announced that he will meet with
Congressional leaders to develop legislation concerning elec-
tronic surveillance and to prevent unauthorized opening of
mail, and he endorsed legislation to.prohibit assassinations of
foreign leaders, and, (3) proposed a framework in which con-
structive Congressional oversight can be established without
disclosing intelligence secrets.
OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS
The President's actions are designed to insure that:
(1) The United States has a strong and effective capa-
bility to gather and evaluate foreign intelligence
and conduct necessary covert operations; and
(2) These activities are conducted in a Constitutional
and lawful manner and never aimed at our own citizens.
The President's actions will strengthen our foreign intelligence
capability and establish an effective process to prevent abuses
by.
(A) Setting forth in Executive Order, policy guidance for
the foreign intelligence agencies which define what
functions they are supposed to carry out and which
clearly states what they are not permitted to do.
(B) Creating a streamlined command structure for
intelligence community leadership which makes
specifically designated individuals accountable.
(C) Requiring the NSC to conduct semi-annual reviews
of the adequacy of the foreign intelligence
product and establishing the Intelligence
Oversight Board to monitor compliance with the
restrictions which have been placed on the
intelligence community's activities.
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OMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER
(1) Control and Direction of Intelligence Organizations
(A) Overall Policy Development
1. The National Security Council (NSC) will con-
tinue to exercise overall policy control over
the foreign intelligence community.
2. Statutory members are:
The President
Vice President
~? Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
3. The NSC will conduct a semi-annual policy review
of foreign intelligence activities focused on,
but not limited toy the following:
Needs of government foreign policy-makers
and the responsiveness of foreign intelli--
gence to these needs, including the quality,
scope and timeliness of the intelligence
product,
The effective and efficient use of resources
in the collection of intelligence informa-
tion; and
The continued appropriateness of ongoing
covert operations and sensitive intelligence
collection missions.
The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs will have staff responsibility
for the semi-annual policy reviews. Heads of the
departments and agencies which use foreign
intelligence will be consulted.
(B) Management and Resource Control
1. Responsibility for management and resource control
of the foreign intelligence community is vested by
Executive Order in the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI), which reports directly to
the NSC.
2. Membership of the CFI is:
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
Chairman
- Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
(NOTE: Staff support shall be provided by the
intelligence community staff.)
3? The Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall:
Control budget preparation and resource
allocation for the National Foreign Intelli
gence Program (defined as excluding tactical
.intelligence).
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Establish management policies for the
Foreign Intelligence Program.
Carry out policy decisions of the NSC with
particular emphasis on collection and pro-
duction of national intelligence.
L1. Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the NSC
upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence
or any member of the NSC.
(C) Production of National Intelligence
1. Responsibility for the production of substantive
national (i.e., not tactical or departmental)
intelligence is vested in the Director of Central
Intelligence. The DCI is the President's primary
advisor on foreign intelligence.
2. To assist in developing national intelligence
requirements and priorities, and in developing
finished national intelligence, the DCI shall
establish such boards and committees (similar to
the former USIB) of the intelligence community
as will enable him most effectively to utilize
the talent of the community to produce the best
possible intelligence product.
(D) Covert Action and Other Special Operations
1. Responsibility to review and advise the President
on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign
intelligence collection missions is assigned by
Executive Order to the Operations Advisory Group
(Ope?r?-ations Group).
2. New membership is.
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Chairman
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
-- Director of Central Intelligence
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Observers are:
Attorney General
Director of OMB
3? The Special Intelligence Operations Group shall:
Consider and make recommendations to the
President on all proposals for covert
action and certain sensitive intelligence
collection missions.
Submit to the NSC a periodic review of
ongoing covert operations and sensitive
intelligence collection missions.
Meet formally to carry out its responsi-
bility to make recommendations to the
President.
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(E) The following existing committees or organizations
are abolished:
(1) United States Intelligence Board
(2) Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
(3) National Security Council Intelligence
Committee
(4) Executive Committee for resource control
of certain intelligence collection
activity
(5) 40 Committee
(2) Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community
(A) The Senior Official of each organization of the
intelligence community shall insure his organization
operates in accordance with the Executive Order. He
shall establish a system of independent inspection
within the organization and provide information to
the DISC, CFI and Intelligence Oversight Board. Other
responsibilities as designated in Section IV of the
Order.
