RISK ANALYSIS BIG BUSINESS FOR EX-AIDES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150039-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2005
Sequence Number: 
39
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 28, 1981
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150039-8.pdf369.49 KB
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ST AT Approved For Release 2006/01/12 CIA-RDP91-00901R0 ARTICLE APPEARED ON SAGE ;,~ C% NET YOI TIMES 28 OCTOBER 1981 .' Big -business By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTl3 SpedaitoTbeNtewYmkTimes WASHINGTON, Oct: 27- At the end-,,,' of a long shadowy corridor in a nonde_. script office building three blocks, from the White House, the sign by the= locked door reads International Busl ness Government Counsellors Inc After pressing a buzzer, the visitor is- swiftly led into a room filled with books, a large map of the world and se- cure filing cabinets. The air is-heavy with the aromatic smoke of pipe tobac- co. William E. Colby, a former director, of the Central Intelligence Agency, ap- praises a visitor from behind steel.- , 'rimmed glasses and then ever so cir caunapectly describes his new job for. private industry'as an "investmenx: risk assessor- -r. It's a "natural follow-up" to his ex perience in intelligence, he says, and then briefly sizes up conditions in Egypt, Saudi"',` Arabia, Mexico and France as he used to do for his former client in the Oval'office. T'aouglits on Saudi Royalty One of his conclusions: Expect a devaluation of Mexico's currency be- fore next year's general elections. An- other:. The Saudi royal house has far deeper political roots in that country fore not ripefora coup. Mr. Colby is a leading practitioner ton, the selling of expertise to' the pri- ficials. It's known as the "revolving. Lawyers in regulatory agencies take jobs with the companies they once regulated. Former trade officials ad- vise private clients on United States trade policy. Former Cabinet officers, with flesh knowledge of the inner workings of Government, provide new input to their old law -firms or to the, boards of private companies. j Review of Tax Policies - The analysts also look at a country's regulatory process and tax policies to see whether they will be excessively burdensome for the companies consid- eringdoing business there. - While there has beeaa proliferation of'indepehderrt risk-analysis consult- But now, after the collapse of the I~ ancies, they are now due for "some. Shah in Iran and the clobbering that kind of shakeout," said Gordon Ray- many companies too1cJn., faiWng to held, who is president Of the Associa: foresee the revolution, a growing num- ber of former officials; - particularly those with experience in intelligence or the foreign service,.are becoming investment risk assessors for multina- tional companies. r''_ A One-Man Cousvltfng Concern Richard Helms , another former top C.I.A;- offfcial, who was once the. American envoy to'Iran, now runs a has 300 members. Multinational corn pames. are starting to build in-house departments of full-time investment .analysts. Gulf, Exxon, Mobil, General-' Motors, and Chemical Bank and Chase moved in this direction-. The Chase uses the services of former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger on its risk. committee for foreign loans. he calls Safeer, after the Persian word i some universities-. Georgetown gUni for ambassador. Among his clients is versity's School of Foreign Service is the Bechtel Corporation, the lnternarl among these. And the professor, tionai-: constriction enterprise ; that Thomas Reckford, not surprisingly is thrives on contracts with i var ous Mid- a formeroperative for the C.I. die Eastern countries. James R. Schlesinger Jr.; who had been Defense and Energy Secretary as well as director of the C.I.A.; now ad-: vises Lehman Brothers, Kuhn Loeb. One of his current tasks is the exami- nation of investment possibilities in China fora host of Lehman clients. Not all have come in eat of thecold James A. Johnson, who was eaecu tive assistant to Vice President Mon- dale, and two other Carter Adminis tiation appointees, Richard C. Hol- broolce, Assistant Secretary of State _ for East Asia, and Decker Anstrom, who had a-high position in the Office' of Management and Budget, have formed a consulting operation. that they call Public Strategies. The assessment of a country's politi-- cal stability is only one element of what has become a highly sophisti- . vestmentanaiysis. - Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500150039-8 Approved For Release 2006/01/12: CIA-RDP91-00901R00 ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGE.___---- 13 October 1981 Th, e Br en ca s , Reagan and Mitterrand `Costar'' in Documnentary.' I By Donnie'Radcli ffe. Washington Ways Richard Helms was still U.S. am- bassador to Iran when Anwar Sadat mgde a-state-visit to Tehran in 1976: As former. director of the Central: Intelligence Agency,. Helms had made.: headlines shuttling back and forth to the United States to testify, on the CIA's role in; Watergate and in Chile's 1970 presidential elections. At a reception, Sadat turned to Helms~'and,' in his distinctively "ac cented English, startled America's former-head spook 'by asking: "Why do you do this striptease?". `.`I'm sorry, Mr. President," Helms replied,: "I don't quite understand what you're saying." : . ~ "What I'm talking about,"-Sadat scolded,"is all these secrets the CIA is putting out in public. It's very silly to do things like that." Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500150039-8 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0001 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE _:_ _ By Edwin Guthman Ed?.tor of The Inquirer PiIILA )3LPHIA Ird:2U7: Z It 11 Oc to'ber 1981 Shortly after the end of World War II, the U. S. Navy, responding to reports that Soviet military agencies. had achieved amazing results in using drugs to alter human behav- ior, began a program of identifying and test- ing drugs that might be useful in interroga- tions and in recruitment of agents. It began as a defensive effort to detect and counteract drugs and biological _ agents which might be used by the Soviets or other hostile countries against the United States and its allies. But, as congressional investigating com~ mittees reported a quarter of a century lat- er; the defensive orientation of the program soon became secondary as U.S. Intelligence agencies experimented to find how the drugs could be used to get information from, or gain control over, enemy spies. By 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency began a project with the code name of MKULTRA to determine how chemical and biological materials could be used effective- ly in clandestine operations. The results, backers of the project said, would "enable us to defend ourselves against a foe who. might not be as restrained in the use of those techniques as we are." MKULTRA began by experimenting with possible uses 'of LSD and over the next 10 years expanded into a full-blown clandes-, tine operation with "safe houses" in the San Francisco Bay and New York areas, plenty of cash and a range of experiments in which LSD and other drugs were tented on unsus- pecting individuals from all levels of soci- ety. MKULTRA was a secret tightly held with- in the CIA. Few people within the agency knew about it. Even_ thf- CIA's ..inspector- general was unaware- of it alter an inspec- tion in 1957? of the Technical Services Divi- sion which operated the project "The con- gressional investigating committees said there is no evidence that anyone in the White House or in the Congress were told about it How many unsuspecting, nonvolunteer persons,: were given ISD or other drugs is not known as MKUIJI'RA records were de= stroyed in' 1973 on 'the~'orders of Richard, Helms, then director of the CIA. It is known, however, that at Ieast one' ' person, Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employ- - 1 ' . A n . fin treau in which a CIA>ofticer had injected did severe damage to the CIA's reputation approximately 70 micrograms of LSD as part and its ability to function,,::? of an M1