(B) CIA is responsible, among other duties as defined
in Section IV of the Order, for:
Production of national intelligence
:Iaintaining and improving a national intel-
ligence analytic base
. Collection by other than normal, overt means
Foreign counterintelligence activities
Undertaking activities defined in the
Executive Order necessary to implement
the above
(C) The Department of State is primarily responsible for
overt collection of foreign, non-military information.
Its Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall also
produce departmental intelligence and contribute
to national intelligence production.
(D) The Department of Treasury is responsible for overt
collection of foreign, economic information.
(E) The Department of Defense is responsible for:
Overt collection outside the United States
of foreign military and military-related
information.
Producing--that intelligence required to, fulfill
the responsibilities of DOD.
Managing the Defense Attache system.
Providing intelligence staff support to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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The National Security Agency is responsible for:
Full control over signals intelligence
collection activities.
Production and dissemination of signals
intelligence.
Providing communications security services
to the U.S. Government.
Research and development related to signals
intelligence.
(F)
The
Energy Research and Development Administration
is
to
responsible for producing intelligence relating
atomic and nuclear matters.
(G)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible
for:
Making. available to foreign intelligence
agencies foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence which it collects.
Conducting foreign counterintelligence
activities within the United States.
(3)
Restrictions on Intelligence Activities
The Executive Order prohibits or severely restricts the
following activities by United States foreign intelligence
agencies:
Collection and analysis of information on the
domestic activities of United States citizens,
corporations and organizations and permanent
resident aliens (referred to as U.S. persons).
Physical or electronic surveillance or physical
searches of United States persons.
Opening of United States mail in violation of
law.
Illegally obtaining federal tax returns or
information.
Infiltration of domestic groups for the purpose
of influencing or reporting on them.
Experimentation with drugs on humans without the
subject's informed consent.
Sharing among agencies information on the
domestic activities of United States persons
except in compliance with stringent safeguards.
. Assignment of personnel to other agencies.
Providing assistance to law enforcement agencies
in violation of law.
Testing of electronic surveillance equipment
within the United States.
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Limited exceptions are permitted to allow the agencies
to meet the legitimate foreign intelligence needs of the
Nation. These narrow exceptions are expressed in detail
in the Order. They are designed to permit the following
activities under carefully defined circumstances:
Collection of information on the domestic activi-
ties of U.S. persons in order to: conduct security
checks on intelligence agency employees, contrac-
tors, people who are given access to classified
information and persons who may assist the agency
in the future. Overt collection of certain
foreign intelligence information from other
government agencies.
. Counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.
(4) Oversight of Intelligence Activities
1. Responsibility to assist the President, the
NSC and the Attorney General in overseeing
the intelligence community is assigned by
Executive Order to the Intelligence Oversight
Board (Oversight Board).
2. New membership consists of three members from
the private sector designated by the President.
One of these will be designated by the President
to be Chairman. They will also be made members
of the PFIAB.
3. The Board shall:
Receive and consider reports by Inspectors
General and General Counsels of the
intelligence community concerning activi-
ties that raise questions of legality or
propriety.
Review periodically the practices and
procedures of the intelligence community
Inspectors General and General Counsels
designed to assist the Oversight Board.
Report periodically and in a timely manner,
as appropriate; to the Attorney General
and the President on any activities that
raise serious questions about legality.
It shall report to the President on
activities that raise questions of pro-
priety of intelligence community activities.
Receive staff support from persons not
connected with the intelligence community.
(5) Secrec Protection
All persons given access to information containing intel-
ligence sources and methods shall be required to sign an
agreement that they will not disclose that information to
persons not authorized to receive it.
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MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
(A) Message
Today the President sent a message to the Congress which:
(1) Advised the Congress of the actions he has taken
by Executive Order.
(2) Transmitted the legislative proposal as indicated
below.
(3) Urged Congress to establish effective oversight
consistent with the following general objectives:
The oversight functions should be centralized
in a Joint House-.Senate Committee to provide
better security.
Both the House and Senate should adopt rules
to insure that secrets will not be improperly
disclosed.
The President's injunction of secrecy over
foreign intelligence information provided to
the Congress by the Executive Branch should be
respected.
The Executive Branch should keep the Joint
Oversight Committee fully informed of foreign
intelligence matters, but there should be no
requirement for prior notification of specific
activities.
(4) Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act should be
moriified. This requires the intelligence agencies
to brief over six committees of Congress on covert
actions and has resulted in unauthorized disclosures
of classified information.
(B) Legislation
The President submitted the following proposed legislation:
Secrecy of Sources and Methods
This bill provides for:
Criminal penalties for the disclosure
to unauthorized persons of information
relating to intelligence sources and
methods.
Limits its coverage to persons whose
access to such information arise out of
their relationship to the Government
(Government employees, contractors and
contractor employees).
Injunctive relief where. unauthorized
disclosure is threatened and serious
damage to the intelligence collection
effort would result.
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The President endorsed the objectives of the legislation
proposed by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
to prohibit the assassination of foreign officials in
peacetime.
The President also will meet with Congressional leaders
to develop acceptable proposed legislation to control
electronic surveillance in the United States and mail
openings for foreign intelligence purposes.
ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN
The following are examples of agency actions:
CIA directives implementing the recommendations of
the Rockefeller Commission and other reforms have
been issued internally.
NSA reform directives have been issued internally.
FBI guidelines are being drafted. Some have already
been made public.
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A BILL
To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for
other purposes. -
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
2 the United States of America in Congress assembled, that
3 Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
4 (50 U . S . C .A . 403) is further amended by adding the following
5 new subsection (g) :
(g) In the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, and in order further
to implement the proviso of section 102 (d) (3) of the Act that the
9 Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
10 protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
11 disclosure-- 0
12
(1) Whoever, being or having been in duly
13 authorized possession or control of information relating
14 to intelligence sources and methods, or whoever, being
15 or having been an officer or employee of the United States,
16 or member of the Armed Services of the United States,
17 or a contractor of the United States Government, or an
18 employee of a contractor of the United States Government,
19 and in the course of such relationship becomt s possessed
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1 of such information imparts or communicates it by any
2 means to a person not authorized to receive it or to the
3 general public shall be fined not more than $5, 000 or
4 imprisoned not more than five years, or both;
5 (2) For the purposes of this subsection,-the- .
6 term "information relating to intelligence sources and
7 methods" means any information, regardless of its origin, that
8 is classified pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive
9 order, or a regulationor a rule issued pursuant thereto as
10 information requiring a specific degree of protection against
11 unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security and
12 which, in the interest of the foreign intelligence activities
13 of the United States, has been specifically designated by
.14 a department or agency of the United States Government
15 which is authorized by law or by the president to engage
16 in foreign intelligence activities for the United States as
17 information concerning-
18 (A) methods of collecting foreign intelligence;
19 (B) sources of foreign intelligence, whether
20 human, technical, or other; or
;C) methods and techniques of analysis
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1 and evaluation of foreign intelligence.
2 (3) A person who is not authorized to receive
3 information relating to intelligence sources and methods is
4 not subject to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an
offense under this subsection, or as an accomplice, within
6 the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of Title 18, United States
7 Code, in the commission of an offense under this
---8--- subsection, unless he became possessed of such information
in the course of a relationship with the United States Govern-
ment as described in paragraph (1): Provided, however, That
the bar created by this paragraph does not preclude the
12 indictment or conviction for conspiracy of any person who is
13 subject to prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
14 (4) It is a bar to prosecution under this subsection that:
15 (A) at the time of the offense there did not
16 exist a review procedure within the Government
17 agency described in paragraph (2) of this subsection
18 through which the defendant could obtain review
19 of the continuing necessity for the classification
20 and designation;
21 (B) prior to the return of the indictment or the
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filing of the information, the Attorney General and the
Director of Central Intelligence did not jointly certify
to the court that the information was lawfully classified
and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2)
at the time of the offense;
(C) the information has been placed in the public
domain by the United States Government; or
(D) the information was not lawfully classified
9 and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2)
10 at the time of the offense.
11 (5) It is a defense to a prosecution under this
12 subsection that the information was communicated only to a
13 regularly constituted subcommittee, committee or joint
14 committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful demand.
15 (6) Any hearing by the court for the purpose of
16 making a determination whether the information was lawfully
17 classified and lawfully designated, shall be in camera;
18 (A) at the close of any in camera review, the
19 court shall enter into the record an order pursuant
20 to its findings and determinations;
21 (B) any determination by the court under this
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paragraph shall be a question of law.
(7) Whenever in the judgment of the Director of
Central Intelligence any person is about to engage in any
acts or practices which will constitute a violation of this
subsection, the Attorney General, on behalf of the United
States, may make application to the appropriate court for an
order enjoining such acts or practices, and upon a showing
that such person is about to engage in any such acts or
practices, a permane,At or temporary injunction, restraining
10 order, or other order may be granted. In the case of an
11 application for an order under this paragraph;
12 (A) the court shall not hold an in camera hearing
13 for the purpose of making a determination as to the
14. lawfulness of the classification and designation of the
is. information unless it has determined after giving due
16 consideration to all attending evidence that such
17 evidence does not indicate that the matter has been
18 lawfully classified and designated;
19 (B) the court shall not invalidate the classification
20 or designation unless it finds that the judgment of the
21 department or agency, pursuant to pal agraph (2).
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as to the lawfulness of the classification and
designation was arbitrary, capricious and without
a reasonable basis in fact.
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SECTIONAL ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
The draft bill by adding a new subsection (g) to the National
Security Act of 1947 further implements a proviso of that Act imposing
a duty upon the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The new sub-
section draws upon existing concepts of law found within 18 U . S . C .
798 (relating to communication intelligence) and 42 U . S . C . 2204 et se q.
(relating to atomic energy Restricted Data).
Paragraph (1) of the new' subsection identifies the special and
limited class of individuals having privity of access to'the sensitive
information defined in paragraph (2) below and proscribes their culpable
communication of such information to an unauthorized recipient.
Paragraph (2) of the new subsection defines the special category
of information relating to intelligence sources and methods which is
subject to the new provisions. It also recognizes the authority of the
Director and heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or
by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the United States,
to pfovide for the appropriate designation of such information.
Paragraph (3) of the new subsection assures that only the special
and limited class of individuals identified under paragraph (1) above will
be subject to prosecution as a result of the violation of the new subsection.
This is in keeping with :he intent that the new provision penalizes as
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u, u on y t e c uct o ose w ose access to esignated informa-
tion is dependent upon understandings arising out of a relationship
involving trust and confidence. Collateral prosecution related to the
violation of any other provision of law, however, is not vitiated by this
paragraph.
Paragraph (4) of the new subsection provides that no prosecution
may be instituted unless the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence first jointly certify to the court that the information was
lawfully classified and lawfully designated for limited dissemination; the
information was not placed in the public domain by the Government; an
agency review procedure existed whereby the defendant could have secured
a review of the information in question for a determination on public releas-
ability; and the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated
pursuant to paragraph (2) at the time of the offense.
Paragraph (5) of the new subsection provides a defense to
prosecution if the information was only provided to a regularly constituted
? committee, joint committee or joint committee of Congress, pursuant to
lawful demand.
Paragraph (6) of the new subsection provides that any hearing by
the court to determine whether the information was lawfully classified
and lawfully designated shall be in camera and such determination shall
be a question of law.
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Paragraph (7) of the new subsection permits the Attorney General
to petition a court to enjoin injunction any act which the Director believes
will violate any provision of the new subsection. This authority is
intended to provide prompt judicial action to avoid damage to the U. S.
foreign intelligence effort in circumstances where punitive criminal action
alone, being necessarily ex post facto, may be inadequate in achieving the
underlying objective of the legislation which is to protect intelligence sources,
methods and techniques from unauthorized disclosure. This paragraph also
provides that in any hearing for such an order the court shall not hold an
in camera hearing to determine they lawfulness of the classification and
designation of the information unless it has first considered all attending
evidence and determined that the evidence does not indicate that the
matter has been lawfully classified and lawfully designated. The paragraph
further provides that the court may invalidate a classification or designation
if it finds the judgment of the department or agency head was arbitrary,
capricious and without a reasonable basis in fact.
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